Holding

Section 54 does not exclude a Letters Patent Appeal, so such an appeal is maintainable against the judgment of a Single Judge of the High Court.

Summary

Sharda Devi appealed against the State of Bihar challenging a land acquisition award. The dispute turned on whether a Letters Patent Appeal (LPA) could be filed before a Division Bench of the High Court against the judgment of a Single Judge who had decided an appeal under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Supreme Court examined the language of Section 54, including its non‑obstante clause and the phrase "an appeal shall only lie," and considered whether these provisions barred a LPA. It held that a Letters Patent is a charter, not a statutory enactment, and therefore the non‑obstante clause cannot override the High Court’s appellate jurisdiction under the Letters Patent. The Court further reasoned that the word "only" in Section 54 refers to the forum of appeal, not to the number of appeals, and that the statute does not expressly exclude a LPA. Consequently, the Court declared that a Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable in the present circumstances. The civil appeal was disposed of, and the matter was remitted to a Division Bench for further consideration.

Issues considered

Whether Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 bars a Letters Patent Appeal against a judgment of a Single Judge of the High Court.
Whether the non‑obstante clause in Section 54 can override the charter of the High Court embodied in the Letters Patent.
Whether the term "only" in Section 54 limits the number of appeals to a single appeal in the High Court.
Whether a harmonious construction of Section 54 and the Letters Patent is required to resolve any apparent conflict.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 110
Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 26, s. 54

Subjects

Letters Patent AppealSection 54Land Acquisition ActStatutory interpretationNon‑obstante clauseHigh Court jurisdictionDivision BenchSupreme Court

Judgment

A SHARDA DEVI 1
v. >-
STATE OF BIHAR

MARCH 13, 2002

B [G.B. PATTANAIK, S.N. PHUKAN AND S.N. VARIAVA, JJ.]

Land Acquisition Act, 1894: Section 54-Letters Patent Appeal-
Maintainability of-Before Letters Patent Bench against judgment and decree
ofSingle Judge of High Court passed in appeal preferred under Section 54-
c Held, such letters patent appeal is maintainable-If there is conflict between
Section 54 and provisions of letters patent, provisions should be construed
harmoniously-Interpretation of Statutes.

The question referred to the present three Judge Bench is whether letters
D patent appeal is maintainable before the letters patent Bench against the
judgment and decree of the Single Judge of High Court pasSed in an appeal
preferred under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
~
In appeal before this Court appellant contended that on a plain reading
of Section 54 it is clear that a letters patent appeal would not lie against a
E judgment passed by a Single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under
Section 54.

Respondent contended that a letters patent appeal would lie against a
judgment ofa Single Judge passed in an appeal filed under Section 54 of the
Act.
....
F
Answering the question referred to it, the Court

HELD: 1. A letters patent is the charter u.nder which the High Court is
established. The powers given to a High Court under the letters patent are
akin to the constitutional powers of a High Court. Thus when a letters patent
G grants to the High Court a power of appeal, against a judgment of a Single
-"
Judge, the right to entertain the appeal would not get excluded unless the
concerned statutory enactment excludes an appeal under the letters patent.
[409-B-C)
"'
2. A letter patent is not an enactment. It is the charter of the High Court.
H 404
SHARDA DEVI v. STATE 405

A non-obstante clause in Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 cannot A
cover the charter of the High Court. (409-Fj
.....
3. Section 26 of the Act provides that every award shall be a decree
and the statement of grounds of every award shall be a judgment By virtue
of the letters patent "an appeal" against the judgment of a Single Judge of
the High Court would lie to a Division Bench. Section 54 of the Act does not B
exclude an appeal under the letters patent. The word 'only' occurring
immediately after the non-obstante clause in Section 54 refers to the forum
of appeal. It provides that the appeal will be to the High Court and not any
other Court e.g. the District Court The term "an appeal" does not restrict it
to only one appeal in the High Court. The term "an appeal" would take within
its sweep even a letters patent appeal. The decision of the Division Bench
c
rendered in a letters patent appeal will then be subject to appeal to the
Supreme Court. Read in any other manner there would be a conflict between
Section 54 and the provision of letters patent It is settled law that if there is
a conflict, attempt should be made to harmoniously construe the provisions.
Therefore, under Section 54 of the said Act there is no bar to the D
maintainability ofa letters patent appeal. (410-D-Gj

Basant Kumar v. Union of India., (19961 11 SCC 542, relied on.
Baljit Singh and Ors. etc. v. State of Haryana and Ors., C.A. Nos. 1663-
1968 of 1982, overruled.
E
Asia Industries v. Sarup, (1965( 2 SCR 756, distinguished.

Mahi/ Devi v. Chander Bhan, AIR (1995) Delhi 293; Mohabbat Singh v.
Crown, AIR (1923) Lahore 274; Narayanda' Dago v. Ganaptrao, AIR (1944)
Nagpur 284 and M Srinivas v. Jawaharlal Nehru Technological University,
Hyderabad, (1990) 3 Andhra Law Times 3, referred to. F
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 14198 of
1996.

From the Judgment and Order dated 1.5.96 of the Patna High Court in
LP.A. No. 39 of 1988. G
A. Sharan and Gopal Prasad for the Appellant.
'
... Ashok Mathur, Prem Prakash and Rajesh Pathak B.B. Singh (NP) for
the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by H
406 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 2 S.C.R.

A $.N. V ARIA VA, J. 1. This Appeal is against a Judgment dated 25th
April, 1988.
>. r
2. Briefly stated the facts are as follows: '

The Appellant claims that by a Registered Deed of Settlement dated
24th April, 1954 the land was settled in favour of one Dev Narayan Prasad.
B
On 19th February 1955, by yirtue of Section 3(1) of the Bihar Land Reforms Ii
Act, the land vested in the State of Bihar. The Appellant claims that the State
has been receiving rent from the said Dev Narayan Prasad. On 9th February,
1962 the said Dev Narayan Prasad sold the said !and to the Appellant by a
registered Sale Deed.
c 3. On 18th May, 1979 a notice was issued to the Appellant under
...,.,
Section 3 of the Bihar Land Encroachment Act. The Appellant replied to the
Notice. Whilst these proceedings were pending, on 16th January 1982 a
Notification was issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
(hereinafter called the said Act). This was followed by a Declaration under
D Section 6 on 25th May, 1982. The Appellant filed a claim under Section. 9
of the said Act. Similarly, the Circle Officer, on behalf of the State, filed a
claim under Section 9 of the said Act. An Award came to be passed in favour
of the Appellant on 19th February, 1985. The State filed a Reference under ,../,._

Section 30 of the said Act for determination of the title. The State claimed
that they were entitled to receive compensation. On 6th September, 1986 the
E
Land Acquisition Judge held in favour of the Appellant. The State then filed
an Appeal which was dismissed on 25th April, 1988.

4. The State then filed a Letters Patent Appeal before the Division
Bench. This Letters Patent Appeal was allowed by the impugned Judgment ,,.,;,.._ L
F dated 1st May, 1996. The case has been rem&nded back to the single Judge
I
for decision in the light of the observations made by the Division Bench. r

5. When this matter reached hearing on 31th January, 2002 the following
Order has been passed by this Court:

"One of the questions that arises for consideration in this case is as
G
to whether Letters Patent Appeal was maintainable before the Letters
Patent Bench against the judgment and decree of the learned Single
.J .
Judge of the High Court passed in an appeal preferred under Section ra
54 of the Land Acquisition Act. In Civil Appeal Nos. 1663-1968 of
1982 (Baljit Singh and Ors. etc. v. State of Haryana and Ors.,) a
H Bench of two Judges of this Court held that no Letters Patent Appeal
SHARDA DEVI v. STATE [S.N. VARIAVA,J.] 407

is maintainable against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of A
the High Court whereas in the case of Basant Kumar v. Union of
India, reported in [1996] 11 SCC 542, a Bench of three Judges,
without adverting to the decision in Baljit Singh and Ors. etc. v. State
ofHaryana and Ors. (supra) held that such an appeal is maintainable.

We have heard learned counsel for the parties. B
On a plain reading of Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, we are,
prima facie, of the view that no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable.
However, since no reason has been assigned in the case of Basant
Kumar v. Union of India (supra) for holding that the Letters Patent
Appeal is maintainable against the judgment of a Single Judge of the C
High Court passed in an appeal filed under Section 54 of the Act, we
are of the view that this case requires to be decided by a Bench of
three Hon'ble Judges.

Let this matter be placed before Hon'bfo the Chief Justice oflndia for
appropriate orders." D
Hence the Appeal has been placed before us.

6. In the case of Baljit Singh and Ors. etc. v. State of Haryana and
Ors., two Judges of this Court have held as follows:

"The short question raised is whether the Letters Patent Appeals were E
maintainable under the law. The learned Counsel for the appellants
agreed that such appeals did not lie on the authority of a Judgment
of this Court in Asia Industries v. Sarup, [1965] 2 SCR 756 where
a four Judge bench has clearly held that such an appeal does not lie.
On this authority the Judgment of the Division Bench of the High F
Court has to be vacated and consequently the decision of the learned
Single Judge has got to be restored."

7. The Judgment in Baljit Singh 's case is based on a concession. It is
also based on the judgment in Asia Industries case. The Judgment in Asia
Industries case does not deal with Section 54 of the said Act. In Asia Industries G
case, the question was whether a Letters Patent Appeal would lie against a
decision of the single Judge Bench passed in an Appeal filed under Sections
39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act. Whilst considering this question it was
observed as follows:

"The following legal position emerges from the said discussion : A H
408 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002) 2 S.C.R.

A statute may give· a right of appeal from an order of a tribunal or a
Court to the High Court without any limitation thereon. The appeal
to the High Court will be regulated by the practice and procedure x

obtaining in the High Court. Under the rules made by the High Court
in exercise of the powers conferred on it under s. I 08 of the
Government of India Act, 1915, an appeal under s. 39 of the Act will
B be heard by a single Judge. Any judgment made by the single Judge
in the said appeal will, under cl. 10 of the Letters Patent, be subject
to an appeal to that Court. If the order made by a single Judge is a
judgment and if the appropriate Legislature has, expressly or by
necessary implication, not taken away the right of appeal, the
c conclusion is inevitable that an appeal shall lie from the judgment of
a single Judge under cl. l 0 of the Letters Patent to the High Court.
It follows that, if the Act had not taken away the Letters Patent
appeal, an appeal shall certainly lie from the judgment of the single
Judge to the High Court."

D Thus. the Court holds that a Letters Patent Appeal will lie unless the concerned
statute takes away the right to file Letters Patent Appeal. The Court then
considered Sections 39 and 43 Delhi Rent Control Act and held that a
combined reading of the two Sections showed. that the Order passed by the
High Court, in an appeal under Section 39, was to be final. lt was held that
the provision of finality was intended to exclude any further appeal. This
E decision is thus based on interpretation of Sections 39 and 43 of the Delhi
Rent Control Act. Section 54 of the said Act has no similarity with Sections
39 and 43 of the Delhi Rent Control Act. Asia Industries case does not lay
down that a Letters Patent Appeal would not lie against a judgment passed
in an appeal under Section 54 of the said Act. Thus the case has no relevance
F whilst deciding the question whether a Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable
against a judgment passed in an appeal under Section 54 of the said Act. In
our view the concession made in Baljit Singh's case was wrong.

8. A three Judge Bench of this Court, has in Basant Kumar's case
(supra) held as follows:
G
"The next question is whether the LPA would lie against the judgment
of the learned Single Judge? It is a settled legal position that under
Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, the appeal would lie to the '
High Court; when the appeal on the basis of the pecuniary value was
decided by a Single Judge necessarily, it being the judgment of the
H Single Judge, an appeal would lie to the same Court in the form of
SHARDA DEVI v. STATE [S.N. VARIAVA, J.] 409
LPA to the Division Bench. The Division Bench was not right in A
holding that the LPA would not lie to the High Court against the
judgment of the Single Judge. To that extent, the view of the High
Court is not correct."

9. A Letters Patent is the charter under which the High Court is
established. The powers given to a High Court under the Letters Patent are B
akin to the constitutional powers of a High Court. Thus when.a Letters Patent
grants to the High Court a power of Appeal, against a judgment of a single
Judge, the right to entertain the appeal would not get excluded unless the
concerned statutory enactment excludes an appeal under the Letters Patent.

I 0. The question which thus arises is whether Section 54 of the said C
Act excludes an appeal under the Letters Patent. Section 54 of the said Act
reads as under:

"54. Appeals in proceedings before Court.- Subject to the provisions
of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, applicable to appeals from D
original decrees, and notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any
enactment for the time being in force, an appeal shall only lie in any
proceedings under this Act to the High Court from the award, or from
any part of the award of the Court and from any decree of the High
Court passed on such appeal as aforesaid an appeal shall lie to the
Supreme Court subject to the provisions contained in section 110 of E
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and in Order XLIV thereof."

11. Mr. Sharan submits that Section 54 of the said Act contains a non-
obstante clause. He submits that the words "notwithstanding anything to the
contrary in any enactment for the time being in force" would also include the
provisions contained in a Letters Patent. We are unable to accept this F
submission. A Letter Patent is not an enactment. It is the charter of the High
Court. A non-obstante clause of this nature cannot cover the charter of the
High Court.

12. Mr. Sharan next submits that Section 54 of the said Act uses the G
words "an appeal shall only lie". He submits that the words "an appeal" show
that there can be only one appeal to the High Court. He submits that the use
of the word "only" indicates that the Legislature intended that there should
be only one appeal in the High Court. Mr. Sharan submits that Section 54
also provides that from "such an appeal an appeal shall lie to the Supreme
Court". He submits that this makes it clear that Section 54 provides for only H
410 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 2 S.C.R.

A one Appeal to the High Court and then an appeal to the Supreme Court. He
submits that on a plain reading of Section 54 it is clear that a Letters Patent
Appeal would not lie against a Judgment passe~ by a single Judge of the
High Court in an Appeal under Section 54.

13. On the other hand, Mr. Mathur has submitted that a Letters Patent
B Appeal would lie. He points out that almost all High Courts have taken the
view that a Letters Patent Appeal would lie against a Judgment of a single
Judge passed in an Appeal filed under Section 54 of the said Act. He relies
upon the cases of Mahli Devi v. Chander Bhan reported in AIR (1995) Delhi
293, Mohabbat Singh. v. Crown, reported in AIR (1923) Lahore 274,
C Narayandas Daga v. Ganpatrao reported in AIR (1944) Nagpur 284 and M
Srinivas v. Jawaharlal Nehru Technological University, Hyderabad reported
in (1990) 3 Andhra Law Times 3.

14. In our view, Mr. Mathur is right. Section 26 of the said Act provides
that every award shall be a decree and the statement of grounds of every
D award shall be a judgment. By virtue of the Letters Patent "an appeal" against
the judgment of a single Judge of the High Court would lie to a Division
Bench. Section 54 of the said Act does not exclude an Appeal under the
Letters Patent. The word 'only' occurring immediately after the non-obstante
clause in Section 54 refers to the forum of appeal. In other words it provides
that the appeal will be to the High Court and not any other Court e.g. the
E District Court. The term "an appeal" does not restrict it to only one Appeal
in the High Court. The term "an appeal" would take within its sweep even
a Letters Pat<:nt Appeal. The decision of the Division Bench rendered in a
Letters Patent appeal will then be subject to appeal to the Supreme Court.
Read in any other manner there would be a conflict between Section 54 and
F the provision of a Letters Patent. It is settled law that if there is a conflict,
attempt should be made to harmoniously construe the provisions.

15. We, therefore, hold that under Section 54 of the said Act there is
no bar to the maintainability of a Letters Patent Appeal. We therefore agree
with the view taken in Basant Kumar's case. The reference is answered
G accordingly.

16. The case be now placed before a Division Bench for consideration
of the other aspects.

N.J. Appeal disposed of.