SHEELA BARSEversusUNION OF INDIA & ORS.

                            SHEELA BARSE                                     A
                                 v.

                     UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

                           AUGUST 29, 1988
              .                                                              B
[RANGANATH MISRA AND M.N. YENKATACHAL!AH, JJ.]

      Constitution of IndJa, Art 32'._Public Interest Litigation-With-
drawal of Petition by petitioner-in-person not allowed-No litigant can
be permitted to impose any condition for his participation in the
proceedings-Petitioner may be allowed to withdraw himself from the
proceedings-Information relating to the case gathered by the petitioner
                                                                             c
during pendency of the proceedings-Petitioner not entitled to use such
mformation after withdrawal/deletion of his name from the
case.

       Contempt of Courts Act, 197 I-Sec. 2(c)-Delay in final disposal       D
of public interest litigation-Criticism of-High lighting public accoun-
tability of courts-Whether contempt of court.

        The p_etitioner had filed a Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 1451 of
  1985 in· the Supreme Court praying that the respondents-States be
 directed: (a) to release all children detained in the jails in the res-     E
 pondent-States; (b) to furnish complete information respecting all
 children detained in the States and the circumstances and the legal
 facts of such detention and the number of available juvenile courts and
 children homes; (c) to appoint district judges of the districts to visit
.jails, sub-jails and lock~ups to identify and release children in such
 illegal detention; (d) to requisition immediately necessary buildings and   F
 provide infrastructure and make immediate interim arrangements for
 'places of housing' of children facing trial before juvenile courts. The
 petition also sought directions to the respective States, Legal Aid
 Boards, District Legal Aid Committees through the appointment of
 'duty-counsel' to ensure protection of the rights of the children etc.
                                                                             G
     The said petition was treated as a public interest litigation and in
regard to most of the areas covered by the aforesaid prayers, orders were
made from time to time oy this Court.

         However, being dissatisfied with the progress of the case, the
-
  petitiOner
  ~
             preferred a Misc.
                         .   I
                                PethJon for leave to withdraw the main       H

                                   643
     644         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [1988] Supp. 2 S.C.R.

A    public interest litigation on the grounds: (I) that the Supreme Court has
     become "dysfunctional" in relation to, and in the context of, the gra-
     vity of the violations of the rights of children and the urgenc)'. of the
     requisite remedial steps and that though the proceedings were listed for
     final disposal in the month of November, 1986 however, owing to un-
     justified adjournments obtained by the respondents and owing further,
B    to the functional deficiencies of the procedure of this court the proceed-
     ings have not yet been finally disposed of; (2) that the Court has not
     been able to exact prompt compliance with its own orders and direc-
     tions, issued from time to time, from the respondents; (3) that the
     applicant is disabled from conducting proceedings with "dignity" as
     certain happenings in Court had the effect of casting and tended to cast
     a slur on her integrity and dignity: and (4) that the proceedings were
C    brought as a "voluntary action" and that applicant is entitled to sustain
     her right to be the "petitioner-in-person" in a public interest litigation
     and that the proceedings cannot be proceeded with after delinking her
     from the proceedings.

D          Dismissing the criminal miscellaneous petition,

        HELD: (I) The permission to' withdraw the main petition is
  refused and it is directed that the applicant he deleted from the array of
  parties in this proceeding. The proceedings shall now be proceeded with
  a direction to the Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee to prosecute the
E petition together with the aid and assistance of such persons or agencies
  as the Court may permit or direct from time to time. [667B-C]

           l(ii) The order dated 5.8.1986 and 13.8.1986 forbidding the ap-
     plicant from using the ihformation collected by her during her visits to
     jails and other custodial institutions cannot be modified during the
IF   pendency of the proceedings as the information was gathered for
     purposes of the case and pursuant to the directions of this Court. [6670]

          2(i) The "rights" of those who bring the action on behalf of the
     others must necessarily be subordinate to the ''interests'' of those for
     whose benefit the action is brought. [652C]
G
           2(ii) In a public interest litigation, unlike traditional dispute-
     resolution-mechanism, there is no determination or adjudication of in-
     divid!lal rights. While in the ordinary conventional adjudications the
     party-structure is merely bi-polar and the controversy pertains to the
     determination of the legal-consequences of past events and the remedy
H    is essentially linked to and limited hy the logic of the array of the
                        SHEELA BARSE v. U.0.1.                         645

parties, in a public interest action the proceedings cut across and trans-
                                                                               A
cend these traditional forms and inhibitions. The compulsions for the
judicial innovation of the technique of a public interest action is the
constitutional promise of a social and economic transformation to
usher-in an egalitarian social-order and a welfare-State; Effective solu-
tions bi'the problems peculiar to this transformation are not available in
the traditional-judicial-system. The proceedings in a public interest liti- B
gation are, therefore, intended to vindicate and effectuate the public
interest by prevention of violation of the rights, constitutional or statut- ·
ory, of sizeable segments of the society, which owing to poverty, ignor-
ance, social and economic disadvantages cannot themselves assert-and
quite often not even aware of-those rights. The technique of public
interest litigation serves to provide an effective remedy to enforce these
group-rights and interests. In order that these public causes are c
brought before the courts, the procedural techniques judicially
innovated specially for the public interest action recognises the con-
comitant need to lower the locus-standi-thresholds so as to enable
public-minded citizens or social-action-groups to act as conduits bet·
ween these classes of persons of inherence and the forum for the asser- 0
tion and enforcement of their rights. The dispute is not comparable to
one between private-parties with the result there is no recognition of the
status of a.Dominus-Litis for any individual or group of individuals to
determine the course of destination of the proceedings, except to the
extent recognised and permitted by the court. [65 IE-H; 652A-C]
                                                                              E
      2(iii) What corresponds to the stage of final disposal in an ordi-
nary litigation is only a stage in the proceedings. There is no formal,
declared termination of the proceedings. The lowering of locus-standi·
threshold does not involve the recognition or creation of any vested-
rights on the part of those who initiate tile proceedings, analogus to
Dominus-Litis. [652H; 653A]                                                   F

       3; Unduly harsh and coercive measures against the states and the
authorities might themselves become counter-productive. In the matter
of affirmative-action the willing cooperation of the authorities must, as
far as possible, be explored. If the proceedings are allowed to be
diverted at every stage into puniti~e-proceedings for non-compliance,        G
the main concern and purposes of the proceedings might tend to be
over-shadowed by its incidental ramifications. The coercive action
would, of course, have to be initiated if persuasion fails. [660C-D]

      In the instant case, the Court's orders dated 15.4.86, 12. 7.86,
5.8.86, I3.8.86 and 21.11.86, show that certain important and far-           H
     646         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [1988] Supp. 2 S.C.R.

A reaching actions were Initiated and appropriate directions were is.§ned to
  the States and authorities concerned. The first ground, therefore, does
  not justify the withdrawal of this public interest litigation. If the Court
  acknowledges any such status of aDominus-Litis to a person who brings
  a public interest litigation, it will render the proceedings in public
  interest litigations vulnerable to and susceptible of a new dimension
B which might, in conceivable cases, be us_ed by persons for personal-ends
  resulting in prejudice to the public-weal. [653F-G; 662H; 6b3A-B1

           4(i) The concept of public accountability of the judicial system is,
     indeed, a matter of vital public-concern for debate and evaluation at a
     different plane. But, for that reason courts of law, in their actual day-
     to-day judicial work, cannot allow the incantations and professions of
G:   these principles to enable parties to judicial-adjudications to constitute
     themselves the overseers of the judicial performance and accountability
     in the individual-case in which they are immediately concerned and
     permit temselves comments and criticism of the judicial-work in the
     particular case. [66IF, G-H; 662AJ
ID
           4(ii) While comments and criticisms of judicial-functioning, on
    matters of principle, are healthy aids for introspection and improve-
    ment, the criticism of the functioning of the Court in the course of and
    in relation to a particular proc~eding by the parties to it borders on a
    conduct intended or tending to impair the dignity, authority and the
IE: functional-disposition of the court. It is, therefore, thought important
    to maintain respect and digl)ity of the courts and its officers whose task
    is to uphold and enforce the law because without such respect, public
    faith in the administration of justice would be undermined and the law
    itself would fall into disrespect. l662B-C]

F         4(iii) This is not to deny the broader right to criticise the systemic
     inadequacies in the larger public interest. It is the privileged right of the
     Indian citizen to believe what he considers to be true and to speak-out
     his mind, though not, perhaps, always with the best of testes; and speak
     perhaps, with greater courage then care for exactitude. Judiciary is not
     exempt from such criticism. Judicial institutions are, and should be
G    made, of stronger stuff intended to endure and thrive even in such
     hardy climate. [662F-G]

          In the instant case, there is no justification to the resort to this
     freedom and privilege to criticise the proceedings during their pendency .
     by persons who are parties and participants therein. [662G-H]
H
                         SHEELA BARSE v. U.0.1.                          647

      S(i) Even the humblest citizen or the land, irrespective of his sta-
                                                                                A
tion in life, is entitled to present his case with dignity and is entitled to
be heard with courtesy and sympathy, Courts are meant for, and are
sustained by, the people and no litigant can be allowed to be looked
upon as a supplicant or an importuner. [663C-D]                     ·

      S(ii) The parties who seek justice at the hands of the court are          B
nejther its subordinates or subsidiaries. But the notion of an equal
participation, in its practical applications, presents difficulties and can·
not be stretched to the point where the court could share the responsi-
bility, and the powers that go with it, of regulating the proceedings of
the court with any of the parties before it. In the existing system, the
parties who seek recourse to courts have to submit themselves to the
jurisdiction and discipline of the court. Their conduct, in relation to the C
proceediQgs, is liable to be regulated by the court. This is not a matter
of expression or assertion of any superiority but is merely a necessity
and a functional-imperative. [666B-C]

      In the instant case, keeping in view the facts and circumstances of D
the case, the second ground of withdrawal is wholly insubstantial and
proceeds on what appear to be certain subjective susceptibilities of the
applicant which, to the extent they are irreconcilable with the disci-
pline of the court, cannot be countenanced. [666D]

      6(i) The contention; that applicant is entitled to sustain her right      E
to be the "petitioner-in-person" in a public interest litigation and that
the proceedings cannot be proceeded with after de-linking her from the
proceedings cannot be accepted. Any recognition of any such vested
right in the persons who initiate such proceedings is to introduce a new
and potentially harmful element in the judicial administration of this
form of public law remedy. That apart, what is implicit in the assertion        p
of the applicant is the appropriation to herself of the right and wisdom
to determine the course the proceedings are to or should take and its
pattern. This cannot be recognised. [666E-G]

      6(ii) No litigant can be permitted to stipulate conditions with the
court for the continuance of his or her.participation. [667A]                   G

      7. The initiation of a public interest litigation o_r proceedings for
issue of a writ of Habeas Corpus on the basis of letters reflects and
symbolises the Court's anxiety to relax the rigour of formal pleadings.
However, ;n proceedings which are already initiated and are pending it
would he inappropriate for a party to the proceedings to address letters · H
    648          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                (1988] Supp. 2 S.C.R.

A · directly to the Judges. What is sought to be brought to the notice of the
    Court should, as far as possible, be filed io the Registry for being placed
    before the appropriate bench or submitted in the open court. There
    might be extra-ordinary circumstances when a party is compelled ·to
    resort to the expedience of a letter or a telegram. Even in such a case, it
    would be appropriate to .address them to the Registry to be placed.
B before the appropriate bench. The difficulties arising out of such direct-
    communications are too Obviom to require any elaborate dticUssiou. 1664E-GJ

          ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Criminal Misc. Petition No.
    3128 of 1988.

          IN
c
          Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 1451of1985.                  I


          (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.)

0         Petitioner-in,person.

         P.A. Chaudhary, S.B. Bhasme, V.C. Mahajan, Tapash Ray,
    Swaraj Kausal, Probir Choudhary, K. Ram Kumar, K. Ram Mohan,
    K.R. Nambiar, A.S. Bhasme, C.V.S. Rao, Girish Chandra, Kailash
    Vasdev, J.R. Dass, D.K. Sinha, A.V. Rangam, T.V. Ratna, A. Subba
E   Rao, Ranjan Mukherji, D.N. Mukherfee, R.S. Sodhi, T. Sharma, M.
    Veerappa, A.S. Nambiar, P.K. Manohar, Mrs. ·H. Wahi, Dalveer
    Bhandari, Mahabir Singh, P.R. Ramasesh, A.K. Sanghi, Ms. Kamini
    Jaiswal, D.K. Sinha, J.R. Das, Ms. A. Subhashini, R.B. Misra, S.K.
    Bhattarcharya, Mrs. Urmila Kapoor, and Ms. S. Janani for the
    Respondents.

          The Order of the Court was delivered by

           VENKATACHALIAH, J. This Miscellaneous Petition for leave
    to withdraw the main public interest litigation is filed under circums-
    tances which can only be characterised as somewhat unfortunate. The
G   main petition is brought to highlight the gross violations of the 9on-
    stitutional and statutory rights of a large number of children in the
    country who are suffering custodial restraints in various parts of the
    country and for the protection and enforcement of their rights.

          Jt mignt clear some possible misconceptions if it is clarified what
H   this order is tiot abouL Th~applicant is not, by the force of this order, .
           SHEELA BARSE v. U.0.1. (VENKATACHALIAH, J.]                649

denied the right or the opportunity of instituting any public interest       A
litigation nor is the right of a public-minded citizen to bring an action
for the enforcement of fundamental rights of a disabled segment of the
citizenry disputed. The question agitated relates, on the contrary, to
the aspect whether a public-minded person who brings such an action
is entitled, as of right, to withdraw the proceedings from the court.
Applieantasserts that this Court cannot refuse leave for withdrawal.         B
The proceedings, it is contended, are the result of a "voluntary action
of a citizen" and that, as a corollary, the proceedings cannot be con-
tinued except with applicant's participation. The applicant relies on
what she calls "a citizen's right to be a petitioner-in-person in a public
interest litigation". As stemming from this premise, appl.icant
contends that not only that leave for withdrawal cannot be refused but       C
also that the main petition cannot be continued by any other citizen or
organisation.

       2. No elaborate arguments are, indeed, necessary to decide a
question such as this; but out of deference to the applicant's submis-
sion tlfat the -propositions she propounds in this behalf be considered      D
b:y the court, we proceed to do so.

      3. Applicant, on certain perceptions and assessment of her own,
both as to the effectiveness and utility of the continuance of the pro-
ceedings as well as the manner of their conduct in and by this court,
which according to her, has not been conducive either to their efficacy E
or to her participation iherein with "dignity" seeks leave to withdraw
the main petition itself. Figuratively, this is a 'walk-out' of the court.
The prayer, if granted, would frustrate.the important issues the main
petition has served to high"light.in the matter of the status and enforce-
ment of the laws e.nacted for the ·protection "llnd welfare of the children
in the country. The proceedings espouse the cause of a large number of F
suffering children who, on account of the traditional inertia against
reform, t.he bureaucratic and official apathy, insensitivity to and lack
of human consideration for the lot of the suffering children and the
lack of proper perceptions of the values and idealogy of the legislation
concerning children even on the part of law enforcing agencies, are
being denied the protection of their constitutional and statutory rights. G

      4. It is not necessary to go into all the averments in the present
application. The board reasons on which the applicant has persuaded
herself to make this somewhat extraordinary request are recognisable
in three areas:
                                                                             H
      650         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [1988] Supp. 2 S.C.R.

A        The first is that this court has become "dysfunctional" in relation
   to, and in the context of, the gravity of the violations of the rights of
   children and the urgency of the requisite remedial steps and that
   though the proceedings were listed for final disposal in the month of
  ·November, 1986, however, owing to unjustified adjournments
   obtained by the respondents and owing further, to the functional
B deficiencies of the procedure of this court the proceedings have not yet
   been finally disposed of. It is also averred that the court has not been
   able to exact prompt complainance with its own orders and directions,
   issued from time to time, frem-the respondents.

            The second area is that the applicant is disabled from conductive
      proceedings with "dignity" as certain happenings in court had the
c     effect of casting and tended to cast a slur on her integrity and dignity.

            The third-this pertains to the claim that no body else can go on
      with this litigation-is that the proceedings were initiated as a result of
      the voluntary action on the part of a citizen and that that citizen is
I)    entitled to withdraw them. The applicant claims that she as represen-
      ting "other conscientious citizens, social workers and activists is duty
      bound to sustain the citizen's right to be petitioners-in-person" and
      that, therefore, the petition cannot be continued against the wishes
      and without the participation of the applicant.

        5. The applicant's stand on these points are put across, accord-
  ing to the· learned counsel for respondents, in over assertive tone of
  great severity but of questionable propriety. But we should not allow
  _ourselves to be influenced by this. The applicant's references- to the
  manner of conduct of the proceedings are certainly unflattering-to· the
  Court. But the cgncern of this Court for and its achievements in the
F field of public interest litigation are open to the public-assessment; and
  the assessments even of those immersed in an individual experience
  and where objectivity might, episodically, be clouded should also
  serve some purpose-of introspection. Though the language employed
  in relation to the Court is not conspicuous for its moderation, we may
  yet examine objectively the justifiability, if any, for such strong ex-
G pressions of remonstrance.

            6. In regard to the first area, applicant's grievance' had better be
      set out from her own application:

                       "The petitioner submits that .with such an over-
I-l               whelming confirmation and reconfirmation of the fact of
            SHEELA BARSE v. U.0.1. [VENKATACHALIAH, J.)                651

            imprisonment of children by the State, the GOI, hundreds
            of DJs as also the reaffirmation of Hussainara Khatoon in         A
            one of the orders ih this petition by this Court, were sound
            grounds for delivering final judgment in this case in
            November, 1986."

                  "The then Chief justice of India who was presiding          B
            Judge of the Bench ..... fixed· 9.12.1986 as the date for
            delivering final judgment, and 2.12.1986 for confirming
            that date."

                  "The petitioner states that she obeyed the Court's
            order and arranged the Court's hundreds of files. But the
            CJ absented himself from the Court for 3 days to attend an        c
            International Judges' meet he had initiated and convened."

                  "The petitioner states that on 13.12.1986, an hour
            and ·half after opening of the Court, the then CJ informed
            the petitioner that he would not be in Court that afternoon       D
            hence there can be no final hearing as scheduled. The
            petitioner understands that the CJ had to inaugurate some
            chambers and the date had been fixed in advance."

       The grievance is that the final disposal of the main petition was
not expeditiously done. In a public interest litigation, unlike traditional   E
dispute-resolution-mechanism, there is no determination or adjudica-
tion of individual rights. While in the ordinary conventional adjudica-
tions the party-structure is merely bi-polar and the controversy per-
tains to the determination of the legal-consequences of p~st events and
the remedy is essentially linked to and limited by the logic of the array
of the parties, in a public interest action the proceedings cut across and    F
transcend these tradiiional forms and inhibitions. The compulsions for
the judicial innovation of the technique of a public interest action is
the constitutional promise of a social and economic transformation to
usher-in an egalitarian social-order and a welfare-State. Effective solu-
tions to the problems peculiar to this transformation are not available
in the traditional-judicial-system. The proceedings in a public interest      G
litigation are, therefore, intended to vindicate and effectuate the
public interest by prevention of violation of the rights, constitutional
or statutory, of sizeable segments of the society, which owing to
poverty, ignorance, social and economic disadvantages cannot them-
selves assert-and quite often not even aware of-those rights. The
technique of public interest litigation serves to provide an effective        H
      652         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [1988] Supp. 2 S.C.R.

A     remedy to enforce these group-rights and interests. In order that these
      public-causes are brought before the Courts, the procedural techni-
      ques judicially innovated specially for the of public interest action
      recognises the concomitant need to lower the Locus-standi-thresholds
      so as to enable public-minded citizens or social-action-groups to act as
      conduits between these classes of persons of inherence and the forum
B     for the assertion and enforcement of their rights. The dispute is not
      comparable to one between private-parties with the result there is no
      recognition of the status of a Dominus-Litis for any individual or group
      of individuals to determine the course or destination of the proceed-
      ings, except to the extent recognised and permitted by the Court. The
      "rights" of those who bring the action on behalf of the others must
      necessarily by subordinate to the "interests" of those for whose benefit
c     the action is brought. The grievance in a public interest action, gener-
      ally speaking, is about the content and conduct of governmental-action
      in relation to the constitutional or statutory rights of segments of
      society and in certain circumstances the conduct of governmental-
      policies. Necessarily, both the party structure and the matters in con-
0     troversy are sprawling and amorphous, to be defined and adjusted or
      re-ad justed as the case may be, ad-hoc, according as the exigencies of
      the emerging situations. The proceedings do not partake of pre-
      determined private law litigation models but are exo_geneously
      determined by variations of the theme.

i::          Again, the relief to be granted looks to the future and is, gener-
      ally, corrective rather than compensatory which, sometimes, it also is.
      The pattern of relief need not necessarily be derived logically from the
      rights asserted or found. More importantly, the court is not merely a
      passive, disinterested umpire or onlooker, but has a more dynamic and
      positive role with the responsibility for the organisation of the pro-
F     ceedings, moulding of the relief and-this is important-also supervis-
      ing the implementation thereof. The Court is entitled to, and often
      does seek the assistance of expert-panels, Commissioners, Advisory-
      committees, Amici etc. This wide range of the responsibilities neces-
      sarily implies correspondingly higher measure of control over the
      parties, the subject-matter and the procedure. Indeed as the relief is
G     positive and implies affirmative-action the decision are not "one-shot"
      determinations but have on-going implications. Remedy is both
      imposed, negotiated or quasi-negotiated.

           Therefore, what corresponds to the stage of final disposal in an
      ordinary litigation is only a stage in the proceedings. There is no for-
H     ma!, declared termination of the proceedings. The lowering of locus-
            SHEELA BARSE v. U.0.1. [VENKATACHALIAH, J.]               653

standi-threshold does not involve the recognition or creation of any
                                                                             A
vested~rights on the part of those who initiate the proceedings, analo-
glis to Dominus-Litis.

      7. The theme, implicit in the applicants hyper-articulated grie-
vance, is that this Court has not shown adequate-concern for justice in
this case. Is this justified? The record of the proceedings show that        B
even by November, 1986, directions of far-reaching effect had been
issued and very significant exercises had been initiated. The grievance,
in the ultimate analysis, is really in the area of non-compliance by the
several States and its authorities with the orders and directions issued
by the Court from time to time in the proceedings.

        In order to appreciate the position, perhaps, it would be relevant   c
 to refer to the prayers made in the main petition and the orders passed
from time to time even prior to a month of November, 1986. The
prayer in the m'ain petition was that this Court should pass order direct-
 ing the Respondent-States: (a) to release all children detained in the
'jails in the respondent States; (b) to furnish complete information         D
respecting alJ children detained in the States and the circumstances and
the legal facts of such detention and the number of available juvenile
courts and children homes; (c) to appoint district judges of the districts
to visit jails, sub-jails and lock-ups to identify and release children in
such illegal detention; (d) to requisition immediately necessary build-
ings and provide infrastructure and make immediate interim arrange-          E
ments for "places of housing" of children facing trial before juvenile
courts. The petition also seeks directions to the respective States,
Legal Aid Boards, District Legal Aid Committees through the
appointment of 'duty-counsel' to ensure protection of the rights.of the
chiJdren etc.
                                                                             F
      8. In regard to most of the areas covered by these prayers,
orders were made from time to time by this Court. The Court's orders
dated 15.4.1986, 12.7.1986, 5~8.1986, 13.8.1986, 21.11.1986, show that
certain important and far-reaching actions were initiated and
appropriate directions were issued to the States and authorities con-
cerned. The following are some of the excerpts of the orders made by         G
this Court:

                   "This Writ Petition discloses a disturbing state of af-
            fairs with regard to children below the age of 15 years in
            jail. It is an elementary requirement of any civilised society
            and it has been so provided in various statutes concerning       H
    654   SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [1988] Supp. 2 S.C.R.

          children that children should not be confined in jail
A
          because incarceration in jail has a dehumanising effect and
          it is harmful to the growth and development of children
                 "

          " ...... We would, therefore, direct the District Judges in
B         the country to nominate the Chief Judicial Magistrate or
          any other judicial magistrate to visit the District Jail and
          sub Jail in his District for the purpose of ascertaining how
          many children below the age of 16 years are confined in
          jail, what are the offences in respect of which they are
          charged, how many of them have been in detention-
          Whether in the same jail or previously in any other jail
c         before being brought to the jail in question, whether they
          have been produced before the children's court and if so,
          when and how many times and whether any legal assistance
          is provided to them.

D               Each district Judge will give utmost priority to this
          direction ...... "

          " .... We would also direct the State Legal Aid & Advise
          Board in each State or any other Legal Aid Organisation
          existing in the State concerned, to send two lawyers to each
E         jail within the State once in a week for the purpose of
          providing legal assistance to children below the age of 16
          years who are confined in jails. If there are any other
          persons confined in jails who are there merely because they
          are suffering from some handicap (physical or otherwise)
          they should be released immediately and placed in
F         appropriate home or place where they can receive suitable
          medical assistance or other educational training."

          [Vide order dated 15.4.1986]

          "Meanwhile, there are a few matters which need our
G         urgent directions. It seems that there are a number of
          children who are mentally or physically handicapped and
          there are also children who are abandoned or destitute and
          who have no one of take care of them. They are lodged in
          various jails in different states ..... "

          " .... The State Governments must take care of these men-
SHEELA BARSE v. U.0.I. IVENKATAO!AL!AH, J.]                 655

tally or physically handicapped children ap.d remove them          A
to. a Home where they can be properly looked after and so
far as the·mentally handicapped children. are concerned,
they can be given proper medical treatment and physically
handicapped children may be given not only medical treat,
ment but also vocational training to enable them to earn
their livelihood. Those children who are abandoned or lost         B
and are presently kept in jails must also be removed by the
State Governments to appropriate places where they can
be looked after and rehabilitated .... "

" .... We would also ask the Director Generai, All India
Radio and the Director General, Doordarshan to give
publicity requesting non-governmental social service               c
organisations to offer their services for the purpose of
accepting these children with a view to taking care of them
and providing for their rehabilitation in accordance with a
hand-out to be sent by the Registrar of this Court."
                                                                   D
"There are two girls in the Julp,aiguri District Jail who have
been kept in that jail in "safe custody" One of them is
Parbati Dass, aged 8, who has been det,ained in jail since
12.11.84 and the other is Sabita Sah, aged 10, who has been
detained in jail since 20.8.85 .... "
                                                                   E
" .... We would accordingly direct that Parbati Dass and
Sabita Shah should be transferred immediately to the
Home in Raiketpara as recommended by the District Judge,
Jalpaiguri."

[Vide ord~r dated 12.7.1986]                                       F

"This Court directed the District Judges in the country to
nominate the Chief Judicial Magistrate or any other Judi-              \
cial Magistrate to visit the District Jail and Sub-Jail in their
districts for the purpos~ of ascertaining how many children
below the age of 16 years are confined in jail, what are the       G
offences in respect of which they are charged, how many of
them have been in detention-whether in the same jail or
previously in any other jail-before being brought to the
jail in question, whether they have been produced before
the children's court and, if so, when and how many times
and whether any legal assistance is provided to them. The          H
    656   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [1988] Supp. 2 S.C.R.

          Court also directed that each District Judge will give
A
          utmost priority to this direction and the Superintendent of
          each jail in the district will provide full assistance to the
          District Judge or the Chief Judicial Magistrate or the judi-
          cial magistrate, in this behalf who will be entitled to inspect
          the registers of the jail visited by him as also any other
B         document/documents which he may want to inspect and will
          also interview the children if he finds it necessary to do so
          for the purpose of gathering the correct information in case
          of any doubt. The District Judge, Chief Judicial Magistrate
          or the Judicial Magistrate, as the case may be, will submit
          report to this court within 10 weeks from today .... "
c

          "Six further weeks have passed beyond the time indicated
          in the order dated April 15, 1986, and even till this day
          analysis shows that several District Judges have not comp-
          lied with the direction. This Court had intended that the
          reports of the District Judges would be sent to the Registry
          of this Court through the Registrars of the respective High
          Courts. This obviously meant that the Registrars of the
          High Courts were to ensure compliance. We are both con-
E         cerned and surprised that a direction given by the apex
          Court has not been properly carried out by the District
          Judges who are an effective instrumentality in the hier-
          archy of the judicial system. Failure to submit the reports
          within the time set by the Court has required adjournment .
          of the hearing of the writ petition on more than one occa-
F         sion. We are equally surprised that the High Courts have
          remained aloof and indifferent and have never endea-
          voured to ensure submission of the reports by the District
          Judges within the time indicated in the order of this Court.
          We direct that every defaulting District Judge who has not
          yet submitted his report shall unfailingly comply with the
G         direction and furnish the report by August 31, 1986,
          through his High Court and the Registrar of every High
          Court shall ensure that compliance with the present direc-
          tion is made.''
    SHEELA BARSE v. U.0.1. [VENKATACHALIAH. J.]              657

    " .. , . We are of the view that the petitioner should have
                                                                    A
    access to information and should be permitted to visit jails,
    children's homes, remand homes, observation homes,
    borstal schools and all institutions connected with housing
    of delinquent or destitute children. We would like to point
    out that this is not an adversary litigation and the petitioner
    need not be looked upon as an adversary. She has in fact B
    volunteered to do what the ·state should have done. We
    expect that each State would extend to her every assistance
    she needs during visit as aforesaid. We direct that the
    Union Government-respondent no. 1-shall deposit a
    sum of rupees ten thousand for the time being within two
    weeks in the Registry of this Court which the petitioner can C
    withdraw to meet her expenses.

\          We would like to make it clear that the information
    which the petitioner collects by visiting the children's
    institutions in different States as indicated above is
    intended to be placed before this Court and utilised in this   D
    case and not intended for publication otherwise."

    [Vide order dated 5th August, 1986]

     "If a child is a national asset, it is the duty of the State to
    look after the child with a view to ensuring full develop- E
    ment of its personality. That is why all statutes dealing with
    children provide that a child shall not be kept in jail. Even
    apart from this statutory prescription, it is elementary that
    a jail is hardly a place where a child should be kept. There
    can be no doubt that incarceration in jail would have the
    effect of dwarfing the development of the child, exposing F
    him to beneful influences, coarsening his conscience and
    alienating him from the society. It is a matter of regret that
    despite statutory provisions and frequent exhortations by
    social scientists, there are still a large number of children in
    different jails in the country as is now evident from the
    reports of the survey made by the District Judges pursuant G
    to our order dated 15th April, 1986. Even where children
    are accused of offences, they must not be kpet in jails. It is
    no answer on the part of the State to say that it has not got
    enough number of remand homes or observation homes or
    other places whj:re children can be kept and that is why
    they are lodged in jails. It is also no answer on the part of H
    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [1988] Supp. 2 S.C.R.

    the State to urge that the ward in the jail where the children
A
    are kept is separate from the ward in which the other pri-
    soners are detained. It is the atmosphere of the jail which
    has a highly injurious effect on the mind of the child,
    estranging him from the society and breeding in him aver-
    sion bordering on hatred against a system which keeps him
B   in jail. We would therefore like once again to impress upon
    the State Governments that they must set up necessary
    remand homes and observation homes where children
    accused of an offence can be lodged pending investigation
    and trial. On no account should the children be kept in jail
    and if a State Government has not got sufficient accommo-
    dation in its remand homes or observation homes, the
c   children should be released on bail instead of being sub-
    jected to incarceration in jail."




D
    " .... It is absolutely essential, and this is something which
    we wish to impress upon the State Governments with all
    the earnestness ·at our command, that they must set up
    Juvenile Courts, one in each district, and there must be a
    special cadre of Magistrates who must be suitably trained
    for dealing with cases against children. They may also do
    other criminal work, if the work of the Juvenile Court is
    not sufficient to engage them fully, but they must have
    proper and adequate training for dealing with cases against
    juveniles, because these cases require a different type of
    procedure and qualitatively a different kind of approach."
F
    "We would also direct that where a complaint is filed or
    first information report is lodged against a chiid below the
    age of 16 years for an offence punishable with imprison-
    ment of not more tban 7 years, the investigation shall be
    completed within a period of three months from the date of
G   filing of the complaint or lodging of the First Information
    Report and if the investigation is not completed within this
    time, the case against the child must be treated as closed. If
    within three months, the chargesheet is filed against the
    child in case of an offence punishable with imprisonment of
    not more than 7 years, the case must be tried and disposed
           SHEELA BARSE v. U.0.1. [VENKATACHALIAH, J.]               659

            of Within a further period of 6 months at the outside and       A
            this period should be inclusive of the time taken up in
            committal proceedings, if any ..... "

            " .... We would direct every State Government to give
           .effect to this principle or norm laid down by us in so far as
            any future cases are concerned, but so far as concerns B
            pending cases relating to offences punishable with impri- ·
            sonment of not more than 7 years, we would direct every
            State Government to complete the investigation within a
            period of 3 months from today if the investigation has not
            already .resulted in filillg of chargesheet and if a charge-
            sheet has been filed, the trial shall be completed within a C
            period of 6 months from today and if it is not, the prosecu-
            tion shall be quashed."

            [Vide order dated 13th August, 1986]

            "In regard to Sub-Jails, no reports have been received in       D
            respect of such jails of 14 districts of Maharashtra. Though
            this matter was listed on 14.11.1986 for final disposal, an
            adjournment became imperative in view of the failure of
            compliance with the directions in the manner indicated
            above and the matter is adjourned till 2.12.1986. We direct
            the Registrars of the High Courts of the States in which the    E
            districts indicated above are located to ensure compliance
            with the previous directions by 30.11.1986. We hope and
            trust that special care will be taken to ensure compliance
            and this Court will not be forced to take any stringent
            action."
                                                                            F
            [Vide order dated 21st Nov., 1986]

     9. It is true that with the active and willing co-operation of the
respective States, the progress made in the proceedings would have
been far more substantial. It is also true that several of the States and
the authorities have not, prima facie, realised the seriousness and the     G
magnitude of the problem. Some states pleaded financial constraints in
implementing the directions.

      The detention and mal-treatment of children in violation of the
law is far too serious a matter to be looked at with any complacence,
and unfortunately, a stage has now been reached _where this Court           H
                                                        '
    660         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                I1988] Supp. 2 S.C.R.
    cannot be content with the expectation of compliance with its orders in
A
    these proceedings but would have to go'further and exact it. The States
    have to be more honest about their ·obligations to the delinquent-
    children. Ch.ildren misbehave because, perhaps, the society and the
    elders have,-may be-behaved worse. Society is becoming increas-
    ingly inhospitable to its weak. By ignoring the non-custodial alterna-
B   tives prescribed by law and exposing the delinquent-child to the
    trauma of custodial-cruelty, the state and the society run the serious
    risk of losing the child to the criminal clan. This is no more a matter of
    concession to the child; but its constitutional and statutory right.

           Even so, unduly harsh and c~ercive measures against. the states
    and the authorities might themselves become counter-productive. In
c   the matter of affirmative-action the willing cooperation oi the
    authorities must, as far as possible, be explored. If the proceedings are
    allowed ,to be diverted at every stage into punitive.-proceedings for non
    compliance, the main concern and purpose of the proceedings might
    tend to be over-shadowed by its incidental ramifications. The coercive
D   action would, of course, have to be initiated if persuasion fails. We are
    dealing with a large number of states and authoriti~s. There are 32
    respondents, 429 districts in which reports of the District Judges have
    been called for and nearly 400 of them have submitted their reports.
    There are innumerable jails, sub-jails, remand-homes, custodial-
    institutions etc. This court issued notice to the Home-Secretaries of
E   the States to file their reply by 15-7-1988 finally.

        Jhe applicant has complained that "the non-participation of
  counsel has assumed focal importance to the case" and has also aired a
  grievance about the "Court's overwhelming use of discretionary
  powers to accommodate every one except the petitioner.I•. The point to
F note is that learned counsel for the respondent-States and the appli-
  cant are not in the same position. The former were accountable to the
  Court to report compliance by their respective client-States with the
  directions issued by the Court. Learned counsel appeared to have
  sought extensions of time. Their req_uest might or might not have been
  made with perfect justificatipns. Grant of their request does not
G amount to discriminatory treatment meted out to the applicant who
  was not in any such position representing any party who was required
  to report compliance with the Court's directions. The two are not
  comparable positions. Indeed, in January 1988, the case appears to
  have been adjourned for about six weeks on grounds of ill-health of
  the applicant herself. While we understand the concern of the appli~
H cant in regard to the delays occasioned, we are unable to appreciate
           SHEELA BARSE v. U.0.1. IVENKATACHALIAH, J.]                 661

the unconcealed, cynical scorn the applicant has permitted .to exhibit
                                                                              A
towards the process of this Court. Instead of sustaining and strengthen-
ing the process of this Court in what is clearly a sensitive and difficult
task of some importance and magnitude, the applicant has chosen to
give herself the role of a s~lf-appointed invigilator and has made a
generous use of that position by her barbed quips and trenchant
comments against the court. By this, we think, she has done no service        B
either to herself or to the cause she sought to serve. Scornful
impatience can also wreck a mission.

      The attitudes of the applicant is perhaps conditioned and
influenced by her own perceptions of what she considers to be the real
and larger-issues-apart from the immediate problems of the case-
involved in the proceedings. Applicant says:
                                                                              c
                  " ............ Therefore, it is important to establish
            principles of accountability of the GOI, the.States and the
            Judiciary."
                                                                              D
                  "In the last analysis both the dignity of the Court, the
            honour of the institution of judiciary and the effectiveness
            of judicial process are at stake."               ·

      We are afraid, the references to judicial-accountability, having
regard to the specific-context in which they are made in the context,         E
really mean no more than that the proceedings are to be conducted in
conformity with the standards of promptitude and dispatch of which
the applicant chooses to constitute herself the judge, to sit in judgment
over the alleged short-comings in that behalf. The concept of public
accountability of the judicial system is, indeed, a matter of vital public-
concern for debate and evaluation at a different plane. All social and        F
political institntions are under massive challenges and pressures of
reassessment of their relevance and utility. Judicial institutions are no
exception. The justification for all public institutions are related to and
limited by their social relevance, professional competence and ability
to promote the common-weal. There is no denying that a debate is
necessary and, perhaps, is overdue.                                           G

       Bu!, for that reason courts of law, in their actual day-to-day
judicial work, cannot allow the incantations and professions of these
principles to enable parties to judicial-adjudications to constitute
themselves the overseers of the judicial performance and accountabil-
ity in the individual-case in which they are immediately concerned and        H
    662        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [1988] Supp. 2 S.C.R.

A permit themselves comments and criticism of the judicial-work in the
  particular case. The application and its annexures are replete with
  statements intended to demostrate the inefficacy of the proceedings
  before this Court, disclosing a cynical distrust of its utility and effec-
  tiveness. Indeed, while comments and criticisms of judicial-function-
  ing, on matters of principle, are healthy aids for introspection and
B improvement, the criticism of the functioning of the Court in the
  course of and in relation to a particular proceeding by the parties to it
  borders on a conduct intended or tending to impair the dignity,
  authority and the functional-disposition of the court.

         10. The attitude "we call respect for law" says a leamed author
C "is a complex one". It "may consist for example, in the belief that the
  law is democratic and fair and that it contributes to social progress or
  that it protects individual rights. They may include pride that the law
  of one's country is by and large enlightened and progressive, satisfac-
  tion that one lives under the protection of an adequate legal system,
  respect or even admiration for institutions or persons involved in
D creating or administering the law and for symbols of the law ..... "
  [See "The Authority of Law" by Joseph Raz, 1979Edn. page 2511. It is,
  therefore, thought important to maintain respect and dignity of the
  Courts and its officers whose task is to uphold and enforce the law
  because without such respect public faith in the administration of
  justice would be undermined and the law itself would fall into dis-
E respect. What excites general dissatisfaction with the judicial determi-
  nations of the Court also indisposes the minds of litigants to obey them
  shaking men's allegiance to law. "Laws are not made by Legislatures
  alone, but by the law abiding as well; the Statute ceases to embody a
  law (except in a formal sense) in the degree that it is widely dis-
  regarded."                                              ·
F
         11. This is not to deny the broader right to criticise the systemic
  inadequacies in the larger public interest. It is the privileged right of
  the Indian citizen to believe what he considers to be true and to speak-
  out his mind, though not, perhaps, always with the best of tastes; and
  speak perhaps, with greater courage than care for exactitude.
G Judiciary is not exempt from such criticism. Judicial institutions are,
  and should be made, of stronger stuff intended to endure and thrive
  even in such hardy climate. But we find no justification to the resort to
  this freedom and privilege to criticise the proceedings during their
  pendency by persons who are parties and participants therein.

H         12. The first ground, therefore, does not justify the withdrawal
            SHEELA BARSE v. U.0.1. [VENKATACHALIAH, J.]                663

of this public interest litigation. If we acknowledge any such status of a A
Dominus-Litis to a person who brings a public interest litigation, we
will render the proceedings in public interest litigations vulnerable to
and susceptible of a new dimension which might, in conceivable cases,
 be used by person for personal-ends resulting in prejudice t.o the
 public-weal.      '
                                                                           B
       13. The second ground for withdrawal is no better. The ground
is that the applicant, in view of what transpired in the two immediately
preceding dates of hearing of the case, is unable to prosecute the
proceedings with "dignity" and that, therefore, the applicant is
•entitled to withdraw the proceedings. There is, and can be, no dis-
agreement with the principles that even the humblest citizen of the C
land, irrespective of his station in life, is entitled to present his case
with dignity and is entitled to be heard with courtesy and sympathy.
Courts are meant for, and are sustained by, the people and no litigant
can be allowed to be looked upon as a supplicant or an importuner. It
is, unfortunate that the applicant claims that there was any shortcom-
ing in this behalf in her case. We regret that there should at all have D
 been any occasion for this. Let us see whether there is any real justifi-
cation for this.

       At one of the hearings of the case, the Court had occasion to
 point out to the applicant who was not present in Court at the com-
 mencement of the hearing and who sought to interrupt the submis.sions        E
 of Shri Bhasme, learned Senior Counsel, who was on his legs, that she
 having been absent at the commencement of the proceedings could not
 interrupt the proceedings. It is the practice of courts that when parties-
 in-person or even learned counsel who were not initially present but
 seek to participate in the proceedings, a formal submission is made to
 the court in that behalf. This is nothing more than a matter of courtesy     f
 and decorum. As the applicant straight away sought to interrupt the
 learned counsel who was on his legs, she was told of the impropriety.
'Her re-action to this as set out in the application is this:

                   "The petitioner states that she arrived in Court just
             40 seconds after her case was called."                           G

                 "The petitioner states that Mr. Bhasme Counsel for
            Maharashtra, had just started his argument that as the
            counsel for Maharashtra, he found himself with papers of
            Himachal Pradesh. He said that in the absence of correct
            documents not being available to him, and the Home                H
    664         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [1988) Supp. 2 S.C.R.

A               Secretary, they be allowed an adjournment of 12 weeks."

                      "The petitioner states and submits that she had a
                right to reply to Mr. Bhasme's outlandish argument. The
                petitioner states and submits that she come to the Court as
                a responsible citizen at her personal cost. She is not a paid
B               professional ..... ''

          The question was not of the right of the applicant to make such
    submissions as she considers appropriate but one of the manner of its
    exercise. But the applicant does not seem to appreciate this. Indeed
    she did exercise her right and made a strong criticism of Sri Bhasme's
    submissions.
c
        14. The court also had occasion to point out to the applicant the
  impropriety of addressing communications to Judges by postal letters
  in regard to the pending cases or on matters bearing on them. The
  re-action of the applicant which has been set out in strong assertions is,
D again, that she is entitled to address such communications and in para
  7(b) of her written submissions relies on the position, inter alia, that
  letters to the Courts have been the basis of many public interest litiga-
  tions; that applicant was not a private litigant and got no benefit from
  the letters she wrote, that Judges were themselves inviting the citizens
  to write to the Court etc. What this arg11ment over-looks is that the
E initiation of a public interest litigation or proceedings for issue of a
  writ of Habeas Corpus on the basis of letters reflects and symbolises
  the Court's anxiety to relax the rigour of formal pleadings. However, in
  proceedings which are already initiated and are pending it would be
  inappropriate for a party to the proceedings to address letters directly
  to the Judges. What is sought to be brought to the notice of the Court
F should, as far as possible, be filed in the Registry for being placed
  before the appropriate bench or submitted in the open court. There
    might be extra-ordinary circumstances when a party is compelled to
  resort to the expedience of a letter or a telegram. Even in such a case,·
  it would be appropriate to address them to the Registry to be placed
  before the appropriate bench. The difficulties arising out of such
G direct-communications are too obvious to require any elaborate dis-
  cussion. The opposite parties would not have had the benefit of the
  information contained in the communication. Sometimes, even the
  other Judges on the Bench would not know. The authenticity and even
  the delivery of the communication may be disputed. It is only proper
  that Judges who have to decide the case should not be drawn into such
H controversies. That apart the office would not be able to check the
                    SHEELA\ ilMlSE v. u.6.1. IVENKATACMUAH, n                665

        papers and process them for appropriate judicial Mtice. fodicial iradi-     A
        tion considers·, for good reason, such practice undesirable. Applicant;
        howevet,has, and is entitled to, her own views in the matter. we·regtei
        our inability to accept them.

              Another instance referred to by the applicant as impairing her
        'dignity' arose in the context of the court pointing out to the applicant   B
        the impropriety of her resorting to the press to air her· grievances
        against the proceedings in court and of making what the Court con-
        sidered, a factually inaccurate statement.

              Indeed on the subsequent date of hearing; the Couri had pointed
        out to the applicant of her misunderstanding of what she ~lated.to the
        press and that the "warning" which the applicant thought was                c
        a?.ministered to her and made a public complaint abor, was not
        directed towards her but was attnbuted by her erroneously to herself ..
        This clarification should have been sufficient. But t!Je clarification of
·       the Court, apparently, did not re-assure her. Referring to it she fays:
    '                                                                               D
                          "On 27 .08.88, the Court explained ihat the warnirig
                    "we will put you on the dock, if you utter another word",
                    was addressed to the counsel for Maharashtra while I was
                    warned that I was in contempt of Court for writing a letier
                    to the Court. Well, as I perceived it them both the threats
                    were held out to me because I was on my legs at that time."·    E:

                Frankly, we are unable to unravel the purpose of this ere-
        ·disposition to and determination on het part to misunderstand. We
         shall leave it at that.

             15. Applicant has her own notions of the relationship between the      F
        Court and the parties. She asserts:

                    " ..... While the litigants have entitlements the Court has
                    decision making powers. However, the Court's special
                    powers do not make it more equal, not do they make the
                    Court the fountain-head of justice. The citii:ewpetitioner      G
                    coming to court on behalf of fellow citizens ·whose rights
                    are violated by the State is certainly an equal participant
                    and Mt a subsidiary of the institution.''

                          " ..... Institutions are made by the conduct and' the
                    quality of work and output of the persons who man it. My        H
    666         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [1988] Supp. 2 S.CR.

                application No. 3128/88 records the conduct of persons
A               who man it. This record is not a slur on the institution of
                the judiciary but a critique perhaps, of a dysfunctional
                institution."

    It is true that the parties who seek justice at the hands of the Court are
    neither its subordinates or subsidiaries. But the notion of an equal
    participation, in its practical applications, presents difficulties and can-
    not be stretched to the point where the court could share the responsi-
    bility, and the powers that go with it, of regulating the proceedings of
    the court with any of the parties before it. In the existing system, the
    parties who seek recourse to courts have to submit themselves to the
    jurisdiction and discipline of the Court. Their conduct, in relation to
c   the proceedings, is liable to be regulated by the Court. This is not a
    matter of expression or assertion of any superiority but is merely a
    necessity and a functional-imperative.

          The second ground on which withdrawal is sought is, therefore,
D   wholly insubstantial and proceeds on what appear to be certain subjec-
    tive susceptibilities of the applicant which, to the extent they are
    irreconcilable with the discipline of the Court, cannot be coun-
    tenanced.

          16. The third ground is that the proceedings are brought as a
E   "voluntary action" and that applicant is 'entitled to sustain her right to
    be the "petitioner-in-person" in a public interest litigation and that the
    proceedings cannot be proceeded with after de-linking her from the
    proceedings. This again proceeds on certain fallacies as to the rights of
    a person who brings a public interest litigation. Any recognition of any
    such vested right in the persons who initiate such proceedings is ·to
    introduce a new and potentially harmful element in the judicial
    administration of this form of public law remedy. That apart, what is
    implicit in the assertion of the applicant is the appropriation to herself
    of the right and wisdom to determine the course the proceedings are to
    or should take and its pattern. This cannot be recognised. In the pre-
    sent proceedings the Court has already gone through and has initiated
G   an elaborate exercise as indicated in the orders excerpted earlier. The
    petition cannot be permitted to be abandoned at this stage. Only a
    private litigant can abandon his claims.

         Though the main prayer is one for the withdrawal of the petition,
   in the written submissions, however, the applicant seems to strike a
H. different note and seeks to participate in the proceeding subject to
            SHEELA BARSE v. U.0.1. :VENKATACHALIAH, J.l              667

certain conditions. No litigant can be permitted to stipulate conditions    A
with the_ Court for the continuance of his or her participation.

      There is, thus, no substance in any of the grounds.

      17. Now at the end of the day, the order that commends itself as
appropriate, having regard to all in the circumstances of the case, is to
                                                                            B
refuse permission for the withdrawal of the petition, and to direct that
the applicant be deleted from the array of parties in this proceeding.
The proceedings shall now be proceeded with a direction to the
Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee to prosecute the petition
together with the aid and assistance of such persons or agencies as the
Court may permit or direct from time to time.                               c
      18. The other prayer in the application is for modification of the
order dated 5.8.1986 and 13.8.1986 forbidding the applicant from
using the information collected by h~r during her visits to jails and
other custodial institutions pursuant to the Court's order in 1986. This
permission cannot be granted during the pendency of the proceedings         D
as the information was gathered for purposes of the case and pursuant
to the directions of this Court.

      19. In the result, the Criminal Miscellaneous Petition is dismis-
sed; but the name of the Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee shall be
substituted in place of that of the applicant. There will be no order as    E
to costs.

M.L.A.                                               Petition dismissed.