SHEO RAJ SINGH (DECEASED) THROUGH LRS. & ORS.versusUNION OF INDIA & ANR.

                 [2023] 13 S.C.R. 743 : 2023 INSC 885



                           CASE DETAILS

    SHEO RAJ SINGH (DECEASED) THROUGH LRS. & ORS.
                                    v.
                      UNION OF INDIA & ANR.
                    (Civil Appeal No. 5867 of 2015)
                          OCTOBER 09, 2023
       [BELA M. TRIVEDI AND DIPANKAR DATTA, JJ.]
                            HEADNOTES
     Issue for consideration: Whether the High Court was justified
in condoning the delay in presentation of the appeal; and whether the
department had shown sufficient cause for which the appeal could not be
presented within the prescribed period of limitation.
     Delay/laches – Condonation of – Exercise of discretionary power –
High Court condoned the delay of around 479 days in presentation of
the appeal by the Department from the decision of the Reference Court
whereby it had enhanced compensation payable to the landowners –
Correctness of:
       Held: Substantive rights of private parties and the State are not
defeated at the threshold simply due to technical considerations of delay
– However, condonation of delay being a discretionary power available to
courts, exercise of discretion must necessarily depend upon the sufficiency
of the cause shown and the degree of acceptability of the explanation, the
length of delay being immaterial – There is no formula that caters to all
situations – Sometimes, due to want of sufficient cause being shown or an
acceptable explanation being proffered, delay of the shortest range may
not be condoned whereas, in certain other cases, delay of long periods
can be condoned if the explanation is satisfactory and acceptable – Courts
must distinguish between an ‘explanation’ and an ‘excuse’ – High Court
did not exercise discretion in an arbitrary manner – Order under challenge
had to be a clearly wrong order so as to be liable for interference, which
it is not – High Court’s decision to condone the delay on account of the
                                   743
744          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2023] 13 S.C.R.


department’s inability to present the appeal within time, for the reasons
assigned therein, does not suffer from any error warranting interference
– An exercise of discretion does, at times, call for a liberal and justice-
oriented approach by Courts, where certain leeway could be provided
to the State – Hidden forces that are at work in preventing an appeal
by the State being presented within the prescribed period of limitation
so as not to allow a higher court to pronounce upon the legality and
validity of an order of a lower court and thereby secure unholy gains,
cannot be ignored – Impediments in the working of the grand scheme
of governmental functions have to be removed by taking a pragmatic
view on balancing of the competing interests – Thus, the impugned order
reasonably condoned the delay caused in presenting the appeal before
the High Court. [Para 29, 30, 32, 37, 38]
     Delay/laches – Condonation of – An ‘explanation’ and an
‘excuse’ offered for the delay – Difference between:
      Held: Courts must distinguish between an ‘explanation’ and an
‘excuse’ – Care must be taken to distinguish explanation from excuse
– An ‘explanation’ is designed to give someone all of the facts and lay
out the cause for something – It helps clarify the circumstances of a
particular event and allows the person to point out that something that
has happened is not his fault, if it is really not his fault – An ‘excuse’
is often offered by a person to deny responsibility and consequences
when under attack.

       LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES

      Balwant Singh (Dead) v. Jagdish Singh & Ors. (2010) 8 SCC
685 : [2010] 8 SCR 597; University of Delhi v. Union of India & Ors.
(2020) 13 SCC 745 : [2019] 16 SCR 1259; Collector, Land Acquisition,
Anantnag & Anr. v. Mst. Katiji & Ors. (1987) 2 SCC 107 : [1987] 2 SCR
387; State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO & Ors. (2005) 3 SCC 752 : [2005]
3 SCR 108; Lanka Venkateswarlu (Dead) v. State of Andhra Pradesh &
Ors. (2011) 4 SCC 363 : [2011] 3 SCR 217; Postmaster General & Ors.
v. Living Media India Limited & Anr. (2012) 3 SCC 563 : [2012] 1 SCR
1045; Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur
Nafar Academy & Ors. (2013) 12 SCC 649 : [2013] 9 SCR 782; State of
          SHEO RAJ SINGH (DECEASED) THROUGH LRS.                  745
               & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR.


Manipur & Ors. v. Koting Lamkang (2019) 10 SCC 408 : [2019] 13 SCR
565; G. Ramegowda v. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer (1988) 2 SCC 142
: [1988] 3 SCR 198; State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani (1996) 3 SCC
132 : [1996] 1 SCR 1060; Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition v. K.V.
Ayisumma (1996) 10 SCC 634 : [1996] 3 Suppl. SCR 848; Manjunath
Anandappa v. Tammanasa (2003) 10 SCC 390 : [2003] 2 SCR 1068;
Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha (1980)
2 SCC 593 : [1980] 2 SCR 146; State of M.P. v. Bherulal (2020) 10 SCC
654 : [2020] 8 SCR 912 – referred to.

      OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED
             ORDER AND APPEARANCES

     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5867 of 2015.
     From the Judgment and Order dated 21.12.2011 of the High Court of
Delhi at New Delhi in LAA No.655 of 2010 and CM No.11018 of 2010.
     Appearances:
    Chinmay Pradeep Sharma, Sr. Adv., Ms. Divya Jyoti Singh, Sultan
Chaudhary, Ms. Shobha Gupta, Advs. for the Appellants.
    Sanjib Sen, Sr. Adv., Ms. Malvika Kapila Kalra, Ms. Anjali Singh,
Ms. Radha Gupta, Bhavesh Sharma, Tanwangi Shukla, Advs. for the
Respondents.

      JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT

                            JUDGMENT
     DIPANKAR DATTA, J.
     THE CHALLENGE
     1. This appeal, at the instance of certain affected landowners,
challenges an order dated 21 st December 2011 passed by a learned
Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi (“High Court”, hereafter). By
the order under challenge, the High Court allowed an application filed
by the Union of India (“first respondent”, hereafter) under section 5
of the Limitation Act, 1963 (“Limitation Act”, hereafter) and thereby
condoned the delay of around 479 days in presentation of an appeal
746          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2023] 13 S.C.R.


from the decision of the Reference Court under section 18 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894.
      THE ISSUE
      2. The limited issue that we are tasked to decide is, whether the High
Court was justified in condoning the delay in presentation of the appeal. In
the process, we need to necessarily consider whether the first respondent had
shown sufficient cause for which the appeal could not be presented within
the prescribed period of limitation.
      RELEVANT FACTS GIVING RISE TO THE APPEAL
       3. The appeal has its genesis in a proceeding for acquisition of land.
It is noticed from the materials on record that the Reference Court in LAC
No. 198/08, vide its order dated 31st October 2008, enhanced compensation
payable to the landowners. Such order was sought to be challenged by
the first respondent in an appeal before the High Court on 2nd June 2010,
numbered as LA. App. No. 655/2010. Since the appeal was time barred
(delayed by 479 days), the first respondent applied for condonation of delay.
     4. After considering the pleadings as well as the other materials
on record, the High Court was satisfied that the first respondent, as the
appellant, had shown sufficient cause for which it could not present the
appeal within time; hence, vide the impugned order, it proceeded to allow
C.M. No. 11018/2010. The delay of 479 days in presentation of the appeal
was condoned but not without the High Court imposing costs of Rs. 10,000/-
on the first respondent.
     5. The explanation put forth by the first respondent, which ultimately
found favour with the High Court, reveals the lamentable institutional
inefficiency and the deplorable bureaucratic inertia.
     6. The following events in the aftermath of the order of the Reference
Court need to be briefly mentioned. Counsel who represented the first
respondent before the Reference Court applied for the certified copy of the
Reference Court’s order on 22nd April 2009, despite the same being passed
on 31st October 2008. Thereafter, certified copy was received on 30 th July
2009. On 10th August 2009, the Deputy Legal Advisor (Land and Building)
advised the first respondent to file an appeal before the High Court. The
         SHEO RAJ SINGH (DECEASED) THROUGH LRS.           747
     & ORS. V. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.]


Principal Secretary (Land and Building) then approved the proposal for
filing the appeal on 11th August 2009 (erroneously mentioned as 2010 in
the application for condonation delay before the High Court). The Deputy
Legal Advisor (Land and Building) thereafter sent the certified copy and
the approval of the Principal Secretary to the Deputy Commissioner (East)
on 26th August 2009, which was received on 28th August 2009, whereupon
the case file reached the Land Acquisition Collector on 31st August 2009.
The case file was next forwarded to the counsel for the first respondent for
preparation of the appeal on 17th September 2009, and the same was sent
back to the first respondent on 7th October 2009. The file for payment of the
requisite court fee of Rs. 51,36,592/- was put up before the relevant Deputy
Commissioner on 12th October 2009. Subsequently, the budget for the same
was sanctioned on 15th December 2009. The certified copy of the order of
the Reference Court, in the meanwhile, was misplaced necessitating another
application for the same which was made on 24th October 2009. Pursuant
thereto, certified copy was received on 3rd November 2009; thereafter
the Accounts Department, on 12th January 2010, sent the case file to the
Finance Department for the requisite funds. The Finance Department’s
letter dated 15th March 2010 approving the funds was received by the
Accounts Department on 25th March 2010. The cheque towards court fees
was received sometime in April 2010, after which the same was deposited
with the Treasury on 7th May 2010. The Treasury having deposited the court
fees on 11th May 2010, finally the appeal came to be presented on 2nd June
2010.
     APPELLANT’S CONTENTIONS
      7. Mr. Chinmoy Pradip Sharma, learned senior counsel, contended
that the High Court plainly erred in condoning the delay without sufficient
cause being shown therefor. He pointed out that the reasons cited were not
reasonable by any measure, and that the same were habitual unacceptable
explanations meted out in such land acquisition matters to seek condonation
of delay. Adverting to the order granting the prayer for condonation of delay,
it was next submitted that the High Court, and this Court, on numerous
occasions had refused to condone delays of lesser periods. An attempt was
made to impress upon us that it was not even the case of the first respondent
that the explanation proffered by it in the present matter was more cogent
748            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2023] 13 S.C.R.


than the ones in the other cases before several fora which were not accepted.
He urged that the High Court caused a failure of justice in not appreciating
that inter-departmental correspondence, bereft of an attempt to explain the
delay, did not amount to showing sufficient cause warranting condonation
of the same. The approach of the High Court was criticised as mechanical
and perverse.
      8. Mr. Sharma submitted that the application for condonation of delay
before the High Court simply provided a narration of the ‘chain of matters’
post the order of the Reference Court. In the present case, not only was there
a delay of almost 6 months in applying for a certified copy of the order of the
Reference Court, but also a delay of 10 months thence in filing the appeal
after receipt of approval from the Principal Secretary (Land and Building)
on 11th August 2009. Such an explanation, Mr. Sharma urged, ought not
to be construed as a satisfactorily explained delay as per Balwant Singh
(Dead) v. Jagdish Singh & Ors.1.
      9. Relying on several other decisions of this Court, more particularly
the decision in University of Delhi v. Union of India & Ors2, Mr. Sharma
prayed that the appeal be allowed by setting aside the impugned order and
dismissing the appeal of the first respondent before the High Court as time
barred.
       RESPONDENTS’ CONTENTIONS
      10. Per contra, Mr. Sanjiv Sen, learned senior counsel, urged this Court
not to disturb the findings in the impugned order since the High Court had, in
judicious exercise of discretion, condoned the delay after satisfying itself as
to the sufficiency of the reasons for the delay in presentation of the appeal.
     11. Mr. Sen was heard informing us of the negligent conduct of
counsel for the first respondent before the Reference Court costing him his
empanelment. The delay in applying for the certified copy of the order of
the Reference Court, according to him, was mainly due to unprofessional
conduct of the concerned counsel and so implored Mr. Sen that such conduct
should not have any bearing in the mind of the Court to nip a meritorious


1
      (2010) 8 SCC 685.
2
      (2020) 13 SCC 745.
         SHEO RAJ SINGH (DECEASED) THROUGH LRS.           749
     & ORS. V. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.]


claim of the first respondent in the bud, particularly when stakes are high and
the public exchequer is likely to be unnecessarily drained if the impugned
order were interdicted.
      12. Insofar as the subsequent delay is concerned, Mr. Sen sought to
remind us of the impersonal machinery and bureaucratic methodology of
government departments contributing to such delays. He submitted that it
is unfortunate that such delays often act as impediments in the way of the
State’s collective cause for the community, where the ultimate prey happens
to be public interest.
      13. Mr. Sen put forth the contention that the High Court, in due
exercise of its discretion, had chosen the pragmatic path while noting that
the negligence in pursuing the appeal did not amount to callousness; it was
in this light that the High Court had condoned the delay after imposing
heavy costs on the first respondent.
      14. In the light of the foregoing submissions, Mr. Sen prayed that
the High Court ought to be given the opportunity to decide LA. App. No.
655/2010 on its own merits where the appellant would have the opportunity
to persuade the High Court to dismiss the appeal, if at all. He, thus, prayed
that the present appeal be dismissed.
     THE PRECEDENTS
      15. Learned senior counsel for both the parties invited our attention
to various decisions of this Court, which we propose to consider hereafter.
      16. In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. v. Mst. Katiji
& Ors.3 the relevant high court did not condone the delay of 4 (four) days
in presentation of an appeal by the Collector in a land acquisition matter for
which the order rejecting the application under section 5 of the Limitation
Act was carried in appeal. This Court opined that legislature had conferred
power under section 5 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice
to the parties by disposing of matters on “merits”. It was further held that
the expression “sufficient cause” employed by the legislature is adequately
elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which
sub-serves the ends of justice — that being the life-purpose for the existence


3
    (1987) 2 SCC 107.
750            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2023] 13 S.C.R.


of the institution of courts. Despite the liberal approach being adopted in
such matters, which was termed justifiable, this Court lamented that the
message had not percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy and,
accordingly, emphasis was laid on the Courts adopting a liberal and justice-
oriented approach. The following passage from the decision is reflective of
this Court’s realization that:
       “3. […] And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it
       is realized that:
       ***
       4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted
       against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be
       preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in
       injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.
       ***
       6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of
       its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it
       is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.”
                                                           (bold in original)
      17. State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO & Ors.4 arose out of an appeal
where this Court condoned the State’s delay of 57 days in applying for grant
of leave to appeal before the high court against acquittal of certain accused
persons. This Court observed that in cases where substantial justice and a
technical approach were pitted against each other, a pragmatic approach
should be taken with the former being preferred. Further, this Court noted
that what counted was indeed the sufficiency of the cause of delay, and not
the length, where the shortness of delay would be considered when using
extraordinary discretion to condone the same. This Court also went on to
record that courts should attempt to decide a case on its merits, unless the
same is hopelessly without merit. It was also observed therein that it would
be improper to put the State on the same footing as an individual since it
was an impersonal machinery operating through its officers.


4
      (2005) 3 SCC 752.
         SHEO RAJ SINGH (DECEASED) THROUGH LRS.           751
     & ORS. V. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.]


      18. In Balwant Singh (supra), this Court refused to condone the delay
of 778 days in bringing on record the legal heirs of the petitioner therein
through an application filed under Order XXII Rule 9 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908. It was observed that though sufficient cause should be
construed in a liberal manner, the same could not be equated with doing
injustice to the other party. For sufficient cause to receive liberal treatment,
the same must fall within reasonable time and through proper conduct of
the concerned party. The Court emphasised that for such an application for
condonation to be seen in a positive light, the same should be bona fide,
based on true and plausible explanations, and should reflect the normal
conduct of a common prudent person. Further, the explained delay should
be clearly understood in contradistinction to inordinate unexplained delay
to warrant a condonation.
      19. Lanka Venkateswarlu (Dead) v. State of Andhra Pradesh
& Ors.5 happened to be a case where this Court set aside the impugned
judgment condoning both a delay of 883 days in filing the petition to set
aside the dismissal order by the relevant high court, along with a delay
of 3703 days caused by the respondents in bringing on record the legal
representative of the appellant. This Court observed that whilst the high
court admonished the concerned government pleaders for their negligence
in prosecuting the appeal before it and not providing a sufficient cause for
delay, it nonetheless proceeded to condone the delay despite holding the
same to be unjustifiable.
      20. In Postmaster General & Ors. v. Living Media India Limited
& Anr.6, this Court noted that in cases when there was no gross negligence,
deliberate inaction, or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession ought to be
adopted to render substantial justice but on the facts before the Court, the
appellant could not take advantage of the earlier decisions of this Court.
Further, merely because the State was involved, no different metric for
condonation of delay could be applied to it. Importantly, it noted that the
appellant department had offered no proper and cogent explanation before
this Court for condonation of a huge delay of 427 days apart from simply


5
    (2011) 4 SCC 363.
6
    (2012) 3 SCC 563.
752            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2023] 13 S.C.R.


mentioning various dates. The claim on account of impersonal machinery
and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making file notes, it was held,
not acceptable in view of the modern technologies being used and available.
Also, holding that the law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody,
including the Government, this Court went on to reject the prayer for
condonation.
       21. This Court in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee
of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Ors.7, whilst referring to various
precedents rejected the pleas of lack of knowledge and miscarriage of justice
raised by the respondent/managing committee in challenging an interim
order of a Single Judge of the high court. It then proceeded to set aside the
impugned judgment condoning a delay of 2449 days in challenging the
said interim order based on lack of bona fides. Paragraph 21 of the decision
contains the principles culled out by this Court from the several precedents
that it had considered in the process.
      22. A Bench of three Hon’ble Judges of this Court in State of Manipur
& Ors. v. Koting Lamkang8 was faced with a delay of 312 days by the State
in preferring its first appeal before the high court. This Court, on grounds of
public interest, the impersonal nature of governments, and the ramifications
of individual errors on State interest, condoned the delay in filing the first
appeal on payment of costs of Rs. 50,000/-.
      23. In Delhi University (supra), another Bench of three Hon’ble
Judges of this Court declined to condone the delay of 916 days by the
appellant in challenging an order of a Single Judge of the high court. This
Court, whilst distinguishing Mst. Katiji (supra) on facts, observed that
the consideration to condone could only be made on presentation of a
reasonable explanation, and the same could not be done simply because
the appellant therein was a public body. It then went on to note the conduct
of the appellant in demonstrating delay and laches not only in filing the
appeal, but also the original writ petition before the high court at the first
instance. While refusing to condone the appellant’s delay, it was specifically


7
      (2013) 12 SCC 649.
8
      (2019) 10 SCC 408.
         SHEO RAJ SINGH (DECEASED) THROUGH LRS.           753
     & ORS. V. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.]


noted that condonation of delay at that stage would be prejudicial to public
interest as one of the respondents therein (Delhi Metro Rail Corporation)
had received large amounts of money years ago to carry out development
on the subject land in question.
     24. We may profitably refer hereunder to some other decisions of this
Court for the purpose of the present adjudication.
      25. G. Ramegowda v. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer9, while
summarising the position of law on ‘sufficient cause’, had the occasion to
observe that the contours of the area of discretion of the courts in the matter
of condonation of delays in filing appeals have been set out in a number of
pronouncements of this Court. It was observed to be true that there is no
general principle saving the party from all mistakes of its counsel. Noting
that there is no reason why the opposite side should be exposed to a time-
barred appeal if there was negligence, deliberate or gross inaction or lack of
bona fides on the part of the party or its counsel, it was further observed that
each case will have to be considered on the particularities of its own special
facts. However, this Court reiterated that the expression ‘sufficient cause’
in section 5 must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial
justice and generally delays in preferring appeals are required to be condoned
in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction
or lack of bona fides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of the
delay. This was followed by these words:
     “15. In litigations to which Government is a party there is yet another
     aspect which, perhaps, cannot be ignored. If appeals brought by
     Government are lost for such defaults, no person is individually
     affected; but what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers is public interest.
     The decisions of Government are collective and institutional decisions
     and do not share the characteristics of decisions of private individuals.
     ***
     17. Therefore, in assessing what, in a particular case, constitutes
     ‘sufficient cause’ for purposes of Section 5, it might, perhaps, be
     somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the considerations that go into the


9
    (1988) 2 SCC 142.
754            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2023] 13 S.C.R.


       judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to and characteristic
       of the functioning of the government. Governmental decisions are
       proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a considerable degree
       of procedural red tape in the process of their making. A certain amount
       of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly said that those
       who bear responsibility of Government must have ‘a little play at
       the joints’. Due recognition of these limitations on governmental
       functioning — of course, within reasonable limits — is necessary if the
       judicial approach is not to be rendered unrealistic. It would, perhaps,
       be unfair and unrealistic to put government and private parties on
       the same footing in all respects in such matters. Implicit in the very
       nature of governmental functioning is procedural delay incidental to
       the decision-making process.” […]
     26. Mst. Katiji (supra) was also noticed by a Bench of three Hon’ble
Judges of this Court in State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani10 where we
find the following discussion:
       “11. *** When the State is an applicant, praying for condonation
       of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of impersonal
       machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with
       the note-making, file-pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay
       on the part of the State is less difficult to understand though more
       difficult to approve, but the State represents collective cause of the
       community. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies
       proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files
       from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing
       delay — intentional or otherwise — is a routine. Considerable delay of
       procedural red-tape in the process of their making decision is a common
       feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If
       the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person
       is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is
       public interest. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ should, therefore,
       be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather
       than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every


10
      (1996) 3 SCC 132.
          SHEO RAJ SINGH (DECEASED) THROUGH LRS.           755
      & ORS. V. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.]


      day’s delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of
      the functioning of the governmental conditions would be cognizant
      to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented
      process.” ***
      27. This Court, in Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition v. K.V.
Ayisumma11, had the occasion to observe that it would not be necessary
for the State to provide a day-to-day explanation of delay while seeking
condonation of the same. The relevant observations therein read as follows:
      “It is now settled law that when the delay was occasioned at the behest
      of the Government, it would be very difficult to explain the day-to-day
      delay. The transaction of the business of the Government was being
      done leisurely by officers who had no or evince no personal interest
      at different levels. No one takes personal responsibility in processing
      the matters expeditiously. As a fact at several stages, they take their
      own time to reach a decision. Even in spite of pointing at the delay,
      they do not take expeditious action for ultimate decision in filing the
      appeal. This case is one of such instances. It is true that Section 5 of the
      Limitation Act envisages explanation of the delay to the satisfaction of
      the court and in matters of Limitation Act made no distinction between
      the State and the citizen. Nonetheless adoption of strict standard of
      proof leads to grave miscarriage of public justice. It would result in
      public mischief by skilful management of delay in the process of filing
      the appeal. The approach of the Court should be pragmatic but not
      pedantic. Under those circumstances, the Subordinate Judge has rightly
      adopted correct approach and had condoned the delay without insisting
      upon explaining every day’s delay in filing the review application in
      the light of the law laid down by this Court. The High Court was not
      right in setting aside the order. Delay was rightly condoned.”
      ANALYSIS
      28. We have heard Mr. Sharma and Mr. Sen, appearing on behalf of
the appellants and the respondents respectively, and perused the order under
challenge.


11
     (1996) 10 SCC 634.
756          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2023] 13 S.C.R.


       29. Considering the aforementioned decisions, there cannot be any
quarrel that this Court has stepped in to ensure that substantive rights of
private parties and the State are not defeated at the threshold simply due to
technical considerations of delay. However, these decisions notwithstanding,
we reiterate that condonation of delay being a discretionary power available
to courts, exercise of discretion must necessarily depend upon the sufficiency
of the cause shown and the degree of acceptability of the explanation, the
length of delay being immaterial. Sometimes, due to want of sufficient
cause being shown or an acceptable explanation being proffered, delay of
the shortest range may not be condoned whereas, in certain other cases,
delay of long periods can be condoned if the explanation is satisfactory and
acceptable. Of course, the courts must distinguish between an ‘explanation’
and an ‘excuse’. An ‘explanation’ is designed to give someone all of the
facts and lay out the cause for something. It helps clarify the circumstances
of a particular event and allows the person to point out that something that
has happened is not his fault, if it is really not his fault. Care must however
be taken to distinguish an ‘explanation’ from an ‘excuse’. Although people
tend to see ‘explanation’ and ‘excuse’ as the same thing and struggle to find
out the difference between the two, there is a distinction which, though fine,
is real. An ‘excuse’ is often offered by a person to deny responsibility and
consequences when under attack. It is sort of a defensive action. Calling
something as just an ‘excuse’ would imply that the explanation proffered
is believed not to be true. Thus said, there is no formula that caters to all
situations and, therefore, each case for condonation of delay based on
existence or absence of sufficient cause has to be decided on its own facts. At
this stage, we cannot but lament that it is only excuses, and not explanations,
that are more often accepted for condonation of long delays to safeguard
public interest from those hidden forces whose sole agenda is to ensure
that a meritorious claim does not reach the higher courts for adjudication.
      30. Be that as it may, it is important to bear in mind that we are not
hearing an application for condonation of delay but sitting in appeal over a
discretionary order of the High Court granting the prayer for condonation
of delay. In the case of the former, whether to condone or not would be
the only question whereas in the latter, whether there has been proper
exercise of discretion in favour of grant of the prayer for condonation
would be the question. Law is fairly well-settled that “a court of appeal
          SHEO RAJ SINGH (DECEASED) THROUGH LRS.           757
      & ORS. V. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.]


should not ordinarily interfere with the discretion exercised by the courts
below”. If any authority is required, we can profitably refer to the decision
in Manjunath Anandappa v. Tammanasa12, which in turn relied on the
decision in Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor
Sabha13 where it has been held that “an appellate power interferes not when
the order appealed is not right but only when it is clearly wrong”.
      31. The order under challenge in this appeal is dated 21st December
2011. It was rendered at a point of time when the decisions in Mst. Katiji
(supra), Ramegowda (supra), Chandra Mani (supra), K.V. Ayisumma
(supra) and Lipok AO (supra) were holding the field. It is not that the
said decisions do not hold the field now, having been overruled by any
subsequent decision. Although there have been some decisions in the recent
past [State of M.P. v. Bherulal14 is one such decision apart from University
of Delhi (supra)] which have not accepted governmental lethargy, tardiness
and indolence in presenting appeals within time as sufficient cause for
condonation of delay, yet, the exercise of discretion by the High Court
has to be tested on the anvil of the liberal and justice oriented approach
expounded in the aforesaid decisions which have been referred to above. We
find that the High Court in the present case assigned the following reasons
in support of its order:
      a. The law of limitation was founded on public policy, and that some
         lapse on the part of a litigant, by itself, would not be sufficient to
         deny condonation of delay as the same could cause miscarriage of
         justice.
      b. The expression sufficient cause is elastic enough for courts to do
         substantial justice. Further, when substantial justice and technical
         considerations are pitted against one another, the former would
         prevail.
      c. It is upon the courts to consider the sufficiency of cause shown
         for the delay, and the length of delay is not always decisive while
         exercising discretion in such matters if the delay is properly


12
     (2003) 10 SCC 390.
13
     (1980) 2 SCC 593.
14
     (2020) 10 SCC 654.
758          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2023] 13 S.C.R.


         explained. Further, the merits of a claim were also to be considered
         when deciding such applications for condonation of delay.
      d. Further, a distinction should be drawn between inordinate
         unexplained delay and explained delay, where in the present
         case, the first respondent had sufficiently explained the delay on
         account of negligence on part of the government functionaries
         and the government counsel on record before the Reference
         Court.
      e. The officer responsible for the negligence would be liable to suffer
         and not public interest through the State. The High Court felt
         inclined to take a pragmatic view since the negligence therein did
         not border on callousness.
      32. Given these reasons, we do not consider discretion to have been
exercised by the High Court in an arbitrary manner. The order under
challenge had to be a clearly wrong order so as to be liable for interference,
which it is not.
     33. It is now time to distinguish the two decisions on which Mr. Sharma
heavily relied on.
     34. Balwant Singh (supra) arose out of a landlord-tenant dispute. Our
thought process need not be guided by the law laid down on what would
constitute ‘sufficient cause’ in a dispute between private parties to a case
where the Central Government is a party.
      35. According to Mr. Sharma, University of Delhi (supra) is a decision
by a larger Bench and, therefore, binding on us. This Court, while deciding
University of Delhi (supra), was seized of a situation where even if the
delay were to be condoned, it would cause grave prejudice to the respondent
Delhi Metro Rail Corporation at the instance of the casual approach of
the appellant University. This Court, on the argument of non-availability
of the Vice Chancellor for granting approval to file the appeal, and other
reasons put forth in the matter, could not conclude that there was fulfilment
of sufficient cause for condonation of delay; hence, the refusal to condone
the delay. The decision really turns on the facts before this Court because
of the prejudice factor involved.
         SHEO RAJ SINGH (DECEASED) THROUGH LRS.           759
     & ORS. V. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.]


     36. We can also profitably refer to Koting Lamkang (supra), cited
by Mr. Sen, where the same Bench of three Hon’ble Judges of this Court
which decided University of Delhi (supra) was of the view that the
impersonal nature of the State’s functioning should be given due regard,
while ensuring that individual defaults are not nit-picked at the cost of
collective interest. The relevant paragraphs read as follows:
     “7. But while concluding as above, it was necessary for the Court
     to also be conscious of the bureaucratic delay and the slow pace in
     reaching a government decision and the routine way of deciding
     whether the State should prefer an appeal against a judgment adverse
     to it. Even while observing that the law of limitation would harshly
     affect the party, the Court felt that the delay in the appeal filed by
     the State, should not be condoned.
     8. Regard should be had in similar such circumstances to the
     impersonal nature of the Government’s functioning where individual
     officers may fail to act responsibly. This in turn, would result in
     injustice to the institutional interest of the State. If the appeal filed
     by the State are lost for individual default, those who are at fault,
     will not usually be individually affected.”
                                           (underlining ours, for emphasis)
      37. Having bestowed serious consideration to the rival contentions,
we feel that the High Court’s decision to condone the delay on account
of the first respondent’s inability to present the appeal within time, for
the reasons assigned therein, does not suffer from any error warranting
interference. As the aforementioned judgments have shown, such an
exercise of discretion does, at times, call for a liberal and justice-oriented
approach by the Courts, where certain leeway could be provided to the
State. The hidden forces that are at work in preventing an appeal by the
State being presented within the prescribed period of limitation so as not
to allow a higher court to pronounce upon the legality and validity of an
order of a lower court and thereby secure unholy gains, can hardly be
ignored. Impediments in the working of the grand scheme of governmental
functions have to be removed by taking a pragmatic view on balancing
of the competing interests.
760            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2023] 13 S.C.R.


      CONCLUSION
     38. For the foregoing reasons and the special circumstances obtaining
here that the impugned order reasonably condones the delay caused in
presenting the appeal by the first respondent before the High Court, the
present appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also
stand disposed of.
      39. Parties shall bear their own costs.


Headnotes prepared by:                                        Appeal dismissed.
Nidhi Jain