Holding

Charand land is part of shamilat‑deh and may be vested in and leased by the Gram Panchayat for cultivation as authorized by the Act and Rules; the appeal is dismissed.

Summary

The appellants, residents of Khajuri village in Haryana, filed a writ petition seeking to stop the Gram Panchayat from leasing "charand" (common grazing) land and to have it reserved for grazing. The High Court dismissed the petition, holding that charand land falls within the definition of "shamilat‑deh" under the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulations) Act, 1961 and that the Panchayat may lease it for cultivation under Rule 3(2) of the 1964 Rules. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether charand can be vested in the Panchayat, whether leasing it violates Article 31A of the Constitution, and whether the appellants’ delay and prior acceptance of lease benefits barred their claim. The Court affirmed that charand is included in shamilat‑deh, that the Panchayat is empowered to lease the land for cultivation, and that the petition was not bonafide, noting the 34‑year unexplained delay and estoppel. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed without costs.

Issues considered

Whether "charand" land is included within the definition of "shamilat‑deh" under the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulations) Act, 1961.
Whether the Gram Panchayat may lease charand land for cultivation under Rule 3(2) of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulations) Rules, 1964.
Whether reservation of charand land for the Panchayat's income violates Article 31A of the Constitution.
Whether the appellants’ 34‑year delay and prior acceptance of lease benefits invoke estoppel and render the petition non‑bonafide.

Legislation cited

Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulations) Act, 1961s. 2(g), s. 5

Subjects

Punjab Village Common Lands Actcharandshamilat‑dehGram Panchayatlease of common landArticle 31Aestoppelbonafide actionland vestinggrazing land

Judgment

A SHISH RAM AND ORS.
v.
THE STATE OF HARYANAAND ORS.

MAYS, 2000

B [S. SAGHIR AHMAD AND R.P. SETHI, JJ.]

Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulations) Act, 1961.

Sections 2(g} & 5-Shamilat-deh and charand-Leasing of charand
land by Gram Panchayat Challenged-Held, land could be leased for culti-
c vation-limitation-Vesting of land challenged after 34 years-Held, delay
unexplained-Estoppel-Appellants having taken benefit of lease-hold rights,
challenging the same-Held, action not bonafide-Punjab Village Common
Lands (Regulations) Rules, 1964-Rule 3(2)(vi) & (XXV).

D Words & Phrases-"Shamilat deh" & "Charand"-Meaning of

Appellants filed writ petition for prohibiting Gram Panchayat from
leasing out charand land and to reserve said land for grazing catties. High
Court dismissed writ petition holding that "charand" land is included
within the definition of"Shamilat-deh". Hence this appeal.
E
The appellants contended that reservation of charand land for in-
come of Gram Panchayat violated Article 31A of the C~nstitution and .
breached Section 5 of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulations)
Act, 1961; that the said leasing out/use by Gram Panchayat. contravened
Rule3(2) of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulations) Rules, 1964;
F that there is distinction between charand and shamilat-deh and charand
land could not vest with Gram Panchayat.

The respondents contended that clause (XXV) of Rule 3(2) of the
1964 Rules authorised Gram Panchayat to lease land for cultivation.
G Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD : 1. The land vesting in the Gram Panchayat can be used for
any one or more of the purposes specified in Sub-Rule (2) of Rule 3 of the
Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulations) Rules, leasing out for culti·
H vation being one of the purposes. [1125-C]
1122
SHISH RAM v. STATE 1123
Saligram & Ors. v. Maksudan Singh & Ors., (1965.). Current Law A
....
• )l
Journal 711; Klzushi Puri v. State of Ha1yana, (1978) Punjab Law Journal
78 and Bishambar Dayal v. State of Haryana & Ors., (1986) Punjab Law
Journal 208, approved.

2. The definition of Shamilat deb under the Punjab Village Common
Lands (Regulations) Act, 1961 provides that it shall include "lands de-
B
scribed in the revenue record as shamilat deb or (charand-in Haryana)
excluding abadi deb". Therefore, there does not exist any distinction be-
tween the charand and shamilat deb and the charand could vest with the
Gram Panchayat under the Act. (1126-H]
c
Khushi Puri v. State of Hmyana, (1978) Punjab Law Journal 78,
approved.

3. Despite this Court's insistence, the appellants could not refer to
any averments in the writ petition filed in the High Court regarding the
alleged violation of Article 31-A of the Constitution. (1127-B] D

Bhagat Ram & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors., (1967] 2 SCR 165,
distinguished.

)'
4. The present petition though filed in a representative capacity, yet
was not a bonafide action inasmuch as the appellants and their relations E
ha"ing accepted the position of law and earliel' at times taking the benefit
of lease-hold rights could not have recourse to the legal proceedings after
having failed to get lease in favour or in favour of their relations. (1127-C]

5. After the vesting of the land in the Gram Panchayat, none of the F
inhabitants of the village raised any objections regarding its vesting for a
period of about 34 years. The delay in approaching the court also re-
mained unexplained. (1124-G; 1127-D]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1941of1997.
G
From the Judgment and Order dated 7.10.96 of the Punjab & Haryana
High Court in W.P.(C) No. i7681 of 1995.

B.S. Malik and Shiv Sagar Tiwari for the Appellants.

Neeraj K. Jain, Ms. Sonal Jain, Aditya K. Choudhary, U.S. Prasad and H
1124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] 3 S.C.R.
A Mahabir Singh for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court delivered by :

SETHI, ,J. Holding that the land described as "charand" is included
within the definition of."Sharnilat-deh" as defined under Section 2(g) of the
B Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulations) Act, 1961 (hereinafter refened
to as "the Act") and relying upon its earlier Division Bench judgment in the
C(lSe of Khushi Puri v. State of Hatyana, (1978) Punjab Law Journal 78, the
High Court dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellants praying for
issuance of directions prohibiting the Gram Panchayat from leasing. out the
charand land and to keep land measuring 541 kanal and 2 marlas reserved
c as charand for grazing up catties. The High Comt also did not consider it
proper to grant the prayer of the appellants seeking declaration that the land
reserved for charand during consolidation could not be used for the income
of the Gram Panchayat as it stood allegedly deducted from the lands of the
proprietors. Not satisfied with the judgment of the Division Bench of the High
D Court, the appellants have filed the present appeal with the submission that
the reservation of charand land for the income of Gram Panchayat violated
Article 3 lA of the Constitution of India as was the ratio of this Court in
Bhagat Ram & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors., [1967] 2 SCR 165. It is further
submitted that without paying any compensation at the market value to the
E proprietors of the village, the land could not vest in the Gram Panchayat. The
reservation of Charand land for the income of Gram Panchayat allegedly in
breach of Section 5 of the Act is stated to be illegal. The leasing out has been
alleged to be in contravention of the grazing rights of the proprietors and non-
...
proprietors of the village.

F There is no dcubt that the appellants are the inhabitants of village
Khajuri, Tehsil Jagadari, District Yamuna Nagar, Haryana. It is also not
disputed that the land; the subject matter of the litigation being shamilat-deh
is vested in the Gram Panchayat. It has also to be noticed that after the vesting
of the land in the Gram Panchayat, none of the inhabitants of the village
raised any objections regarding its vesting for a period of about 34 years. It
G
is also on record that some land out of sharnilat deh land was being leased
out to the proprietors of the village since the year 1976 and none of the
inhabitants raised any objection. From the counter affidavit filed on behalf
of the respondents it appears that many of the family members of the
appellants, particularly, the brother of the appellant No.1 had themselves been
H taking the land in dispute on lease without raising any objection.
-,
SHISH RAM v. STATE [SETHI, J.) 1125
Leamed counsel appearing for the appellants relying upon a Full Bench A
judgment of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Bishamber Dayal v. State
of Haryana & Ors., (1986) Punjab Law Joumal 208, submitted that the Gram
Panchayat was not entitled to lease the land or use it in the manner it like
without following the·procedure and subject to the restrictions placed on its
use by the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulations) Rules, 1964 (here- B
inafter refelTed to as "the Rules"). Refe1ring to Rule 3(2), the .learned counsel
submitted that the Gram Panchayat could use the land in shamilat-deh vested
in it under the Act either itself or through another for anyone or more of the
purposes specified therein. One of the purposes refelTed to in clause (vi) is
'grazing of animals'. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents drew our
attention to clause (xxv) of Sub-mle (2) of Rule 3 which auth01ised the Gram c
Panchayat to use the land for the purposes of leasing out for cultivation. He
also drew our attention to the Division Bench judgment of the High Court
in Khushi Puri's case (supra) wherein it was held:

· "It is provided by mle 3(2) of the Punjab Village Common Lands D
(Regulation) Rules, 1964, that the panchayat could make use of the
land in shamilat deb vested in it either itself or through another for
the purposes related to forestry. It cannot, therefore, be gainsaid that
the plantation of trees was such a purpose for which the land could
not be utilised by the panchayat. Whatever rights the panchayat had
for the iilanagement of the land devolved upon the Administrator and E
there is, therefore, no basis for this contention made by the learned
counsel fot the petitioners that the Administrator acted beyond his
powers."

In Salig Ram & Ors. v. Maksudan Singh & Ors., (1965) Current Law F
Journal 711, the High Court had earlier held:

" ... that the panchayat has a tight to use the shamilat deh vested in it
under the 1954 Act either itself or through another person in any of ·
the manners set out in that rule. Similar mies are stated to have been
framed under the Act. This shows that except to the extent to which G
the statutory rules indicate, there is no fetter on the power of the
panchayat to use the sharnilat deb which vests in it under the Act for
any of the specified purposes it likes and it is not necessmy that what
was grazing land out of the shamilat deh previous to such vesting,
must continue to be such." H
1126 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000) 3 S.C.R.
A In Bislzamber Dayal's case (supra) the Full Bench of tl1e Court had
'.'I.. -
considered and approved tl1e view taken by the Division Bench in Khushi
Puri's case. In that regard the Court had held:

"The Act and tl1e Rules empower tl1e Gram Panchayat to convert a
portion of tlie street for any one or more of tlie purposes given in Rule
B 3(2). A- Division Bench of tliis Court had an occasion to constme tlie
provisions of Sections 2(g)(4), 4 and 5 of tlie Act and Rule 3(2) of
tlie Rules made tliereunder in Khushi Puri's case (supra). It was held
that tlie Gram Panchayat could make use of tlie shamilat deh land
vested in it either itself or through another for tlie purposes mentioned
c in Rule 3(2). In that case a part of Charand land which was used for
grazing cattle had been entmsted to the Forest Department to plant
trees, which were to be tlie property of tlie Gram Panchayat. This
action of the Gram Panchayat had been upheld by theDivision Bench.
Shri Bansal, learned counsel for the petitioner has raised no conten-
tion before us that Khuslzi Puri's case (supra) does not lay down t11e
D
colTect law or tl1at tlie ratio thereof needs reconsideration by a larger
Bench. We are in respectful agreement witl1 tl1e ratio of Khushi Puri's
case (supra)."

We do not agree witli tlie submission of the leamed counsel for the
E appellants that in Bishamber Dayal's case the Full Bench of tl1e High Comt
had taken a different view tlian tlie one which was taken in Khushi Puri's
c~se. The High Court appears to have consistently held that the land vesting
in tlie Gram Panchayat can be used for any one or more of the purposes
specified in Sub-Rule (2) of Rule 3, leasing out for cultivation being one of
F tlie purposes. We find no reason to disagree with tlie High Court and in fact
approve the position of law settled by it in Khushi Puri's case which was
upheld by the Full Bench in Bishamber Dayal's case.

Learned counsel for fue appellants fuen tried to make a distinction
...
between the charand land and the shamilat deh. In support of his contentions
G he referred to Annexures I and II wherein tl1e land, tlie subject matter of the
dispute has been defined to be chara~d land. The defmition of shamilat deh
proivdes that it shall include "lands described in tl1e revenue record as
sharnilat deh or (charand-in Haryana) excluding abadi deh". Relying upon the
Khushi Puri's case the High Comt in the impugned judgment was, therefore,
H right in holding that tliere did not exist any distinction between tlie charand
SIDSH RAM v. STATE [SETHI, J.] 1127
and shamilat deb and the contention of the appellants that the charand could A
not vest with the Gram Panchayat under the Act was based upon wrong
assumptions.

Reliance placed by the learned counsel for the appellants upon the
judgment in Bhagat Ram's case is misplaced besides being without any basis.
Despite our insistence, the learned counsel for the appellants could not refer B
to any averments in the writ petition filed in the High Court regarding the
alleged violation of Article 3 lA of the Constitution.

We are also of the opinion that the present petition though filed in a
representative capacity, yet was not a bonafide action inasmuch as the
appellants and their relations having accepted the position of law and earlier
c
at times taking the benefit of lease-hold rights could not have recourse to the
legal proceedings after having failed to get the lease in their favour or in
favour of their relations. The delay in approaching the court also remained
unexplained.
D
There is no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed but
without any order as to costs.

A.K.T. Appeal dismissed.