SHIV CHANDER KAPOORversusAMAR BOSE

                     SHIV CHANDER KAPOOR
                                                                              A
                                    v.
                             AMAR BOSE

                         NOVEMBER 28, 1989

         [M.N. VENKATACHALIAH, N.D. OJHA AND                                  B
                    J.S. VERMA, JJ.]

      Delhi Rent Control Act 1958--Section 21-Contro/Ier-Permis-
sion to create. tenancy-Grant of-Duty of tenant to raise plea of
invalidity-Enquiry by controller-Scope of.

       This is a land-lord's appeal. By an agreement in writing between the   c
parties, the second floor of the premises bearing no. 19/10, Rajinder
Nagar, New Delhi was let out to the Respondent for a limited period of
three years w.e.f. June 8, 1980, with the permission of the Rent Con-
troller obtained under section 21 of the Act. The Respondent-tenat
having failed to deliver vacant possession of the premises in question,       D
after the expiry of the stipulated period, the appellant moved an appli-
catio'1 before the Rent Controller for execution of his order by delivery
of possession of the premises to him. The Respondent-tenant filed an
objection to the said application to which the appellant replied duly.

      The Rent Controller rejected the appellant's application taking         E
the view that the permission granted under section 21 of the Act was
invalid and thus the tenant could not be. evicted on the expiry of 3 years.
The Rent Controller thereby upheld the tenant's objection that the
landlord's son being aged only 19 or 20 years, on the date of the expiry
of the period of limited tenancy while the minimum age prescribed by
law for marriage being 21 years the ground that the premises were             F
needed for the son's marriage was not tenable. The Rent Controller
accordingly held that creation of limited tenancy amounted to fraud
and misrepresantation by the landlord which rendered the permission
invalid. The appellant's appeal to the Tribunal as also to the High
Court having failed, he has flied this appeal after obtaining Special
Leave. The Tribunal and the High Court affirmed the view of the Rent          G
Controller treating the grant of permission by the Controller to be
mechanical and without application of mind.

      Allowing the appeal, this Court,

      HELD: The object of enquiring into the validity of the Control-         H

                                    299
    300          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [1989] Supp. 2 S.C.R.

  ler's permission under section 21 is only to ensure that essentials of a ·
A limited tenancy existed and the same was genuine; and it is not meant to
  permit raising of frivolous pleas which would frustrate the very object
  of its enactment. This view protects the honest tenants and only curbs
  the frivolous and vexatious pleas. [3108; 31IA]

B          Controller's permission when granted to create a limited tenancy
    under sec. 21 of the Act is presumed to be valid unless declsred
    otherwise. It is, therefore, for the person assailing its validity to get
    such a declaration from a proper forum in a proper proceedings.
    Unless this is done, the order remains enforceable. The duty is
    clearly on the tenant himself to raise the pleas of invalidity and
    uitless the order is declared invalid at his instance, its enforceability
C   cannot be doubted. [311B-C]

         All that has to be seen is whether the period oflimited tenancy was
    indicated by the landlord with reference to a foreseeable future event
    and the estimate of time of its occurrence was not unreasonable. [312B]
D
         When the period of limited tenancy is stated on the basis of a
   future event the happening of which is reasonably certain at that time
   though the precise date of the future event cannot be predicted with
   precision, the landlord's estimate of the period after which the event is
  ,expected to happen, unless unreasonable must be accepted for this
E 'purpose as genuine. This would satisfy the test of a genuine limited
   tenancy if there be no other factor indicating it to be a mere pretence
   adopted by the landlord. (312C-D]

          The enquiry contemplated under section 21 in this behalf is not
    the same as that for detemlining existence of ground of bona fide need of
p   the landlord for an order of eviction under section 14 of the Act, and
    section 14 is expressly superseded by section 21. The scope of enquiry is.
    limited only to the existence of the jurisdictional facts at the time of grant
    of the permission when its validity is challenged subsequently. (312F]

          The absence of existence of any jurisdictional fact not having been
0 proved by the respondent-tenant even after objecting to recovery of
    possession on expiry of the period of limited tenancy, there was no
    ground to refuse restoration of possession to the landlord. (313C]

       S.B. Naronah v. Prem Kumari Khanna, [1980] l SCR 281; V.S.
  Rahi & Anr. v. Smt. Ram Chambeli, [1984] 2 SCR 290; Smt.
H Dhanwanti v. D.D. Gupta, [1986] 3 'sec l; Inder Mohan Lal v.
               S.C. KAPOOR v. AMAR BOSE [VERMA, J.]                    301

Ramesh Khanna, [1987] 4 SCC I; S.K. Lata v. R.C. Chhiba & Anr.,                A
[1988) 4 SCC 709 and J.R. Vohra v. India Export House (P) Ltd. &
Anr., [1985) 2 SCR 899, referred to.

      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4779
of 1989.
                                                                               B
     From the Judgment and Order dated 3.8.1987 of the Delhi High
Court in S.A.0. No. 393 of 1986.

    Ashok Sen, Ms. S. Janani and Mrs. Urmila Kapoor for the
Appellant.

      G .C. Lalwani and P .N. Misra for the Respondent.
                                                                               c
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

      VERMA, J. Leave granted.
                                                                               D
      The landlord Shri Shiv Chander Kapoor has preferred this
appeal by special leave against the judgment dated August 3, 1987
passed by the Delhi High Court in S.A.O. No. 393 of 1986 whereby
the High Court dismissed the landlord's appeal against the Order
dated October 14, 1986 of the Rent Control Tribunal affirming in
appeal the order dated August 9, 1985 of the Rent Controller dismissing        E
the landlord's application dated October 12, 1983 for restoration of
possession of the premises let out for residence to the tenant Amar
Bose for the limited period of three years w.e.f. June 8, 1980 under
section 21 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred as
the 'Act'). The true scope of the enquiry contemplated when the
tenant assails validity of the Rent Controller's permission granted            F
under section 21 of the Act for creation of a tehancy for limited period
arises for determination in the present case.

      The premises is the second floor of the building bearing No.
19/l'l, Old Rajinder Nagar, New Delhi comprising of two rooms, a
kitchen, bathroom and lavatory let out for residence on a monthly rent         G
of Rs.800 apart from electricity and water charges. The landlord of-
fered to let out the premises for three years only w .e .f. June 8, 1980 for
the reason that it would be needed by his family thereafter when his
son got married, to which the tenant consented. Accordingly, by an
agreement in writing between the parties the premises was so let out
for the limited period of three years w .e.f June 8, 1980 with the             H
                                                                               \
    302         SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [1989] Supp. 2 S.C.R.

A permission ot the Rent Controller obtained under section 21 of the
  Act. The order of the Rent Controller is as under:

               "In view of the statements of the parties made above, I am
               satisfied that there is no collusion or fraud. I am also
               satisfied that the petitioner does not require the suit pre-
B              mises for a limited period of three years. Permission, there-
               fore, is hereby granted to the petitioner Sh. Shiv Chander
               Kapoor to let out his premises No. 19/10; situated at Old
               Rajinder Nagar, New Delhi, the details of which are given
               in the site plan Ext. AI to the respondent for residential
               purpose for a limited period of three years with effect from
               8.6.1980".
c
        On failure of the tenant Amar Bose to restore possession of the
  premises to the landlord on expiry of the period of limited tenancy, an
  application dated October 12, 1983 was filed by the landlord before
  the Rent Controller praying for execution of the aforesaid order by
D delivery of vacant possession of the premises to the landlord. The
  tenant filed his objection to the execution application which was
  replied by the landlord. The Rent Controller by order dated August 9,
  1985 rejected the landlord's application taking the view that the
  permission granted under section 21 of the Act was invalid so that the
  tenant could not be evicted on expiry of the period of three years. The
E landlord's further appeal to the Rent Control Tribunal and then to the
  Delhi High Court failed. Hence this further appeal.

        The Rent Controller upheld the tenant's objection that the land-
  lord's son being aged only about 19 or 20 years on the date of expiry of
  the period of limited tenancy while the minimum age prescribed by law
F for marriage being 21 years the ground that the premises would be
  needed on the son's marriage after three years was untenable. On this
  basis it was held that creation of tenancy for the limited period of three
  years amounted to fraud and misrepresentation by the landlord
  rendering invalid the permission granted under section 21 of the Act.
  This view has been upheld by the Rent Control Tribunal and then the
G Delhi High Court, treating the grant of permission by Controller to be
  mechanical and without application of mind. The tenant also con-
  tended that the landlord was in possession of the remaining building
  which comprises of sufficient accommodation to meet the bona fide
  need of the landlord's family; and that the premises were constructed
  in 1972 and the second floor of the building was never occupied by the
H landlord being let out to other tenants from time to time. In substance
               S.C. KAPOOR v. AMAR BOSE {VERMA, J.I                  303

the grounds taken by the ·tenant were two, namely (1) the landlord's
son was below the prescribed minimum age for marriage of 21 years on        A
the date of the expiry of the period of three years of the limited
tenancy which showed that the reason given was false, and (2) absence
of bona fide need of the landlord for occupying the premises, namely,
the second floor of the building. The High Court's order is based only
on the first ground.                                                        B

      .The scope of enquiry contemplated under section 21 of the Act
when the tenant assails validity of the Controller's permission to create
a limited tenancy thereunder was·seriously debated at the hearing of
this appeal. On behalf of the appellartt/landlord it was urged that the
scope is limited to examining only the existence of jurisdictional facts
which permit grant of permission to creat a tenancy for limited period      c
and no more. On this basis, learned counsel for the appellant
contended that the above first ground alone was within the scope of
enquiry which too has been wrongly decided by the High Court on a
misconstruction of Section 21. On the other hand it was contended on
behalf of the respondent-tenant that the enquiry) extends also to           D
examining the other ground viz. existence of landlord's bona fide need
to occupy the premises on expiry of the period of limited tenancy. The
same earlier decisions of this Court on the point were relied on by both
sides with equal vehemence in support of the rival contentions.

      Section 21 is as under:                                               E

           "Recovery of possession in case of tenancies for limited
           period.-(!) W_here a landlord does not require the whole
           or any part of any premises for a particular period, and the
           landlord, after obtaining the permission of the Controller
           irt the prescribed mannner, lets the whole of the premises       F
           or part thereof as a residence for such period as may be
           agreed to in writing between the landlord and the tenant
           and the tenant does not, on the expiry of the said period,
           vacate such premises, then, notwithstanding anything con-
           tained in Section 14 or in any other law, the Controller
           may, on an application made to him in this behalf by the         G
           landlord within such time as may be prescribed, place the
           landlord in vacant possession of the premises or part
           thereof by evicting the tenant and every other person who
           may be in occupation of such premises.

            (2) While making an order under sub-section (1), the Con-       H
        304         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [1989] Supp. 2 S.C.R.

                    !roller may award to the landlord such damages for the use
    A
                    or occupation of the premises at such rates as he considers
                    proper in the circumstances of the case for the period from
                    the date of such order till the date of actual vacation by the
                    tenant".

    B        Chapter Ill of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 comprising of
      Sections 14 to 25 contains provisions relating to control of eviction of
•     tenants. The object of enacting the Rent Control Laws is well-known
      and it does not need an elaborate enunciation. Suffice it to say that in
      view of acute shortage of housing accommodation, more particularly
      in the bigger cities, these laws have been enacted to regulate the letting
      of the available premises and an attempt has been made to reconcile the
    C conflicting interests of landlords and the need for the protection of
      tenants. Section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act gives protection to
      the tenants against eviction and specifies the. grounds on which alone
      the landlord can obtain an order of the competent authority to recover
      possession of any premises let out to a tenant. Apparently, it was
    O realised that some premises may be available for being let only for a
      limited period where the landlord did not require the same during that
      period alone provided the landlord was assured of restoration of pos-
      session on expiry of the limited period. However, while enacting a
      provision permitting the creation of a tenancy for limited period to
      utilise such premises and alleviate to some extent the suffering of
    E persons needing residential accommodation, it was necessary also co
      ensure that the provision was not misused by capricious landlords to
      circumvent Section 14 of the Act. It was to achieve this dual purpose
      that Section 21 was enacted in the Delhi Act to encourage landlords
      who did not need any premises for a limited period only, to let it out for
      such period with the assurance of restoration of possession at the end
    F of that period without being required to satisfy Section 14 of the Act.
      The provision also contains an internal check upon an unscrupulous
       landlord by requiring the Rent Controller's permission to be granted
      in the given circumstances only.

            The conditions on which permission can be granted by the Rent
    G Controller under Section 21 are specified in Section 21 itself. A fortiori
      when the question arises about the validity of the Rent Controller's
      permission it can be tested only with reference to the specified condi-
      tions subject to which alone permission can be granted by the Control-
      ler. No outside factor can be imported either for grant of the permis-
      sion thereunder or for adjudicating its validity at a subsequent stage.
    H Section 21 being in the nature of an exception to the ordinary mode of
                S.C. KAPOOR v. AMAR BOSE [VERMA, J.]                   305

eviction of tenants prescribed under .section 14 of the Act, it must be
strictly construed and the scope thereof limited to its contents. Section     A
2 1 of the Act is by itself the complete provision relating to the creation
of a tenancy for limited period and recovery of possession on expiry of
that period. Thus, Section 21 is a self-contained code in this behalf.

      Section 21 permits the creation of a tenancy for limited period      B
"Where the landlord does not require the whole or any part of pre-
mises for a particular period"; and it is to be let for 'residence'. These
words of the provision specify the jurisdictional facts which alone
pennit creation of a tenancy for limited period. The remaining provi-
sion provides the machinery for doing so by an agreement in writil)g
between the landlord and the tenant on the basis of which permission
of the Controller is obtained. The provision further says that if on c
expiry of the said period the tenant does not vacate such premises,
then 'notwithstanding anything contained in Section 14 or in any other
Jaw' the Controller ruay on an application by the landlord place the
landlord in vacant possession of the premis~s by evicting the tenant
and every other person who may be in occupation of such premises.          D
The enquiry contemplated at the stage of grant of permission by the
Controller under this provision requires the Controller to be satisfied .
that the landlord does not require such premises for a limited period
only; and the said premises is to be let as a residence in terms of an
agreement in writing between the landlord and tenant. On satisfaction
of the existence of these facts, the Controller grants permission for      E
creation of tenancy for a limited period under this provision. When
recovery of possession of the premises is sought thereafter by the
landlord under this provision then the Controller is to restore posses-
sion to the landlord "notwithstanding anything contained in Section 14
or in any other law" subject only to the requirements of this provision.
                                                                           F
      Obviously it is the existence of a valid permission of the Control-
ler for creation of a tenancy for limited period under this provision
which brings into existence a valid limited tenancy and, therefore, such
valid permission is a sine qua non of Controller's jurisdiction to order
restoration of possession on expiry of that period under the second
part of Section 21. It is, therefore, the obligation of the Controller to G
examine the question of validity ·of his earlier permission, if such an
objection is raised before he orders restoration of possesion to the
landlord on expiry of the limited term. However, that enquiry must be
limited only to the existence of the aforesaid jurisdictional facts at the
time of grant of permission and no more. This is quite evident from the
expression 'notwithstanding anything contained in Section 14 or in any H
    306         SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [1989] Supp. 2 S.C.R.

A   other law'. in the second part of Section 21 itself. This is the inbuilt
    safeguard in the provision against its misuse.

         We have no doubt that the language of Section 21 of the Act
  clearly forbids the Controller from embarking on an enquiry beyond
B the ambit of Section 21 itself which may impinge into the sphere of
  Section 14 of the Act or any other law. We have no hesitation in
  holding that it is the existence of the aforesaid jurisdictional facts at
  the time of grant of permission to create a limited tenancy which alone
  is required to be determined by the Controller, if and when, validity nf
  his permission is assailed ai a subsequent stage. This being the scope of
  his enquiry while granting permission, the scope of enquiry at the
C subsequent stage cannot be wider. For this reason any objection to the
  validity of the permission on a ground other than non-existence of the
   jurisdictional facts at the time of grant of permission is untenable and
  beyond the scope of the Controller's power to examine validity of his
  earlier permission before directing restoration of possession to the
  landlord under section 2'1 of the Act.
0
        In short, the scope of enquiry beforeothe Controller when vali-
  dity of the permission granted by him is assailed is to determine:
  whether, the permission accorded by him earlier was not really to the
  creation of a genuine tenancy for limited period but to a mere pretence
  of the landlord for circumventing the provisions of Section 14? If so,
E such an act being a fraud on the statute, it does not bind the tenant
  whose consent to the sham transaction is obtained taking advantage of
  his unequal bargaining power, and he can assail the permission. It is
  equally plain that the object of enacting Section 21 to permit creation
  of tenancies for limited period should not be frustrated by unduly
F enlarging the scope of that enquiry at the behest of a tenant who
  having given his free consent to the creation of a genuine limited
  tenancy thereafter attempts to thwart restoration of possession to the
  landlord by raising untenable pleas inspite of the clear prohibition
  made by the words "notwithstanding anything contained in Section 14
  or in any other law" This delicate balance between the two conflicting
  interests has to be borne in mind, in order to give true effect to Section
G 21 and thereby to promote the object of its enactment.

        We may now refer to the decisions of this Court. S.B. Naronah v.
  Prem Kumari Khanna, [1980] 1 SCR 281 is the first decision on the
  point which deals comprehensively with the scope of Section 21 of the
H Act. Krishna Iyer, J. speaking for the Bench said as follows:
   S.C. KAPOOR v. AMAR BOSE !VERMA, l.I                        307

"Parliament was presumably keen on maximising accom-
                                                                       A
modation available for letting, realising the scarcity crises.
One source of such spare accommodation which is usually
shy is potentially vacant building or part thereof which the
landlord is able to let out for a strictly limited period pro-
vided he has some credible assurance that when he needs
he will get it back ........ The problem is felt most for              B
residential uses .

 . . . . . . . . . So the law has to make itself credit-worthy. Sec-
tion 21 is the answer".

"Section 21 overrides Section 14 precisely because it is
otherwise hedged in with drastic limitations and safeguards
                                                                       c
itself against landlords' abuses .....

What, then, are those conditions and safeguards? The first
condition is that the landlord does not require the demised
premises "for a particular period" only ..... The Control- D
ler must be satisfied that the landlord means what he says
and it is not a case of his not requiring the property indefi-
nitely as distinguished from a specific or particular limited
period of say one year, two years or five years. If a man has
a house available for letting for an indefinite period and he
so lets it, even if he specifies as a pretence, a period or term E
in the lease, Section 21 cannot be attracted. On the other
hand, if he gives a special reason why he can let out only for
a limited period and requires the building at the end of that -
period .....

 . . . . .it is good compliance. The second condition is that          F
the letting must be made for a residential purpose. The
house must be made over 'as a residence'."

"The fact that a landlord and a potential tenant together
apply, setting out the formal ingredients of Section 21, does
not relieve the Controller from being vigilant to inquire              G
and satisfy himself about the requ.isites of the landlord's
non-requirement "for a particular period" and the letting
itself being 'as a residence'. A fraud on the statute cannot
be permitted ..... "

"If he makes a mindless order, the Court, when challenged              H
    308         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [1989] Supp. 2 S.C.R.

               at the time of execution, will go into the question as to
A
               whether the twin conditions for sanction have really been
               fulfilled. Of course, there will be a presumption in favour of
               the sanction being regular, but it w:ll still be open to a party
               to make out his case that in fact and in truth the conditions
               which make for a valid sanction were not present ..... "
B
               " ..... the sanction granted under Section 21, if it has been
               procured by fraud or collusion, cannot withstand invalidity
               because, otherwise, high public policy will be given and
               hostage to successful collusion .....

                . . . . . Collusion between the strong and the weak cannot
c              confer validity where the mandatory prescriptions of the
               law are breached or betrayed".
                                                        (emphasis supplied)

        S.B. Naronah's case has thereafter been consistently followed by
D this Court and treated as the correct analysis of Section 21. With
  respect, we concur and reiterate that the scope of Section 21 is
  succinctly summarised in the above extracts. There is nothing in this
  decision to support the respondent-tenant's contention in this appeal
  that the scope of enquiry is wider permitting determination of the
  landlord's bona fide need of the pemises as if such a ground for evic-
E tion specified in Section 14 of the Act has to be proved. Extending the
  enquiry to that extent will indeed be against the express prohibition
  enacted in Section 21 itself.

        The next decision in V.S. Rahi and Anr. v. Smt. Ram Chambeli,
  [1984] 2 SCR 290. Venkataramiah, J. (as he then was) speaking for the
p Bench applied the decision in S.B. Naronah's case and pointed out
  that even though the initial presumption was that the permission
  granted by the Controller under section 21 of the Act was regular yet
  the material produced should be examined in order to be satisfied that
  there has not been any misuse of the said provision by the landlord
  taking advantage of the helpless situation of the tenant due to house
G scarcity. Facts of that case show that the scope of enq_uiry was limited
  only to examining existence of the jurisdictional facts at the time of
  grant of permission by the Controller.

        In Smt. Dhanwantiv. D.D. Gupta, (1986] 3 SCC 1, it was held on
  the facts of that case that permissions for letting out to the same tenant
H for limited period obtained more than once after expiry of each said
               S.C. KAPOOR v. AMAR BOSE [VERMA, J.]                  309

period was by itself not sufficient to establish that the premises was
                                                                            A
available for being let out for an indefinite periotl; without showing
absence of landlord's intention to occupy the premises. Notice was
taken of the common knowledge that it is not possible for a man to
plan his future life with any degree of definiteness and changing
circumstances may justify such a conrse. The principle applied was the
same and the ultimate conclusion was reached on the particular facts        B
of that case.

      In Inder Mohan Lal v. Ramesh Khanna, [1987] 4 SCC 1, it was
held that the presumption of validity of the permission given by the
Controller was not rebutted by the tenant since there was no evidence
to show non-existence of any of the essential conditions which enable
the permission to be granted.. The earlier decisions of this Court start-   c
ing with Naronah's case were referred and the test indicated therein
was applied.

In S.K. Lata v. R.C. Chhiba and Another, [1988] 4 SCC 709, the
permission given by the Controller for creation of tenancy for a limited    D
period was held to be vitiated on the ground of fraud on statute
becanse the permission was obtained without disclosing that the tenant
had already been inducted under an oral lease and was in possession of
the premises prior to the application made before the Controller. It
was, therefore, held applying the same test that an essential condition
for grant of sanction under section 21 by the Rent Controller did not       E
exist.

      Now the only remaining point is the requirement of notice during
enquiry into validity of the Controller's permission before ordering
restoration of possession to the landlord. A decision of this Conrt on
this point is J.R. Vohra v. India Export House (P) Ltd. & Anr., [1985]      F
2 SCR 899. In J.R. Vohra's case it was reiterated that the conditions
specified for grant of permission by the Controller under section 21
must be 'truely fulfilled and not by way of any make-belief before the
Controller grants his permission for the creation of such limited
tenancy'. After reiterating this position the Court proceeded to con-
sider the requirement of a notice to the tenant before issuing warrant      G
of possession in favour of landlord. It was held that the competing
claims of the landlord and the tenant can be harmonised not bv .insist-
ing upon service of a prior notice on the tenant before the issuance of
the warrant of possession to evict him but by insisting upon his
approaching the Rent Controller during tt.o currency of the limited
tenancy for adjudication of his pleas no sooner he discovers facts and      H
    310         SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [1989] Supp. 2 S.C.R.

A circumstances that tend to vitiate ab initio the initial grant of permis-
  sion. It was observed that there ts no reason for the tenant to wait
  till the landlord makes his application for recovery of possession to
  raise his plea. It was further observed that in case the tenant comes to
  know, aliunde, of the landlord's application for recovery of posses-
  sion even without notice to him, he may raise his plea at that stage
B and the. Controller would enquire into the same but in that situa-
  tion the tenant may run the risk of getting his plea rejected as an
  after-thought. It was expressly held in this decision that there is no
  obligation on the part of the Rent Controller to serve a notice on the
  tenant before issuing the warrant of possession on the landlord's appli-
  cation made after expiry of the period of limited tenancy for recovery
C of possession.
        It is obvious from the decision in J.R. Vohra's case that the
  tenant is expected to raise such a plea during currency of the limited
  tenancy and on such a plea being raised by the tenant enquiry into it is
  contemplated. Even though it is not expressly said in Vohra's case, it is
  implicit that on such an application being made by the tenant requiring
D adjudication by the Controller, it is the Controller's obligation to issue
  notice of the same to the landlord and then to make the adjudication
  with opportunity to both sides to prove their respective contentions.
        As for the requirement of notice to the tenant before issuing the
  warrant of possessi0n in favour of the landlord on his application for
E recovery of possession on expiry of the limited tenancy, it appears to
  U> also that no· notice to the tenant at that stage is either contemplated
  or expedient. This appears to be the reasonable view which is in accord
  with the scheme of Section 21. Obviously notice is to be given of a fact
  which may otherwise be not known to the noticee. The period of
  limited tenancy and the date of its expiry are known to the tenant from
F the very inception. The tenant is equally aware of his own default in
  restoring vacant possession of such premises to the landlord on expiry
  of that period. It is only these facts, well known to the tenant, which
  compel the landlord to apply for recovery of possession pursuant to
  the tenant's default. The plea of invalidity, if any, of Controller's
  earlier permission must equally be known to the tenant at least by then
G coupled with his knowledge that unless a declaration is made at his
  instance that the Controller's permission is invalid, he must vacate, the
  limited tenancy having expired. Why then should a notice to him at
  that stage be necessary and for what useful purpose? We cannot think
  of any good reason to require a notice to the tenant at that stage. The
  object of enquiring into the validity of the Controller's permission
H under section 21 is only to ensure that essentials of a limited tenancy
               S.C. KAPOOR v. AMAR BOSE [VERMA, J.J                 Ji!

existed and the same )Vas genuine; and it is not meant to permit raising
of frivolous pleas which would frustrate the very object of its enact-     A
ment. This veiw protects the honest tenants and only curbs the fri-
volous and vexatious pleas.
       -
      There is another aspect of the matter. The Controller's permis-
sion when granted to create a limited tenancy under section 21 of the      B
Act is presumed to be valid unless declared otherwise. It is, therefore,
for the person assailing its validity to get such a declaration from a
proper forum in a proper proceeding. Unless this is done, the order
remains enforceable. The duty is clearly on the tenant himself to raise
the plea pf invalidity and unless the order is declared invalid at his
instance, itis enforceability cannot be doubted.
                                                                           c
      In Wade's Administrative Law, 6th Edn. at pp 351-353, there is
an illuminating discussion of this topic. It has been pointed out that
'void' is meaningless in an absolute sense; and 'unless the necessary
proceedmgs are taken at law to establish the cause of invalidity and to
get it quashed or otherwise upset, it will remain as effective for its     D
ostensible purpose as the most impeccable of orders'. In the words of
Lord Diplock, "the order would be presumed to be valid unless the
presumption was rebutted in competent legal proceedings by a party
entitled to sue".

      For the above reasons, we are in respectful agreement with the       E
view taken in J.R. Vohra's case (supra) that there is no obligation on
th'e Controller to issue notice to the tenant of the landlord's applica-
tion for recovery of possession made on expiry of the period of tenancy
for a limited period under section 21 of the Act, but an enquiry on the
tenant's plea has to be made to the extent indicated, if the tenant
assails validity of the Controller's permission even at that stage.        F
      We shall now consider the merits of this case on the basis indi-
cated above. The High Court has upheld rejection of the landlord's
application for recovery of possession under section 21 of the Act on
the ground that the landlord's son would be about 19 or 20 years old on
expiry of ·three years period of limited lease but he could not be mar- G
ried till he attained the prescribed minimum age of 21 years which
showed that the Controller's order granting permission was mindless
and was obtained by fraud. The permission has, therefore, been held
invalid. In our opinion, the High Court as well as the authorities below
it misconstrued the requirements of Section 21 of the Act. It is not a
case where the landlord did not have a son who was expected to be H
    312          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [1989] Supp. 2 S.C.R.

A married some time after three years. Jn substance the reason for
     availability of the accommodation for the limited period of three years
    only given by the landlord was that the premises was not needed by the
     landlord till his son got married some time after three years. The
     reason was not to be construed as a statement that the son was to be
    married exactly on the date on which three years expired. The date of
B son's marriage conld not be foreseen or estimated with such precision
     as to coincide with the date of expiry of the limited lease. All that has
    to be seen is whether the period of limited tenancy was indicated by
    the landlord with reference to a foreseeable future event and the esti-
     mate of time of its occurrence was not unreasonable. When the period
    of limited tenancy is stated on the basis of a future event, the happen-
C ing of which is reasonably certain at that time though the precise date
    of the future event cannot be predicted with precision, the landlord's
    estimate of the period after which the event is expected to happen,
     unless unreasonable must be accepted for this purpose as genuine.
    This would satisfy the test of a genuine limited tenancy if there be no
  · other factor indicating it to be a mere pretence adopted by the land-
D lord. This test is fully satisfied in the present case. Merely because the
     son's age then was about one year below the prescribed minimum age
    for marriage the estimate of landlord that he would not need the
    premises for three years only till his son's marriage cannot be treated
    .as a pretence. One year's period for settling and arranging perfor-
    mance of the marriage is nothing unusual since existence of the basic
E facts is undisputed. Existence of this jurisdictional fact to justify the
     permission has not been negatived and no material has been produced
     by the tenant to substantiate his plea.

         The other ground taken by the respondent-tenant is that the
  existing accommodation available with the landlord is sufficient for the
F needs of his family. It is sufficient to state that the enquiry contemp-
  lated under section 21 in this behalf is not the same as that for
  determining existence of the ground of bona fide need of the landlord
  for an order of eviction under section 14 of the Act, and Section 14 is
  expressly superceded by Section 21. This question is, therefore,
  beyond the scope of the present enquiry.
G
         The respondent-tenant also contended that the premises was
  constructed in 1972 and the landlord had never occupied this premises
  viz., the second floor of the building for his personal ·use and h.ad even
  let out the first floor prior to 1980. In the present case the respondent-
  tenant did not produce any material to prove letting out of any part of
H the building much less this premises i.e. second floor of the building.
                 S.C. KAPOOR v. AMAR BOSE [VERMA, J.]                       313

After the arguments were concluded before us and the judgment was
reserved, 1he respondent has filed an application under order 41 Rule              A
27 read with Section 151 C.P.C. for admitting additional evidence to
show letting out of the second floor of the building. It has been stated
that the evidence could not be produced in the Courts below since the
objections were not listed for investigation by the Courts. No cogent
ground is shown to permit any additional evidence when no attempt to               B
produce any evidence was made in any of the Courts below upto the
High Court or even here till conclusion of the hearing before us. The
application is rejected. The lease for limited period of three years expired .in
1983 and more than six years have been spent since then in this litiga-
tion at the stage of recovery of possession. The facts of the case indi-
cate that the respondent's plea is a clear after-thought and is baseless.
                                                                                   c
      The absence of existence of any jurisdictional fact not having
been proved by the respondent-tenant even after objecting to recovery
of possession on expiry of the period of limited tenancy there was no
ground to refuse restoration of possession to the landlord. More than
twice the period of the limited lease has expired even after the date of           D
expiry of the lease. We see no reason to delay any more the relief due
to the landlord.

       Consequently, the appeal is allowed. The impugned orders pas-
sed by the Rent Controller, Rent Control Tribunal and the High Court
are set aside and the landlord's application for recovery of possession            E
is allowed. ·

The rt>Spondent-tenant shall also pay Rs.2,000 as costs to the
appm1ant-landlord in addition to an amount equal to that calculated on
the basis of the monthly rent for the entire period till the date of
restoration of possession.                                                         F

Y. Lal                                                       Appeal allowed.