Holding

An amendment that seeks to introduce a claim barred by limitation is not permissible where the plaintiff fails to show bona fides and a reasonable explanation for the delay.

Summary

In 1986 the original plaintiff filed an eviction suit which was later converted into a title suit after the defendant claimed ownership based on a sale deed dated 4‑Oct‑1985. The plaintiff failed to amend the pleadings to challenge that deed despite being directed to do so, and the suit remained pending for many years. In 2004 the plaintiff sought amendment under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC to declare the 1985 sale deed bogus, a claim that was over fifteen years old. The trial court and High Court allowed the amendment, but the Supreme Court held that such an amendment cannot be permitted when the claim is time‑barred and the plaintiffs have shown no bona fides or reasonable explanation for the delay. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the lower courts' orders and dismissed the amendment application, allowing the appeal.

Issues considered

Whether an amendment under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC can be allowed to introduce a claim that is barred by limitation.
Whether the plaintiffs' delay of over fifteen years and lack of bona fides preclude the amendment.
Whether the lower courts erred in permitting the amendment despite the time‑barred nature of the claim.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order 6 Rule 17, s. Section 115

Subjects

eviction suitamendmentlimitation periodbona fidesOrder 6 Rule 17 CPCtime‑barred claimtitle suit

Judgment

~
A SHIV GOPAL SAH@SHIV GOPAL SAHU
v.
SITA RAM SARAUGI AND ORS.

MARCH 30, 2007

B [ASHOK BHAN AND V.S. SIRPURK.AR, JJ.]

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-0rder 6 Rule 17-Amendment
application-Permissibility of-Eviction suit-Plea of tenant that he became
the owner by sale deed in his favour-Amendment ofplaint-Claim regarding
c the declaration of sale deed being bogus and ineffective document-Held :
Not permissible since the claim was ti!fle barred-Delay was of 15 years
without any explanation-Original plaintiff and co-plaintiffs-new transferees
were complacently negligent, and as such plaintiff lacked bonafides.

D In 1986, the original plaintiff filed suit for eviction and impleaded the
original defendant. Original defendant pleaded that since he had purchased >
the suit property along with other part of the property by sale deed dated ;.-

4.10.1985, he was the full owner of the entire house including the suit property.
In 1991, the suit was converted into a Title Suit and the plaintiff was to effect
the necessary amendments. However, plaintiff did not amend the suit. Original
E defendant died and the present petitioner-defendant was impleaded. In 1997,
during the pendency of the suit the original plaintiff sold the suit property in
favour of respondent nos.3 and 4, who were added as the co-plaintiffs. On
11.12.2004, the plaintiffs filed an application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC
seeking amendments to the plaint. Trial court allowed the application. High
Court upheld the order. Hence the present appeal.
F
Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1. By way of an amendment even the claims which were barred
by time has been allowed by this Court. However, for that there had to be a
valid basis made out in the application and first of all there had to be bona
G
fides on the part of the plaintiffs and a reasonable explanation for the delay. It
is also true that the amendments can be introduced at any stage of the suit,
however, when by that amendment an apparently time barred claim is being
~
introduced for the first time, there could have to be some explanation and

H 568
•
I

SHIV GOPAL SAH@ SHIV GOPAL SAHU"· SIT A RAM SARA UGI 569

secondly, the plaintiff would have to show his bonafuies, particularly because A
such claims by way of an amendment would have the effect of defeating the
rights created in the defendant by lapse of time. [Para 12) (573-D-E]

2.1. Having gone through the amendment application carefully there is
no explanation whatsoever for this towering delay. Some explanation is
expected, atleast regarding the delay since the delay was very substantial The B
whole amendment application, when carefully scanned, does not show a_.y
explanation whatsoever. This negligent complacency on the part of the
plaintiffs would not permit them to amend the plaint, more particularly when
the claim has, apparently, become barred by time. [Para 11) [573-C)

2.2. The defendant having set up a rival title on the basis of sale deed C
dated 4.10.1985 the plaintiff was bonnd to amend his pleadings if he wanted
to challenge~the said sale deed to be ineffective and incapable of creating a
valid title in favour of the defendant. It completely beats as to why the plain~iff
remained complacently negligent right from 1987 in case of original plaintiff
and after 1997 in case of co-plaintiffs. On the top of it when the amendment D
application is seen, it is sadly silent regarding any explanation as to why all
these steps were not taken after a long period right from 1987 till ~be
amendment application is made on 11.12.2004 seeking a declaration that is
bogus and did not create any title in favour of the original defendant. Having
not challenged the sale deed dated 4.10.1985, the plaintiff could not lead
evidence regarding the circumstances under which that sale deed came into E
existence which facts they would be entitled now if the amendments were to
be allowed. That would be completely different from their preliminary task of
proving a better •itle to the property. [Para 15) [574-C-E]

2.3. The plaintiffs cannot be permitted at this stage to introduce a time F
barred claim under the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case where
a complacent negligence was found on the part of the plaintiffs apart from the
towering delay of more than 15 years. Thus, the application for amendiµent
is dismissed and the orders of the High Court as well as the trial court are
set aside. [Para 16] [574-F)
G
Dondapati Narayana Reddy v. Duggireddy Venkatanarayan Redd); and
Ors. [2001) 8 SCC 115 and T. N. Alloy Foundry Co. Ltd. v. T. N Electricity
Board and Ors., (2004) 3 SCC 392, referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civi Appeal No. l 700of2007.
H
570 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007) 4 S.C.R.

A From the Final Judgment and Order dated 23.08.2005 of the High Court
of Judicature at Patna in C.R. No. 1159 of 2005.

Bhaskar Y. Kulkarni, for the Appellant.

H.L. Agrawal and Dr. Kailash Chand for the Respondents.
B
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

V.S. SIRPURKAR, J 1. Leave granted.

2. Judgment of the High Court passed under Sectign 115 CPC confmning
C the order passed by the Additional Munsiff is in challenge in this appeal. The
High Court has approved of the amendments which were permitted to be
made by the trial court.

3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner herein assails
both the judgments stating that the said amendment application was liable to
D be dismissed on the ground that it permitted the plaintiffs to include a time
barred claim and secondly it was hopelessly belated and as such the plaintiffs
lacked bona jides.

4. Some facts would be necessary. Original suit was filed in the year
1986 bearing registration number Eviction Suit No. I I of 1986 which was filed
E by Sita Ram Saraugi and some others impleading the present petitioner-
defendant Shiv Gopal Sah @ Shiv Gopal Sahu. This was a suit for eviction
on the ground of personal necessities of the plaintiffs. Original defendant
Ram Charitra Sahu appeared and raised a plea that he was not a tenant and
further that he was in fact an owner having purchased the suit property along
p with the other part of the property from Banwari Sah and others by sale deed
dated 4.10.1985 and as such he was the full owner of the entire house
including the suit property. In view of these pleadings raised by the defendant, _,
the suit was converted into a Title Suit by the order of the court dated .....
16.12.1988. By subsequent order dated 4.1.1991 the suit was renumbered as
Title Suit No.17 of 1991 and the plaintiff was directed to pay advalorem court
G fees as also to effect the necessary amendments. The plaintiff failed to avail
of this opportunity to amend the suit. Eventually, the original defendant died
and the present petitioner-defendant has been impleaded for him. The original
plaintiff, namely, Sita Ram Saraugi seems to have sold the :mit property during
the pendency of the suit in favour of Vijay Kumar Yadav and Manju Devi,
H respondent nos.3 and 4 herein in the year 1997, who were added as the co-
SHIVGOPALSAH@SHIVGOPALSAHU 1·. SITARAMSARAUGl[V. S.SIRPURKAR,J.) 571
plaintiffs by their application dated 22.5.2004. A
5. On 11.12.2004 the plaintiffs moved an application under Order 6 Rule ,
17 CPC seeking amendments to the plaint. It was stated in that amendment
application that the said amendments have become necessary on account of
the plea raised by the defendant regarding his becoming an owner by the
registered sale deed dated 4.10.1985. It was also suggested that the averments B
regarding the title of the plaintiffs, reliefs to be claimed relating to the title,
description of the area of the land in the suit and the explanation of plaintiffs ·
relating to the sale deeds in favour of the defendant had to be introduced by
the amendments. It was also alleged that it was necessary to challenge the
sale deed dated 4.10.1985 in favour of the defendants and get it declared C
bogus and not binding against the plaintiffs and that the defendant no.1 had
not acquired any right, title or interest over the suit property by that sale deed
and to further assert that plaintiff Sita Ram Saraugi had a valid title and '
possession on the suit land which he transferred validly in favour of Vijay
Kumar Yadav and Manju Devi. The plaintiffs also prayed, vide the said
amendment application, that the original plaintiff Sita Ram Saraugi was liable D
to be transposed as a party-defendant.

6. This amendment application was, though strongly opposed by the
defendants on various grounds, allowed and as stated earlier, the challenge ·
by the defendants by way of a Civil Revision thereto in the High Court also
did not succeed necessitating the present appeal. E
7. Shri Kulkarni, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-original
defendant pointed out that the High Court was in error in confirming the order
passed by the trial court allowing the amendment. His main thrust was that
the amendment application was trying to introduce a time barred claim F
regarding the declaration of the sale deed dated 4.10.1985 being a bogus and
ineffective document. According to the learned counsel the fact of the said
sale deed was brought to the notice of the plaintiffs way back in the year 1987
when the defendants had pleaded a title in his favour on the basis of that
sale deed. Learned counsel further points out that even after the original
eviction suit was converted into title .suit in the year 1988 and was re- G
numbered in 1991, the civil court in its order dated 4.1.1991 had permitted the
original plaintiffs, respondent no. l and 2 to suitably amend the plaint. However,
the original plaintiffs did not challenge the said sale deed dated 4.10.1985
which was in direct conflict with his title. Learned counsel further points out
that again in the year 1987 when the plaintiff transferred the suit property in H
\
572 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007] 4 S.C.R.

A favour ofVijay Kumar Yadav and Manju Devi, respondents 3 and 4 herein as ~
the watchful purchasers, the new so-called transferees were bound to join the .' '
plaintiffs which they did not do upto 2004 and it was only after they joined
the suit as the co-plaintiffs that it dawned upon them for the first time to
challenge the sale deed dated 4.10.1985 in favour of the petitioner-defendant.
B All this suggests that the challenge to the sale deed which had become
known to the original plaintiff way back in 1987 and of which there was bound
to be a notice to the newly added plaintiffs, hopelessly time barred. Learned
counsel further submits that there are no bona tides in the plaintiffs at all as
the plaintiffs have remained callously negligent towards their own rights.
Learned counsel, therefore, states that the trial court as well as High Court
C erred in allowing the amendments.

8. As against this it was contended by the learned counsel appearing
on behalf the original plaintiffs-respondents I and 2 herein that it was always
permissible for the court to allow the amendment at any stage and even if it
is presumed that the challenge has become time barred, yet the court could
D permit the amendments. Learned counsel for the respondent tried to rely on
some rulings of this Court stating that this Court had pennitted the amendments
even when a time barred challenge was sought to be introduced by the
amendments.

9. It is to be seen as to whether the courts below were right in allowing
E the plaintiffs to introduce the amendments.

10. There can be no dispute that the defendant had opened his cards
and asserted his title vis-a-vis the original plaintiffs right in the beginning in
the year 1987 when he, for the first time, filed the written statement. It is then
F that the original eviction suit was converted into the title suit. This was the
first opportunity to challenge the sale deed dated 4.10.1985. As if this was
not sufficient, the trial court also pennitted the plaintiffs to make the necessary
amendments. We fail to understand the apathy on the part of the plaintiffs
in the wake of all this happenings. As if this was not sufficient when the
plaintiffs allegedly sold the property in favour of Vijay Kumar Yadav and
G Manju Devi in the year 1997 by two separate sale deeds, he could have given
the notice of the cloud on his title to the purchasers or atleast the purchasers
were bound to take notice of the cloud on the title of the original plaintiff.
The purchasers, i.e., respondents 3 and 4 herein respectively remained
complacent right till 2004. We do not know as to how original plaintiffs kept
H the suit alive for a long period of seven years. It is only in the year 2004 that
SHIVGOPAL SAH@SHIVGOPAL SAHU1•. SITARAMSARAUGI[V. S. SIRPURKAR,J.] 573

the transferees sought to add themselves as the co-plaintiffs which should A
have been done immediately after they purchased the said suit property by
two separate sale deeds in the year 1997. It is, therefore, clear that the original
plaintiff as also the subsequent purchasers remained complacent and negligent
all through for a period of more than 15 years and woke up for t~e first time
to challenge the sale deed dated 4.10.1985 by seeking a declaration that it is B
bogus and did not create any title in favour of the original defendant.

11. We have gone through the amendment application carefully where
we do not find any explanation whatsoever for this towering delay. We would
expect some explanation, atleast regarding the delay since the delay was very
substantial. The whole amendment application, when carefully scanned, does C
not show any explanation whatsoever. This negligent complacency on the
part of the plaintiffs would not permit them to amend the plaint, more particularly
when the claim has, apparently, become barred by time.

12. It is quite true that this Court in a number of decisions, has allowed
by way of an amendment even the claims which were barred by time. However, D
for that there had to be a valid basis made out in the application and first of
all there had to be bona tides on the part of the plaintiffs and a reasonable
explanation for the delay. It is also true that the amendments can be introduced
at any stage of the suit, however, when by that amendment an apparently time
barred claim is being introduced for the first time, there would have to be
some explanation and secondly, the plaintiff would have to show his bona E
fides, particularly because such claims by way of an amendment would have
the effect of defeating the rights created in the defendant by lapse of time.
When we see the present facts, it is clear that no such attempt is made by
the plaintiffs anywhere more particularly in the amendment application.
p
13. In Dondapati Narayana Reddy v. Duggireddy Venkatanarayan
Reddy & Ors., [2001] 8 SCC 115 this court observed:

"The amendment should, generally, be allowed unless it is shown that
permitting the amendment would be unjust and result in prejudice
against the opposite side which cannot be compensated by costs or G
would deprive him of a right which has accrued to him with the lapse
of time."

~ 14. In T.N. Alloy Foundry Co. Ltd. v. T.N. Electricty Board & Ors.,
[2004] 3 SCC 392 a three Judge Bench of this Court relying on L.J. Leach &
Co. Ltd. v. Jardine Skinner and Co., AIR (1957) SC 357 reiterated as under: H
574 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 4 S.C.R.

A "The law as regards permitting amendments to the plaint is well
settled. In L.J. Leach & Co. ltd v. Jardine Skinner and Co. it was
held that the court would as a rule decline to allow amendments, if a
fresh suit on the amended claim would be barred by limitation on the
date of the application. But that is a factor to be taken into account
in exercise of the discretion as to whether •amendment should be
B ordered and does not affect the power of the court to order it."

The situation is no different in this appeal and as such a suit as described
above would be clearly barred by limitation.

15. The defendant having set up a rival title on the basis of sale deed
C dated 4.10.1985 the plaintiff was bound to amend his pleadings if he wanted
to challenge the said sale deed to be ineffective and incapable of creating a
valid title in favour of the defendant. It completely beats us as to why the
plaintiff remained complacently negligent right from 1987 in case of original
plaintiff and after 1997 in case of co-plaintiffs. On the top of it when we see
D the amendment application, it is sadly silent regarding any explanation as to
why all these steps were not taken after a long period right from 1987 till the
amendment application is made on 11.12.2004. Having not challenged, the sale
deed dated 4.10.1985, the plaintiff could not lead evidence regarding the
circumstances under which that sale deed came into existence which facts
they would be entitled now ifthe amendments were to be. allowed. That would
E be completely different from their preliminary task of proving a better title to
the property.

16. Under the circumstances we would not permit the plaintiffs now at
this stage to introduce a time barred claim under the peculiar facts and
F circumstances of this case where we find a complacent negligence on the part ~·
of the plaintiffs apart from the towering delay of more than 15 years. We,
therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the orders of the High Court as well +
as the trial court and dismiss the application for amendment dated 11.12.2004.

17. There will be no order as to costs.
G N.J. Appeal allowed.