SHIV KUMAR & ANR.versusUNION OF INDIA & ORS.

                         [2019] 13 S.C.R. 695                           695


                     SHIV KUMAR & ANR.                                  A
                                 v.
                    UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
                  (Civil Appeal No. 8003 of 2019)
                                                                        B
                        OCTOBER 14, 2019
    [ARUN MISHRA, M. R. SHAH AND B. R. GAVAI, JJ.]
       Land Acquisition Act, 1894: s.4 – Whether a purchaser of
the property after issuance of notification under s.4 of the Act of
1894, can invoke the provisions contained in s.24 of the Act of         C
2013 – Held: An incumbent, who has purchased the land after s.4
notification, has no right to question the acquisition – The Act of
2013 intends to benefit landowners mentioned in the notification
under s.4 and not such purchasers who purchase the land after it
has been vested in the State – Such purchasers do not have right
                                                                        D
to receive the higher compensation under the provisions contained
in the Act of 2013 – Proviso to s.24(2) makes it clear that in case
compensation concerning the majority of landholding has not been
deposited, then recorded owner(s) at the time of issuance of
notification under s.4 of the Act of 1894 shall have the right to
receive the compensation – A transaction effected after s.4             E
notification is illegal and void – Such void transactions are not
validated under the Act of 2013 – Thus, the Act of 2013 does not
confer any right on purchaser whose sale is ab initio void – Right
to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 – s.24(2) and its proviso.
                                                                        F
      Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013: ss.3(c), 3(r)
– Affected family, land owner – Meaning of – Discussed.
      Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013: s.24(2) –       G
Who can claim declaration/rights under s.24(2) for the restoration
of land or lapse of acquisition – Held: It cannot be by a person
with no title in the land – A person cannot enforce and ripe fruits
based on a void transaction to start claiming title and possession
of the land by seeking a declaration under s.24 of the Act of 2013;
                                                                        H
                                695
696            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2019] 13 S.C.R.


A     it will amount to conferment of benefit never contemplated by the
      law – The provision of the Act of 2013 cannot be said to be enabling
      or authorizing a purchaser after s.4 Notification to question
      proceeding taken under the Act of 1894 of taking possession –
      What cannot be done directly cannot be permitted in an indirect
      manner – Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – s.4.
B
            Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
      Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013: s.24(2) –
      Subsequent purchasers cannot be termed to be affected persons
      within the provisions of Act of 2013 – Thus, no right can be claimed
      based on a transfer made by way of execution of Power of
C     Attorney, Will, etc., as it does not create any interest in immovable
      property.
             Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
      Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013: Object of
      the Act – Held: The provisions of the Act of 2013 aim at the
D     acquisition of land with least disturbance to the landowners and
      other affected families and to provide just and fair compensation
      to affected families whose land has been acquired or proposed to
      be acquired or are affected and to make adequate provisions for
      such affected persons for their rehabilitation and resettlement –
E     The provisions of Act of 2013 aim at ousting all inter-meddlers from
      the fray by ensuring payment in the bank account of landholders
      under s.77 of the Act – The intendment of the Act of 2013 is to
      benefit farmers etc. – Subsequent purchasers cannot be said to be
      landowners entitled to restoration of land and cannot be termed
      to be affected persons within the provisions of Act of 2013.
F
            Dismissing the appeal, the Court
            HELD: 1. An incumbent, who has purchased the land after
      section 4 notification, has no right to question the acquisition.
      The Act of 2013 intend to benefit landowners mentioned in the
G     notification under Section 4, not for the benefit of such
      purchasers who purchase the land after it has been vested in
      the State. Sub-section 4 of Section 11 of the Act of 2013, which
      is akin to section 4 of the Act of 1894, contains a prohibition
      that no person shall make any transaction or cause any
      transaction of land or create any encumbrance on land from the
H     date of publication of such notification. Without seeking
     SHIV KUMAR & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.                      697


exemption from the Collector, there is a total prohibition on any    A
transaction of land. Whereas the legal position under the Act of
1894 was that a transaction effected after section 4 notification
was illegal and void. [Paras 6, 8, 9] [703-F; 709-A-B]
     Government (NCT of Delhi) v. Manav Dharam Trust
     & Anr. (2017) 6 SCC 751 : [2017] 4 SCR 232 –                    B
     overruled.
     U.P. Jal Nigam, Lucknow through its Chairman & Anr.
     v. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd., Lucknow & Ors. (1996)
     3 SCC 124 : [1996] 1 SCR 683 ; Sneh Prabha (Smt.)
     & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Anr. (1996) 7 SCC 426 :               C
     [1995] 5 Suppl. SCR 264 ; Meera Sahni v. Lieutenant
     Governor of Delhi & Ors. (2008) 9 SCC 177 : [2008]
     10 SCR 1012 ; V. Chandrasekaran & Anr.
     v. Administrative Officer & Ors. (2012) 12 SCC 133 :
     [2012] 10 SCR 603 ; Rajasthan State Industrial
     Development and Investment Corpn. v. Subhash Sindhi             D
     Cooperative Housing Society, Jaipur & Ors. (2013) 5
     SCC 427 : [2015] 5 SCR 365 ; Rajasthan Housing
     Board v. New Pink City Nirman Sahkari Samiti
     Ltd. & Anr. (2015) 7 SCC 601 : [2015] 5 SCR 365 ;
     M. Venkatesh & Ors. v. Commissioner, Bangalore                  E
     Development Authority, etc. (2015) 17 SCC 1 : [2015]
     11 SCR 454 – referred to.
      2. The ‘affected family’ has been defined under section 3(c)
of the 2013 Act. The affected family includes landowners for
whose benefit land is held before the acquisition. A person          F
acquiring interest after section 11 notification cannot be said to
be included in the “affected family” at all. Landowner as defined
in Section 3(r) is a person who is recorded as the owner of land
or building. A purchaser after section 11 cannot be said to be a
landowner within the purview of section 3(r). [Paras 10, 12] [709-
G; 710-F; 711-B-F]                                                   G
      3.1 Section 24(2) provides that in case the award has been
passed five years or more prior to the commencement of the
Act, but the physical possession of the land has not been taken,
or the compensation has not been paid, the said proceedings
shall be deemed to have lapsed. In the instant case, there is        H
698            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2019] 13 S.C.R.


A     nothing to doubt that actual physical possession had been taken
      in 2000. Thus, Section 24(2) is not attracted in the case. Even
      otherwise, proviso to Section 24(2) does not recognize a
      purchaser after Section 4 notification inasmuch as it provides that
      where an award has been made, and the compensation in respect
      of a majority of land holdings has not been deposited in the
B
      account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in
      the notification for acquisition issued under the Act of 1894, shall
      be entitled to compensation under the provisions of the Act of
      2013. The proviso makes it clear that in case of compensation
      concerning the majority of landholding has not been deposited,
C     then recorded owner(s) at the time of issuance of notification
      under section 4 of the Act of 1894 shall have the right to receive
      the compensation. Purchasers after section 4 notification have
      not been given the right to receive the higher compensation
      under the provisions contained in the Act of 2013. [Paras 16,
      17] [713-D-F-H; 714-A ]
D
             3.2 The Act of 2013 presupposes that a person is required
      to be rehabilitated and resettled. Such a person who has
      purchased after section 4 notification as sale deed is void under
      the Act of 1894, cannot claim rehabilitation and resettlement as
      per policy envisaged under the Act of 2013, as his land has not
E     been acquired, but he has purchased a property which has
      already been acquired by the State Government, he cannot claim
      even higher compensation, as per proviso to section 24(2) under
      the Act of 2013. Given that, the transaction of sale, effected after
      section 4 notification, is void, is ineffective to transfer the land,
F     such incumbents cannot invoke the provisions of section 24. As
      the sale transaction did not clothe them with the title when the
      purchase was made; they cannot claim ‘possession’ and challenge
      the acquisition as having lapsed under section 24 by questioning
      the legality or regularity of proceedings of taking over of
      possession under the Act of 1894. It would be unfair and unjust
G     and against the policy of the law to permit such a person to claim
      resettlement or claim the land back as envisaged under the Act
      of 2013. When he has not been deprived of his livelihood but is
      a purchaser under a void transaction, the outcome of exploitative
      tactics played upon poor farmers who were unable to defend
H     themselves. Thus, under the provisions of Section 24 of the Act
      SHIV KUMAR & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.                       699


of 2013, challenge to acquisition proceeding of the taking over        A
of possession under the Act of 1894 cannot be made, based on
a void transaction nor declaration can be sought under section
24(2) by such incumbents to obtain the land. The Act of 2013
does not confer any right on purchaser whose sale is ab initio
void. Such void transactions are not validated under the Act of
                                                                       B
2013. No rights are conferred by the provisions contained in
the 2013 Act on such a purchaser as against the State. ‘Void is,
ab initio,’ a nullity, is inoperative, and a person cannot claim the
land or declaration once no title has been conferred upon him
to claim that the land should be given back to him. A person
cannot enforce and ripe fruits based on a void transaction to start    C
claiming title and possession of the land by seeking a declaration
under Section 24 of the Act of 2013; it will amount to conferment
of benefit never contemplated by the law. [Paras 18-21] [714-B-
C-E-H; 715-A-D]
       4. The provisions of the Act of 2013 aimed at the               D
acquisition of land with least disturbance to the landowners and
other affected families and to provide just and fair compensation
to affected families whose land has been acquired or proposed
to be acquired or are affected and to make adequate provisions
for such affected persons for their rehabilitation and
resettlement. The intendment of Act of 2013 is to benefit farmers      E
etc. Subsequent purchasers cannot be said to be landowners
entitled to restoration of land and cannot be termed to be
affected persons within the provisions of Act of 2013. It is not
open to them to claim that the proceedings have lapsed under
Section 24(2). Apart from that the claims have been made on            F
transactions based on the power of attorneys, agreements, etc.;
as such also they are not entitled to any indulgence and cannot
invoke provisions of section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. No right can
be claimed based on a transfer made by way of execution of
Power of Attorney, Will, etc., as it does not create any interest
in immovable property. [Paras 22, 23, 24] [715-F-H; 716-A; 718-        G
E]
      Suraj Lamp and Industries Pvt. Ltd. through Director
      v. State of Haryana & Anr.; Mamleshwar Prasad v.
      Kanahaiya Lal, (1975) 2 SCC 232 ; A.R. Anutulay v.
      R.S.Nayak (1988) 2 SCC 602 : [1975] 3 SCR 834 ;                  H
700          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2019] 13 S.C.R.


A          State of Uttar Pradesh v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd.
           (1991) 4 SCC 139 ; State of B. Shama Rao v. Union
           Territory of Pondicherry AIR 1967 SC 1480 ;
           Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur
           (1989) 1 SCC 101 : [1988] 2 Suppl. SCR 929 ;
           Narmada Bachao Andolan (III) v. State of Madhya
B
           Pradesh, AIR 2011 SC 1989 : [2011] 6 SCR 443 ;
           Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd. v. State of Odisha (2015)
           2 SCC 189 : [2014] 14 SCR 1029 ; Sant Lal Gupta v.
           Modern Coop. Societies Ltd. [2010] 13 SCC 336 :
           [2010] 13 SCR 621 ; Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh
C          Sharma (2019) 6 SCC 162 – referred to.
                           Case Law Reference
      [2017] 4 SCR 232                overruled            Para 3
      [1996] 1 SCR 683                referred to          Para 6 (a)
D
      [1995] 5 Suppl. SCR 264         referred to          Para 6 (b)
      [2008] 10 SCR1012               referred to          Para 6 (c)
      [2012] 10 SCR 603               referred to          Para 6 (d)

E     [2015] 5 SCR 365                referred to          Para 6(g)
      [2015] 11 SCR 454               referred to          Para 6(f)
      [2015] 5 SCR 365                referred to          Para 24
      (1975) 2 SCC 232                referred to          Para 26
F     [1975] 3 SCR 834                referred to          Para 26
      (1991) 4 SCC 139                referred to          Para 26
      AIR 1967 SC 1480                referred to          Para 26
      [1988] 2 Suppl. SCR 929         referred to          Para 26
G
      [2011] 6 SCR 443                referred to          Para 26
      [2014] 14 SCR 1029              referred to          Para 26
      [2010] 13 SCR 621               referred to          Para 26
H     (2019) 6 SCC 162                referred to          Para 26
      SHIV KUMAR & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.                              701


      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 8003                    A
of 2019.
      From the Judgment and Order dated 18.01.2019 of the Division
Bench of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Writ Petition (C)
No. 92 of 2018.
      S. N. Bhatm B. S. Mathur and Rajat Mathur, Advs. for the                B
Appellants.
     K. M. Natraj, ASG and Debashish Rout, Advs. for the
Respondents.
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
                                                                              C
      ARUN MISHRA, J.
      1. The question involved in the matter is whether a purchaser of
the property after issuance of notification under section 4 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, “the 1894 Act”), can invoke the
provisions contained in section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation          D
and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement
Act, 2013 (for short, “the Act of 2013”).
       2. Notification No.F.10(29)/96/L&B/LA/11394, dated 27.10.1999,
was issued for the acquisition of the land situated in the revenue estate
of Village Pansali, Delhi, for the public purpose of the Rohini Residential   E
Scheme under planned development of Delhi. It was followed by the
declaration under section 6 issued on 3.4.2000. Possession was taken
on 12.5.2000. Subsequently, the petitioners purchased the land on
5.7.2001 by way of Registered Sale Deed executed by one Satya Narain,
the Power of Attorney holder of original owners. The purchasers then
participated in the proceedings for the determination of compensation         F
under sections 9 and 10 of the 1894 Act. The award was passed on
3.4.2002. In the meanwhile, an unauthorized colony came up with the
name of Deep Vihar, Pansali, Pooth Kalan, Delhi. The petitioners
claimed that they continued in the actual physical possession of the land
even after passing of the award on 17.09.2008 and the same formed
                                                                              G
part of the unauthorized colony. The Government of NCT of Delhi
provisionally regularised the colony. The Act of 2013 came in force from
1.1.2014. The respondents never took the actual physical possession
of the land; as such, the acquisition has lapsed. The purchasers/
petitioners filed a writ petition at the High Court of Delhi. A Division
Bench of the High Court has dismissed the writ application.                   H
702             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2019] 13 S.C.R.


A            3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the purchasers
      submitted that the High Court has erred in rejecting the writ application
      on the ground that the purchasers after issuance of notification under
      section 4 of the 1894 Act cannot question the land acquisition. The
      decision runs contrary to the dictum laid down by this Court in
      Government (NCT of Delhi) v. Manav Dharam Trust & Anr. (2017)
B
      6 SCC 751. Learned counsel further submitted that the High Court has
      also erred in dismissing the writ application on the ground that petitioners
      have admitted that the property is part of the unauthorized colony of
      Deep Vihar.
             4. Shri K.M. Natraj learned Additional Solicitor General has
C
      supported the impugned judgment and order and submitted that the
      purchase made after the notification issued under section 4 of the 1894
      Act and declaration under section 6 is void. The purchasers had acquired
      no right, and they cannot question the land acquisition, nor they can
      invoke the provisions contained in section 24 of the Act of 2013. It was
D     further submitted that decision in Manav Dharam Trust (supra) is per
      incuriam because of a large number of decisions of this Court holding
      that sale made after issuance of notification under section 4 is void.
             5. It is crystal clear that for seeking the relief under section 24,
      the proceedings for taking possession under Act of 1894 have been put
E     into question as illusory one, and possession continues with appellants.
      The decision in Manav Dharam Trust (supra) has been mainly relied
      upon by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the purchasers/
      petitioners in which a Division Bench opined that subsequent purchasers
      are affected by the acquisition. Therefore, they are entitled to seek a
      declaration of the lapse of acquisition under the Act of 2013. It has
F
      further opined that since declaration is sought, the challenge is not to
      the acquisition proceedings. Because of the operation of section 24(2)
      of the 2013 Act, the ratio of the various cases decided by this Court
      under the Act of 1894, has no application to such situations. It has
      observed thus:
G
            “21. All the decisions cited by the learned Senior Counsel
            appearing for the appellants, no doubt, have categorically held
            that the subsequent purchasers do not have locus standi to
            challenge the acquisition proceedings. However, in the present
            case, the challenge is not to the acquisition proceedings; it is only
H           for a declaration that the acquisition proceedings have lapsed
      SHIV KUMAR & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.                              703
                 [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

      because of the operation of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, and          A
      therefore, the ratio in those cases has no application to these
      cases.
      22. It is one thing to say that there is a challenge to the legality
      or propriety or validity of the acquisition proceedings and yet
      another thing to say that by virtue of the operation of subsequent      B
      legislation, the acquisition proceedings have lapsed.
      23. In all the decisions cited by the learned Senior Counsel for
      the appellants, which we have referred to above, this Court has
      protected the rights of the subsequent purchaser to claim
      compensation, being a person interested in the compensation,            C
      despite holding that they have no locus standi to challenge the
      acquisition proceedings.
      28. Thus, the subsequent purchaser, the assignee, the successor
      in interest, the power-of-attorney holder, etc., are all persons who
      are interested in compensation/landowners/affected persons in           D
      terms of the 2013 Act and such persons are entitled to file a case
      for a declaration that the land acquisition proceedings have lapsed
      by virtue of operation of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. It is a
      declaration qua the land wherein indisputably they have an
      interest, and they are affected by such acquisition. For such a
      declaration, it cannot be said that the respondent-writ petitioners     E
      do not have any locus standi.”
       6. First, we advert to the legal position concerning the purchases
made on 5.7.2001, made after notification under Section 4 had been
issued under the Act of 1894. Law is well settled in this regard by a
catena of decisions of this Court that an incumbent, who has purchased        F
the land after section 4 notification, has no right to question the
acquisition.
       6 (a). In U.P. Jal Nigam, Lucknow through its Chairman &
Anr. v. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd., Lucknow & Ors. (1996) 3 SCC
124 it was observed :                                                         G
      “3. …...That apart, since M/s. Kalra Properties, the respondent
      had purchased the land after the notification under Section 4(1)
      was published, its sale is void against the State, and it acquired
      no right, title, or interest in the land. Consequently, it is settled
      law that it cannot challenge the validity of the notification or the    H
704           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2019] 13 S.C.R.


A          regularity in taking possession of the land before the publication
           of the declaration under Section 6 was published.”
            6(b). In Sneh Prabha (Smt.) & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Anr.
      (1996) 7 SCC 426 it has been laid down that subsequent purchaser
      cannot take advantage of land policy. It was observed:
B
           “5. Though at first blush, we were inclined to agree with the
           appellant but on a deeper probe, we find that the appellant is not
           entitled to the benefit of the Land Policy. It is settled law that
           any person who purchases land after the publication of the
           notification under Section 4(1), does so at his/her peril. The object
C          of publication of the notification under Section 4(1) is notice to
           everyone that the land is needed or is likely to be needed for a
           public purpose, and the acquisition proceedings point out an
           impediment to anyone to encumber the land acquired thereunder.
           It authorizes the designated officer to enter upon the land to do
D          preliminaries, etc. Therefore, any alienation of land after the
           publication of the notification under Section 4(1) does not bind
           the Government or the beneficiary under the acquisition. On
           taking possession of the land, all rights, titles, and interests in land
           stand vested in the State, under Section 16 of the Act, free from
           all encumbrances, and thereby, absolute title in the land is
E
           acquired thereunder. If any subsequent purchaser acquires land,
           his/her only right would be subject to the provisions of the Act
           and/ or to receive compensation for the land. In a recent
           judgment, this Court in Union of India v. Shri Shivkumar Bhargava
           and Ors. [1995] 1 SCR 354 considered the controversy and held
F          that a person who purchases land subsequent to the notification
           is not entitled to an alternative site. It is seen that the Land Policy
           expressly conferred that right only on that person whose land
           was acquired. In other words, the person must be the owner of
           the land on the date on which notification under Section 4(1) was
G          published. By necessary implication, the subsequent purchaser
           was elbowed out from the policy and became disentitled to the
           benefit of the Land Policy.”
            6(c). In Meera Sahni v. Lieutenant Governor of Delhi & Ors.
      (2008) 9 SCC 177, the Court had relied upon the decision described
H     above and observed thus:
      SHIV KUMAR & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.                              705
                 [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

      “21. In view of the aforesaid decisions, it is by now well-settled      A
      law that under the Land Acquisition Act, the subsequent purchaser
      cannot challenge the acquisition proceedings and that he would
      be only entitled to get the compensation.”
      6(d). In V. Chandrasekaran & Anr. v. Administrative Officer
& Ors. (2012) 12 SCC 133, the Court has considered various decisions          B
and opined that the purchaser after Section 4 notification could not
challenge land acquisition on any ground whatsoever. The Court
observed:
      “15. The issue of maintainability of the writ petitions by the person
      who purchases the land subsequent to a notification being issued        C
      under Section 4 of the Act has been considered by this Court
      time and again. In Leela Ram v. Union of India AIR 1975 SC
      2112, this Court held that anyone who deals with the land
      subsequent to a Section 4 notification being issued, does so, at
      his own peril. In Sneh Prabha v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR
      1996 SC 540, this Court held that a Section 4 notification gives        D
      a notice to the public at large that the land in respect to which it
      has been issued, is needed for a public purpose, and it further
      points out that there will be “an impediment to anyone to
      encumber the land acquired thereunder.” The alienation after that
      does not bind the State or the beneficiary under the acquisition.
                                                                              E
      The purchaser is entitled only to receive compensation. While
      deciding the said case, reliance was placed on an earlier judgment
      of this Court in Union of India v. Shiv Kumar Bhargava and Ors.
      (1995) 2 SCC 427.
      18. In view of the above, the law on the issue can be summarized
      to the effect that a person who purchases land subsequent to            F
      the issuance of a Section 4 notification with respect to it, is not
      competent to challenge the validity of the acquisition proceedings
      on any ground whatsoever, for the reason that the sale deed
      executed in his favour does not confer upon him, any title and at
      the most he can claim compensation on the basis of his vendor’s         G
      title.”
                                                     (emphasis supplied)
      6(e). In Rajasthan State Industrial Development and
Investment Corpn. v. Subhash Sindhi Cooperative Housing Society,
Jaipur & Ors. (2013) 5 SCC 427, it is laid down:                              H
706            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2019] 13 S.C.R.


A           “13. There can be no quarrel with respect to the settled legal
            proposition that a purchaser, subsequent to the issuance of a
            Section 4 Notification in respect of the land, cannot challenge
            the acquisition proceedings, and can only claim compensation as
            the sale transaction in such a situation is Void qua the
            Government. Any such encumbrance created by the owner, or
B
            any transfer of the land in question that is made after the issuance
            of such a notification would be deemed to be void and would
            not be binding on the Government. (Vide: Gian Chand v. Gopala
            and Ors. (1995) 2 SCC 528; Yadu Nandan Garg v. State of
            Rajasthan and Ors. AIR 1996 SC 520; Jaipur Development
C           Authority v. Mahavir Housing Coop. Society, Jaipur, and Ors.
            (1996) 11 SCC 229; Secretary, Jaipur Development Authority,
            Jaipur v. Daulat Mal Jain and Ors. (1997) 1 SCC 35; Meera
            Sahni v. Lieutenant Governor of Delhi and Ors. (2008) 9 SCC
            177; Har Narain (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Mam Chand (Dead) by
            L.Rs. and Ors. (2010) 13 SCC 128; and V. Chandrasekaran and
D
            Anr. v. The Administrative Officer and Ors. JT 2012 (9) SC
            260).”
                                                          (emphasis supplied)
            6(f). A Three-Judge Bench in Rajasthan Housing Board v. New
E     Pink City Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. & Anr., (2015) 7 SCC 601, in
      the context of section 4 as well as section 42 of the Rajasthan Tenancy
      Act which also prohibited the transactions from being entered into with
      SC/ST persons, has observed:
            “33. The other decision relied upon by the Society is V.
F           Chandrasekaran and Anr. v. Administrative Officer and Ors.
            2012 (12) SCC 133] wherein this Court laid down thus:
            17. In Ajay Kishan Singhal v. Union of India: AIR 1996 SC 2677;
            Mahavir and Anr. v. Rural Institute, Amravati and Anr. (1995) 5
            SCC 335; Gian Chand v. Gopala and Ors. (1995) 2 SCC 528;
G           and Meera Sahni v. Lieutenant Governor of Delhi and Ors. (2008)
            9 SCC 177, this Court categorically held that a person who
            purchases land after the publication of a Section 4 notification
            with respect to it, is not entitled to challenge the proceedings for
            the reason, that his title is void and he can at best claim
            compensation on the basis of vendor’s title. In view of this, the
H           sale of land after issuance of a Section 4 notification is void, and
     SHIV KUMAR & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.                              707
                [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

     the purchaser cannot challenge the acquisition proceedings. (See        A
     also: Tika Ram v. the State of U.P. (2009) 10 SCC 689).
     18. In view of the above, the law on the issue can be summarized
     to the effect that a person who purchases land subsequent to
     the issuance of a Section 4 notification with respect to it, is not
     competent to challenge the validity of the acquisition proceedings      B
     on any ground whatsoever, for the reason that the sale deed
     executed in his favour does not confer upon him, any title and at
     the most he can claim compensation on the basis of his vendor’s
     title.
     34. Reliance has been placed on Dossibai Nanabhoy Jeejeebhoy            C
     v. P.M. Bharucha 1958 (60) Bom.LR 1208] so as to contend that
     the ‘person interested’ in the land under Section 9 of the Land
     Acquisition Act would include a person who claims interest in
     compensation to be paid on account of acquisition of land ad the
     interest contemplated Under Section 9 is not restricted to legal        D
     or proprietary estate or interest in the land but such interest as
     will sustain a claim to apportionment, is the owner of the land.
     In our opinion, the decision is of no avail. The instant transaction
     being void as per Section 42 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, and
     the property was inalienable to non-SC. Obviously, the logical
     corollary has to be taken that no right in apportionment to             E
     compensation can be claimed by the Society.”
      6(g). In M. Venkatesh & Ors. v. Commissioner, Bangalore
Development Authority, etc. (2015) 17 SCC 1, a three-Judge Bench
has opined:
                                                                             F
     “16. That brings us to the question of whether Prabhaudas Patel
     and other respondents in SLP (C) No. 12016 of 2013 were
     entitled to any relief from the Court. These respondents claim
     to have purchased the suit property in terms of a sale deed dated
     22-8-1990, i.e., long after the issuance of the preliminary
     Notification published in July 1984. The legal position about the       G
     validity of any such sale, post-issuance of preliminary notification,
     is fairly well settled by a long line of the decisions of this Court.
     The sale in such cases is void and non-est in the eye of the law
     giving to the vendee the limited right to claim compensation and
     no more. Reference may in this regard be made to the decision           H
708            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2019] 13 S.C.R.


A           of this Court in U.P. Jal Nigam v. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd,
            wherein this Court said: (SCC pp. 126-27, para 3)
            “3. … It is settled law that after the notification under Section
            4(1) is published in the gazette, any encumbrance created by the
            owner does not bind the Government, and the purchaser does
B           not acquire any title to the property. In this case, Notification
            under Section 4(1) was published on 24-3-1973; possession of
            the land admittedly was taken on 5-7-1973, and the pumping
            station house was constructed. No doubt, declaration under
            Section 6 was published later on 8-7-1973. Admittedly power
            under Section 17(4) was exercised dispensing with the inquiry
C           under Section 5-A and on service of the notice under Section 9
            possession was taken, since urgency was acute viz. pumping
            station house was to be constructed to drain out floodwater.
            Consequently, the land stood vested in the State under Section
            17(2) free from all encumbrances. It is further settled law that
D           once possession is taken, by operation of Section 17(2), the land
            vests in the State free from all encumbrances unless a notification
            under Section 48(1) is published in the gazette withdrawing from
            the acquisition. Section 11-A, as amended by Act 68 of 1984,
            therefore, does not apply, and the acquisition does not lapse. The
            notification under Section 4(1) and the declaration under Section
E           6, therefore, remain valid. There is no other provision under the
            Act to have the acquired land divested, unless, as stated earlier,
            notification under Section 48(1) was published, and the possession
            is surrendered pursuant thereto. That apart, since M/s Kalra
            Properties, the respondent had purchased the land after the
            notification under Section 4(1) was published, its sale is void
F
            against the State, and it acquired no right, title, or interest in the
            land. Consequently, it is settled law that it cannot challenge the
            validity of the notification or the regularity in taking possession
            of the land before the publication of the declaration under Section
            6 was published.
G                                                          (emphasis supplied)”
            7. It has been laid down that the purchasers on any ground
      whatsoever cannot question proceedings for taking possession. A
      purchaser after Section 4 notification does not acquire any right in the
      land as the sale is ab initio void and has no right to claim land under
H     the Policy.
      SHIV KUMAR & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.                             709
                 [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

       8. When we ponder as to beneficial provisions of the Act of 2013,     A
they also intend to benefit landowners mentioned in the notification under
Section 4, not for the benefit of such purchasers who purchase the land
after it has been vested in the State.
       9. Sub-section 4 of Section 11 of the Act of 2013, which is akin
to section 4 of the Act of 1894, contains a prohibition that no person       B
shall make any transaction or cause any transaction of land or create
any encumbrance on land from the date of publication of such
notification. Section 11(4) is extracted hereunder:
      “11. Publication of preliminary notification and power of
      officers thereupon.–                                                   C
      xxxxx
      (4) No person shall make any transaction or cause any transaction
      of land specified in the preliminary notification or create any
      encumbrances on such land from the date of publication of such
      notification till such time as the proceedings under this Chapter      D
      are completed:
      Provided that the Collector may, on the application made by the
      owner of the land so notified, exempt in special circumstances
      to be recorded in writing, such owner from the operation of this
      subsection:
                                                                             E
      Provided further that any loss or injury suffered by any person
      due to his wilful violation of this provision shall not be made up
      by the Collector.”
       Without seeking exemption from the Collector, there is a total
prohibition on any transaction of land. Whereas the legal position under     F
the Act of 1894 was that a transaction effected after section 4
notification was illegal and void.
      10. When we consider other provisions, the ‘affected family’ has
been defined under section 3(c) of the 2013 Act. The definition reads
as under:
                                                                             G
      “3. Definitions.–In this Act, unless the context otherwise
      requires,—
      (c) “affected family” includes—
        (i) a family whose land or other immovable property has been
            acquired;                                                        H
710            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2019] 13 S.C.R.


A            (ii) a family which does not own any land but a member or
                  members of such family may be agricultural labourers,
                  tenants including any form of tenancy or holding of usufruct
                  right, share-croppers or artisans or who may be working in
                  the affected area for three years prior to the acquisition of
                  the land, whose primary source of livelihood stand affected
B                 by the acquisition of land;
             (iii) the Scheduled Tribes and other traditional forest dwellers
                   who have lost any of their forest rights recognized under
                   the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers
                   (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 (2 of 2007) due
C                  to acquisition of land;
             (iv) family whose primary source of livelihood for three years
                  prior to the acquisition of the land is dependent on forests
                  or water bodies and includes gatherers of forest produce,
                  hunters, fisherfolk and boatmen, and such livelihood is
D                 affected due to acquisition of land;
             (v) a member of the family who has been assigned land by the
                 State Government or the Central Government under any of
                 its schemes and such land is under acquisition;
            (vi) a family residing on any land in the urban areas for
E                preceding three years or more prior to the acquisition of the
                 land or whose primary source of livelihood for three years
                 prior to the acquisition of the land is affected by the
                 acquisition of such land;”
             The affected family includes landowners for whose benefit land
F     is held before the acquisition. A person acquiring interest after section
      11 notification cannot be said to be included in the “affected family” at
      all.
            11. Definition of ‘family’ is in section 3(m), it is extracted
      hereunder:
G
            “3. Definition.–In this Act, unless the context otherwise
            requires,—
            …..
            (m) “family” includes a person, his or her spouse, minor children,
H           minor brothers and minor sisters dependent on him: Provided that
      SHIV KUMAR & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.                               711
                 [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

      widows, divorcees, and women deserted by families shall be               A
      considered separate families;
      Explanation.—An adult of either gender with or without spouse
      or children or dependents shall be considered as a separate family
      for the purposes of this Act.”
      12. The definition of ‘landowner’ is in section 3(r), the same is        B
extracted hereunder:
      “3. Definition.–In this Act, unless the context otherwise
      requires,—
      …..                                                                      C
      (r) “landowner” includes any person,— (i) whose name is
      recorded as the owner of the land or building or part thereof, in
      the records of the authority concerned; or
      (ii) any person who is granted forest rights under the Scheduled
      Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of             D
      Forest Rights) Act, 2006 (2 of 2007) or under any other law for
      the time being in force; or
      (iii) who is entitled to be granted Patta rights on the land under
      any law of the State including assigned lands; or (iv) any person
      who has been declared as such by an order of the court or                E
      Authority;”
       Landowner is a person who is recoded as the owner of land or
building. The record of date of issuance of preliminary notification under
section 11 is relevant. A purchaser after section 11 cannot be said to
be a landowner within the purview of section 3(r).                             F
      13. Person interested is defined in section 3(x) thus :
      “3. Definition.–In this Act, unless the context otherwise
      requires,—
      (x) “person interested” means—                                           G
            (i) all persons claiming an interest in compensation to be
                made on account of the acquisition of land under this
                Act;
            (ii) the Scheduled Tribes and other traditional forest dwellers,
                 who have lost any forest rights recognized under the          H
712            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2019] 13 S.C.R.


A                    Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers
                     (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 (2 of 2007);
             (iii) a person interested in an easement affecting the land;
             (iv) persons having tenancy rights under the relevant State laws
                  including share-croppers by whatever name they may be
B
                  called; and
             (v) any person whose primary source of livelihood is likely to
                 be adversely affected;”
            14. A rehabilitation and resettlement scheme has to be prepared
C     under Section 16. Section 17 deals with the review of such a scheme.
      An approved scheme to be made public under Section 18. Section 19
      deals with the publication of declaration and summary of rehabilitation
      and resettlement scheme. After inquiry, Award is passed by the Collector
      under Section 23. The Collector is required to consider, among other
      things, the interest of the person claiming the compensation,
D
      rehabilitation, and resettlement while making an award.
            15. Section 24 of the Act of 2013, which deals with land
      acquisition made under the Act of 1894, is also relevant. The same is
      extracted hereunder:
E            “24. Land acquisition process under Act No. 1 of 1894
            shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases – (1)
            Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in any case of
            land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition
            Act, 1894,—
F            (a) where no award under section 11 of the said Land
                 Acquisition Act has been made, then, all provisions of this
                 Act relating to the determination of compensation shall
                 apply; or
             (b) where an award under said section 11 has been made, then
G                such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the
                 said Land Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not been
                 repealed.
            (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), in case
            of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land
H           Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), where an award under the
      SHIV KUMAR & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.                               713
                 [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

      said section 11 has been made five years or more prior to the            A
      commencement of this Act but the physical possession of the
      land has not been taken, or the compensation has not been paid
      the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the
      appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate the
      proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with
                                                                               B
      the provisions of this Act:
      Provided that where an award has been made, and compensation
      in respect of a majority of land holdings has not been deposited
      in the account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified
      in the notification for acquisition under section 4 of the said Land
      Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to compensation in accordance         C
      with the provisions of this Act.”
                                                      (emphasis supplied)
       16. Section 24 (2) provides that in case the award has been
passed five years or more prior to the commencement of the Act, but            D
the physical possession of the land has not been taken, or the
compensation has not been paid, the said proceedings shall be deemed
to have lapsed. It is not the case set up that compensation had not been
paid to purchasers/owners. The only case set up is that physical
possession has not been taken and proceedings of taking over possession
have been questioned to take advantage of provisions under Section             E
24(2) of the Act of 2013. Whereas, averment in the writ petition itself
indicates that possession had been taken over in the year 2000 and that
unauthorized colonies have come up in the area. Thus, it is clear that
possession, if any, is illegal, and in fact, the actual physical possession
had been taken, and re-entering in possession in an unauthorized manner        F
can confer no right. There is nothing to doubt that actual physical
possession had been taken in 2000. Thus, Section 24(2) is not attracted
in the case.
      17. Even otherwise, proviso to Section 24(2) does not recognize
a purchaser after Section 4 notification inasmuch as it provides that          G
where an award has been made, and the compensation in respect of a
majority of land holdings has not been deposited in the account of the
beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the notification for
acquisition issued under the Act of 1894, shall be entitled to
compensation under the provisions of the Act of 2013. The proviso
makes it clear that in case of compensation concerning the majority of         H
714            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2019] 13 S.C.R.


A     landholding has not been deposited, then recorded owner(s) at the time
      of issuance of notification under section 4 of the Act of 1894 shall have
      the right to receive the compensation. Purchasers after section 4
      notification have not been given the right to receive the higher
      compensation under the provisions contained in the act of 2013
B            18. The Act of 2013 presupposes that a person is required to be
      rehabilitated and resettled. Such a person who has purchased after
      section 4 notification as sale deed is void under the Act of 1894, cannot
      claim rehabilitation and resettlement as per policy envisaged under the
      Act of 2013, as his land has not been acquired, but he has purchased
      a property which has already been acquired by the State Government,
C     he cannot claim even higher compensation, as per proviso to section
      24(2) under the Act of 2013. An original landowner cannot be deprived
      of higher value under the Act of 2013, which higher compensation was
      not so contemplated when the void transaction of sale had been entered,
      and right is conferred under proviso to Section 24(2) on recorded owners
D     under Act of 1894. We have come across instances in which after
      notifications under section 4 were issued and, the property was
      purchased at throwaway prices by the builders and unscrupulous
      persons, such purchases are void and confer no right even to claim
      higher compensation under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 as it is to
      be given to the owner as mentioned in the notification.
E
             19. Given that, the transaction of sale, effected after section 4
      notification, is void, is ineffective to transfer the land, such incumbents
      cannot invoke the provisions of section 24. As the sale transaction did
      not clothe them with the title when the purchase was made; they cannot
      claim ‘possession’ and challenge the acquisition as having lapsed under
F     section 24 by questioning the legality or regularity of proceedings of
      taking over of possession under the Act of 1894. It would be unfair
      and profoundly unjust and against the policy of the law to permit such
      a person to claim resettlement or claim the land back as envisaged under
      the Act of 2013. When he has not been deprived of his livelihood but
      is a purchaser under a void transaction, the outcome of exploitative
G     tactics played upon poor farmers who were unable to defend
      themselves.
            20. Thus, under the provisions of Section 24 of the Act of 2013,
      challenge to acquisition proceeding of the taking over of possession
      under the Act of 1894 cannot be made, based on a void transaction
H     nor declaration can be sought under section 24(2) by such incumbents
       SHIV KUMAR & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.                                 715
                  [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

to obtain the land. The declaration that acquisition has lapsed under the         A
Act of 2013 is to get the property back whereas, the transaction once
void, is always a void transaction, as no title can be a acquired in the
land as such no such declaration can be sought. It would not be legal,
just and equitable to give the land back to purchaser as land was not
capable of being sold which was in process of acquisition under the
Act of 1894. The Act of 2013 does not confer any right on purchaser               B
whose sale is ab initio void. Such void transactions are not validated
under the Act of 2013. No rights are conferred by the provisions
contained in the 2013 Act on such a purchaser as against the State.
       21. ‘Void is, ab initio,’ a nullity, is inoperative, and a person cannot
claim the land or declaration once no title has been conferred upon him           C
to claim that the land should be given back to him. A person cannot
enforce and ripe fruits based on a void transaction to start claiming title
and possession of the land by seeking a declaration under Section 24
of the Act of 2013; it will amount to conferment of benefit never
contemplated by the law. The question is, who can claim declaration/              D
rights under section 24(2) for the restoration of land or lapse of
acquisition. It cannot be by a person with no title in the land. The
provision of the Act of 2013 cannot be said to be enabling or authorizing
a purchaser after Section 4 to question proceeding taken under the Act
of 1894 of taking possession as held in U.P. Jal Nigam (supra) which
is followed in M. Venkatesh (supra) and other decisions and                       E
consequently claim declaration under Section 24 of the Act of 2013.
What cannot be done directly cannot be permitted in an indirect method.
      22. The provisions of the Act of 2013 aimed at the acquisition
of land with least disturbance to the landowners and other affected
families and to provide just and fair compensation to affected families           F
whose land has been acquired or proposed to be acquired or are affected
and to make adequate provisions for such affected persons for their
rehabilitation and resettlement. The provisions of Act of 2013 aim at
ousting all inter-meddlers from the fray by ensuring payment in the bank
account of landholders under section 77 of the Act.                               G
       23. The intendment of Act of 2013 is to benefit farmers etc.
Subsequent purchasers cannot be said to be landowners entitled to
restoration of land and cannot be termed to be affected persons within
the provisions of Act of 2013. It is not open to them to claim that the
proceedings have lapsed under Section 24(2).                                      H
716            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2019] 13 S.C.R.


A            24. Apart from that the claims have been made on transactions
      based on the power of attorneys, agreements, etc.; as such also they
      are not entitled to any indulgence and cannot invoke provisions of section
      24(2) of the 2013 Act. The Court has considered the question of the
      validity of transactions in the form of power of attorney in Suraj Lamp
      and Industries Pvt. Ltd. through Director v. State of Haryana &
B
      Anr. (2012) 1 SCC 656, and has held that no rights could be accrued
      on such transactions as this is not a legal mode of transfer. This Court
      has observed :
             “20. A power of attorney is not an instrument of transfer in
            regard to any right, title, or interest in an immovable property.
C           The Power of Attorney is a creation of an agency whereby the
            grantor authorizes the grantee to do the acts specified therein,
            on behalf of the grantor, which when executed will be binding
            on the grantor as if done by him (see Section 1A and Section 2
            of the Powers of Attorney Act, 1882). It is revocable or
D           terminable at any time unless it is made irrevocable in a manner
            known to law. Even an irrevocable attorney does not have the
            effect of transferring title to the grantee.
            21. In-State of Rajasthan v. Basant Nehata 2005 (12) SCC 77
            this Court held:
E           “13. A grant of power of attorney is essentially governed by
            Chapter X of the Contract Act. By reason of a deed of power
            of attorney, an agent is formally appointed to act for the principal
            in one transaction or a series of transactions or to manage the
            affairs of the principal generally conferring necessary authority
F           upon another person. A deed of power of attorney is executed
            by the principal in favor of the agent. The agent derives a right
            to use his name and all acts, deeds, and things are done by him
            and subject to the limitations contained in the said deed, the same
            shall be read as if done by the donor. A power of attorney is, as
            is well known, a document of convenience.
G
            Execution of a power of attorney in terms of the provisions of
            the Contract Act as also the Powers-of-Attorney Act is valid. A
            power of attorney, we have noticed hereinbefore, is executed by
            the donor so as to enable the done to act on his behalf. Except
            in cases where power of attorney is coupled with an interest, it
H           is revocable. The done in exercise of his power under such
SHIV KUMAR & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.                              717
           [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

power of attorney only acts in place of the donor subject, of           A
course, to the powers granted to him by reason thereof. He
cannot use the power of attorney for his own benefit. He acts
in a fiduciary capacity. Any act of infidelity or breach of trust is
a matter between the donor and the done.
An attorney holder may, however, execute a deed of conveyance           B
in the exercise of the power granted under a power of attorney
and convey title on behalf of the grantor.
Scope of Will
14. A will is the testament of the testator. It is a posthumous
disposition of the estate of the testator directing the distribution    C
of his estate upon his death. It is not a transfer inter vivo. The
two essential characteristics of a will are that it is intended to
come into effect only after the death of the testator and is
revocable at any time during the lifetime of the testator. It is said
that so long as the testator is alive, a will is not be worth the       D
paper on which it is written, as the testator can at any time
revoke it. If the testator, who is not married, marries after making
the will, by operation of law, the will stands revoked. (see
Sections 69 and 70 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925).
Registration of a will does not make it any more effective.
                                                                        E
Conclusion
15. Therefore, a SA/GPA/WILL transaction does not convey any
title nor create any interest in an immovable property. The
observations by the Delhi High Court, in Asha M. Jain v. Canara
Bank 94 (2001) DLT 841 that the “concept of power of attorney           F
sales have been recognized as a mode of transaction” when
dealing with transactions by way of SA/GPA/WILL are
unwarranted and not justified, unintended misleading the general
public into thinking that SA/GPA/WILL transactions are some
kind of a recognized or accepted mode of transfer and that it
can be a valid substitute for a sale deed. Such decisions to the        G
extent they recognize or accept SA/GPA/WILL transactions as
concluded transfers, as contrasted from an agreement to transfer,
are not good law.
16. We, therefore, reiterate that immovable property can be legally
and lawfully transferred/ conveyed only by a registered deed of         H
718            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2019] 13 S.C.R.


A           conveyance. Transactions of the nature of ‘GPA sales’ or ‘SA/
            GPA/WILL transfers’ do not convey title and do not amount to
            transfer, nor can they be recognized or valid mode of transfer
            of immovable property. The courts will not treat such transactions
            as completed or concluded transfers or as conveyances as they
            neither convey title nor create any interest in an immovable
B
            property. They cannot be recognized as deeds of title, except to
            the limited extent of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act.
            Such transactions cannot be relied upon or made the basis for
            mutations in Municipal or Revenue Records. What is stated
            above will apply not only to deeds of conveyance in regard to
C           freehold property but also to transfer of leasehold property. A
            lease can be validly transferred only under a registered
            Assignment of Lease. It is time that an end is put to the pernicious
            practice of SA/GPA/WILL transactions known as GPA sales.
            17. It has been submitted that making declaration that GPA sales
D           and SA/GPA/WILL transfers are not legally valid modes of
            transfer is likely to create hardship to a large number of persons
            who have entered into such transactions, and they should be given
            sufficient time to regularize the transactions by obtaining deeds
            of conveyance. It is also submitted that this decision should be
            made applicable prospectively to avoid hardship.”
E
             No right can be claimed based on a transfer made by way of
      execution of Power of Attorney, Will, etc., as it does not create any
      interest in immovable property.
             25. In Manav Dharam Trust (supra), even the provisions of the
F     Act of 2013 have not been taken into consideration, which prohibits
      such transactions in particular provisions of section 11, including the
      proviso to section 24(2). Apart from that, it was not legally permissible
      to a Division Bench to ignore the decisions of the larger Bench
      comprising of three Judges and of Co-ordinate Bench. They were not
G     per incuriam and were relevant for deciding the issue of taking
      possession under Act of 1894, at the instance of purchaser. In case it
      wanted to depart from the view taken earlier, it ought to have referred
      the matter to a larger bench. It has been ignored that when a purchase
      is void, then no declaration can be sought on the ground that the land
      acquisition under the Act of 2013 has lapsed due to illegality/irregularity
H     of proceedings of taking possession under the Act of 1894. No
      SHIV KUMAR & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.                             719
                 [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

declaration can be sought by a purchaser under Section 24 that               A
acquisition has lapsed, effect of which would be to get back the land.
They cannot seek declaration that acquisition made under the Act of
1894 has lapsed by the challenge to the proceedings of taking possession
under the Act of 1894. Such right was not available after the purchase
in 2000 and no such right has been provided to the purchasers under
the Act of 2013 also. Granting a right to question acquisition would be      B
against the public policy and the law which prohibits such transactions;
it cannot be given effect to under the guise of subsequent legislation
containing similar provisions. Subsequent legislation does not confer any
new right to a person based on such void transaction; instead, it includes
a provision prohibiting such transactions without permission of the          C
Collector as provided in Section 11(4).
       26. Thus, we have to follow the decisions including that of larger
Bench mentioned above, laying down the law on the subject, which still
holds the field and were wrongly distinguished. The binding value of
the decision of larger and coordinate Benches have been ignored while        D
deciding the Manav Dharam Trust case (supra), it was not open to it
to take a different view. The decision in Manav Dharam Trust (supra)
is per incuriam in light of this decision of this Court in Mamleshwar
Prasad v. Kanahaiya Lal, (1975) 2 SCC 232, A.R. Anutulay v. R.S.
Nayak, (1988) 2 SCC 602, State of Uttar Pradesh v. Synthetics and
Chemicals Ltd., (1991) 4 SCC 139, State of B. Shama Rao v. Union             E
Territory of Pondicherry, AIR 1967 SC 1480, Municipal
Corporation of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur, (1989) 1 SCC 101, Narmada
Bachao Andolan (III) v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 2011 SC
1989, Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd. v. State of Odisha, (2015) 2 SCC
189 and Sant Lal Gupta v. Modern Coop. Societies Ltd. 2010 13
                                                                             F
SCC 336.
       27. We hold that Division Bench in Manav Dharam Trust (supra)
does not lay down the law correctly. Given the several binding
precedents which are available and the provisions of the Act of 2013,
we cannot follow the decision in Manav Dharam Trust (supra) and
                                                                             G
overrule it. Shri S.N. Bhatt, learned counsel submitted that in case this
Court does not agree with the Manav Dharam Trust (supra), the case
may be referred to Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India under the
provisions of Order VI Rule 2 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013. He
has relied upon the decision of this court in Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh
Sharma (2019) 6 SCC 162 in which, in view of the conflict of opinion         H
720              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2019] 13 S.C.R.


A     of two Division Bench judgments of this Court as to the interpretation
      of section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 the matter was referred
      to the Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India, for constituting an appropriate
      Bench. However, in the instant case, the issue is different, whether we
      have to follow the decision in Manav Dharam Trust (supra) or the
      earlier decisions of this Court mentioned above. It is apparent that the
B     decisions of the Three Judges Bench are binding on us, and in view of
      other consistent decisions of this Court, we have to follow them. It is
      not appropriate to refer the case to larger Bench under Order VI Rule
      2 of Supreme Court Rules. We find no fault in the Judgments laying
      down the law that the purchase after section 4 is void as against the
C     State. We are not impressed with the submission raised on behalf of
      the purchasers to refer the matter for the constitution of a Larger Bench
      to the Hon’ble Chief Justice. When decisions of Larger Bench and
      other Division Bench are available, the case cannot be referred to a
      Larger Bench.

D            28. Concerning the illegal colony, averments have been made that
      the colony is an unauthorized and provisional order was passed to
      regularise it. The plea taken is contradictory and shows the falsity of
      the claim raised by the purchasers. That, apart predecessors of the
      purchaser obtained the land-based on Power of Attorney, Agreement
      to Sell, and Will on 9.12.1982. As per averments made in the writ
E     application, Bijender Singh, who was owning ½ share, sold the share
      to Satya Narain by the documents like Agreement to Sell, Power of
      Attorney, or Will. It has also been averred that Om Prakash sold the
      remaining ½ share to Satya Narain on 11.3.1984 by way of Agreement
      to Sale, Power of Attorney, or Will. The purchase made through
      Agreement to Sale, Power of Attorney, or Will by Satya Narain did
F
      not confer a title upon him to transfer it to the purchasers apart from
      the fact that it was void in view of purchase after Section 4. Based on
      purchase made from such owners whose title was not perfect,
      purchasers had no derivative title in the eye of law. There was no legally
      recognized title deed in favor of Satya Narain.
G            29. Resultantly, we hold that no interference is called for in the
      judgment and order passed by the High Court. Accordingly, the appeal
      is dismissed.


      Devika Gujral                                              Appeal dismissed.
H