SHIVDEV KAUR (D) BY LRS. & ORS.versusR.S. GREWAL

                   [2013] 5 S.C.R. 267


          SHIVDEV KAUR (D) BY LRS. & ORS.                       A
                             v.
                      R.S. GREWAL
          (Civil Appeal Nos, 5063-5065 of 2005)
                    MARCH 20, 2013.
                                                                B
     [DR. S.S. CHAUHAN AND FAKKIR MOHAMED
               IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, JJ.]

    Hindu Succession Act, 1956 - s.14(2) - 'Life interest'
created in favour of a Hindu female - Under a 'Will' executed   C
prior to commencement of the Act - Held: After
commencement of the Act, the 'life interest' would not stand
converted to 'absolute title'.

      Words and Phrases - Expression 'destitute' - Meaning
                                                                0
of, in the context of Succession.

    The question for consideration in the instant appeals
was whether a 'life interest' created in favour of a Hindu
female through a 'Will' prior to commencement of Hindu
Succes.sion Act, 1956, would stand converted into               E
'absolute right' on commencement of the 1956 Act.

    Dismissing the appeals, the Court

     HELD: 1. Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956
provides for conversion of life interest into absolute title    F
on commencement of the 1956 Act. However, sub·
section (2) carves out an exception to the same, as it
provides that such right would not be conferred where a
property is acquired by a Hindu female by way of 'Gift'
or under a 'Will' or any other instrument prescribing a         G
restricted estate in that property. Therefore, if a Hindu
female has been given only a 'life interest', through 'Will'
or 'Gift' or any other document referred to in Section 14

                            267                                 H
    268     SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [2013] 5 S.C.R.


A of the 1956 Act, the said rights would not stand
  crystallised into the absolute ownership. Interpreting the
  provisions to the effect that she would acquire absolute
  ownership/title into the property by virtue of the
  provisions of Section 14(1) of the 1956 Act, would render
8 the   provisions of Sections 14(2) and 30 of the 1956 Act
  otiose. Thus the property acquired by a Hindu female by
  a 'Will' or 'Gift', giving her only a "life interest", would
  remain the same even after commencement of the 1956
  Act, and .such a Hindu female· cannot acquire absolute
C title. [Paras 9, 13] [272-H; 273-A-B; 274-H; 275-A-C].
      Mst. Karmi v. Amru and Ors. Al~ 1971 SC 745; Navneet
  Lal @ Rangi v. Goku/ and Ors. AIR 1976 SC 794: 1976 (2)
  SCR 924; Jagan Singh (Dead) Through LRs. v. Dhanwanti
  and Anr. (2012) 2 SCC 628: 2012 (2) SCR 303; Sadhu
D Singh v. Gurdwara Sahib Narike and Ors. AIR 2006 SC 3282:
  2006 (5) Suppl. SCR 799; Ba/want Kaur and Anr. v. Chanan
  Singh and Ors. AIR 2000 SC 1908: 2000 (3) SCR 61 - relied
  on.

E        2. Whether person is destitute or not, is a question
    of fact. The expression .'destitute' has not been defined
  . under the 1956 Act or under the Code of Criminal
    Procedure, 1973, or Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The
    dictionary meaning is "without resources, in want of
    necessaries". A person can be held destitute when no
F one is to support him and is found wandering without
    any settled place of abode and without visible means of
    subsistence. [Para 14] [275-D-E]

                                   . .
                     Case Law Reference:
G
     AIR 1971 SC 745           relied on            Para 10
     1976 (2) SCR 924          relied on            Para 10
     2012 (2) SCR 303          relied on            Para' 10
H
     SHIVDEV KAUR (D) BY LRS. & ORS. v. R.S.                    269
                   GREWAL

 2006 (5) Suppl. SCR 799 relied on                       Para 11        A

 2000 (3) SCR 61                relied on                Para 12

    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos.
5063-5065 of 2005.
                                                                        B
    From the Judgment & Orders dated 02.07.2004 of the
High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in Regular
Second Appeal . Nos. 257 & 608 of 1982 and Cross
                                             I
                                                 Objection
                                                         .

No. 14-C of 1982.

     Devender, Minakshi for the Appellants.
                                                                        c
    R.K. Dhawan, Kanika Greval, Sheweeta Joshi, M.A.
Chinnasamy for the Respondent.

     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                         D
     DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J: 1. These appeals have been
preferred against the impugned judgment and order dated
2.7.2004 passed by the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at
Chandigarh in Regular Second Appeal No. 257 of 1982 and
Regular Second Appeal No. 608 of 1982 and Cross Objection               E
No. 14-C of 1982 by which the High Court has affirmed the
judgment of the first appellate court as well as the trial court so
far as the nature of the rights of the appellant in the suit property
are concerned.
                                                                        F
     2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to these appeals
are that:

       A. One Dr. Hira Singh had acquired a huge property in his
life time. He executed various deeds creating certain rights in         G
favour of his sole son Dr. Shivdev Singh Grewal and two
daughters, namely, Smt. Dayawant Kaur and Dr. Shivdev Kaur
including the Will dated 16.9.1944, creating certain rights in
favour of the appellant. Dr. Hira Singh died on 11.4.1945. ·

     B. Shri Shivdev Singh Grewal and Smt. Dayawant Kaur                H
    270       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 5 S.C.R.


A died leaving behind their children. Dr. Shivdev Kaur claimed
  certain rights on the basis of the Will dated 16.9.1944, and for
  the same she filed Suit No. 161/399/74 on 4.10.1974 against
  her nephew for mandatory injunction seeking his eviction from
  the suit premises claiming absolute right/ownership over the
B same in view of the provisions of Section 14 of the Hindu
  Succession Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act
  1956'). The respondent/defendant contested the suit denying
  such a right.

       C. During the pendency of the said suit, the respondent/
C defendant also filed Suit No. 80 of 1976, against the appellant/
  plaintiff for permanent injunction restraining her from transferring/
  alienating the suit property. The trial court vide judgment and
  decree dated 28.4.1978 decided the Suit No. 161/399/74,
  holding that appellant/plaintiff had no absolute right/ownership
D over the suit property. The trial court vide judgment and decree
  dated 4.6.1979 passed in Suit No. 80/1976, held to the effect
  that the appellant would not interfere in any manner in respect
  of the agricultural lands etc., however, she would not be
  dispossessed from the suit premises and it would be subject
E to the final decision of tne another suit.

       D. _Aggrieved, both parties filed appeals and cross-
  objections. The appellate court dismissed the appeal filed by
  the respondent on 22.10.1981. On the same day, appeal filed
F by the appellant was allowed to certain extent. However, so far
  as the issue relating to conversion of the life interest into
  absolute title was decided against the appellant.

      E. Aggrieved, respondent filed RSA Nos. 257 and 608 of
  1982, and appellant filed RSA No. 608/1982 and cross-
G objection bearing No. 14-C/1982.

       F. The appellant executed a Will dated 28.2.1991 in
  respect of the suit property creating a trust in the name of her
  father and appointing Shri Sudarshan Singh Deol and Brig
H lnderjeet Singh Dhillon as the trustees. She further made
     SHIVDEV KAUR (D) BY LRS. & ORS. v. R.S.                    271
         GREWAL [DR. B. S. CHAUHAN, J.]
 Codicil dated 25.8.1995. The appellant died on 15.2.1998 and           A
 thus executors of her Will got impleaded.

     G. The High Court allowed both the RSAs filed by the
 respondent and dismissed the claim of the appellant.

       Hence, these appeals.                                            B

      3. Shri Devender Mohan Verma, learned counsel
 appearing on behalf of the appellant, has argued that the
 appellant had become a widow at a very young age. She was
 maintained by her in laws, thus, her father took pity on her and       c
 ~s she was a destitute, brought her back and created a "life
 interest" in her favour in respect of the suit property by executing
 a Will dated 16.9.1944. She started r;;:isiding in the suit
 property. Her father died in 1945. After commencement of the
 Act 1956, right of "life interest" stood ·crystallised into absolute   .D
 right and title. Therefore, the courts below erred in deciding the
 issue againsther. Thus, the appeals deserve to be allowed.
                                                                             "
       4. Per contra, Shri R.K, Dhawan, learned counsel
  appearing on behalf of the respondent, has opposed the
  appeals contending that the appellant cannot be permitted to          E
  introduce a new case that the appellant was a destitute. She
  was a well qualified person and MBBS doctor. She had
  acquired large properties from the family of her late husband.
  More so, father of the appellant had created only "life interest"
. in her favour in the suit property by executing the Will. Section     F
  14(2) of the Act 1956 does not ,provide that such "life interest"
  would stand converted into absolute ownership on
  commencement of the said Act. There are concurrent findings
  of facts on this issue and, thus, the appeals lack merit and are
  liable to be dismissed.                                               G

      5. We have considered the rival ·submissions made by the
 learned counsel for the parties and perused the records.

     6. The document creating a limited right, "life interest" in
 favour of the appellant Le. Will dated 16.9.1944 so far as the         H
    272       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 5 S.C.R.


A   relevant parUs concerned reads as under:

          "I give this Kothi situated at Iqbal Road to my daughter
          Bibi Shivdev Kaur subject to the rights of Bibi Shiv Charan
          Kaur, mentioned above, for life time, who after my death
B         will remain abad in this Kothi and get benefit thereof. If she
          wishes, she can get the benefit of its rent also as per
          necessity and can use the income of rent. But these rights
          are only for her life time. She can not alienate this kothi or
          the site relating thereto, in any way, or create any charge
          thereon, nor she can mortgage gift, sell or transfer it. My
c         son Shibdev Singh aforesaid shall also l;>e the sole owner
          of this Kothi subject to the above mentioned rights."

          7. It.is evident from the aforesaid part of the Will that only
    a life interest had been created in favour of the appellant by
D   that Will. Therefore, the sole question for our consideration
    remains as to whether such limited right got converted into
    absolute right on commencement of the Act 1956.

          8. Section 14 of the Act 1956 reads as under:
E         "14. Property of a female Hindu to be her absolute
          property.

          (1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether
          acquired before or after the commencement of this Act,
F         shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a
          limited owner.

          (2) Nothing contained in sub- section (1) shall apply to any
          property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other
          instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or
G
          under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other
          instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a
          restricted estate in such property."
                                                   {Emphasis added)
H         9. The aforesaid statutory provisions provide for
    SHIVDEV KAUR (D) BY LRS. & ORS. v. R.S.                 273
        GREWAL [DR. B. S. CHAUHAN, J.]
conversion of life interest into absolute title on commencement   A
of the Act 1956, however, sub-section (2) carves out an
exception to the same as it provides that such right would not
be conferred where a property is acquired by a Hindu female
by way of gift or under a Will or any other instrument
prescribing a restricted estate in that property.                 B

     10. In Mst. Karmi v. Amru & Ors., AIR 1971 SC 745, a
similar issue was considered by this Court and after examining
the contents of the Will came to the conclusion that where a
woman succeeded some property on the strength of a Will, she      C
cannot claim any right in those properties over and above what
was given to her under that Will. The life estate given to her
under the Will would not become an absolute estate under the
provisions of the Act 1956 and, thus, such a Hindu female
cannot claim any title to the suit property on the basis of the
Will executed in her favour. (See also: Navneet Lal @ Rangi        D
 v. Gokul & Ors., AIR 1976 SC 794; and Jagan Singh (Dead)
 Through LRs. v. Dhanwanti & Anr., (2012) 2 SCC 628).

    11. In Sadhu Singh v. Gurdwara Sahib Narike & Ors., AIR
2006 SC 3282, this Court again considered the issue, held as       E
under:

            "When he thus validly disposes of his property by
     providing for a limited estate to his heir, the wife or widow
     has to take it as the estate falls. This restriction on her
     right so provided, is really respected by the Act. It provides F
     in Section 14(2) of the Act, that in such a case, the widow·
      is bound by the limitation on her right and she cannot
     claim any higher right by invoking Section 14(1) of the
    .Act. In other words, conferment of a limited estate which
     is otherwise valid in law is reinforced by this Act by the G
     introduction of Section 14(2) of the Act and excluding the
     operation of Section 14(1) of the Act, even if that provision
     is held to be attracted in the case of a succession under
     the Act. Invocation of Section 14(1) of the Act in the case
     of a testamentary disposition taking effect after the Act, H
    274        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2013] 5 S.C.R.


A         would make Sect;ons 30 and 14(2) redundant or otiose.
          It will also make redundant, the expression "property
          possessed by a female Hindu" occurring in Section 14(1)
          of the Act. An interpretation that leads to such a result
          cannot certainly be accepted. Surely, there is nothing in
s         the Act compelling such an interpretation. Sections 14
          and 30 both have play. Section 14(1) applies in a case
          where the· female had received the property prior to the
          Act being entitled to it as a matter of right, even if the right
          be to a limited estate under the Mitakshara law or the
c         right to maintenance. (Emphasis added)

        12. Shri Verma, learned counsel for the appellant placed
  a very heavy reliance on the judgment of this Court in Ba/want
  Kaur & Anr. v.- Chanan Singh & Ors., AIR 2000 SC 1908,
  contending that a destitute Hindu daughter if acquires such a
D right, it would stand crystallised in absolute title. There is a
  complete fallacy in his argument. In the said case, this Court
  held that all the clauses of the Will must be read together to
  find out the intention of the testator. The court held:

E         "... This is obviously on the principle that the last clause
          represents the latest intention of the testator. It is true that
          in the earlier part of the Will, the testator has stated that
          his daughter Ba/want Kaur shall be the heir, owner and
          title-holder of his entire remaining moveable and
F         immovable property but in the later part of the same Will
          he has clearly stated that on the death of Ba/want Kaur,
          the brothers· of the testator shall be the heirs of the
          property. This' clearly shows that the recitals in the later
          part of the Will would operate and make Appellant 1 only
          a limited estate-holder in the property bequeathed to her."
G
                                                    (Emphasis added)

       13. Thus, in view of the above, the law on the issue can
  be summarised to the effect that if a Hindu female has been
H given only a "life interest", through Will or gift or any other
     SHIVDEV KAUR (D) BY LRS. & ORS. v. R.S.                   275
         GREWAL [DR. B. S. CHAUHAN, J.]
document referred to in Section 14 of the Act 1956, the said           A
rights would not stand crystallised into the absolute ownership
as interpreting the provisions to the effect that she would
acquire absolute ownership/title into the property by virtue of
the provisions of Section 14(1) of the Act 1956, the provisions
of Sections 14(2) and 30 of the Act 1956 would become otios.           8
      Section 14(2) carves out an exception to rule provided in
  sub-section (1) thereof, which clearly provides that if a property
  has been acquired by a Hindu female by a Will or gift, giving
  her only a "life interest", it would remain the same even after
. commencement of the Act 1956, and such a Hindu female                C
  cannot acquire absolute title.

      14. Whether person is destitute or not, is a question of fact.
 The expression 'destitute' has not been defined under the Act
 1956 or under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, or Code           o
 of Civil Procedure, 1908. The dictionary meaning is "without
 resources, in want of necessaries". A person can be held
 destitute when no one is to support him and is found wandering
 without any settled place of abode and without visible means
 of subsistence. In the instant case, no factual foundation has        E
 ever been laid by the appellant before the courts below in this
 regard. In such a fact-situation, the issue does not require
 consideration.

      15. All the courts have taken a consistent view rejecting
 the claim of the appellant of having acquired an absolute title.      F
 We do not see any cogent reason to interfere with the
 concurrent findings of facts. Appeals lack merit and are
 accordingly dismissed.

 K.K.T.                                      Appeals dismissed.        G