Supreme Court of India
SHRI ABHEY RAM (DEAD) BY LRS. AND ORS.versusUNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
- Citation
- 1997 INSC 425
- Decided
- 22 April 1997
- Disposal
- Leave Granted & Dismissed
Holding
The declaration under Section 6 for the appellants is valid, not barred by the proviso, and the stay orders obtained by other petitioners do not extend to them; a partial quashing does not invalidate the composite declaration.
Summary
The appellants owned 25 bighas of land in Khirkee village that were covered by a composite notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 issued on 5 November 1980, and a subsequent declaration under Section 6 published on 7 June 1985, more than three years later. Several writ petitions were filed challenging the notification and declaration; some petitioners obtained stay orders, and the Delhi High Court Full Bench held that the period of stay excluded the three‑year limitation under the proviso to Section 6(1) (Explanation II). The Division Bench later quashed the declaration only for the petitioners before it, but not for the appellants. On special leave, the Supreme Court examined whether the stay orders obtained by some petitioners extended to other landowners and whether the declaration for the appellants was barred by the limitation. The Court held that the stay orders did not automatically apply to the appellants, that the declaration was not vitiated by any error of law, and that a partial quashing does not invalidate the whole composite declaration. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.
Issues considered
- Whether a stay order obtained by some petitioners under Section 4/6 of the Land Acquisition Act extends to other landowners not obtaining a stay, in view of Explanation II to Section 6(1).
- Whether a declaration under Section 6 published after the three‑year period is barred by the proviso to Section 6(1).
- Whether the quashing of the declaration by the Division Bench for certain petitioners benefits other petitioners whose lands are covered by the same composite notification.
- Whether the failure to file objections under Section 5‑A affects the validity of the declaration.
Legislation cited
- Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 4(1), s. 5-A, s. 6(1)
Subjects
Land acquisitionSection 4 notificationSection 6 declarationLimitation periodStay orderExplanation IIComposite notificationQuashing of declarationPublic interest litigation
Judgment
SHRI ABHEY RAM (DEAD} BY LRS. AND ORS. A
v.
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
APRIL 22, 1997
[K. RAMASWAMY, S. SAGHIR AHMAD B
AND G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.)
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 :
Ss. 4(1), 5-A and 6(1) Explanation II-Delay in publication of decla-
ration u/s. 6(1)--Stay by High Court of a composite notification u/s. 4(1) in
c
respect of some of the land owners, and limiting of controversy to quashing
of declaration u/s. 6 for non-compliance with s. SA in respect of writ
petitioners before the High Court-Effeel of as regards other land
owners-Held declaration qua the appellants has not been barred by proviso
to s. 6 nor is it vitiated by any error of law warranting interference-In view D
of the fact that the notification under s. 4( 1) is a composite one and, equally
the declaration under s. 6 is also a composite one, unless the declaration
under s. 6 is quashed in toto, it does not operate as if that the entire
declaration requires to be quashed-Besides, the appellants had not filed any
objections to the notice issued under s. 5-A.
E
Delhi Development Authority v. Sudan Singh & Ors. Etc., 45 (1991)
Delhi Law Times 602 SC, held not applicable.
Yusujbhai Noonnohmed Nendoliya v. State of Gujarat & Anr., [1991]
4 SCC 531 and B.R. Gupta v. U.O.l. & Ors., 37 (1989) Delhi Law Times 150,
F
referred to.
Words and phrases :
"Stay of the action or proceeding"-Meaning of.
Yusujbhai Noonnohmed Nendoliya v. State of Gujarat & Anr., (1991] G
4 SCC 531; Hansraj Jain v. State of Maharashtra & Ors.,(1993) 4 JT 360;
Sangappa Gurulingappa Sajjan v. State of Kamataka & Ors., (1994] 4 SCC
145; Gandhi Grah Ninnan Sahkari Samiti Ltd. Etc. Etc. v. State of Rajasthan
& Ors., (1993) 3 JT 194; G. Narayanaswamy Reddy (dead) by Lrs. & Anr. v.
Govt. of Kamataka & Anr., (1991) 3 JT 12 and Roshnara Begum Etc. v. H
931
932 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] 3 S.C.R.
A U.O.l. & Ors., (1986) l Apex decision 6, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 3358 of
1997.
From the Judgment and Order dated 2'.9.87 of the Delhi High Court
B in C.W. No. 2657 of 1985.
Rajinder Sachhar and B.R. Sabharwal for the Appellants.
Ravinder Sethi, V.B. Saharaya, Shashi Kiran and D.S. Mehra for the
Respondents.
c The following Order of the Court was delivered :
Leave granted. Heard counsel for the parties.
This appeal by special ieave arises from the judgment of the Division
O Bench of the High Court of Delhi passed on 2.3.1987 in C.W. No. 2657/85.
Notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
(for short, the "Act") was published on November 5, 1980 acquiring a large
extent of land admeasuring 50,000 bighas situated in several villages includ-
ing Khirkec village. The land in Khirkee village admeasures 1011 bighas of
E which the appellant is in possession of 25 bighas. Declaration under Section
6 was published on June 7, 1985. Challenging the declaration, several writ
petitions came to be filed in the High Court. The primary contention was
that the declaration having been published after 3 years, is barred by law.
The notification under Section 4(1) stands lapsed. Similar to the appellants,
F several persons approached the High Court. The Full Bench in Balak Ram
Gupta v. Union of India, C.W.P. No. 1639/85 decided on May 27, 1987
upheld the validity of the notification under Section 4(1) and declaration
under Section 6 on the ground that some of the land owners whose land
was covered under the common notification under Section 4(1) had already
approached the High Court and obtained stay of further proceedings
G including publication of declaration under Section 6. As a consequence,
the stay obtained continuing in operation stood excluded by operation of
Explanation II to Section 6(1) of the Act. Accordingly, the declaration
published under Section 6(1) was held valid in law. When the present writ
petition had come up for hearing, the Division Bench of the High Court
H passed an order stating that the controversy raised was covered by the
AB HEY RAM (DEAD) BY LRS. v. U .O.I. 933
judgment of the Full Bench and no other point has been raised or argued A
before the Division Bench. The Writ Petition has been dismissed. Thus this
appeal by special leave.
Shri Rajinder Sachhar, learned senior counsel appearing for the
appellants, contends that the view taken by the Full Bench of the High
Court is not correct in law. In view of the fact that the appellants had not
B
obtained any stay pending the writ petition qua the appellants, there is no
prohibition for the respondent-U.O.I., to proceed further by publishing the
declaration under Section 6 and that, therefore, the declaration having
been published beyond three years, is invalid in law. He further contends
that after the Full Bench judgment was rendered, the matter was remitted c
to the Division Bench, which quashed the declaration under Section 6 on
the ground that the objections filed under Section SA were not properly
considered and that, therefore, publication of the declaration under Sec-
tion 6 was quashed in respect of the writ petitioners therein. The same
benefits should enure to the appellants as well. In support thereof, he D
placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in Delhi Developmellt
Authority v. Sudan Singh & Ors., (1991) Delhi Law Times 602. He also
sought support from the judgment in Yusujbhai Noonnohmed Nendoliya v.
State of Gujarat & Anr., [1991) 4 SCC 531. L1>arned counsel for the
respondents, on the other hand, contends that the appellants have not filed
any objections before the Land Acquisition Collector for enquiry under E
Section SA. Therefore, the need to consider their objections does not arise.
The Division Bench, after remittance, confined the controversy of quashing
the declaration in respect of the lands of the writ petitioners. Therefore, it
operates only with regard to them and not the persons who were not
eonominee parties to that judgment. In fact, many persons had accepted
F
the award, received the compensation and sought and had reference.
Therefore, the publication of the declaration under Section 6 was not bad
in law on the ground of non-consideration of the objections. Under these
circumstances, the view taken by the Full Bench is correct in law.
Having regard to the respective contentions, the question that arises
G
for consideration is : whether the view taken by the Division Bench and
the Full Bench in Balak Ram Gupta's case is correct in law? It is an
admitted position that notification under Section 4(1) was published on
November 5, 1980 and the declaration under Section 6(1) came to be
published on June 7, 1985. Therefore, ex f acie, it is beyond three years as H
934 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997) 3 S.C.R.
A contemplated under the proviso to section 6(1) of the Act. The question
is : whether the stay obtained by some of the persons would enure the
benefit to other persons under Explanation II to Section 6? It is seen that
notification under Section 4(1) is a common notification with reference to
all the lands situated in 12 villages. The Full Bench has noted in paragraph
6 as under :
B
"6. In the case before us, the declaration under S. 6 were made on
27.5.1985, 6.6.1985, 7.6.1985 and 26.2.1986 (the individual details
of which need not be set out here). This is clearly beyond a period
of three years from the dates of the notifications under s. 4, viz.
5.11.1980 and 25.11.1980. They are clearly barred by limitation
c under the proviso to S. 6(1) unless the period can be got extended
by invoking the terms of the explanation newly substituted in 1984
(which is the attempt of the respondents here)."
It has extracted the various orders .passed by the Court from time to
D time in paragraphs 20, 21 and 22 which read as under :
"20. It may be useful here to refer to the slay orders which the
respondents rely on to bring the S. 6 declarations within the scope
of the explanation. In Munni Lal v. Lt. Govemm; (CW 426 of 1981)
wherein the validity of the notification dated 25.11.1980 was chal-
lenged by certain residents of village Satbari, the following interim
E
order was passed in CM 668/81 on 18.3.1981.
' ....... Case for 27.4.1981. In the meanwhile, respondents 1 and
2 arc restrained from issuing any declaration under S. 6.......... '.
The above interim order was made absolme on 4.5.1981, when the
F
writ petition was admitted.;
' ......... Stay order passed on 18.3.81 made absolute till further
orders with liberty to the appropriate authorities of the respon-
dents to take action according to law if the existing conditions and
G requirements of the Master Plan and Zonal Plan, if any, arc
breached or violated by the petitioners'.
This writ petition was dismissed on 15.11.1983 (see ILR (1985) 1
Delhi-469 : AIR (1984) NOC 230). In Laguna Farms (P) Ltd. v.
Lt. Govemor (CW 1251/81) also, the petitioner challenged the
H validity of the S. 4 notification dated 25.11.80. The writ petition
ABHEY RAM (DEAD) BY LRS. v. u.o.r. 935
was admitted on 26.5.81 when an interim order in the following A
terms was also made in CM 1717/81.
'Notice for 29.7.1981. In the meanwhile, we stay further proceed-
ings in consequence of the impugned notification under S. 4 and
declaration under S. 6 Land Acquisition Act'.
B
This order was made absolute on 29.7.1981 and this C.W. along
with a number of other C.Ws., was disposed of on 15.11.83 along
with C.W. 426/81. In Gogia v. Lt. Govemor, (CW 175/82) the writ
petition was admitted on 21.1.82. An interim order was made in
C.M. 250/82 on the same date staying "further proceedings in
pursuance of the impugned notification dated 25.11.80". This order
c
was made absolute on 4.3.82 "with liberty to the respondents to·
move this Court for variation of the order, if so advised. "This C.W.
was also disposed of on 15.11.83 along with C.W. 426/81 (though
the list of cases given at the top of the judgment in C.W. 175/81,
apparently by oversight). An order similar in terms to that set out D
above was made on 11.2.82 in CM 4514/81 in Ansal Housing &
Estates Pvt. Ltd. v. Lt. Govemor, (CW 2451/81); Vijay Narain v. Lt.
Govemor, (CW 2450/81); Smt. Bherco Duggal v. Lt. Govemor, (CW
2468/81); Daryao Singh v. Lt. Govemor, (CW 2135/82). Except the
last, other were disposed of on 15.11.83 with CW 426/81.
E
21. The operation of the notification dated 5.11.1980 was stayed in
similar terms by orders dated 30.9.81 and 11.2.82 in CM 4226/81
in CW 2263/81 (Bishamber Dayal v. Lt. Governor), a writ petition
filed by some of the residents of the village of Tughlakabad
following similar orders in Om Prakash v. Lt. Govemor, (CW F
1250/81). These writ petitions were also disposed of on 15.11.83.
But this list is not exhaustive and it appears, there arc other writ
petitions pending in this court today in which the stay order passed
continues to be in force (e.g. CW 861/82).
22. Reference has also been made on behalf of the petitioners to G
certain orders in CW 1203/82 (Budh Vihar Welfare Society v. Lt.
Govemor), though that was a writ petition which challenged the
validity of a S. 4 notification dated 31.12.1981. In that case, the
court had granted an interim order on 23.4.82 "restraining the
respondents from taking further proceedings in consequence of H
936 SUPREME COURT REPORJS f1997] 3 S.C.R.
A the impugned notification" and this was apparently, later made
absolute till disposal of the writ petition. The petitioner thereafter
moved C.M. 315/84 on 24.1.1984 alleging that "the respondents are
misinterpreting the aforesaid stay ordcr .... and arc saying that the
aforesaid stay order is in respect of the entire village of Rithala"
and praying, therefore, that as the petitioners had prayed for stay
B only in respect of their lands, the court should be please "to clarify
the order dated 23.4.1982 to the effect that the stay is only in
respect of the petitioners' land, Khasra Nos. of which have been
mentioned in the writ petition". The above position was contested
by the Union of India which urged that the stay order had been
c granted qua notification under S. 4 and was not in respect of
particular land. After hearing both parties, the court passed the
following order on 24.2.1984.
"...... We do not understand that clarification is needed. The
prayer in CM 1759/82 was in respect of the petitioners' land. It
D follows necessarily that the interim order we passed was in regard
to the petitioners. No further order is, therefore, necessary."
22A. The petitioners also seek to derive support from an order
passed by this Court on 7.8.1985 CCP 152/85 in CW 861 of 1982
E (Manakvala v. Chaudhary). That contempt petition was moved
because the respondents had made a declaration under S. 6 in
respect of some lands covered by the notification under S. 4 dated
25.11.1980 during the subsistence of a stay order at the request of
some petitioners who had challenged the said notification. The
court observed :
F
'It is no doubt true that there was stay of other proceedings
but in land acquisition matters it is really the dispossession which
is of consequence. Apart from this position, a large number of
other lands were obviously the subject matter of notification under
G Ss. 4 and 6 and it could not be expected that the authorities should
delay further acquisition proceedings in regard to them.
Mere notification under S. 6 may be technically not right qua
the petitioners but we cannot agree that it amounts to contempt
H calling for any action.
ABHEY RAM (DEAD) BY LRS. v. U.O.l. 937
Of course; as long as stay order stands dispossession of the A
petitioners cannot take place ...... and no one has passed the order
ordering dispossession. Dismissed."
Ultimately, after consideration of all the respective contentions, the
- Full Bench has observed in paragraphs 30 and 31 which read as under :
"30. Secondly the nature of proceedings in which stay orders are
obtained are also very different from the old pattern of suits
B
confined to parties in their scope and effect. Section 4 notifications
are challenged in writ petitions and it is now settled law that in
this type of proceedings, the principle of locus standi stands con- C
siderably diluted. Any public spirited person can challenge the
validity of proceedings of acquisition on general grounds and when
he does this the litigation is not inter parties simpliciter : it is a
public interest litigation which affects wider interests. The grourids
of challenge to the notification may be nothing personal to the D
particular landholder but are, more often than not, grounds com-
mon to all or substantial blocks of the land owners. In fact, this
group of petitions now listed before us raise practically the same
contentions just as the previous batch of writ petition challenging
the notifications under S. 4 raised certain common contentions. To
accept the contention that the challenges and their lands would E
virtually provide persons with common interests with a second
innings. If the initial challenge succeeds, all of them benefit; and,
if for some reason that fails and the second challenge succeeds on
a ground like the one presently raised, the first batch of petitioners
also get indirectly benefited because of the impossibility of partial F
implementation of the scheme for which the acquisition is in-
tended."
'31. We have, therefore, to give full effect to the language of the
section and the stay orders in question, in the above context and
background. The use of the word "any" in the explanation consid- G
erably amplifies its scope and shows clearly that the explanation
can be invoked in any case if some action or proceeding is stayed.
It may be a complete stay of the operation of the entire notification
or may even be a partial stay - partial in dP.gree or in regard to
persons or lands in respect of whom it will operate. The words H
938 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] 3 S.C.R.
A used in the explanation are of the widest amplitude and there is
no justification whatever to confine its terms and operation only
to the cases in which the stay order is actually obtained."
It concluded in paragraph 39 as under :
B "39. We have, for the reasons stated above, come to the conclusion
that the period during stay orders were in force should be excluded
in computing the validity of the declaration undei" S. 6. So far as
the notification dated 25.11.80 is concerned, we find that the latest
of the S. 6 declarations was on 26.2.86. The stay order (in C.M.P.
668/81) was in operation from 18.3.81 to 15.11.83 i.e. for a period
c of 2 years, 7 months and 27 days. They are, therefore, in time
having been issued within three years plus 2 years 3 months, i.e. 5
years 3 months of the S. 4 notification. So far as the notification
dated 15.11.1980 is concerned, we find that the latest of the S. 6
D
declaration was issued 7 .6.1985, i.e. 4 years 7 months after the S.
4 notification. The stay order in CMP 4226/81 was operative from
30.9.81to15.11.83, i.e. for 2 years and 1-1/2 months. In this period
is excluded the declaration is within time. We answer the principal
-
issue debated before us accordingly."
E Accordingly, the Full Bench has upheld the validity of the notifica-
tion. It is true, as contended by Mr. Rajinder Sachhar, that the Division
Bench after remittance has quashed the declaration published under Sec-
tion 6. The operative part reads as under :
"The orders of Land Acquisition Collectors under Section 5-A and
F the notification issued by the Lt. Governor under Section 6 of the
Land Acquisition Act together with further land acquisition
proceedings in all the above writ petitions are qua~hed and set
aside with cost. There shall be two set of counsel's fees at Rs. 1500
each as the group of petitions were heard mainly in the two writ
petitions. The respondents have also not filed the counter affidavits
G in all the petitions as it was agreed to complete two sets of petitions
with counter affidavits. The rule is made absolute. 'Reasons to
follow."
Therefore, the reason given in B.R. Gupta v. U.O.l. & Ors., 37 (1989)
H Delhi Law Times 150 are obvious with reference to the quashing of the
AB HEY RAM (DEAD) BY LRS. v. U .O.I. 939
publication of the declaration under Section 6 vis-a-vis the writ petitioners A
therein. The question thus arise for consideration is : whether the stay
obtained by some of the persons who prohibited the respondents from
publication of the declaration under Section 6 would equally be extendible
to the cases relating to the appellants? We proceed on the premise that
the appellants had not obtained any stay of the publication of the declara-
tion but since the High Court in some of the cases has, in fact, prohibited
B
them as extracted hcreinbefore, from publication of the declaration, neces-
sarily, when the Court has not restricted the declaration in the impugned
orders in support of the petitioners therein, the officers had to hold back
their hands till the matters are disposed of. In fact, this Court has given
extended meaning to the orders of stay or proceeding in various cases, c
namely, Yusujbhai Noomwhmed Nendoliya v. State of Gujarat & Anr.,
[1991] 4 SCC 531; Hansraj Jain v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., (1993) 4 JT
360; Sangappa G11mli11gappa Sajjan v. State of Kamataka & Ors., [1994] 4
SCC 145; Gandhi Grah Ninnan Sahkari Samiti Ltd. Etc. Etc. v. State of
Rajastha11 & Or.s., (1993) 3 JT 194; G. Narayanaswamy Reddy (dead) by Lrs.
D
& A11r. v. Govt. of Kamataka & Anr., (1991) 3 JT 12 and Roshnara Begum
Etc. v. U.0.I. & Ors., (1986) l Apex Decision 6. The words "stay of the
action or proceeding" have been widely interpreted by this Court and mean
that any type of the orders passed by this Court would be an inhibitive
action on the part of the authorities to proceed further. When the action
of conducting an enquiry under Section 5-A was put in issue and the E
declaration under Section 6 was questioned, necessarily unless the Court
holds that enquiry under Section 5-A was properly conducted and the
declaration published under Section 6 to be valid, it would not be open to
the officers to proceed further into the matter. As a consequence, the stay
granted in respect of some would be applicable to others also who had not
F
obtained stay in that behalf. We are not concerned with the correctness of
the earlier direction with regard to Section 5-A enquiry and consideration
of objections as it was not challenged by the respondent union. We express
no opinion on its correctness, though it is open to doubt.
The question then arises is : whether the quashing of the declaration G
by the Division Bench in respect of the other matters would enure the
benefit to the appellants also? Though, prima facie, the argument of the
learned counsel is attractive, on deeper consideration, it is difficult to give
acceptance to the contention of Mr. Sachhar. When the Division Bench
expressly limited the controversy to the quashing of the .declaration qua the H
f
940 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] 3 S.C.R.
A writ petitioners before the Bench, necessary consequences would be that
the declaration published under Section 6 should stand upheld.
It is seen that before the Division Bench judgment was rendered, the
petition of the appellants stood dismissed and the appellants had filed the
special leave petition in this Court. If it were a case entirely relating to
B Section 6 declaration as has been quashed by the High Court, necessarily
that would enure the benefit to others also, though they did not file any
petition, except to those whose lands were taken possession of and were
vested in the State under Section 16 and 17(2) of the Act free from all
encumbrances. But it is seen that the Division Bench confined the con-
C troversy to the quashing of the declaration under Section 6 in respect of
the persons qua the writ petitioners before the Division Bench. Therefore,
the benefit of the quashing of the declaration under Section 6 by the
Division Bench docs not enure to the appellants.
It is true that a Bench of this Court has considered the effect of such
D a quashing in Delhi Developmeflt Authority v. Sudan Singh & Ors. Etc.,
reported in 45 (1991) Delhi Law Times 602 SC. But, unfortunately, in that
case the operative part of the judgment referred to earlier has not been
brought to the notice of this Court. Therefore, the ratio therein has no
application to the facts in this case. It is also true that in Yusufbhai
E Noomwhmed Nendoliya's case (supra), this Court has also observed that
it would enure the benefit to those petitioners. In view of the fact that the
notification under Section 4(1) is a composite one and equally the decla-
ration under Section 6 is also a composite one, unless the declaration under
Section 6 is quashed in toto, it does not operate as if that the entire
declaration requires to be quashed. It is seen that the appellants had not
F filed any objection to the notice issued under Section 5-A.
Under these circumstances, there is no need to consider their objec-
tions, as pointed out by the Division Bench of the High Court in Delhi
Development Authority case (supra) which, relied on by Mr. Sachhar, has
G no application. Thus we hold that the declaration qua the appellants has
not been barred by proviso to Section 6 nor is it vitiated by any error of
law warranting interference.
The appeal is dismissed. No costs.
H R.P. Appeal dismissed.
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