SHRI ALVARO NORONHA FERRIERA & ANR.versusUNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
- Citation
- 1999 INSC 199
- Decided
- 23 April 1999
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- S SAGHIR AHMAD
Holding
Judicial officers of Goa are entitled to parity in pay with their Delhi counterparts on the principle of equal pay for equal work.
Summary
The appellants, District and Sessions Judges serving in the Union Territory of Goa, claimed that their pay should have been increased in line with the raise granted to their counterparts in the Union Territory of Delhi in 1982. The High Court dismissed their writ petition, holding that they had not proved the nature of their duties was identical to those in Delhi. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the principle of "equal pay for equal work" under Articles 14, 16 and 39(d) of the Constitution, emphasizing that the nature of work of judicial officers is substantially the same irrespective of workload variations. The Court held that the burden of proof lies on the Government to justify any differential treatment and that no such justification was shown. Consequently, the Court directed the Union of India to pay arrears to the Goa judges, calculating their salaries on par with Delhi judges for the period 1 March 1982 to 31 March 1987. The appeal was allowed.
Issues considered
- Whether the principle of "equal pay for equal work" under Articles 14, 16 and 39(d) applies to judicial officers serving in different Union territories.
- Whether the nature of duties and responsibilities of District and Sessions Judges in Goa and Delhi are identical for the purpose of pay parity.
- Who bears the burden of proof to justify differential pay scales between officers performing the same work.
Subjects
Judgment
A SHRI ALVARO NORONHA FERRIERA & ANR.
v.
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
APRIL 23, 1999
B [S. SAGHIR AHMED AND K.T. THOMAS, JJ.]
Service Law :
"Equal pay for equal work"-Judicial Officers-Working in two different
C Union territories-Nature of duties and responsibilities indentical-Disparity
in pay scales-Validity of-Held, work pattern and pendency of cases at two
different places cannot make the nature of work different-Burden to justifY
differential treatment lies on the Government-Appellants entitled to parity
in pay scales-Constitution of India, 1950-Articles 14, 16 and 39(d).
D Appellants were judicial officers posted in the Union Territory of Goa.
They were fixed in the pay scales on par with their counterparts in Union
Territory of Delhi. However, in the year 1982, the pay scales of judicial
officers in Union Territory of Delhi was increased while the appellants were
not given the benefit of increased pay scales. Even the pay commission
E recommendation did not remove the disparity. Aggrieved, the appellants filed
a writ petition before the High Court which was dismissed on the ground that
the appellants failed to establish that their nature of duties and responsibilities
were identical with that of judicial officers in Delhi. Hence the present
appeal
F Allowing the appeal, this Court
HELD: 1.1. The judicial officers of Union Territory of Goa are entitled
to parity in pay scale on par with their counterparts in Union Territory of
Delhi on the principle of'equal pay for equal work'. [829-G)
1.2. The parameters for invoking the principles of 'Equal pay for equal
G work' would include, inter alia, nature of the work and common employer.
There can be no two views that the nature of work of District and Sessions
Judges is the same though in some areas pendency of cases would be higher
than others. Difference in the backlog are not uncommon even in two different
stations of the same territory, nay, in two different courts of the same station.
H Such lopsidedness is hardly the ground to conclude that the nature of work
824
A.N. FERRIERA v. U.O.I. [THOMAS, J.] 825
done by one judicial officer at one place is different from the other. The duty A
hours would be substantially the same, the powers to be discharged are in
no way different, whether they are District Judges in Goa or in Delhi. It
would be a futile exercise to make an endeavour for drawing a distinction
between the work pattern at the two different places, for, such differences
are discernible everywhere. But that would not make the nature of work B
different. [828-E}
Randhir Singh v. Union of India, (1982) (1) SCC 612, referred to.
1.3. B'!rden of proof cannot be cast on the appellants to establi;Sh "the
pendency of litigation or the norms fixed for disposal of cases by the Delhi
court to enable comparison between the nature of duties and the C
responsibilities ,carried by the officers of the Delhi Territory and the Goa
Territory." Till hike in the pay-scale was brought about in 1982 for Delhi
Judges the parity was maintained between the judicial officers of Union
Territory of Goa and Delhi. Nobody doubted till then that the nature and
dismension of work discharged by the officers of the same cadre of judicial
officers at two different territories were different from any perceptible D
standard. It is for the Government to show that there was change in the
nature of work which necessitated to keep two different levels of pay to the
same officers working at two different pl&\:es. [829-A]
2. Respondent Union of India is directed to disburse the arrears of pay E
to the appellants calculating their scales of pay on par with their counterparts
in the Union Territory of Delhi for the period 1.3.J 982 to 31.3.1987 within
six months. (829-G]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Aweal No. 1460 of
1994. F
From the Judgment and Order dated 14.3.91 ofthe Bombay High Court
in W.P. No. 228of1988.
Ashok H. Desai and Kailash Vasdev for the Appellants.
G
A.S. Nambiar, S.K. Mehta, Dhruv Mehta, Fazlin Anam, Ms. Shobba, Y.P.
Mahajan and P. Parmeswaran for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
THOMAS, J. Some Judges whose function was dispensation of justice H
•
826 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1999] 2 S.C.R.
A had to approach the High Court for justice based on the celebrated doctrine
'/
"equal pay for equal work" but they were non-suited by a Division Bench of
that High Court. They were Judges of higher judiciary in the subordinate
level. They have now come to the Supreme Court with this appeal by special
leave. It is interesting that, in the meanwhile, two of them have become
Judges of the same High Court of Bombay as efflux of a decade in between
B has changed the hierarchiel status of the parties who initiated this legal
action. When they filed the writ petition in the High Court they were District
and Sessions Judges. One of them has since retired from service but the
cause which they espoused survives.
C The nub of their grievance is this: When the scale of pay of their
counterparts in the Union Territory of Delhi was increased, appellants, while
working in the same cadre in the Union Territory of Goa, were not given that
pay scale. It infringes, according to them, the principle enshrined in the
Constitution.
D Facts are simple. On 20-12-1961 the Territories of Goa, Daman and.Diu
were liberated from the suzerainty of Portugal. In 1962, Goa became part of
the Union Territory of India. Appellants were District Judges posted in the
Unfon Territory of Goa. On 3-9-1981 the pay-scale of judicial officers (in the
category of Additional District & Sessions Judges) in the Union Territories
E was the same Rs.1200-2000. In 1982 the Union Territory of Delhi increased the
scale of pay of such Judges to Rs.2000-3200 while their counterparts in the
Union Territory of Goa were not given any increase to keep the scale on par
with the former. When the Fourth Pay Commission was fonned representations
were made by the judicial officers of Goa to rectify the anomaly which,
according to them, came into existence for the first time in 1982, but no relief
F was provided to them. On the contrary, the recommendations of the Pay
Commission were for raising the scale of pay of Delhi Judges to Rs.4500-5700
while that of Goa Judges was raised only to Rs.3000-5000.
On 30-5-1987, Goa became a State separate from Union Territory. It is
G conceded that appellants cannot claim parity with the Delhi judicial officers
after that date. Hence the grievance of the appellants was confined to the
period between 1-3-1982 and 31-3-1987. Appellants therefore filed writ petitions
before the High Court for necessary reliefs to be granted to them.
The Division Bench of the High Court while declining to grant the
H reliefs advanced the following reasons:
A.N. FERRIERA v. U.0.1. [THOMAS, J.] 827
"It is now well-settled by a catena of decisions of the Supreme Court A
and this Court that the doctrine of "equal work, equal pay" is a well-
accepted norm in administration of services under the control of the,
Governments. To enable the employees to claim an advantage, it is .
essential to establish that the posts of judicial officers in Delhi and
Goa are equal or are comparable before demanding that the pay scales
available to Delhi officers should be made available to Goa officets. B
The only averment in the petition is that the posts in Delhi and Goa
Judicial Service carry the same duties, responsibilities and nature of ·
work being identical, the Goa officers are entitled to identical pay
scales as those available to Delhi officers. The averment made in the
petition is not supported by any material whatsoever and it would be C
impossible to draw on imagin11tion to hold that the nature of the
duties of officers in Delhi and Goa are identical."
Learned Judges repelled the contention that since Delhi and Goa were
Union Territories it must be assumed that the nature of the duties and
responsibilities of the District and Sessions Judges were identical and D
consequently both must get same benefit. They took the view that "merely
because the officers in the two Territories are in judicial service it cannot be
even suggested that the nature of the duties and the responsibilities are
identical."
To buttress the aforesaid reasoning the Division Bench cited an E
illustration as the following :
"Take for illustration, the nurses employed in a large hospital in a city
like Bombay. Is it possible by any stretch of imagination to suggest
that the nurses working in a small hospital in a remote village are
performing the same duties and carrying the same responsibilities as F
the nurses working in a large hospital in a city like Bombay?"
Ultimately the writ petitions were dismissed as learned Judges were
unable to appreciate on what basis they could clain1 to be entitled to the same
pay-scales as those available to judicial officers in Delhi. In the concluding G
passage the Division Bench said that "in our judgment the claim made by the
petitioners is wholly misconceived and the petitioners are not entitled to any
relief. We are unable to grant any relief to the petitioner and the petition must
fail."
Shri Ashok Desai, learned senior counsel contended that Division Bench H
828 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999) 2 S.C.R.
A of the High Court missed the crucial point that the claim is confined to the
period whert the District Judges and their counterparts in Delhi were working
under the same Union Government though the administration in the two
territories was carried on through separate agencies. According to the senior
counsel, pendency of work at two places is not a criteria, as the workload and
B the nature of work at both places were substantially the same. The illustration
of nurses cited in the judgment was sought to be demonstrated as another
point in support of the claim instead of repelling it
The principle of "equal pay for equal work" has gained judicial
recognition. The principle incorporated in Article 14 when understood from
C the angle provided in Article 39(d) of the Constitution is held to be the
recognition of the aforesaid doctrine. It has been held in Randhir Singh v.
Union of India [1982 1SCC612] that the principle "equal pay for equal work"
is not an abstract doctrine but one of substance. Their Lordships pointed out:
"To the vast majority of -the people in India the equality clauses of the
Constitution would mean nothing if they are unconcerned with the work they
D do and the pay they get. To them the equality clauses will have some
substance if equal work means equal pay."
The parameters for invoking the said principles would include, inter alia,
nature of the work and common employer. There can be no two views that
E the nature of work of District and Sessions Judges is the same though in
some areas pendency of cases would be higher than others. Differences in
the backlog are not uncommon even in two different stations of the same
territory, nay, in two different courts of the same station. Such lopsidedness
is hardly the ground to conclude that the nature of work done by one judicial
officer at one place is different from other. The duty hours would be
F sqbstantially the same, the powers to be discharged are in no way different,
whether they are District Judges in Goa or in Delhi. I.t would be a futile
exercise to make an endea¥bur for drawing a distinction between the work
pattern at the two different places, for, such differences are discernible
everywhere. But that would not make the nature of work different. It was not
G necessary to cast the burden of proof on the appellants to establish' "the
pendency of litigation or the norms fixed for disposal of cases by the Delhi
court to enable comparison between the nature of duties and the
responsibilities carried by the officers of the Delhi Territory and the Goa
Territory."
H One admitted fact which looms large is that till hike in the pay-scale was
A.N. FERRIERA v. U.0.1. [THOMAS, J.] 829
brought about in i 982 for Delhi Judges the parity maintained as between
• A
Union Territory of Goa and Delhi applied to the same cadre of judicial officers.
Nobody doubted till then that the nature and dimension of work discharged
by the officers of the same cadre of judicial officers at two different territories
were different from any perceptible standard. It is for the contesting
respondents to show that there was change in the nature of work which
necessitated the Government to keep two different levels of pay to the same B
officers working at two different places.
Pay-scale of District and Sessions Judges in the Union Territory of Goa
was made on a par with that of Delhi by means of the rules and regulations
formulated by the Central Government in exercise of the powers conferred on C
it by the provisions of"The Goa, Daman and Diu (Absorbed Employees) Act,
1965." The change was effected in 1982 on the premise that the judicial
officers in Delhi were upgraded as class I officers and since Union Territory
of Delhi was declared a Metropolitan city, the pay-scales were equated with
the pay-scales of judicial officers in other Metropolitan cities. We are not
against revision of the pay-scales of the judicial officers in the Union Territory D
of Delhi on the basis of any justifiable grounds. But in doing so the pay-
scales of their counterparts workir g in other Union Territories cannot suffer.
Shri A.S. Nambiar, learned Senior Advocate made a bid to raise a new
contention that the Central Government was helpless in. keeping up the pay-
scales of the officers in Goa on a par with the judicial officers of Delhi as Goa E
was then administered through a separate elected legislature, and under
Article 240 of the Constitution powers of the President to make regulations
had been bridled. We are not disposed to countenance the said contention
advanced for the first time during arguments, for, that was not the premise
on which the parity was denied to the appellants. p
For the aforesaid reasons we allow this appeal and direct the respondent
Union of India to disburse the arrears of pay to the appellants calculating
their scale of pay on a par with t!leir counterparts in the Union Territory .of
Delhi during the period between 1.3.1982 and 31.3.1987. Such recalculation
shall be made and the arrears shall be quantified to be disbursed within six G
months from today.
S.VKI. Appeal allowed.
Search Indian case law
Ask in plain English, not just keywords. 25,000 AI words free, no card.