Holding

The suit is hopelessly barred by limitation and the plaint must be rejected at the threshold under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC.

Summary

The Supreme Court heard an appeal by Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust and its trustees challenging the High Court’s affirmation of a trial court order that rejected their application under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC to dismiss a plaint filed by Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj seeking declaration of ownership and possession of lands. The plaintiff claimed title based on ancestral rights, while the appellant‑defendant had acquired a three‑quarter share of the lands by a court auction in 1938 and the remaining quarter by a registered deed in 1952. The Court examined the limitation provisions of the Limitation Act, the constructive notice arising from the 1938 auction and 1952 deed under Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, and the presumption of validity of registered documents, concluding that the right to sue accrued to the plaintiff’s predecessors at the time of the auction, making the suit hopelessly barred by the three‑year limitation period. It held that the plaint created an illusion of a cause of action and must be rejected at the threshold under Order VII Rule 11(d). Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the orders of the lower courts, allowed the appellants’ application, and rejected the plaint, with no order as to costs.

Issues considered

The plaint is barred by limitation under Articles 58, 59, 60 and 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
Whether the plaintiff’s predecessors had constructive notice of the 1938 court auction and the 1952 registered deed, invoking Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
Whether the Court may dismiss the plaint at the threshold under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC when the suit is manifestly barred by limitation.
Whether the reliefs seeking declaration of title, cancellation of compromise decrees and possession are maintainable given the bar under Order XXIII Rule 3A of the CPC.
From which date the limitation period commences – the date of registration (deemed knowledge) or the plaintiff’s attainment of majority.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order VII Rule 11(d), s. Order VII Rule 14(1), s. Order XXIII Rule 3A
Limitation Act, 1963s. Article 58, s. Article 59, s. Article 60, s. Article 65
Specific Relief Act, 1963s. Section 31
Transfer of Property Act, 1882s. Section 3

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Whether the High Court erred in affirming the order of the trial Court dismissing the application filed by the appellants under Order VII Rule 11(d), Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for rejection of plaint being barred Procedure, 1908 – Order VII Rule 11(d) – Rejection of plaint – Limitation Act, 1963 – Article 58-60, 65 – Suit filed by the Respondent No.1-Plaintiff, if was barred by limitation and ought to have been rejected at the threshold: Held: Yes – The right to sue

Subjects

Order VII Rule 11(d) of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908Rejection of plaintPlaint barred by limitationCourt auctionTitle claimClaim for possessionRecovery of possessionAlleged cause of actionFictionFictional dateFraudRegistered sale deedRegistered documentVoidable transactionVoid transactionRevenue grantSoil grantCompromise decreeStranger to the suit propertiesRelief of declaration of ownershipConsequential reliefInamOriginal sanadNew sanadThird partyLimitation a mixed question of fact and lawSuit hopelessly barred by limitationConstructive noticeClever draftingIllusion of cause of action

Judgment

[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1445 : 2024 INSC 1025

Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust and Ors.
v.
Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj
Bhonsle and Another
(Civil Appeal No. 14807 of 2024)
20 December 2024
[J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Whether the High Court erred in affirming the order of the trial Court
dismissing the application filed by the appellants under Order VII
Rule 11(d), Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for rejection of plaint
being barred by limitation.

Headnotes†
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order VII Rule 11(d) – Rejection
of plaint – Limitation Act, 1963 – Article 58-60, 65 – Suit filed
by the Respondent No.1-Plaintiff, if was barred by limitation
and ought to have been rejected at the threshold:
Held: Yes – The right to sue first accrued to the predecessors
of the plaintiff when the properties were brought for sale by
the court – Court auction was held in 1938 and sale deed was
registered in 1952 in favour of the Defendant No.1-appellant in
respect of the suit properties – However, the suit was filed only
in the year 2008, though the plaintiff and his predecessors were
aware of the existence of the said registered sale deed of the suit
properties – Predecessors of the plaintiff never challenged the
sale of property to the Defendant No.1 by court auction and the
subsequent registration of the deeds, despite constructive notice,
as they acceded to the title of the appellant, which cannot now
be questioned by the plaintiff after such long time – Title claim of
the plaintiff was thus, barred by limitation and therefore, the claim
for possession was also barred and consequently, the relief of
recovery of possession was also hopelessly barred by limitation –
Plaintiff did not produce any documentary evidence to show that
he is entitled for the relief of declaration of ownership of the suit
properties except by relying on the government resolutions which

*Author
1446 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

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lost its force in view of the decree of the Civil Court and subsequent
compromise decrees – The alleged cause of action is a creation
of fiction – Plaintiff was a stranger to the suit properties and the
Defendants were the owners of the suit properties – The plea of
fraud was raised only to overcome the period of limitation – Suit
was hopelessly barred by limitation – Trial Court erroneously
dismissed the application filed by the appellants u/Or.VII, r.11(d) –
High Court erred in affirming the same – Though, limitation is a
mixed question of fact and law and the question of rejecting the
plaint thereon has to be decided after weighing the evidence on
record however, in cases like the present one, where it is glaring
from the plaint averments that the suit was hopelessly barred
by limitation, the Courts should drive the parties back to the trial
Court – Orders passed by Courts below set aside – Application filed
by the appellants u/Or.VII, r.1(d) of CPC allowed, plaint rejected.
[Paras 14, 19.1, 20, 23, 24, 26]

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – s.3 – Interpretation clause –
“a person is said to have notice” – Presumption u/s.3 – When
comes into operation:
Held: A portion of the property was conveyed by court auction and
registered in the first instance and another portion was conveyed
by a registered sale deed in 1952 – Thus, there was a constructive
notice from the date of registration and the presumption u/s.3 comes
into operation – The possession also rested with the appellant
before several decades, which operates as notice of title. [Para 16]
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Or. XXIII, r.3A – Bar under,
when applicable – Discussed.
Specific Relief Act, 1963 – s.31 – When cancellation may be
ordered – Applicability – Discussed.

Case Law Cited
T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal [1978] 1 SCR 742 : (1977) 4
SCC 467 – held applicable.
Satti Paradesi Samadhi & Pillayar Temple v. M. Sankuntala [2014]
9 SCR 221 : (2015) 5 SCC 674; Sajjan Sikaria v. Shakuntala Devi
Mishra (2005) 13 SCC 687; Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra
[2002] Supp. 5 SCR 491 : (2003) 1 SCC 557; Dahiben v. Arvindbhai
Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra) dead through legal representatives
[2020] 5 SCR 694 : (2020) 7 SCC 366 : 2020 SCC OnLine SC
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1447

Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust and Ors. v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan
Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle and Another

562; Prem Singh v. Birbal [2006] Supp. 1 SCR 692 : (2006) 5 SCC
353 : 2006 SCC OnLine SC 522; R.K. Mohd. Ubaidullah v. Hajee
C. Abdul Wahab [2000] Supp. 1 SCR 524 : (2000) 6 SCC 402;
Ningawwa v. Byrappa Shiddappa Hireknrabar [1968] 2 SCR 797 :
1968 SCC OnLine SC 206 : (1968) 2 SCJ 555 : AIR 1968 SC 956;
Dilboo v. Dhanraji [2000] Supp. 3 SCR 214 : (2000) 7 SCC 702;
Mohd. Noorul Hoda v. Bibi Raifunnisa [1995] Supp. 6 SCR 110 :
(1996) 7 SCC 767; Triloki Nath Singh v. Anirudh Singh [2020] 4 SCR
650 : (2020) 6 SCC 629 : (2020) 3 SCC (Civ) 732 – referred to.

List of Acts
Civil Procedure Code, 1908; Limitation Act, 1963; Transfer of
Property Act, 1882; Specific Relief Act, 1963.

List of Keywords
Order VII Rule 11(d) of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Rejection of
plaint; Plaint barred by limitation; Court auction; Title claim; Claim
for possession; Recovery of possession; Alleged cause of action;
Fiction; Fictional date; Fraud; Registered sale deed; Registered
document; Voidabale transaction; Void transaction; Revenue grant;
Soil grant; Compromise decree; Stranger to the suit properties;
Relief of declaration of ownership; Consequential relief; Inam;
Original sanad; New sanad; Third party; Limitation a mixed question
of fact and law; Suit hopelessly barred by limitation; Constructive
notice; Clever drafting; Illusion of cause of action.

Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 14807 of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 26.04.2016 of the High Court
of Judicature at Bombay in CRA No. 904 of 2014

Appearances for Parties
Amar Dave, Sr. Adv., Parimal Shroff, Mahesh Agarwal, Rishi
Agrawala, Ankur Saigal, Ms. S. Lakshmi Iyer, Ms. Nidhi, E. C.
Agrawala, Advs. for the Appellants.
Sunil Fernandes, Sr. Adv., Ms. Nupur Kumar, Ms. Diksha Dadu,
Sachin Patil, Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Aaditya Aniruddha Pande,
Geo Joseph, Durgesh Gupta, Risvi Muhammed, Advs. for the
Respondents.
1448 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

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Judgment/Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

R. Mahadevan, J.

1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal is filed by the Defendant No.1 viz., Shri Mukund Bhavan
Trust and its trustees, against the Order dated 26th April 2016 passed
by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay1 in the Civil Revision
Application No.904 of 2014, whereby the High Court dismissed
the said application preferred by the appellants challenging the
Order dated 29th April 2009 passed by the 7th Joint Civil Judge,
Senior Division, Pune.2 By the said order, the trial Court rejected
the application filed by the appellants under Order VII Rule 11(d) of
the Civil Procedure Code, 19083 for rejection of plaint being barred
by limitation.
3. The Respondent No.1 / plaintiff filed a Special Civil Suit No.133 of
2009 against the appellants and the State of Maharashtra, inter alia
for the following reliefs:
(a) to declare that the plaintiff is the absolute owner of the suit lands
more particularly described in schedule of the plaint;
(b) to declare that other than the Plaintiff, no other person is entitled
to deal with, alienate and create any third-party interest in
respect of suit lands;
(c) to restrain the appellants / defendants permanently, from in
any manner holding themselves as owners or representing
themselves as owners of the said suit lands;
(d) to declare that the compromise decrees passed in Special
Civil Suit Nos.152/1951 and 1622/1988 and Civil Appeal
No.787/2001, Pune, are void ab-initio, null and void and to set
aside the same;

1 Hereinafter referred to as “the High Court”
2 Hereinafter referred to as “the trial Court”
3 For short, “the CPC”
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1449

Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust and Ors. v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan
Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle and Another

(e) to direct the appellants / defendants to vacate and hand over
the possession of the suit lands to the Plaintiff.
4. Pending the aforesaid suit, the appellants took out an application
under Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC r/w Articles 58, 59 and 65 of the
Limitation Act, 1963, seeking rejection of the plaint as the reliefs
sought in the suit were barred by limitation. The said application
was seriously resisted by the Respondent No.1 / plaintiff by stating
inter alia that the issue of limitation is a mixed question of facts and
law and it has to be adjudicated only in the trial.
5. The trial Court by order dated 12.10.2009, rejected the aforesaid
application filed by the appellants under Order VII Rule 11(d) of
CPC. Aggrieved by the same, the appellants preferred Civil Revision
Application No.731 of 2009 before the High Court, which set aside
the order dated 12.10.2009 and remanded the matter to the trial
Court for considering the application filed under Order VII Rule 11(d)
of CPC afresh.
6. After remand, the trial Court vide order dated 29.04.2014, rejected
the application filed by the appellants under Order VII Rule 11(d)
of CPC, observing inter alia that the issue of limitation is a mixed
question of law and facts, for which, the parties will have to lead
evidence. Challenging the same, the appellants preferred Civil
Revision Application No. 904 of 2014, which was dismissed by the
High Court, by order dated 26.04.2016 impugned in this appeal.
7. The learned counsel for the appellants, at the outset, submitted that
on a bare perusal of the averments made in the plaint disclosed that
the reliefs sought in the plaint were barred by limitation. However,
the High Court erroneously dismissed the Civil Revision Application
on the ground that the question of whether the suit is barred by
limitation is for the trial Court to independently decide considering
the evidence led before it by the parties as the limitation is a mixed
question of law and facts which cannot be decided based on the
pleadings alone. Adding further, it is submitted that the High Court
could have examined the maintainability and sustainability of the
revision proceedings initiated by the appellants under Order VII
Rule 11 (d) of CPC.
7.1. Elaborating further, on facts, the learned counsel for the
appellants submitted that the Defendant No.1 – Trust had
1450 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

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purchased 3/4th share of the suit lands mentioned in the Schedule
in an auction sale conducted by the Civil Court, Pune, in the
year 1938 from the previous Inamdar Gosavis family and the
same was duly registered; and they had also purchased the
remaining 1/4th share in the suit lands in the year 1952 by
another registered sale deed. Till then, the subject lands were
in possession of the Government. Thereafter, the Defendant
No.1 Trust became entitled to the suit lands in pursuance of
the compromise decree dated 05.01.1990 passed in Civil Suit
No.1622 of 1988, and they entered into several agreements
with third parties, who constructed buildings in the suit lands.
While so, without any right, title and interest, the Respondent
No.1 preferred Special Civil Suit No.133 of 2009 claiming
declaration and possession over the suit lands. According to
the learned counsel, the Respondent No.1 by filing the said
suit, has attempted to question the correctness of various
orders passed by several Courts including the order passed by
this Court. These orders date back to the year 1953. Further,
this exercise is done with an oblique motive to set at naught
the orders which have attained finality decades ago and the
respondent No.1/Plaintiff and its predecessors having slept over
the orders which conclusively affirmed the title and ownership
of the appellant Trust over the suit lands, cannot now suddenly
come up with a suit to overturn the effect of the orders in the
guise of there being a fresh cause of action.
7.2. Drawing our attention to paragraphs 34 and 53 of the plaint filed
by the Respondent No.1, the learned counsel for the appellants
submitted that the Respondent No.1 attempted to create an
illusion of a cause of action by erroneously stating that the cause
of action to file the suit arose on 02.03.2007 when he came to
know that his rights over the suit properties have been affected
by the proceedings between the defendants and another. Further,
the Respondent No.1 relied on the pleadings stated in the writ
petition filed by one Dr.F.Wadia, who claims to be in possession
of a portion of the subject lands. The Respondent No.1, in
paragraph 34 of the plaint stated that “…. One Advocate Shri
Godge had appeared in the said matter. The said Advocate
is well acquainted with the plaintiff. The said Advocate, after
reading all the necessary related proceedings, informed the
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1451

Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust and Ors. v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan
Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle and Another

plaintiff of the mischief committed by the Defendants. The
plaintiff thereafter collected all the necessary information and
documents. The plaintiff then instructed his Advocates to file
the present suit”. However, there is no averment as to when the
Respondent No.1 was intimated by Mr.Godge. Thus, the cause
of action alleged by the Respondent No.1 is purely illusory and
has been stated with a view to get over the bar under Order
VII Rule 11(d) of CPC.
7.3. It is also submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that
the limitation period for seeking cancellation of an instrument
as per Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is 3 years from the
date when the existence of document first becomes known to
the plaintiff. In case of registered document, the date of registra-
tion becomes the date of deemed knowledge. Accordingly, the
Respondent No.1 and his predecessors are deemed to have
implied notice of the contents of the registered sale deeds and
as per Article 58, the period of limitation to obtain any declara-
tion in the suit commences within 3 years from the date when
right to sue accrues. However, the Respondent No.1 by clever
drafting, attempted to circumvent the provisions of the Limitation
Act. That means, the Respondent No.1 knowing fully well that
a challenge to the registered sale deeds of the years 1938 and
1952 in and by which the Defendant No.1 Trust acquired the title
over the subject lands, would be hopelessly barred by limitation,
has attempted to question the title of the Defendant No.1 Trust
by inventing an imaginary cause of action to sustain his suit.
7.4. The learned counsel for the appellants further submitted that
according to Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the right to
possess immovable property or any interest therein, based on
title, must be asserted within twelve years from the date, when
the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff.
Admittedly, the Respondent No.1 did not assert any right over
the subject lands prior to the year 2008 or 2009. Consequently,
the relief sought for possession is also barred by the law of
limitation. Ultimately, it is submitted that the Respondent No.1
being stranger, has no locus standi to seek a declaration that
compromise decrees passed in Special Civil Suit Nos.152/1951
and 1622/1988 and Civil appeal No.787/2001 are void ab initio,
null and void and be set aside.
1452 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

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7.5. Without properly appreciating all these aspects, the trial Court
erred in rejecting the application filed by the appellants under
Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC and the same was also affirmed
by the High Court, by the order impugned herein, which will
have to be set aside, according to the learned counsel for the
appellants.
8. Per contra, the learned counsel for the Respondent No.1 submitted
that in the year 1710, Raja Shahu Chhatrapati, the ancestor of the
Respondent No.1/Plaintiff gave a sanad to Guru Shree Jadhavgir
Gosavi of all the lands mentioned in the Sanad. The said Sanad
gave rights of revenue grant which was hereditary. The said grant
did not confer any titular rights over the land to the Gosavi family.
The descendants of the Gosavi family though not empowered to
create third party rights and interests, created third party rights. Thus,
the said Gosavis who only had Inam grant in their favour entitling
them only to the revenue from the land, had overstepped their
authority and had parted the suit properties to the Defendant No.1
Trust, when they absolutely had no right to sell the suit properties.
It is further submitted that the Defendant No.1 filed Special Civil
Suit No.152/1951 against the State of Bombay and one Sukramgir
Chimangir Gosavi in relation to the lands in village Yerawada, Taluka
Haveli. The Defendant Nos.1 and 2 entered into compromise and
it was agreed between them that the Yerawada Inam Village was
a grant of soil and the Defendant No. 1 was Nivval Dhumaldars of
the village to the extent of 12 anna share. The Respondent No.1 /
Plaintiff was not a party to the said suit and without his knowledge,
the consent decree was obtained clandestinely. Therefore, the said
sale deeds and compromise are not binding on the Respondent
No.1. It is also contended that the parties cannot be permitted to
construct and improve the terms of sanad of the year 1710 in 1950s
to their whims and fancies. In any event, the Court had not given a
determinative finding after adjudication, and hence, the compromise
decree of the Court cannot be put against it.
8.1. Continuing further, the learned counsel for the Respondent
No.1 submitted that the Respondent No.1 specifically stated
in paragraph 39 of the Plaint that the defendants have played
systematic fraud on various courts and without any judicial
pronouncements have usurped the lands under suspicious
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1453

Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust and Ors. v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan
Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle and Another

compromises arrived at before the Court. Moreover, in paragraph
44 of the Plaint, the Respondent No.1 stated that the compromise
arrived at in the suits filed in District Court, Pune, appears to
be clearly an attempt to deprive the legal rights of the Plaintiff
in respect of the said suit lands.
8.2. It is also submitted that whether the Respondent No.1 is entitled
to declaration as sought for in the Plaint is a matter of trial and
that cannot be gone into at the stage of deciding the application
under Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC. The Respondent No.1 in
paragraph 53 of the Plaint clearly stated that he had come to
know about the proceedings on 2nd March 2007 only when
he was informed about Civil Application No. 1562/2006 in Writ
Petition No. 3813 of 1996 filed by Dr. F Wadia. The knowledge
of the fact that the Respondent’s right in the suit property has
been affected by the proceedings between the Defendants and
another on 2nd March 2007 is the crucial date from which the
clock starts ticking to determine limitation. Thus, well within the
period of limitation, he preferred the Special civil suit against
the appellants and another for declaration and possession of
the suit properties.
8.3. That apart, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the
Respondent No.1 that when an issue requires an inquiry into
the facts, it cannot be tried as a preliminary issue. To buttress
the same, he placed reliance on the decision in Satti Paradesi
Samadhi & Pillayar Temple v. M. Sankuntala,4 wherein, it was
held that ‘the court has no jurisdiction to try a suit on mixed
issues of law and fact as a preliminary issue’.
8.4. Referring to the decision in Sajjan Sikaria v. Shakuntala Devi
Mishra,5 it is submitted by the learned counsel for the Respondent
No.1 that while dealing with an application under Order VII
Rule 11 of CPC, there is no requirement to consider the written
statement filed by the defendant. That apart, in Saleem Bhai v.
State of Maharashtra,6 it was held by this Court that ‘a perusal
of Order VII Rule 11 of CPC makes it clear that the relevant

4 (2015) 5 SCC 674
5 (2005) 13 SCC 687
6 (2003) 1 SCC 557
1454 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

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facts which need to be looked into for deciding an application
thereunder are the averments in the plaint; the pleas taken
by the defendant in the written statement would be wholly
irrelevant at that stage; and therefore, a direction to file the
written statement without deciding the application under Order
VII Rule 11 of CPC cannot be procedural irregularity touching
the exercise of jurisdiction by the trial Court’.
8.5. Considering all these factors, the High Court rightly dismissed
the application filed by the appellants under Order VII Rule 11(d)
of CPC, by observing that the plaint cannot be rejected at the
threshold, as the issue of limitation is a mixed question of facts
and law for which the parties will have to lead evidence. Thus,
according to the learned counsel, there is no requirement to
interfere with the order impugned herein and the appeal filed
by the appellants is liable to be dismissed.
9. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel
appearing for both sides and perused the materials available on
record.
10. The subject matter of the present proceedings is qua lands in
S.Nos.14A/1A/1, 144, 145, 95, 90, 129, 191A (part), 160 (Part),
191 (part), 20, 103(part), 120(part), 141, 233, 94(part), 104 and 105
situated in Yerawada, Taluka Haveli, District Pune. The Respondent
No.1 / plaintiff preferred Special Civil Suit No.133 of 2009, for
declaration of his ownership and possession in respect of the suit
properties. Seeking rejecting of the said plaint, the appellants filed
an application under Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC on the ground that
the reliefs sought in the suit were clearly barred by limitation. The
trial Court rejected the application filed by the appellants stating that
the issue of limitation is a mixed question of facts and law, for which,
the parties will have to lead evidence. The revision application filed
by the appellants against the said order of the trial Court, was also
rejected by the High Court, by observing that (i) the plaintiff has
specifically asserted that Gosavis family had no authority to create
third party rights and they were only entitled to revenue grant; (ii)
whether the Plaintiff is entitled to declaration in terms of prayer clauses
(a) and (b) in view of the sale deeds executed in favour of Defendant
No.1, is a matter of trial and that cannot be gone into at the stage
of deciding the application under Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC; and
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1455

Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust and Ors. v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan
Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle and Another

(iii) the defendants played a systematic fraud on various courts and
without any judicial pronouncements, usurped the suit lands under
suspicious compromise arrived at before the Court. Feeling aggrieved
and being dissatisfied with the rejection orders of the Courts below,
the appellants are before us with the present appeal.
11. The law applicable for deciding an application filed under Order
VII Rule 11 of CPC7 was outlined by this Court in the decision in
Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra) dead through legal
representatives8 and the same read as follows:
“23.1 …
23.2. The remedy under Order VII Rule 11 is an
independent and special remedy, wherein the Court is
empowered to summarily dismiss a suit at the threshold,
without proceeding to record evidence, and conducting a
trial, on the basis of the evidence adduced, if it is satisfied
that the action should be terminated on any of the grounds
contained in this provision.
23.3. The underlying object of Order VII Rule 11 (a) is that
if in a suit, no cause of action is disclosed, or the suit is
barred by limitation under Rule 11 (d), the Court would not
permit the plaintiff to unnecessarily protract the proceedings
in the suit. In such a case, it would be necessary to put
an end to the sham litigation, so that further judicial time
is not wasted.

7 “11. Rejection of plaint.– The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases–
(a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;
(b) where the relief claimed in undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to
correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;
(c) where the relief claimed is properly valued but the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently
stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper
within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;
(d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law;
(e) where it is not filed in duplicate;
(f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of rule 9:
Provided that the time fixed by the Court for the correction of the valuation or supplying of the requisite
stamp-paper shall not be extended unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, is satisfied that the
plaintiff was prevent by any cause of exceptional nature for correction the valuation or supplying the
requisite stamp-paper, as the case may be, within the time fixed by the Court and that refusal to extend
such time would cause grave injustice to the plaintiff.”
8 (2020) 7 SCC 366 : 2020 SCC OnLine SC 562
1456 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

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23.4. In Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi9 this Court held
that the whole purpose of conferment of powers under this
provision is to ensure that a litigation which is meaningless,
and bound to prove abortive, should not be permitted to
waste judicial time of the court, in the following words :
(SCC p.324, para 12)
“12. …The whole purpose of conferment of
such power is to ensure that a litigation which
is meaningless, and bound to prove abortive
should not be permitted to occupy the time
of the Court, and exercise the mind of the
respondent. The sword of Damocles need not
be kept hanging over his head unnecessarily
without point or purpose. Even if an ordinary
civil litigation, the Court readily exercises the
power to reject a plaint, if it does not disclose
any cause of action.”
23.5. The power conferred on the court to terminate a
civil action is, however, a drastic one, and the conditions
enumerated in Order VII Rule 11 are required to be strictly
adhered to.
23.6. Under Order VII Rule 11, a duty is cast on the Court
to determine whether the plaint discloses a cause of
action by scrutinizing the averments in the plaint,10 read
in conjunction with the documents relied upon, or whether
the suit is barred by any law.
23.7. Order VII Rule 14(1) provides for production of
documents, on which the plaintiff places reliance in his
suit, which reads as under:
“14.Production of document on which plaintiff
sues or relies.– (1)Where a plaintiff sues upon
a document or relies upon document in his

9 1986 Supp SCC 315. Followed in Manvendrasinhji Ranjitsinhji Jadeja v. Vijaykunverba, 1998 SCC
OnLine Guj 281 : (1998) 2 GLH 823
10 Liverpool & London S.P. & I Assn. Ltd. V. M.V. Sea Success I (2004) 9 SCC 512
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1457

Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust and Ors. v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan
Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle and Another

possession or power in support of his claim, he
shall enter such documents in a list, and shall
produce it in Court when the plaint is presented
by him and shall, at the same time deliver the
document and a copy thereof, to be filed with
the plaint.
(2)Where any such document is not in the
possession or power of the plaintiff, he shall,
wherever possible, state in whose possession
or power it is.
(3)A document which ought to be produced in
Court by the plaintiff when the plaint is presented,
or to be entered in the list to be added or annexed
to the plaint but is not produced or entered
accordingly, shall not, without the leave of the
Court, be received in evidence on his behalf at
the hearing of the suit.
(4)Nothing in this rule shall apply to document
produced for the cross examination of the
plaintiff’s witnesses, or, handed over to a witness
merely to refresh his memory.”
(emphasis supplied)

23.8. Having regard to Order VII Rule 14 CPC, the
documents filed alongwith the plaint, are required to be
taken into consideration for deciding the application under
Order VII Rule 11 (a). When a document referred to in the
plaint, forms the basis of the plaint, it should be treated
as a part of the plaint.
23.9. In exercise of power under this provision, the Court
would determine if the assertions made in the plaint are
contrary to statutory law, or judicial dicta, for deciding
whether a case for rejecting the plaint at the threshold is
made out.
23.10. At this stage, the pleas taken by the defendant in
the written statement and application for rejection of the
1458 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

plaint on the merits, would be irrelevant, and cannot be
adverted to, or taken into consideration.11
23.11. The test for exercising the power under Order VII
Rule 11 is that if the averments made in the plaint are
taken in entirety, in conjunction with the documents relied
upon, would the same result in a decree being passed.
This test was laid down in Liverpool & London S.P. & I
Assn. Ltd. v. M.V.Sea Success I which reads as : (SCC
p.562, para 139)
“139. Whether a plaint discloses a cause of
action or not is essentially a question of fact.
But whether it does or does not must be found
out from reading the plaint itself. For the said
purpose, the averments made in the plaint in
their entirety must be held to be correct. The
test is as to whether if the averments made in
the plaint are taken to be correct in their entirety,
a decree would be passed.”
23.12. In Hardesh Ores (P.) Ltd. v. Hede & Co.12 the Court
further held that it is not permissible to cull out a sentence
or a passage, and to read it in isolation. It is the substance,
and not merely the form, which has to be looked into. The
plaint has to be construed as it stands, without addition or
subtraction of words. If the allegations in the plaint prima
facie show a cause of action, the court cannot embark
upon an enquiry whether the allegations are true in fact.
D.Ramachandran v. R.V.Janakiraman13
23.13. If on a meaningful reading of the plaint, it is found
that the suit is manifestly vexatious and without any merit,
and does not disclose a right to sue, the court would be
justified in exercising the power under Order VII Rule 11
CPC.
23.14. The power under Order VII Rule 11 CPC may be
exercised by the Court at any stage of the suit, either

11 Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v. Charity Commr., (2004) 3 SCC 137
12 (2007) 5 SCC 614
13 (1999) 3 SCC 267
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1459

Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust and Ors. v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan
Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle and Another

before registering the plaint, or after issuing summons to
the defendant, or before conclusion of the trial, as held
by this Court in the judgment of Saleem Bhai v. State of
Maharashtra.14 The plea that once issues are framed, the
matter must necessarily go to trial was repelled by this
Court in Azhar Hussain (supra).
23.15. The provision of Order VII Rule 11 is mandatory in
nature. It states that the plaint “shall” be rejected if any of
the grounds specified in clause (a) to (e) are made out. If
the Court finds that the plaint does not disclose a cause
of action, or that the suit is barred by any law, the Court
has no option, but to reject the plaint.
24. “Cause of action” means every fact which would be
necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order
to support his right to judgment. It consists of a bundle of
material facts, which are necessary for the plaintiff to prove
in order to entitle him to the reliefs claimed in the suit.
24.1. In Swamy Atmanand v. Sri Ramakrishna Tapovanam15
this Court held :
“24. A cause of action, thus, means every fact,
which if traversed, it would be necessary for the
plaintiff to prove an order to support his right
to a judgment of the court. In other words, it
is a bundle of facts, which taken with the law
applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to
relief against the defendant. It must include
some act done by the defendant since in the
absence of such an act, no cause of action can
possibly accrue. It is not limited to the actual
infringement of the right sued on but includes
all the material facts on which it is founded”
(emphasis supplied)

14 (2003) 1 SCC 557
15 (2005) 10 SCC 51
1460 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

24.2. In T. Arivanandam v. T.V. Satyapal16 this Court held
that while considering an application under Order VII
Rule 11 CPC what is required to be decided is whether
the plaint discloses a real cause of action, or something
purely illusory, in the following words: (SCC p. 470, para 5)
“5. …The learned Munsif must remember that
if on a meaningful – not formal – reading of the
plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless,
in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to
sue, he should exercise his power under Order
VII, Rule 11 C.P.C. taking care to see that the
ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if
clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause
of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing …”
(emphasis supplied)

24.3. Subsequently, in I.T.C. Ltd. v. Debt Recovery
Appellate Tribunal17 this Court held that law cannot permit
clever drafting which creates illusions of a cause of action.
What is required is that a clear right must be made out
in the plaint.
24.4. If, however, by clever drafting of the plaint, it has
created the illusion of a cause of action, this Court in
Madanuri Sri Ramachandra Murthy v. Syed Jalal18 held
that it should be nipped in the bud, so that bogus litigation
will end at the earliest stage. The Court must be vigilant
against any camouflage or suppression, and determine
whether the litigation is utterly vexatious, and an abuse
of the process of the court.
25. The Limitation Act, 1963 prescribes a time-limit for the
institution of all suits, appeals, and applications. Section
2(j) defines the expression “period of limitation” to mean
the period of limitation prescribed in the Schedule for
suits, appeals or applications. Section 3 lays down that

16 (1977) 4 SCC 467
17 (1998) 2 SCC 170
18 (2017) 13 SCC 174
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1461

Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust and Ors. v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan
Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle and Another

every suit instituted after the prescribed period, shall be
dismissed even though limitation may not have been set
up as a defence. If a suit is not covered by any specific
article, then it would fall within the residuary article.
26. Articles 58 and 59 of the Schedule to the 1963 Act,
prescribe the period of limitation for filing a suit where a
declaration is sought, or cancellation of an instrument, or
rescission of a contract, which reads as under :

Description of Period of Time from which
suit limitation period begins to run
58. To obtain Three years When the right to sue
any other first accrues
declaration
59. To cancel Three years When the facts
or set aside an entitling the plaintiff to
instrument or have the instrument
decree or for the or decree cancelled
rescission of a or set aside or the
contract contract rescinded
first become known
to him.

The period of limitation prescribed under Articles 58 and
59 of the 1963 Act is three years, which commences from
the date when the right to sue first accrues.
27. In Khatri Hotels Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India19 this Court
held that the use of the word ‘first’ between the words
‘sue’ and ‘accrued’, would mean that if a suit is based on
multiple causes of action, the period of limitation will begin
to run from the date when the right to sue first accrues.
That is, if there are successive violations of the right, it
would not give rise to a fresh cause of action, and the suit
will be liable to be dismissed, if it is beyond the period
of limitation counted from the date when the right to sue
first accrued.

19 (2011) 9 SCC 126
1462 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

28. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of Punjab
v. Gurdev Singh20 held that the Court must examine the
plaint and determine when the right to sue first accrued
to the plaintiff, and whether on the assumed facts, the
plaint is within time. The words “right to sue” means the
right to seek relief by means of legal proceedings. The
right to sue accrues only when the cause of action arises.
The suit must be instituted when the right asserted in the
suit is infringed, or when there is a clear and unequivocal
threat to infringe such right by the defendant against whom
the suit is instituted. Order VII Rule 11(d) provides that
where a suit appears from the averments in the plaint to
be barred by any law, the plaint shall be rejected.”
12. As settled in law, when an application to reject the plaint is filed,
the averments in the plaint and the documents annexed therewith
alone are germane. The averments in the application can be taken
into account only to consider whether the case falls within any of
the sub-rules of Order VII Rule 11 by considering the averments in
the plaint. The Court cannot look into the written statement or the
documents filed by the defendants. The Civil Courts including this
Court cannot go into the rival contentions at that stage. Keeping in
mind the legal position, let us examine whether the suit filed by the
Respondent No.1 is barred by limitation, in the light of the averments
contained in the plaint filed by him.
13. The Respondent No.1/Plaintiff claimed title, right and interest over the
suit properties, stating that he is the direct descendent of Chhatrapati
Shivaji Maharaj from the Bhonsale Dynasty and he has inherited
the vast lands all over Maharashtra from his ancestors. He further
stated in his plaint that Raja Shahu Chhatrapati gave only the rights
of revenue grant to Guru Shree Jadhavgir Gosavi and the said
grant did not give any rights in the lands to the Gosavi family and
hence, they had no right to sell the suit properties to the Defendant
No.1. Though the Respondent No.1 relied on the report of the Inam
Commissioner appointed under the provisions of the Act XI, 1852,
which stated that the grant enjoyed by the Respondent No.1’s
ancestors was only a revenue grant and stated that Gosavis family

20 (1991) 4 SCC 1 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 1082
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1463

Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust and Ors. v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan
Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle and Another

had no authority to create third party rights in the suit lands, the
same was not substantiated with proper pleadings and documents.
It was further stated by the Respondent No.1 that by order dated
17.02.1980, the Government of Maharashtra was pleased to direct
that the Satara Saranjam (Jagir / grant of land) shall be continued
in the name of the Respondent No.1 / plaintiff, but, at that time, he
was a minor. That apart, the Friendship Treaty was continued by
the Government of Maharashtra vide its resolution dated 28.02.1980
and on attaining the age of majority by the plaintiff, the Maharashtra
Government by resolution dated 01.09.1984 continued the said
Saranjam upon the plaintiff. Hence, the Respondent No.1 continues
to be the owner of the suit properties. We are unable to accept these
statements. The averments in the plaint disclose that even prior to
the alleged Resolution dated 28.02.1980, a major portion of the
property (3/4th share) has been conveyed as early as in 1938 through
Court auction and the remaining portion (1/4th share) in 1952. The
plaintiff was a minor in 1980 and by 01.09.1984, he claims to have
become a major. However, he has not stated as to when he was
born. From the averments, it can be presumed that the plaintiff must
have born in 1965/1966 considering the fact that he was declared as
a major in 1984. The above statements in the plaint imply that the
plaintiff was not even born when the property was sold. What also
remains undisputed is the fact that the plaintiff’s predecessors had
not challenged the sale in 1938 and 1952. By the time, the alleged
resolution was passed, the property had already been conveyed.
The resolution can convey any right only over the properties which
have not been conveyed. The plaintiff though has annexed a Family
Tree chart along with the plaint, he has not produced any other
documentary evidence to the various claims which he has made.
In paragraph 10 of the plaint, the plaintiff claims that the estate was
attached as there were no natural heirs. He has narrated many facts
in the plaint from paragraphs 11 to 32, which are adverse to his
claim of title. The averments in the plaint relating to grant of Sanad
are vague without any reference to specific date. They, according to
us, are baseless and vague statements, cleverly crafted to create a
cause of action. The plaintiff himself avers in paragraph 25 that a suit
was filed by the appellant/1st defendant claiming his title based on
the auction purchase against the Government. The averment does
not even disclose that it has come to his knowledge only recently.
1464 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

We feel it strange for the plaintiff to even plead in paragraph 26 that
he was not impleaded as a party in the 1951 suit, compromised in
1953, when he was not even born.
14. The plaintiff, in our wisdom, cannot assert or deny something which
was whether within the knowledge of his predecessor or not, when
he was not even born. Irrespective of the above, the fact that the
predecessors of the Respondent No.1/plaintiff, never challenged the
sale of property to the Defendant No.1/appellant by court auction and
the subsequent registration of the deeds, despite constructive notice,
would imply that they had acceded to the title of the appellant, which
cannot now be questioned by the plaintiff after such long time. There
is also a presumption in law that a registered document is validly
executed and is valid until it is declared as illegal. In this regard, this
Court in Prem Singh v. Birbal,21 held as under:
“27. There is a presumption that a registered document
is validly executed. A registered document, therefore,
prima facie would be valid in law. The onus of proof, thus,
would be on a person who leads evidence to rebut the
presumption. In the instant case, Respondent 1 has not
been able to rebut the said presumption.”
15. At this juncture, it would be relevant to refer to relevant portion of
Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which reads as under:
“3. Interpretation clause……
……
“a person is said to have notice” of a fact when he actually
knows that fact, or when, but for wilful abstention from an
enquiry or search which he ought to have made, or gross
negligence, he would have known it.
Explanation I.—Where any transaction relating to
immoveable property is required by law to be and has
been effected by a registered instrument, any person
acquiring such property or any part of, or share or interest
in, such property shall be deemed to have notice of such
instrument as from the date of registration or, where the

21 (2006) 5 SCC 353 : 2006 SCC OnLine SC 522
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1465

Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust and Ors. v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan
Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle and Another

property is not all situated in one sub-district, or where
the registered instrument has been registered under sub-
section (2) of section 30 of the Indian Registration Act,
1908 (16 of 1908), from the earliest date on which any
memorandum of such registered instrument has been
filed by any Sub-Registrar within whose sub-district any
part of the property which is being acquired, or of the
property wherein a share or interest is being acquired,
is situated:
Provided that—(1) the instrument has been registered and
its registration completed in the manner prescribed by the
Indian Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), and the rules
made thereunder, (2) the instrument or memorandum has
been duly entered or filed, as the case may be, in books
kept under section 51 of that Act, and(3)the particulars
regarding the transaction to which the instrument relates
have been correctly entered in the indexes kept under
section 55 of that Act.
Explanation II.—Any person acquiring any immovable
property or any share or interest in any such property shall
be deemed to have notice of the title, if any, of any person
who is for the time being in actual possession thereof.
Explanation III.—A person shall be deemed to have had
notice of any fact if his agent acquires notice thereof whilst
acting on his behalf in the course of business to which
that fact is material:
Provided that, if the agent fraudulently conceals the fact,
the principal shall not be charged with notice thereof
as against any person who was a party to or otherwise
cognizant of the fraud.”
16. When a portion of the property has been conveyed by court auction
and registered in the first instance and when another portion has been
conveyed by a registered sale deed in 1952, there is a constructive
notice from the date of registration and the presumption under
Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, comes into operation.
The possession, in the present case, also has been rested with the
appellant before several decades, which operates as notice of title.
1466 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

This Court in R.K. Mohd. Ubaidullah v. Hajee C. Abdul Wahab,22
held as follows:
“15. Notice is defined in Section 3 of the Transfer of
Property Act. It may be actual where the party has actual
knowledge of the fact or constructive. “A person is said to
have notice” of a fact when he actually knows that fact, or
when, but for wilful abstention from an inquiry or search
which he ought to have made, or gross negligence, he
would have known it. Explanation II of said Section 3 reads:
“Explanation II.—Any person acquiring any
immovable property or any share or interest
in any such property shall be deemed to have
notice of the title, if any, of any person who is
for the time being in actual possession thereof.”
Section 3 was amended by the Amendment Act of 1929
in relation to the definition of “notice”. The definition has
been amended and supplemented by three explanations,
which settle the law in several matters of great importance.
For the immediate purpose Explanation II is relevant. It
states that actual possession is notice of the title of the
person in possession. Prior to the amendment there
had been some uncertainty because of divergent views
expressed by various High Courts in relation to the actual
possession as notice of title. A person may enter the
property in one capacity and having a kind of interest. But
subsequently while continuing in possession of the property
his capacity or interest may change. A person entering
the property as tenant later may become usufructuary
mortgagee or may be agreement holder to purchase the
same property or may be some other interest is created
in his favour subsequently. Hence with reference to
subsequent purchaser it is essential that he should make
an inquiry as to the title or interest of the person in actual
possession as on the date when the sale transaction was
made in his favour. The actual possession of a person
itself is deemed or constructive notice of the title if any,

22 (2000) 6 SCC 402 : 2000 SCC OnLine SC 995 at page 410
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1467

Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust and Ors. v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan
Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle and Another

of a person who is for the time being in actual possession
thereof. A subsequent purchaser has to make inquiry as
to further interest, nature of possession and title under
which the person was continuing in possession on the
date of purchase of the property. In the case on hand
Defendants 2 to 4 contended that they were already aware
of the nature of possession of the plaintiff over the suit
property as a tenant and as such there was no need to
make any inquiry. At one stage they also contended that
they purchased the property after contacting the plaintiff,
of course, which contention was negatived by the learned
trial court as well as the High Court. Even otherwise the
said contention is self-contradictory. In view of Section
19(b) of the Specific Relief Act and definition of “notice”
given in Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act read
along with Explanation II, it is rightly held by the trial court
as well as by the High Court that Defendants 2 to 5 were
not bona fide purchasers in good faith for value without
notice of the original contract.”
17. The next aspect to be considered herein is the cause of action arose
for filing the suit by the Respondent No.1. In this regard, we may
quote the following paragraphs of the plaint:
“34. The Plaintiff says that in Writ Petition No. 3813 of
1996 a Civil Application No. 1562 of 2006 came to be
filed. One Advocate Shri. Godge had appeared in the
said matter. The said Advocate is well acquainted with
the Plaintiff. The said Advocate, after reading all the
necessary related proceedings, informed the Plaintiff of
the mischief committed by the Defendants. The Plaintiff
thereafter collected all the necessary information and
documents. The Plaintiff then instructed his Advocates to
file the present suit.
35. The Plaintiff says that the present suit has been filed
on the latest information received by the Plaintiff in respect
of the lands in possession with the Defendants. The
Plaintiff has accordingly described the suit properties in
the schedule annexed as Exhibit “B” hereto. The Plaintiff
craves leave of the Hon’ble Court to amend the plaint in
1468 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

the event any other lands of the Plaintiff are detected and
are found. The Plaintiff may also be permitted to amend
the plaint and bring on record the parties in whose favour
the Defendants may have created third party rights.
53. The Plaintiff states and submits that he got the
knowledge of the proceedings on 2nd March 2007 only
when he was informed about the Civil Application No. 1562
of 2006 in Writ Petition No. 3813 of 1996 filed by Dr. F.
Wadia. The said knowledge gives cause of action for the
Plaintiff to file suit. The knowledge that the Plaintiffs right
in the suit Property have been affected by the proceedings
between the Defendants and another the said day i.e.
2nd March 2007 is the date as prescribed by law for the
limitation to start, as he first got the knowledge then.
The Plaintiff has thereafter collected all the information
and approached this Hon’ble Court as soon as possible.
There is much more information that the Plaintiff awaits
in respect of the land in Village Yerwada. The Plaintiff is
also filing· a separate application under Order 2 Rule 2
of the Civil Procedure Code reserving right to seek other
additional reliefs against the Defendants”.
On a reading of the plaint averments, it is clear that the plaintiff was
well acquainted with the counsel Mr.Godge. If the plaintiff was already
acquainted with Mr. Godge, whom upon verification of the records
from the status of the suit, we find to have entered appearance in
the suit for the 20th Respondent on 21.07.2005 itself, would have
acquired knowledge much prior to 2nd March 2007. We also find
that Civil Application No 1562 of 2006 was not filed by Mr.Godge.
Therefore, it is a clear case where the plaintiff has not approached
the Court with clean hands. We have no hesitation to hold that the
2nd March 2007, is a fictional date, created only for the purpose of
this suit. As such, the judgment in T.Arivanandam v. T.V.Satyapal23
squarely becomes applicable.
18. Continuing further with the plea of limitation, the Courts below have
held that the question of the suit being barred by limitation can be
decided at the time of trial as the question of limitation is a mixed

23 (1977) 4 SCC 467
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1469

Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust and Ors. v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan
Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle and Another

question of law and facts. Though the question of limitation generally
is mixed question of law and facts, when upon meaningful reading of
the plaint, the court can come to a conclusion that under the given
circumstances, after dissecting the vices of clever drafting creating
an illusion of cause of action, the suit is hopelessly barred and the
plaint can be rejected under Order VII Rule 11. In the present case,
we have already held that 02.03.2007 is a fictional date. It is not a
case where a fraudulent document was created by the appellant or
his predecessors. The title of the suit property as observed by us
earlier was conveyed in 1938 and 1952, and what transpired later by
way of compromise was only an affirmative assertion by the State.
While so, the prayer (a) made in the suit relates to declaration to the
effect that the Respondent No. 1 is the owner of the suit properties.
19. As per Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, a declaration to
adjudge the documents as void or voidable must be sought if it causes
a serious injury. In the present case, the sale deeds undisputably
stand adverse to the interest and right of the plaintiff and hence, a
relief to declare them as invalid must have been sought. Though
the plaintiff has pleaded the documents to be void and sought to
ignore the documents, we do not think that the document is void,
but rather, according to us, it can only be treated as voidable. The
claim of the plaintiff that the grant is only a revenue grant and not
a soil grant, has not been accepted by the State which entered into
a compromise. In paragraph 14 of the plaint, there is an averment
that the original sanad was lost and a new sanad was given to the
effect that the inam was a revenue grant based on the report of the
Inam Commissioner. Again, specific dates are not mentioned in the
plaint. In paragraph 25, the plaintiff alleges that third party rights
were created by the Gosavi family without any right. Here also,
the details are vague. It can be inferred that such rights ultimately
culminated into court auction, in which, the property was sold to the
appellant. Since the original Sanad was lost, the plaintiff had initiated
a suit against the State which was compromised. It is not in dispute
that there was a grant. There is only a dispute with regard to the
contents of the Sanad, which was lost. In the absence of the original
Sanad, it is not possible for any court to determine the contents of
the same. The alleged misrepresentation is neither to the character
nor is there any allegation of forgery or fabrication. It is also settled
law that a document is void only if there is a misrepresentation on its
1470 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

character and when there is a misrepresentation in the contents, it is
only voidable. In the present case, the averments in the plaint make
out only a case for voidabale transaction and not a void transaction.
Fraud is merely pleaded without any specific attributes but based on
surmises and conjectures. It will be useful to refer to the judgment of
this Court in Ningawwa v. Byrappa Shiddappa Hireknrabar,24 wherein
it was held as under:
“5. The legal position will be different if there is a fraudulent
misrepresentation not merely as to the contents of the
document but as to its character. The authorities make
a clear distinction between fraudulent misrepresentation
as to the character of the document and fraudulent
misrepresentation as to the contents thereof. With
reference to the former, it has been held that the transaction
is void, while in the case of the latter, it is merely voidable.
In Foster v. Mackinon [(1869) 4 CP 704] the action was by
the endorsee of a bill of exchange. The defendant pleaded
that he endorsed the bill on a fraudulent representation by
the acceptor that he was signing a guarantee. In holding
that such a plea was admissible, the Court observed:
“It (signature) is invalid not merely on the ground
of fraud, where fraud exists, but on the ground
that the mind of the signer did not accompany
the signature; in other words, that he never
intended to sign, and therefore in contemplation
of law never did sign, the contract to which his
name is appended…. The defendant never
intended to sign that contract or any such
contract. He never intended to put his name
to any instrument that then was or thereafter
might become negotiable. He was deceived,
not merely as to the legal effect, but as to the
‘actual contents’ of the instrument.”
This decision has been followed by the Indian courts Sanni
Bibi v. Siddik Hossain [AIR 1919 Cal 728], and Brindaban v.
Dhurba Charan [AIR 1929 Cal 606]. It is not the contention

24 1968 SCC OnLine SC 206 : (1968) 2 SCR 797 : (1968) 2 SCJ 555 : AIR 1968 SC 956
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1471

Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust and Ors. v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan
Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle and Another

of the appellant in the present case that there was any
fraudulent misrepresentation as to the character of the
gift deed but Shiddappa fraudulently included in the gift
deed plots 91 and 92 of Lingadahalli village without her
knowledge. We are accordingly of the opinion that the
transaction of gift was voidable and not void and the suit
must be brought within the time prescribed under Article
95 of the Limitation Act.”
19.1. In the present case, the right to sue had first accrued to the
predecessors of the plaintiff, when the properties were brought
for sale by the court. No challenge was made to the court
auction or to the conveyance in 1952. At this length of time,
we can only assume that the predecessors of the Plaintiff had
not initiated any proceedings as according to them, either it
was a grant of soil or during that period, the rights had not
resumed. The plaintiff had become a major by 1984. By virtue
of Article 60 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the plaintiff has a right
to seek a declaration that the alienation of a property in which
he had a right, was void within 3 years. Though the Article
prima facie looks to be applicable only to cases, where there
was an alienation by the guardian, we feel that the period of
limitation would be applicable even when a third party had
alienated the share or property of a minor. Even otherwise,
Article 58 would come into operation and the plaintiff ought
to have filed the suit within three years from the date when
he became a major to seek any declaratory relief, as it is
the date on which his right to sue first is deemed to have
been accrued. The plaintiff has asserted that by government
resolutions in 1980 and 1984 he has acquired the title over
the properties. Therefore, as a prudent man, he ought to have
initiated necessary steps to protect his interest. Having failed
to do so and created a fictional date for cause of action, the
plaintiff is liable to be non-suited on the ground of limitation.
20. As noted in the preceding paragraphs, the court auction was held
in 1938 and sale deed was registered in the year 1952 in favour of
the Defendant No.1 in respect of the suit properties, whereas, the
suit was filed only in the year 2008, though the Respondent No.1 /
Plaintiff and his predecessors were aware of the existence of the
said registered sale deed of the suit properties. In fact, there is no
1472 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

averment in the plaint to the effect that the predecessors were not
aware of the transactions. The limitation period for setting aside
the sale deed would start running from the date of registration of
the same and as per Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963, after
three years of the registration, the Plaintiff is barred from seeking
cancellation of the said registered sale deed or the decree that was
passed before 50 years and the consequential judgements. We have
already referred to Section 3 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The
plaintiff, in our view, has miserably failed to ascertain the existence
of the fact by being diligent. The question as to when a period of
limitation would commence in respect of a registered document is no
longer res integra. In this regard, this Court in Dilboo v. Dhanraji,25
held as follows:
“20…… Whenever a document is registered the date
of registration becomes the date of deemed knowledge.
In other cases where a fact could be discovered by due
diligence then deemed knowledge would be attributed to
the plaintiff because a party cannot be allowed to extend
the period of limitation by merely claiming that he had no
knowledge”
21. It will also be useful to refer to the judgement of this court in Mohd.
Noorul Hoda v. Bibi Raifunnisa,26 wherein the effect of willful abstention
from making enquires was laid down and the following paragraphs
are relevant:
“5. Section 55(1) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
regulates rights and liabilities of the buyer and seller. The
seller is bound to disclose to the buyer any material defect in
the property or in the seller's title thereto of which the seller
is, and the buyer is not, aware, and which the buyer could
not with ordinary care discover. The seller is to answer,
to the best of his information, all relevant questions put
to him by the buyer in respect of the property or the title
thereto. The seller shall be deemed to contract with the
buyer that the interest which the seller professes to transfer
to the buyer subsists and that he has power to transfer the

25 (2000) 7 SCC 702
26 (1996) 7 SCC 767
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1473

Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust and Ors. v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan
Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle and Another

same. Section 3 provides that “a person is said to have a
notice of a fact when he actually knows the fact, or when
but for wilful abstention from an enquiry or search which
he ought to have made, or gross negligence, he would
have known it”. Explanation II amplifies that “any person
acquiring any immovable property or any share or interest
in any such property shall be deemed to have notice of
the title, if any, of any person who is for the time being in
actual possession thereof”. Constructive notice in equity
treats a man who ought to have known a fact, as if he
actually knows it. Generally speaking, constructive notice
may not be inferred unless some specific circumstances
can be shown as a starting point of enquiry which if pursued
would have led to the discovery of the fact. As a fact it is
found that Rafique filed the sale deed dated 1-12-1959
executed in his favour by Mahangu, in Title Suit No. 220 of
1969 for which the petitioner claims to have derivative title
through Rafique. Rafique had full knowledge that despite
the purported sale, Bibi Raifunnisa got the preliminary
decree passed in 1973 and in 1974 under the final decree
the right, title and interest in the suit property passed on to
her. Under Section 55 when second sale deed dated 6-9-
1980 was got executed by the petitioner from Rafique, it is
imputable that Rafique had conveyed all the knowledge of
the defects in title and he no longer had title to the property.
It is also a finding of fact recorded by the appellate court
and affirmed by the High Court that the petitioner was in
know of full facts of the preliminary decree and the final
decree passed and execution thereof. In other words, the
finding is that he had full knowledge, from the inception of
Title Suit No. 220 of 1969 from his benamidar. Having had
that knowledge, he got the second sale deed executed
and registered on 6-9-1980. Oblivious to these facts, he
did not produce the second original sale deed nor is an
attempt made to produce secondary evidence on proof
of the loss of original sale deed.
6. The question, therefore, is as to whether Article 59
or Article 113 of the Schedule to the Act is applicable to
the facts in this case. Article 59 of the Schedule to the
1474 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

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Limitation Act, 1908 had provided inter alia for suits to set
aside decree obtained by fraud. There was no specific
article to set aside a decree on any other ground. In
such a case, the residuary Article 120 in Schedule III
was attracted. The present Article 59 of the Schedule to
the Act will govern any suit to set aside a decree either
on fraud or any other ground. Therefore, Article 59 would
be applicable to any suit to set aside a decree either on
fraud or any other ground. It is true that Article 59 would
be applicable if a person affected is a party to a decree
or an instrument or a contract. There is no dispute that
Article 59 would apply to set aside the instrument, decree
or contract between the inter se parties. The question
is whether in case of person claiming title through the
party to the decree or instrument or having knowledge
of the instrument or decree or contract and seeking
to avoid the decree by a specific declaration, whether
Article 59 gets attracted? As stated earlier, Article 59 is
a general provision. In a suit to set aside or cancel an
instrument, a contract or a decree on the ground of fraud,
Article 59 is attracted. The starting point of limitation is
the date of knowledge of the alleged fraud. When the
plaintiff seeks to establish his title to the property which
cannot be established without avoiding the decree or an
instrument that stands as an insurmountable obstacle in
his way which otherwise binds him, though not a party,
the plaintiff necessarily has to seek a declaration and
have that decree, instrument or contract cancelled or set
aside or rescinded. Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act,
1963 regulates suits for cancellation of an instrument
which lays down that any person against whom a written
instrument is void or voidable and who has a reasonable
apprehension that such instrument, if left outstanding, may
cause him serious injury, can sue to have it adjudged void
or voidable and the court may in its discretion so adjudge
it and order it to be delivered or cancelled. It would thus be
clear that the word ‘person’ in Section 31 of the Specific
Relief Act is wide enough to encompass a person seeking
derivative title from his seller. It would, therefore, be clear
that if he seeks avoidance of the instrument, decree or
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1475

Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust and Ors. v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan
Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle and Another

contract and seeks a declaration to have the decrees set
aside or cancelled he is necessarily bound to lay the suit
within three years from the date when the facts entitling
the plaintiff to have the decree set aside, first became
known to him.
7. The question, therefore, is as to when the facts of
granting preliminary and final decrees touching upon the
suit land first became known to him. As seen, when he
claimed title to the property as owner and Rafique to be
his benamidar, as admitted by Rafique, the title deed
dated 1-12-1959 was filed in Title Suit No. 220 of 1969.
Thereby Rafique had first known about the passing of
the preliminary decree in 1973 and final decree in 1974
as referred to earlier. Under all these circumstances,
Article 113 is inapplicable to the facts on hand. Since the
petitioner claimed derivative title from him but for his wilful
abstention from making enquiry or his omission to file the
second sale deed dated 6-9-1980, an irresistible inference
was rightly drawn by the courts below that the petitioner
had full knowledge of the fact right from the beginning;
in other words right from the date when title deed was
filed in Title Suit No. 220 of 1969 and preliminary decree
was passed on 2-1-1973 and final decree was passed on
5-2-1974. Admittedly, the suit was filed in 1981 beyond
three years from the date of knowledge. Thereby, the
suit is hopelessly barred by limitation. The decree of the
appellate court and the order of the High Court, therefore,
are not illegal warranting interference.”
22. It will also be useful to refer to the judgment of this Court in Prem
Singh v. Birbal,27 where the scope of the Limitation Act, 1963 and
Article 59 was discussed and held as under:
“11. Limitation is a statute of repose. It ordinarily bars a
remedy, but, does not extinguish a right. The only exception
to the said rule is to be found in Section 27 of the Limitation
Act, 1963 which provides that at the determination of
the period prescribed thereby, limited to any person for

27 (2006) 5 SCC 353 : 2006 SCC OnLine SC 522
1476 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

instituting a suit for possession of any property, his right
to such property shall be extinguished.
12. An extinction of right, as contemplated by the provisions
of the Limitation Act, prima facie would be attracted in all
types of suits. The Schedule appended to the Limitation
Act, as prescribed by the articles, provides that upon
lapse of the prescribed period, the institution of a suit will
be barred. Section 3 of the Limitation Act provides that
irrespective of the fact as to whether any defence is set
out or is raised by the defendant or not, in the event a suit
is found to be barred by limitation, every suit instituted,
appeal preferred and every application made after the
prescribed period shall be dismissed.
13. Article 59 of the Limitation Act applies specially when
a relief is claimed on the ground of fraud or mistake. It
only encompasses within its fold fraudulent transactions
which are voidable transactions.
14. A suit for cancellation of instrument is based on the
provisions of Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, which
reads as under:
“31. When cancellation may be ordered.—(1)
Any person against whom a written instrument
is void or voidable, and who has reasonable
apprehension that such instrument, if left
outstanding may cause him serious injury, may
sue to have it adjudged void or voidable; and
the court may, in its discretion, so adjudge it
and order it to be delivered up and cancelled.
(2) If the instrument has been registered under
the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908),
the court shall also send a copy of its decree
to the officer in whose office the instrument has
been so registered; and such officer shall note
on the copy of the instrument contained in his
books the fact of its cancellation.”
15. Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 thus, refers
to both void and voidable documents. It provides for a
discretionary relief.
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1477

Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust and Ors. v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan
Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle and Another

16. When a document is valid, no question arises of its
cancellation. When a document is void ab initio, a decree
for setting aside the same would not be necessary as the
same is non est in the eye of the law, as it would be a
nullity.
17. Once, however, a suit is filed by a plaintiff for
cancellation of a transaction, it would be governed by
Article 59. Even if Article 59 is not attracted, the residuary
article would be.
18. Article 59 would be attracted when coercion, undue
influence, misappropriation or fraud which the plaintiff asserts
is required to be proved. Article 59 would apply to the case
of such instruments. It would, therefore, apply where a
document is prima facie valid. It would not apply only to
instruments which are presumptively invalid. (See Unni v.
Kunchi Amma [ILR (1891) 14 Mad 26] and Sheo Shankar
Gir v. Ram Shewak Chowdhri [ILR (1897) 24 Cal 77].)
19. It is not in dispute that by reason of Article 59 of the
Limitation Act, the scope has been enlarged from the old
Article 91 of the 1908 Act. By reason of Article 59, the
provisions contained in Articles 91 and 114 of the 1908
Act had been combined.
20. If the plaintiff is in possession of a property, he may
file a suit for declaration that the deed is not binding upon
him but if he is not in possession thereof, even under a
void transaction, the right by way of adverse possession
may be claimed. Thus, it is not correct to contend that the
provisions of the Limitation Act would have no application
at all in the event the transaction is held to be void.
21. Respondent 1 has not alleged that fraudulent
misrepresentation was made to him as regards the
character of the document. According to him, there
had been a fraudulent misrepresentation as regards its
contents.
22. In Ningawwa v. Byrappa [(1968) 2 SCR 797 :
AIR 1968 SC 956] this Court held that the fraudulent
misrepresentation as regards character of a document is
1478 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

void but fraudulent misrepresentation as regards contents
of a document is voidable stating: (SCR p. 801 C-D)
“The legal position will be different if there
is a fraudulent misrepresentation not merely
as to the contents of the document but as
to its character. The authorities make a clear
distinction between fraudulent misrepresentation
as to the character of the document and
fraudulent misrepresentation as to the contents
thereof. With reference to the former, it has been
held that the transaction is void, while in the
case of the latter, it is merely voidable.”
In that case, a fraud was found to have been played and
it was held that as the suit was instituted within a few
days after the appellant therein came to know of the fraud
practised on her, the same was void. It was, however,
held: (SCR p. 803 B-E)
“Article 91 of the Limitation Act provides that
a suit to set aside an instrument not otherwise
provided for (and no other provision of the
Act applies to the circumstances of the case)
shall be subject to a three years’ limitation
which begins to run when the facts entitling the
plaintiff to have the instrument cancelled or set
aside are known to him. In the present case,
the trial court has found, upon examination
of the evidence, that at the very time of the
execution of the gift deed, Ext. 45 the appellant
knew that her husband prevailed upon her to
convey Surveys Plots Nos. 407/1 and 409/1 of
Tadavalga village to him by undue influence.
The finding of the trial court is based upon
the admission of the appellant herself in the
course of her evidence. In view of this finding
of the trial court it is manifest that the suit of
the appellant is barred under Article 91 of the
Limitation Act so far as Plots Nos. 407/1 and
409/1 of Tadavalga village are concerned.”
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1479

Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust and Ors. v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan
Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle and Another

………
28. If a deed was executed by the plaintiff when he was
a minor and it was void, he had two options to file a suit
to get the property purportedly conveyed thereunder. He
could either file the suit within 12 years of the deed or
within 3 years of attaining majority. Here, the plaintiff did
not either sue within 12 years of the deed or within 3 years
of attaining majority. Therefore, the suit was rightly held
to be barred by limitation by the trial court.”
23. Further, in the aforesaid suit, the Respondent No.1 also sought
possession of the suit properties based on title. As per Article 65
of the Limitation Act, 1963, the possession of immovable property
or any interest therein, based on title can be sought within twelve
years. From the records, it is evident that the possession of the
subject properties was initially with the Government of Maharashtra,
then with the Gonsavis and thereafter with the Defendant No.1 and
it can be safely said that at least for a century, the Respondent No.1
nor his predecessors have been in possession of the properties
after the grant of Inam. The plaintiff has failed to sue the appellant/
defendant or the State for possession within twelve years. We
have already held that the title claim of the plaintiff is barred by
limitation and therefore, the claim for possession is also barred and
consequently, the relief of recovery of possession is also hopelessly
barred by limitation.
24. Moreover, the Plaintiff has not produced any documentary evidence
to show that he is entitled for the relief of declaration of ownership
of the suit properties except by way of reliance of the resolutions
of the government, which has lost its force in view of the decree of
the Civil Court and subsequent compromise decrees. The decrees
had also attained finality as the neither the plaintiff nor his ancestors
have challenged the same in time. It is also evident on the face of
record that the Plaintiff is a stranger to the suit properties; on the
contrary, the Defendants are the owners of the suit properties. It is
a settled principle of law that the owners cannot be restrained from
dealing with their own properties at the instance of a stranger. The
said relief is again a consequential relief to the claim of title, which
has been non-suited on the ground of limitation. Hence, the prayer (c)
made in the plaint is not maintainable.
1480 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

25. Regarding the averments made in the plaint relating to fraud played
on the plaintiff by the defendants in relation to the compromise
decrees obtained in their favour, we are of the view that they are
vague and general, besides baseless and unsubstantiated. Rather, no
case can be culled out from the averments made in the plaint in this
regard. The plea of fraud is intrinsically connected with the nature of
Inam. We have already discussed the plea of fraud in the preceding
paragraphs. We are also of the view that the plea has been raised
only to overcome the period of limitation. Admittedly the Plaintiff is a
stranger to the suits which ended in compromise. Therefore, in view
of the direct bar under Order XXIII Rule 3A of CPC, he cannot seek
a declaration ‘that the compromise decrees passed in Spl. Civil Suit
Nos.l52/1951 and 1622/1988 and Civil Appeal No.787/2001, Pune
are void ab initio, null and void and the same are liable to be set
aside’. The law on this point is also already settled by this Court
in Triloki Nath Singh v. Anirudh Singh.28 The bar under Order XXIII
Rule 3A of CPC is applicable to third parties as well and the only
remedy available to them would be to approach the same court. In
the present case, such an exercise is also not possible in view of
the bar of limitation. Hence, we find the suit to be unsustainable.
26. At this juncture, we wish to observe that we are not unmindful of
the position of law that limitation is a mixed question of fact and
law and the question of rejecting the plaint on that score has to be
decided after weighing the evidence on record. However, in cases
like this, where it is glaring from the plaint averments that the suit is
hopelessly barred by limitation, the Courts should not be hesitant in
granting the relief and drive the parties back to the trial Court. We
again place it on record that this is not a case where any forgery or
fabrication is committed which had recently come to the knowledge
of the plaintiff. Rather, the plaintiff and his predecessors did not take
any steps to assert their title and rights in time. The alleged cause of
action is also found to be creation of fiction. However, the trial Court
erroneously dismissed the application filed by the appellants under
Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC. The High Court also erred in affirming
the same, keeping the question of limitation open to be considered
by the trial Court after considering the evidence along with other
issues, without deciding the core issue on the basis of the averments

28 (2020) 6 SCC 629 : (2020) 3 SCC (Civ) 732
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1481

Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust and Ors. v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan
Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle and Another

made by the Respondent No.1 in the Plaint as mandated by Order VII
Rule 11 (d) of CPC. The spirit and intention of Order VII Rule 11(d)
of CPC is only for the Courts to nip at its bud when any litigation ex
facie appears to be a clear abuse of process. The Courts by being
reluctant only cause more harm to the defendants by forcing them
to undergo the ordeal of leading evidence. Therefore, we hold that
the plaint is liable to be rejected at the threshold.
27. In fine, this appeal stands allowed by setting aside the orders so
passed by the Courts below and the application filed by the appellants
under Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC is allowed by rejecting the plaint
in Special Civil Suit No.133 of 2009 filed by the Respondent No.1.
However, there is no order as to costs. Pending application(s), if
any, shall stand disposed of.

Result of the Case: Appeal allowed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey