Holding

The power of revision under Section 257 must be exercised within a reasonable time, ordinarily three years, and a 17‑year delay is unreasonable, rendering the revision an abuse of process.

Summary

The case concerned land originally resumed in 1955, where a Tahsildar's 1976 order granted a share of the land to Shivgonda Patil. After the death of the original occupier, his heirs sought revision of that order in 1993. The Sub‑Divisional Officer, invoking Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966, set aside the 1976 order in 1994, declaring Patil's entries illegal. The appellants challenged this revision, arguing that the revisional power could not be exercised after a long lapse. The Supreme Court held that where a statute does not prescribe a time limit, the power must be exercised within a reasonable time—generally three years—subject to exceptional circumstances, and that a 17‑year delay was unreasonable and amounted to an abuse of process. Consequently, the impugned revision order was set aside and the appeals were allowed.

Issues considered

Whether the power of revision under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 can be exercised at any time in the absence of a prescribed time limit.
What constitutes a reasonable time for exercising the revisional power under the said provision.
Whether a delay of 17 years in exercising the revisional power amounts to an abuse of process.

Legislation cited

Subjects

revisionMaharashtra Land Revenue CodeSection 257reasonable timestatutory limitationabuse of processland revenuecivil appeal

Judgment

[2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 1173

SHRI SANTOSHKUMAR SHIVGONDA PATIL & ORS. A
-+·

- v.
SHRI BALASAHEB TUKARAM SHEVALE & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 6017 of 2009)
SEPTEMBER 2, 2009
Ill(
B
[TARUN CHATTERJEE AND R.M. LODHA, JJ.]

+ Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 - s.257 - Power
"ti
of revision under -Whether can be exercised at anytime,
although no time has been prescribed for exercise of such c
power - Held: If a statute does not prescribe the time limit for
-< exercise of revisions/ power, it does not mean that such power
~
can be exercised anytime - Reasonable period, within which
power of revision may be exercised, would be 3 years under
s.257 subject to exceptional circumstances - On facts, D
-*
exercise of revisional power after a lapse of 17 years was not
within reasonable time - It was plain abuse of the process.
.... The question which arose for consideration in the
present appeals was whether the power of revision in
E
Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code,
1966 can be exercised at any time, although no time has
been prescribed for exercise of said power.
• Allowing the appeals, the Court
F
HELD:1.1. If a statute does not prescribe the time
limit for exercise of revisional power, it does not mean
that such power can be exercised at any time; rather it
should be exercised within a reasonable time. It is
\ . so
because the law does not expect a settled thing to be G
unsettled after a long lapse of time. Where the legislature
i does not provide for any length of time within which the
~-
power of revision is to be exercised by the authority, suo
motu or otherwise, it is plain that exercise of such power
1173 H
1174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A within reasonable time is inherent therein. Ordinarily, the
+
reasonable period within which power of revision may be
exercised would be three years under Section 257 of the
. \

Maharashtra Land Revenue Code subject, of course, to
the exceptional circumstances in a given case, but surely
B exercise of revisional power after a lapse of 17 years as --
!

in the present case is not within reasonable time. [Para
16] (1181-A-D]
-f ,.,,_
1.2. Invocation of revisional power by the Sub-
Divisional Officer under Section 257 of the Maharashtra
c Land Revenue Code was plainly an abuse of process in
the facts and circumstances of the case assuming that
the order of Tehsildar passed on March 30, 1976. was
flawed and legally not correct. [Para 16] [1181-D-E]

D State of Gujarat v. Patil Raghav Natha (1969) 2 SCC
,.__

187; Mohamad Kavi Mohamad Amin v. Fatmabai Ibrahim
(1997) 6 SCC 71; State of Punjab and Others v. Bhatinda
District Cooperative Milk Producers Union Ltd. (2007) 11 SCC '
363, relied on.
E I '
Case Law Reference: j

(1969) 2 sec 187 relied on Para 13
-t
(1997) 6 sec 11 relied on Para 14
F (2001) 11 sec 363 relied on Para 15

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
6017 of 2009.

From the Judgment & Order dated 1.9.2004 of the High
G Court of Judicature at Bombay in Letters Patent Appeal No.
129 of 1996 in Writ Petition No. 1962 of 1996. .... ,_, ...,

WITH '
,,.l

C.A. No. 6018 of 2009. ~
H t
'
- 1'
SANTOSHKUMAR SHIVGONDA PATIL & ORS. v. 1175
BALASAHEB TUKARAM SHEVALE
Dr. Rajeev B. Masodkar, Anil K. Jha for the Appellant A

Shivaji M. Jadhav for the Respondent.
-.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
.,
R.M. LODHA, J. 8
1. Delay condoned in SLP (c) No 22662/09 CC 2563.

... t- 2. Leave granted in both matters.

3. The short question that arises for consideration in this .C
appeal by special leave is whether power of revision in Section
257 of Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 can be
exercised at any time although no time has been prescribed
for exercise of such power.
D
~ 4. Takawade Gat No. 1157 (Old Survey No. 201/1)
admeasuring 6H65R originally belonged to one N.R.
Deshpande. The land was an inam land which was resumed
on August 1, 1955. On the date of resumption, there were four
tenants holding 1/4th share each. Tukaram Sakharam Shevale,
predecessor in title of Respondent Nos. 1 to 5, one of such
E
tenants, thus, held land admeasuring 1H 66R. The original
landlord, N.R. Deshpande, was required to pay occupancy price

.. 1- before July 31, 1965 which he did only to the extent of 3/4th in
respect of lands possessed by three tenants other than
Tukaram Sakharam Shevale. The 3/4th portion was, thus, F
regranted and later on sold to the tenants occupying such
portion. As regards 1/4th portion occupied by Tukaram
Sakharam Shevale, it appears that no occupancy price was
paid and this portion was resumed to the State. Tukaram is,
however, said to have continued to remain in possession of 1/ G
4th portion of the land till 1974-75.
-1 5. The Tahsildar, Shirai, on March 30, 1976, passed an
order hereby 3/4th of portion of Land earlier in occupation of
H
1176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A Tukaram was granted in favour of Shivgonda Satgonda Patil
on the basis of his occupation as cultivator and 1/4th remained +
in favour of Tukaram Sakharam Shevale.

6. Tukaram Sakharam Shevale, until his death in 1990, did
not challenge the Tahsildar's Order dated March 30, 1~76 in
8
any proceeding. It was only after the death of Tukaram that his I-=
j
legal heirs, namely, Respondent Nos. 1 to 5 herein, made an
application before the Sub-Divisional Officer, lchalkaranji in -+
1993 seeking revision of the order of Tahsildar, Shirai passed
C on March 30, 1976. The Sub-Divisional Officer, lchalkaranji
invoked his revisional power under Section 257 of the
Maharashtra Land Revenue Code and after hearing the parties
and getting the report from the Tahsildar, Shirai vide his order
dated August 16, 1994 allowed the revision application and set
aside the order dated March 30, 1976 giving 3/16th share in ,
',_
D R.S. No. 210/1 to Shivgonda Satgonda Patil. The Sub- •
Divisional Officer, lchalkaranji declared that 1/4th share in R.S.
No. 210/1admeasuring1H 66R shall be deemed to have been
granted to Tukaram Shevale and pik-pahani entries made in
favour of Shivgonda Satgonda Patil shall be treated as
E unauthorized and illegal.

7. Upset by the order dated August 16, 1994, the present
appellants preferred appeal before the Additional Collector,
Kolhapur who agreed with the view of Sub-Divisional Officer,
F lchalkaranji and rejected the appeal on September 16, 1995.
8. The present appellants carried the matter before
+
.J
r

Commissioner, Pune Division, Pune but without any success. \.--

~·
9. The present appellants then filed writ petition before the ,
G High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Appellate side). The l-
Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on June 20, 1996.
~ _,
10. The appellants preferred Letters Patent Appeal before •
the Division Bench of the High Court which also came to be
rejected on September 1, 2004.
H

~
;
SANTOSHKUMAR SHIVGONDA PATIL & ORS. v. 1177
BALASAHEB TUKARAM SHEVALE [R.M. LODHA, J.]

11. Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code A
+ empowers State Government and certain Revenue and Survey
Officers to call for and examine records and proceedings of .
Subordinate Officers. Thus, a power of revision is conferred on
the State Government and certain Revenue anQ Survey Officers
under Section 257. B
12. Section 257 reads thus :
~ "Section 257 - Power of State Government and of certain
Revenue and Survey Officers to call for and examine
records and proceedings of subordinate officers c
(1) The State, Government and any Revenue or Survey
Officer, not inferior in rank to an Assistant or Deputy
Collector, or a Superintendent of Land Records, in their
respective departments, may call for and examine the D
,f.
record of any inquiry or the proceedings of any subordinate
Revenue or Survey Officer, for the purpose of satisfying
itself or himself, as the case may be, as the legality or
propriety of any decision or order passed, and as to the
regularity of the proceedings of such officer. I:
(2) A Tahsildar, a Naib-Tahsildar, and a District Inspector
of Land Records may in the same manner call for and
1 examine the proceedings of any officer subordinate to them
in any matter· in which neither a formal nor a summary
' inquiry has been held. F

(3) If in any case, it shall appear to the State Government,
or to any officer referred to in sub-section (1) or sub-
section (2) that any decision or order or proceedings so
called for should be modified, annulled or reversed, it or G
he may pass such order thereon as it or he deems fit:
-1 Provided that, the State Government or such officer shall.
not vary or reverse any order affecting any question or right
between private persons without having to the parties
H
.
1178 SUPREME COURT REPO~i·S [1tm9) 13 (ADOL.) S.C.R.

A interested notice to appear and t§ be he§fci in support of +
~
such order: ~

Provided further that, an Assistant or Ceputy Collector shall
not himself pass such order ln any matter in which a formal ..,...
B inquiry has been held, but shall submit the record with his
opinion to the Collector, who shall paBB such order theretm
as he may deem fit."
-.J-
F=
13. A olose look at the aforesaid provision would show that ..-
there is no time limit fixed fer exercise of power of revision by
c the revisional authority. The question is, could it be exercised
at any time. While dealing with the question like the present one,
a 3-Judge Bench of this Court in the tase of State of Gujarat
v. Patil Raghav Natha 1, with reference to Sections 65 and 211
of Bombay Land Revenue Act, 1879, held thus :
~
D
11
11. The question arises whether the Commissioner can
·-- revise an order made under Section 65 at any time. It is
true that there·is no period of limitation prescribed under
Section 211, but it seems to us plain that this power must
E be exercised in reasonable time and the length of the
reasonable time must be determined by the facts of the
case and the nature of the order which is being revised.

12. It seems to us that Section 65 itself indicates the length
+ I
of the reasonable time within which the Commissioner 411
F must act under Section 211. Under Section 65 of the Code
if the Collector does not inform the applicant of his decision
on the application within a period of three months the
permission applied for shall be deemed to have been
granted. This section shows that a period of three months .
G is considered ample for the Collector to make up his mind
and beyond that the legislature thinks that the matter is so >--- _,
urgent that permission shall be deemed to have been
granted. Reading Sections 211 and 65 together it seems
to us that the Commissioner must exercise his revisional
H 1. (1969) 2 sec 1s1.
SANTQ$HKUMAR SHIVGONDA PATIL & ORS. v. 1179
aAl..A$AH~B TUKARAM SHEVALE [R.M. LODHA, J.]

powers within a few months of the order of the Collector. A
This is reasonable time because after the grant of the
permission for building purposes the occupant is likely to
spend money on starting building operations at least within
a few months from the date of the permission. In this case
th~ Commissioner set aside the order of the Collector on B
Oetober 12, 1961 i.e. more than a year after the order and
it aeems to us that this order was passed too late. n
~
14. While dealing with the suo-motu revisional power
under Section 64..C of the Bombay Tenency and Agricultural
L~nde Act, 1976, this Court in Mohamad Kavi Mohamad
c
Amin v. Fatmabai lbrahim2 held that generally where no time-
limit Is prescribed for exercise of power under statute, it should
be exercised within a reasonable time. This is what this Court
s.aid:
D
* "Section 84-C of the Act does not prescribe any time for
Initiation of the proceeding. But in view of the settled
position by several judgments of this Court that wherever
a power it Vt!sted in a statutory authority without
p~aeribing any time-limit, such power should be exercised E
within a reasonable time. In the present case the transfer
took place as early as in the year 1972 and suo motu
enquiry was started by the Mamlatdar in September 1973.
~·
If sale deeds are declared to be invalid the appellant is
likely to suffer irreparable injury, because he has made F
investments after the aforesaid purchase. In this
connection, on b~half of the appellant reliance was placed
on a jyggment of Justice S.B. Majmudar (as he then was
ifl the High Court of Gujarat) in State of Gujarat v. Jethmal
Bhagwandas Shah (Spe. WA No. 2770of1979) disposed
G
Qf cm 1..3.,.1 ~90, where in connection with Section 84-C
itself it was said that the power under the aforesaid section
should be exercised within a reasonable time. This Court
ln connection with other statutory provisions, in the case
2. (1997) s sec 11. H
1180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
-,,

A of State of Gujarat v. Patil Raghav Natha (1969) 2 SCC +
187) and in the case of Ram _Chand v. Union of India
(1994) 1 sec 44) has impressed that where no time-limit
is prescribed for exercise of a power under a statute it
does not mean that it can be exercised at any time; such ~

B power has to be exercised within a reasonable time. We
are satisfied that in the facts and circumstances of the
present case, the suo motu power under Sec~ion 84-C of ~
the Act was not exercised by the Mamlatdar within a
reasonable time:"
c , 15. Recently, in the case of State of Punjab and Others
v. Bhatinda District Cooperative Milk Producers Union Ltd. 3
while dealing with the power of revision under Section 21 of

D
·the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948, it has been held:

"17. A bare reading of Section 21 of the Act would reveal ·\.-.
-
that although no period of limitation has been prescribed
·therefore, the same would not _mean that the suo motu
power can be exercised at any time.
18. It is trite that if no period of limitation has been
E
prescribed, statutory authority must exercise its jurisdiction
within a reasonable period. What, however, shall be the
reasonable period would depend upon the nature of the
statute, rights and liabilities thereunder and other relevant
+
factors.
F
19. Revisional jurisdiction, in our opinion, should ordinarily
be exercised within a period of three years having regard
to the purport in terms of the said Act. In· any event, the
same should not exceed the period of five years. The view
G of the High Court, thus, cannot be said to be unreasonable.
Reasonable period, keeping in view the discussions made
hereinbefore, must be found out from the statutory scheme.
>-
As indicated hereinbefore, maximum period of limitation

H 3. (2001) 11 sec 363.
SANTOSHKUMAR SHIVGONDA PATIL & ORS. v. 1181
BALASAHEB TUKARAM SHEVALE [R.M. LODHA, J.]
-+ provided for in sub-section (6) of Section 11 of the Act is A
five years."
16. It seems to be fairly settled that if a statue does not
prescribe the time limit for exercise of revisional power, it does
not mean that such power can be exercised at any time; rather
8
it should be exercised within a reasonable time. It is so
because the law does not expect a settled thing to be unsettled
+- after a long lapse of time. Where· the legislature does not
provide for any length of time within which the power of revision
is to be exercised by the authority, suo motu or otherwise, it is C
plain that exercise of such power within reasonable time is
inherent therein. Ordinarily, the reasonable period within which
power of revision may be exercised would be three years under
Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code subject,
of course, to the exceptional circumstances in a given case,
~
but surely exercise of revisional power after a lapse of 17 years 0
is not a reasonable time. Invocation of revisional power by the
Sub-Divisional Officer under Section 257 of the Maharashtra
Land Revenue Code is plainly an abuse of process in the facts
and circumstances of the case assuming that the order of
Tehsildar passed on March 30, 1976 is flawed and legally not E
correct. Pertinently, Tukaram Sakharam Shevale, during his
lifetime never challenged the legality and correctness of the
1 order of Tehsildar, Shirol although it was passed on March 30,
1976 and he was alive uptoi1990. It is not even in the case of
Respondent Nos.1 to 5 that Tukaram was not aware of the F
order dated March 30, 1976. There is no finding by the Sub-
Divisional Officer either that order dated March 30, 1976 was
obtained fraudulently.
17. In what we have discussed above, the appeals deserve G
to be allowed against respondent Nos. 1· to 5 and are allowed
-~ and impugned orders are quashed and set aside as against
them. Parties will bear their own costs.

8.8.B. Appeals allowed.
H