SHRI UTTAM CHAND (D) THROUGH LRS.versusNATHU RAM (D) THROUGH LRS. & ORS.

                         [2020] 5 S.C.R. 1                            1


          SHRI UTTAM CHAND (D) THROUGH LRS.                           A
                                v.
          NATHU RAM (D) THROUGH LRS. & ORS.
                  (Civil Appeal No. 190 of 2020)
                       JANUARY 15, 2020                               B
    [L. NAGESWARA RAO AND HEMANT GUPTA, JJ.]
      Adverse Possession:
      Suit for possession – Asserting their title by purchase of
property through Managing Officer – Alleging defendants being         C
in unauthorised possession – Trial Court admitted the title but
dismissed the suit on the ground of limitation and recognising the
right of defendants by adverse possession – Appellate Court
decreed the suit – In second appeal, High Court on the ground of
adverse possession by defendants dismissed the suit – Appeal to
                                                                      D
Supreme Court – Held: Plea of adverse possession is always
founded on acceptance of ownership of property in another
person – In the instant case, defendants never accepted the
ownership either of the plaintiff or the Managing Director – Hence,
cannot be said to have perfected their right by adverse possession.
      Allowing the appeal, the Court                                  E

       HELD: 1. A plea of adverse possession is founded on the
acceptance that ownership of the property vests in another,
against whom the claimant asserts possession adverse to the
title of the other. The defendants have not admitted the vesting
of the suit property with the Managing Officer and the factum         F
of its transfer in favour of the plaintiff. The defendants have
denied the title not only of the Managing Officer but also of the
plaintiff. The plea of the defendants is one of continuous
possession but there is no plea that such possession was hostile
to the true owner of the suit property. The evidence of the           G
defendants is that of continuous possession. Some of the receipts
pertain to 1963 but possession since November, 1963 till the
filing of the suit will not ripe into title as the defendants never
admitted the plaintiff-appellant to be owner or that the land ever
vested with the Managing Officer. Therefore, the findings
                                                                      H
                                1
2           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2020] 5 S.C.R.


A   recorded by the High Court that the defendants have perfected
    their title by adverse possession are not legally sustainable.
    Consequently, the judgment and decree passed by the High
    Court is set aside and the suit is decreed. [Paras 15 and 16] [10-
    B-C; 13-B-E]
B         M Siddiq (D) through LRs v. Mahant Suresh Das and
          Ors. (2019) SCC OnLine SC 1440 – followed.
          T. Anjanappa and Ors. v. Somalingappa and Anr.
          (2006) 7 SCC 570 : [2006] 5 Suppl. SCR 200 ;
          Kurella Naga Druva Vudaya Bhaskara Rao v. Galla
C         Jani Kamma alias Nacharamma (2008) 15 SCC 150:
          [2008] 11 SCR 849 ; Brijesh Kumar and Anr. v.
          Shardabai (Dead) by Legal Representatives and Ors.
          (2019) 9 SCC 369 ; Ravinder Kaur Grewal and Ors.
          v. Manjit Kaur and Ors. (2019) 8 SCC 729 –
          relied on.
D
          Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Government of India &
          Ors. (2004) 10 SCC 779 : [2004] 1 Suppl. SCR 255 ;
          Dagadabai (Dead) by Legal Representatives v. Abbas
          alias Gulab Rustum Pinjari (2017) 13 SCC 705 –
          referred to.
E                         Case Law Reference
    [2006] 5 Suppl. SCR 200              relied on         Para 8
    [2004] 1 Suppl. SCR 255              referred to       Para 9
    [2008] 11 SCR 849                    relied on         Para 9
F   (2017) 13 SCC 705                    referred to       Para 9
    (2019) 9 SCC 369                     relied on         Para 13
    (2019) 8 SCC 729                     relied on         Para 14
    (2019) SCC OnLine SC 1440            followed          Para 15
G         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 190
    of 2020.
          From the Judgment and Order dated 18.02.2011 of the High
    Court of Delhi at New Delhi in R.S.A. No. 225 of 2003.
          Mrs. K. Sarada Devi, R. Vijaynandan Reddy, Advs. for the
H   Appellants.
 SHRI UTTAM CHAND (D) THROUGH LRS. v. NATHU RAM                                 3
             (D) THROUGH LRS. & ORS.

       Gagan Gupta, Dr. (Mrs.) Vipin Gupta, Advs. for the Respondents.          A
       The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
       HEMANT GUPTA, J.
      1. Plaintiff is in appeal before this Court aggrieved against
judgment and decree passed by the High Court of Delhi on 18 th                  B
February, 2011 whereby, the defendants second appeal was allowed
and the suit of the plaintiff for possession on the basis of title was
dismissed.
       2. The plaintiff filed a suit for possession on the basis of purchase
of suit property from the Managing Officer, Department of                       C
Rehabilitation, Government of India in a public auction held on 21st
March, 1964. The certificate of sale was issued thereafter on 4 th
January, 1965. The plaintiff filed a suit for possession on 17 th February,
1979 alleging the defendants to be in an unauthorised possession of the
suit property and who have refused to vacate the same.
                                                                                D
        3. The defendants in the written statement denied that the plaintiff
is the owner of the property. The defendants asserted that their house
existed on the property in question for more than the last two centuries.
The grandfather of the defendants was said to be in possession of the
property as owner, thereafter their father one Tara Chand and now all
the defendants are in possession of the property as owners. It was              E
denied that the property was ever vested with the Managing Officer
and, therefore, it was claimed that the Managing Officer has no authority
or jurisdiction to auction the property in question. Therefore, the plaintiff
has no interest, right or title in the property.
       4. Parties went to trial on the following issues:                        F
            “1. Whether the suit is properly valued for the purpose of
                Court fee & Jurisdiction?
             2. Whether the suit is time barred?
             3. Whether the plaintiff is the owner of the property in suit?
                                                                                G
             4. Whether the defendants become owner by adverse
                possession of the property in suit?
             5. Whether the defendants are in unauthorized occupation
                of the property in dispute?
             6. Relief.”                                                        H
4             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2020] 5 S.C.R.


A          5. Before the learned trial court, the plaintiff examined PW-4
    Chander Bhan, Lower Division Clerk from the Land and Building
    Department who has proved that the sale certificate was issued in
    favour of plaintiff on 15th January, 1965. The learned trial court recorded
    the finding on the basis of testimonies of Din Dayal Khanna (PW-3),
    Chander Bhan (PW-4) and S.B. Lal (PW-5) that the property is situated
B   in Khasra No. 9 and has been sold through auction. The learned trial
    court also considered the testimonies of Bhagwan Dass (DW-1) and
    Ranjit (DW-2), both sons of the defendant, that the plaintiff is the owner
    of the property purchased through Ex.B4/1 in an auction from the
    Managing Officer, Department of Rehabilitation. Thus, Issue No. 3
C   was held in favour of the plaintiff and the plaintiff was found to be
    owner of the property. But Issue Nos. 2, 4 and 5 were decided in
    favour of the defendants and against the plaintiff and consequently the
    suit was dismissed but with a direction to the plaintiff to make good
    the deficiency of court fee of Rs. 2000/- within one month in view of
    the finding recorded on Issue No. 1.
D
            6. In the first appeal by the plaintiff, the learned First Appellate
    Court affirmed the findings recorded by the trial court on Issue Nos. 1
    and 3 that the plaintiff is the owner of the property in question.
    However, in respect of Issue No. 2 as to whether the suit is time barred,
    the learned First Appellate Court returned a finding that the suit is within
E   time as the same was filed on February 17, 1979 i.e. before the
    completion of 12 years. Issue No. 2 was decided against the defendants
    holding that the findings recorded by the trial court that the limitation
    starts from the date of purchase of the suit property is not sustainable.
    The right of the respondents over the property was challenged before
    the completion of 12 years, therefore, the suit filed in February, 1979 is
F
    within period of limitation. Under issue No. 4, the findings recorded
    were that the mere possession of land, however long it may be, would
    not ripe into possessory title unless the possessor has animus
    possidendi to hold the land adverse to the title of the true owner. The
    assertion of title must be clear and unequivocal. Consequently, Issue
G   No. 5 was also decided against the defendants and the suit stood
    decreed.
           7. In the second appeal, the High Court affirmed the finding of
    ownership in favour of the plaintiff and relied upon electricity and house
    tax bills showing the possession of the defendants over the suit property
H   from November, 1963. It was, thus, held that the adverse possession
    SHRI UTTAM CHAND (D) THROUGH LRS. v. NATHU RAM                             5
       (D) THROUGH LRS. & ORS. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

of the defendants over the same matured within 12 years, by November,          A
1995, therefore, the suit filed on 17th February, 1979 was barred by
limitation.
        8. The High Court referred to the statement of PW-1 Uttam
Chand that the suit property was assessed to house tax but no one had
paid such tax. He stated that there was only one kachha room of mud            B
at the site but he did not know when the unauthorised construction was
made in the suit property. The High Court considered the statement
of witness of the plaintiff to return a finding that Tara Chand, deceased
father of the defendants was found in possession of the suit property
in March, 1964. The High Court returned a finding that Tara Chand
was in occupation of the suit property even prior to the purchase of           C
the same by the plaintiff in the year 1964. The Court referred to the
judgment of this Court reported as T. Anjanappa & Ors. v.
Somalingappa & Anr.1 to hold that the defendants were in open,
uninterrupted, peaceful and hostile possession since March, 1964 and
the period of 12 years was completed in March, 1976. Therefore, the
suit filed by the plaintiff on 17th February, 1979 was barred by limitation.   D

        9. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that for a successful
plea of adverse possession against the true owner, the person in
possession has to admit hostile possession to the knowledge of the true
owner. The defendants in their written statement have not admitted
the title of the appellant and of adverse possession to the knowledge          E
of the true owner. The defendants have denied vesting of the land
with the Managing Officer and the subsequent sale in favour of the
appellant. The trial court has returned a finding as to the title of the
appellant itself and such finding has not been set aside neither by the
First Appellate Court nor by the High Court. The defendants are
asserting their long and continuous possession but such possession             F
howsoever long cannot be termed as adverse possession so as to
perfect title within the meaning of Article 65 of the Limitation Act. It
was argued that long possession is not necessarily adverse possession.
Reliance is placed upon Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Government
of India & Ors.2, Kurella Naga Druva Vudaya Bhaskara Rao v.                    G
Galla Jani Kamma alias Nacharamma3 and Dagadabai (Dead) by
Legal Representatives v. Abbas alias Gulab Rustum Pinjari4.
1
  (2006) 7 SCC 570
2
  (2004) 10 SCC 779
3
  (2008) 15 SCC 150
4
  (2017) 13 SCC 705                                                            H
6            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2020] 5 S.C.R.


A          10. On the other hand, learned counsel for the defendants argued
    that the witness of the plaintiff has admitted the possession of the
    defendants in the year 1964 itself i.e. before the purchase, therefore,
    the possession is adverse to the knowledge of the appellants.
           11. In T. Anjanappa, this Court has set aside the finding of the
B   High Court that the defendants claiming adverse possession do not have
    to prove who is the true owner. If the defendants are not sure who
    the true owner is, the question of them being in hostile possession as
    well as of denying the title of the true owner does not arise. The Court
    held as under:
C         “12. The concept of adverse possession contemplates a hostile
          possession i.e. a possession which is expressly or impliedly in
          denial of the title of the true owner. Possession to be adverse
          must be possession by a person who does not acknowledge the
          other’s rights but denies them. The principle of law is firmly
          established that a person who bases his title on adverse possession
D
          must show by clear and unequivocal evidence that his possession
          was hostile to the real owner and amounted to denial of his title
          to the property claimed. For deciding whether the alleged acts
          of a person constituted adverse possession, the animus of the
          person doing those acts is the most crucial factor. Adverse
E         possession is commenced in wrong and is aimed against right. A
          person is said to hold the property adversely to the real owner
          when that person in denial of the owner’s right excluded him from
          the enjoyment of his property.
          13. Possession to be adverse must be possession by a person
F         who does not acknowledge the other’s rights but denies them:
             “24. It is a matter of fundamental principle of law that where
             possession can be referred to a lawful title, it will not be
             considered to be adverse. It is on the basis of this principle
             that it has been laid down that since the possession of one
G            co-owner can be referred to his status as co-owner, it cannot
             be considered adverse to other co-owners.” (See Vidya Devi
             v. Prem Prakash [(1995) 4 SCC 496] , SCC p. 504, para 24.)
          14. Adverse possession is that form of possession or occupancy
          of land which is inconsistent with the title of the rightful owner
H         and tends to extinguish that person’s title. Possession is not held
 SHRI UTTAM CHAND (D) THROUGH LRS. v. NATHU RAM                              7
    (D) THROUGH LRS. & ORS. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

      to be adverse if it can be referred to a lawful title. The person      A
      setting up adverse possession may have been holding under the
      rightful owner’s title e.g. trustees, guardians, bailiffs or agents.
      Such persons cannot set up adverse possession:
          “14. … Adverse possession means a [hostile possession]
          which is expressly or impliedly in denial of title of the true     B
          owner. Under Article 65 [of the Limitation Act,] burden is on
          the defendants to prove affirmatively. A person who bases
          his title on adverse possession must show by clear and
          unequivocal evidence i.e. possession was hostile to the real
          owner and amounted to a denial of his title to the property        C
          claimed. In deciding whether the acts, alleged by a person,
          constitute adverse possession, regard must be had to the
          animus of the person doing those acts which must be
          ascertained from the facts and circumstances of each case.
          The person who bases his title on adverse possession,
          therefore, must show by clear and unequivocal evidence i.e.        D
          possession was hostile to the real owner and amounted to a
          denial of his title to the property claimed. …
          15. Where possession can be referred to a lawful title, it will
          not be considered to be adverse. The reason being that a
                                                                             E
          person whose possession can be referred to a lawful title will
          not be permitted to show that his possession was hostile to
          another’s title. One who holds possession on behalf of another,
          does not by mere denial of that other’s title make his
          possession adverse so as to give himself the benefit of the
          statute of limitation. Therefore, a person who enters into         F
          possession having a lawful title, cannot divest another of that
          title by pretending that he had no title at all. (See Annasaheb
          Bapusaheb Patil v. Balwant [(1995) 2 SCC 543, p. 554 : AIR
          1995 SC 895, p. 902] , SCC p. 554, paras 14-15.)”
       12. In Kurella Naga Druva Vudaya Bhaskara Rao, the                    G
payment of tax receipts and mere possession for some years was found
insufficient to claim adverse possession. It was held that if according
to the defendant, the plaintiff was not the true owner, his possession
hostile to the plaintiff’s title will not be sufficient. The Court held as
under:                                                                       H
8               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2020] 5 S.C.R.


A            “19. The defendant claimed that he had perfected his title by
             adverse possession by being in open, continuous and hostile
             possession of the suit property from 1957. He also produced
             some tax receipts showing that he has paid the taxes in regard
             to the suit land. Some tax receipts also showed that he paid the
             tax on behalf of someone else. After considering the oral and
B
             documentary evidence, both the courts have entered a concurrent
             finding that the defendant did not establish adverse possession,
             and that mere possession for some years was not sufficient to
             claim adverse possession, unless such possession was hostile
             possession, denying the title of the true owner. The courts have
C            pointed out that if according to the defendant, the plaintiff was
             not the true owner, his possession hostile to the plaintiff’s title
             will not be sufficient and he had to show that his possession was
             also hostile to the title and possession of the true owner. After
             detailed analysis of the oral and documentary evidence, the trial
             court and the High Court also held that the appellant was only
D
             managing the properties on behalf of the plaintiff and his
             occupation was not hostile possession.”
         13. In Brijesh Kumar & Anr. v. Shardabai (Dead) by Legal
    Representatives & Ors.5, the Court held as under:
E            “13. Adverse possession is hostile possession by assertion of a
             hostile title in denial of the title of the true owner as held in M.
             Venkatesh [M. Venkatesh v. BDA, (2015) 17 SCC 1 : (2017) 5
             SCC (Civ) 387] . The respondent had failed to establish peaceful,
             open and continuous possession demonstrating a wrongful ouster
             of the rightful owner. It thus involved question of facts and law.
F            The onus lay on the respondent to establish when and how he
             came into possession, the nature of his possession, the factum
             of possession known and hostile to the other parties, continuous
             possession over 12 years which was open and undisturbed. The
             respondent was seeking to deny the rights of the true owner. The
G            onus therefore lay upon the respondent to establish possession
             as a fact coupled with that it was open, hostile and continuous
             to the knowledge of the true owner. The respondent-plaintiff
             failed to discharge the onus. Reference may also be made to
             Chatti Konati Rao v. Palle Venkata Subba Rao [Chatti Konati
    5
H       (2019) 9 SCC 369
    SHRI UTTAM CHAND (D) THROUGH LRS. v. NATHU RAM                               9
       (D) THROUGH LRS. & ORS. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

         Rao v. Palle Venkata Subba Rao, (2010) 14 SCC 316 : (2012)              A
         1 SCC (Civ) 452] , on adverse possession observing as follows:
         (SCC p. 322, para 15)
            “15. Animus possidendi as is well known is a requisite
            ingredient of adverse possession. Mere possession does not
            ripen into possessory title until the possessor holds the property   B
            adverse to the title of the true owner for the said purpose.
            The person who claims adverse possession is required to
            establish the date on which he came in possession, nature of
            possession, the factum of possession, knowledge to the true
            owner, duration of possession and that possession was open           C
            and undisturbed. A person pleading adverse possession has
            no equities in his favour as he is trying to defeat the rights of
            the true owner and, hence, it is for him to clearly plead and
            establish all facts necessary to establish adverse possession.
            The courts always take unkind view towards statutes of
            limitation overriding property rights. The plea of adverse           D
            possession is not a pure question of law but a blended one of
            fact and law.””
      14. As to whether the plaintiff can claim title on the basis of
adverse possession, this Court in a judgment reported as Ravinder Kaur
Grewal & Ors. v. Manjit Kaur & Ors.6 has held as under:                          E
         “60. The adverse possession requires all the three classic
         requirements to co-exist at the same time, namely, nec vi i.e.
         adequate in continuity, nec clam i.e. adequate in publicity and
         nec precario i.e. adverse to a competitor, in denial of title and
         his knowledge. Visible, notorious and peaceful so that if the owner     F
         does not take care to know notorious facts, knowledge is attributed
         to him on the basis that but for due diligence he would have
         known it. Adverse possession cannot be decreed on a title which
         is not pleaded. Animus possidendi under hostile colour of title
         is required. Trespasser’s long possession is not synonymous with        G
         adverse possession. Trespasser’s possession is construed to be
         on behalf of the owner, the casual user does not constitute
         adverse possession. The owner can take possession from a
         trespasser at any point in time. Possessor looks after the property,
6
    (2019) 8 SCC 729                                                             H
10               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2020] 5 S.C.R.


A             protects it and in case of agricultural property by and large the
              concept is that actual tiller should own the land who works by
              dint of his hard labour and makes the land cultivable. The
              legislature in various States confers rights based on possession.”
            15. The matter has been examined by a Constitution Bench in
B    M Siddiq (D) through LRs v. Mahant Suresh Das & Ors.7 wherein,
     it has been held that a plea of adverse possession is founded on the
     acceptance that ownership of the property vests in another, against
     whom the claimant asserts possession adverse to the title of the other.
     The Court held as under:
C             “747. A plea of adverse possession is founded on the acceptance
              that ownership of the property vests in another against whom
              the claimant asserts a possession adverse to the title of the other.
              Possession is adverse in the sense that it is contrary to the
              acknowledged title in the other person against whom it is claimed.
              Evidently, therefore, the plaintiffs in Suit 4 ought to be cognisant
D             of the fact that any claim of adverse possession against the
              Hindus or the temple would amount to an acceptance of a title
              in the latter. Dr Dhavan has submitted that this plea is a subsidiary
              or alternate plea upon which it is not necessary for the plaintiffs
              to stand in the event that their main plea on title is held to be
E             established on evidence. It becomes then necessary to assess
              as to whether the claim of adverse possession has been
              established.
              748. A person who sets up a plea of adverse possession must
              establish both possession which is peaceful, open and continuous
F             - possession which meets the requirement of being ‘nec vi nec
              claim and nec precario’. To substantiate a plea of adverse
              possession, the character of the possession must be adequate in
              continuity and in the public because the possession has to be to
              the knowledge of the true owner in order for it to be adverse.
              These requirements have to be duly established first by adequate
G             pleadings and second by leading sufficient evidence. Evidence,
              it is well settled, can only be adduced with reference to matters
              which are pleaded in a civil suit and in the absence of an
              adequate pleading, evidence by itself cannot supply the deficiency

     7
H        (2019) SCC OnLine SC 1440
SHRI UTTAM CHAND (D) THROUGH LRS. v. NATHU RAM                            11
   (D) THROUGH LRS. & ORS. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

   of a pleaded case. Reading paragraph 11(a), it becomes evident         A
   that beyond stating that the Muslims have been in long exclusive
   and continuous possession beginning from the time when the
   Mosque was built and until it was desecrated, no factual basis
   has been furnished. This is not merely a matter of details or
   evidence. A plea of adverse possession seeks to defeat the rights
                                                                          B
   of the true owner and the law is not readily accepting of such a
   case unless a clear and cogent basis has been made out in the
   pleadings and established in the evidence.
   xx                             xx                     xx
   752. In Supdt. and Remembrance of Legal Affairs, West                  C
   Bengal v. Anil Kumar Bhunja, (1979) 4 SCC 274, Justice R S
   Sarkaria, speaking for a three judge Bench of this Court noted
   that the concept of possession is “polymorphous. embodying both
   a right (the right to enjoy) and a fact (the real intention). The
   learned judge held:
                                                                          D
        “13. “It is impossible to work out a completely logical and
        precise definition of “possession” uniformly applicable to all
        situations in the contexts of all statutes. Dias and Hughes in
        their book on Jurisprudence say that if a topic ever suffered
        from too much theorising it is that of “possession”. Much of
        this difficulty and confusion is (as pointed out in Salmond’s     E
        Jurisprudence, 12th Edn., 1966) caused by the fact that
        possession is not purely a legal concept. “Possession”, implies
        a right and a fact; the right to enjoy annexed to the right of
        property and the fact of the real intention. It involves power
        of control and intent to control. (See Dias and Hughes,           F
        ibid.).”
   These observations were made in the context of possession in
   Section 29(b) of the Arms Act 1959.
   In P Lakshmi Reddy v. L Lakshmi Reddy, 1957 SCR 195, Justice
   Jagannadhadas, speaking for a three judge Bench of this Court          G
   dwelt on the “classical requirement” of adverse possession:
        “4. Now, the ordinary classical requirement of adverse
        possession is that it should be nec vi nec clam nec precario.
        (See Secretary of State for India v. Debendra Lal Khan
        [(1933) LR 61 IA 78, 82] ). The possession required must be       H
12     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2020] 5 S.C.R.


A       adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that
        it is possession adverse to the competitor.”
     The court cited the following extract from U N Mitra’s “Tagore
     Law Lectures on the Law of Limitation and Prescription”:
        “7…An adverse holding is an actual and exclusive
B       appropriation of land commenced and continued under a claim
        of right, either under an openly avowed claim, or under a
        constructive claim (arising from the acts and circumstances
        attending the appropriation), to hold the land against him (sic)
        who was in possession. (Angell, Sections 390 and 398). It is
C       the intention to claim adversely accompanied by such an
        invasion of the rights of the opposite party as gives him a
        cause of action which constitutes adverse possession.” (6th
        Edition, Vol. I, Lecture VI, at page 159)
     This Court held:
D       “7…Consonant with this principle the commencement of
        adverse possession, in favour of a person implies that the
        person is in actual possession, at the time, with a notorious
        hostile claim of exclusive title, to repel which, the true owner
        would then be in a position to maintain an action. It would
E       follow that whatever may be the animus or intention of a
        person wanting to acquire title by adverse possession his
        adverse possession cannot commence until he obtains actual
        possession with the requisite animus.”
     In Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Government of India, (2004)
F    10 SCC 779, Justice S Rajendra Babu, speaking for a two judge
     Bench held that:
        “11…Physical fact of exclusive possession and the animus
        possidendi to hold as owner in exclusion to the actual owner
        are the most important factors that are to be accounted in
        cases of this nature. Plea of adverse possession is not a pure
G
        question of law but a blended one of fact and law. Therefore,
        a person who claims adverse possession should show: (a) on
        what date he came into possession, (b) what was the nature
        of his possession, (c) whether the factum of possession was
        known to the other party, (d) how long his possession has
H       continued, and (e) his possession was open and undisturbed.”
  SHRI UTTAM CHAND (D) THROUGH LRS. v. NATHU RAM                              13
     (D) THROUGH LRS. & ORS. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

       The ingredients must be set up in the pleadings and proved in          A
       evidence. There can be no proof sans pleadings and pleadings
       without evidence will not establish a case in law.
       In Annakili v. A Vedanayagam, (2007) 14 SCC 308, this Court
       emphasized that mere possession of land would not ripen into a
       possessory title. The possessor must have animus possidendi and        B
       hold the land adverse to the title of the true owner. Moreover,
       he must continue in that capacity for the period prescribed under
       the Limitation Act.”
        16. In the present case, the defendants have not admitted the
vesting of the suit property with the Managing Officer and the factum         C
of its transfer in favour of the plaintiff. The defendants have denied
the title not only of the Managing Officer but also of the plaintiff. The
plea of the defendants is one of continuous possession but there is no
plea that such possession was hostile to the true owner of the suit
property. The evidence of the defendants is that of continuous
possession. Some of the receipts pertain to 1963 but possession since         D
November, 1963 till the filing of the suit will not ripe into title as the
defendants never admitted the plaintiff-appellant to be owner or that
the land ever vested with the Managing Officer. In view of the
judgments referred to above, we find that the findings recorded by the
High Court that the defendants have perfected their title by adverse          E
possession are not legally sustainable. Consequently, the judgment and
decree passed by the High Court is set aside and the suit is decreed.
The appeal is allowed.


Kalpana K. Tripathy                                         Appeal allowed.   F




                                                                              G




                                                                              H