Holding

The Court held that the trial court’s omission to determine the acquisition status was fatal, the High Court was correct in finding an arguable case, and therefore the appeal is dismissed with the status‑quo order made absolute.

Summary

The dispute concerned whether Site Nos. 432 and 433 in Survey No. 15/1 were acquired by the Government under the Bangalore Development Authority Act and, consequently, whether an injunction could be granted to restrain construction. The trial court rejected the injunction without examining if the land had been acquired, while the High Court allowed the status‑quo, finding a prima facie case. The Supreme Court held that the trial court erred by not addressing the acquisition question and affirmed the High Court's view that an arguable case existed. It also criticised the appellant’s conduct of proceeding with construction without complying with court processes. The appeal was dismissed, the status‑quo order was made absolute, and the appellant was directed to furnish security.

Issues considered

Whether Site Nos. 432/433 were subject to acquisition under the Bangalore Development Authority Act, Section 18.
Whether a temporary injunction should be granted pending the suit, considering the existence of a prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury.
Whether the trial court erred in failing to consider the acquisition issue.
Whether the appellant’s continuation of construction violated the interim orders and constituted misconduct.
Whether the appeal is barred by limitation.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

Subjects

land acquisitioninjunctionprima facie casebalance of convenienceirreparable injuryconstructionlimitationspecial leave petitiongovernment acquisition

Judgment

_,.
\

SHRIDEVI AND ANR. A
v.

MURALIDHAR AND ANR.

B
OCTOBER 12, 2007

[S.B. SINHA AND HARJIT SINGH BEDI, JJ.]

Land Acquisition: c
Acquisition ofportion ofland in Survey No. I 51I by Government-
Filing of suit by owner of Site No.434 & 435 in the Survey against
appellant No.I and others, owners ofSite Nos. 432 and 433 alleging·
that lands in question not acquired by Government-Filing of
application for injunction in the Suit for not allowing appellant No. I D
to raise construction and not to use bore well in the site for any
purpose-Rejected by trial Court-Appeal allowed by High Court
holding that a triable case has been made out-On appeal, Held:
Prima fade, it appears that the land in question not acquired by the
Government-While considering an application for injunction, E
requirement ofexistence ofprima facie case, balance ofconvenience
ofparties, irreparable injuries to other party have to be considered by
the Court-However, grant ofreliefand extent thereofwill depend upon
facts and circumstances of each case-On facts and in the
_,_ circumstances ofthe case, High Court rightly held that arguable case F
has been made out-Trial Courtfailed to consider the relevant question
as to whether the authority had acquired the site in question or not-
Thereby, it misdirected itself-Omission on the part of trial Court to
consider respective cases ofparties, therefore, deserve inte1ference by
the appellate Court-Conduct of appellant No. I to complete the G
construction to make situation irretrievable must be deprecated-Jn
such circumstances, in(erest ofjustice would be subserved ifthe order
dated 21.6.2007 ofDivision Bench ofthis Court, recalling the interim

375 H
I

'~.
376 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 11 S.C.R.

A . order permitting construction ofthe site, is made absolute-Directed 1--
accordingly.
Engaging common advocates by the Appellant and Respondent-
Implication of-Discussed-Practice and Procedure.
B Respondent No. 1 is said to be in possession of site Nos. 434 and
435 appurtenantto Survey No.15/1 situate in a Village in the Bangalore
~
district. Appellant No.1 purchased Site Nos . .433 and 432 in the same
Survey by registered sale deeds. Allegedly, her name was also mutated "f
in the record of rights. A building plan was submitted by her, which was
c sanctioned by the authority concerned for construction ofa residential
house on the said plots. Respondent No.1 having apprehended that
Appellant No. 1 would raise constructions on Site No. 433, he filed a
suit against Appellant Nos.1 and 2, Respondent No. 2 and the Authority
in the Civil Court inter alia praying for directions to the respondents
D not to use the Borewell put up in site No. 433 for any purpose for all
time to come; and also not to put up any compound wall construction in
site No. 433 and also not to change the nature of site in any manner. >-.
The Authority sought to acquire 2 Acres 20 Gunthas ofland of Survey
No.15/lby a notification dated 28.10.1971. The land in question was said
E to be belonging to two persons, namely, V' and 'B', and accordingly an
award was made in their favour. In the said award again, the northern
boundary was shown as part ofSurvey No.15/1. Later, respondent No.1
filed an application for grant of temporary injunction in the said suit
The Trial Court rejected the application for grant oftemporary injunction
F in the said suit. Aggrieved, Respondent No. 1 ftled an appeal before
the High Court. The High Court, however, opining that a triable case i-
has been made out by respondent No.1, directed maintenance ofstatus
quo. Hence the Special Leave Petition. While admitting SLP, this Court
vide its order dated 8.3.2007, stayed the impugned order that any
G construction raised on the site in question will be subject to the result of
the appeal and at the risk and cost of the petitioners. Later, a Vacation
Bench of this Court by an order dated 21.06.2007 directed maintenance ..l.\
ofstatus quo and the orde~ dated 8.03.2007 permitting construction was
recalled. I
H \
\

f
SHRIDEVI v. MURALIDHAR 377
,._ Appellants contended that the High Court committed a serious A
error in reversing a well-considered judgment of the Trial Court; th~t
the respondents, even as far back in 1992, having not claimed any
ownership in respect of Site No. 433, were not entitled to an order of
injunction; that the Trial Court had found as of fact that the plaintiff.,.
respondent had failed to show his right, title and interest in respect of B
Site No. 433; and that as about 80% of the construction is already over;
~ this Court should allow the appellant to complete the same as otherwise
y she will suffer irreparable injury.
Respondent No. I submitted that it is incorrect to contend that the'
entire Smvey No.15/1 has been acquired, which would be evident from .
c
the fact that the name of the plaintiff's father was shown as owner of
the land appertaining to the said Survey No. 15/1.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
D
HELD: 1.1. Primafade, it does not appear that the plot in question
was acquired by the Government Had entire Survey No.15/1 been the
subject matter of Land Acquisition proceeding, the portion of the land
belonging to the respondent would have also been acquired. Their names
also would have found place in the notification. Possession would have E
been taken from them and an award would have been made in their
favour. The very fact that the northern boundary of the land sought to
be acquired has been shown as Survey No.15/l,primafacie, it appears
that the entire Survey No. 15/1 had not been the subject matter of
acquisition. In that view ofthe matter the High Court was right in opining F
j that an arguable case has been made out. While considering an
application for injunction, existence of a prima facie case, balance of
convenience of parties, irreparable injury were required to be
considered by the Civil Court. Grant of a relief in regard to the nature
and extent thereofwill depend upon the facts and circumstances ofeach G
case. [Para 21 and 22] (384-F, G, H; 385-A, BJ

} M Gurudas & Ors. v. Rasaranjan & Ors., (2006) AIR SCW 4773,
relied on.
1.2. This Court, however, is not oblivious of the fact that ordinarily H
~\
378 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 11 S.C.R.

A a court of appeal does not interfere with the discretionary jurisdiction
<
exercised by the Trial Judge. However, in this case the Trial Court while
passing the order dated 16.08.2006 failed to consider the relevant
question, viz., as to whether the Authority had acquired the Site in
I
question or not. That was the principal question on the basis whereof '
B the Trial Court ought to have proceeded with the matter. It did not do
so; as a resultwhereofit misdirected itself: Title claimed by the appellants
~
is said to have been derived from the Authority. If the Site in question
was not the subject matter of acquisition, the question of execution of "'(

any deed of sale in favour of Respondent No. 2 by the Authority did
c not or could not arise. Consequently, Respondent No. 2 could not have ~,

transferred her right, title and interest in favour of the appellant
{Para 23) [385-C, D, E]
1.3. Omission on the part of the Trial Court to consider the
D
respective cases of the parties, in this behalf deserved interference by
the First Appellate Court. If that be the legal position, whether the
plaintiff- Respondent No. 1 had prayed for raising any construction
on Site No. 433 or not may not strictly arise for consideration.
[Para 24) {385-~]
E. 1.4. Ordinarily this Court having regard to the fact that the
appellant has raised substantial constructions would have allowed her
to complete the same but the fact remains that she did not question the
said order before this Court for a long time. The application for grant
of special leave was barred by limitation. In a situation of this nature,
F ordinarily, the aggrieved party is expected to approach this Courtwithout
any loss of time. {Para 27) [386-A, B] '-i·-
2.1. The conduct of the appellant must be deprecated. Upon
obtaining an interim order from this court, she with a view to complete
G the construction so as to make the situation irretrievable, not only did
not file processes; even without any rhyme or reason a set of complete
paper books had not been served on the Advocate for the plaintiff - ,.,I._·

respondent Although ad-interim order passed bythis Court had nothing '
to do with the hearing of the suit, which in terms ofthe direction issued 1

H
)

f
SHRIDEVI v. MURALIDHAR [SINHA, J.] 379

by the High Court deserved expeditious disposal; an application was A
filed through Respondent No. 2 for deferring the hearing ofthe suit on,
the premise that the matter is pending before this Court. Evidently, such
an application was filed at the behest of the appellant.
(Para 28] [386-C, D, E] ,
B
2.2. The very fact that the appellant and respondent No.2 have a,
common Advocate also goes a long way to show that the application
must have been filed at the instance of the appellants themselves
particularly having regard to the fact that Respondent No. 2 had
transferred her right title and interest in favour of the appellant. c
(Para30} (386-G}

2.3. Furthermore, no construction could be raised in view of the
order of a Division bench of this Court dated 21.06.2007. In that view
of the matter, interest of justice would be subserved if the said order is
made absolute. However, Respondent No. 1 is directed to furnish ' D
security for a sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- (Rupees two lakhs only) within four
weeks from date so that in the event, the suit is dismissed and in the
proceedings the appellants prove that she has suffered any damages
by reason of not being able to raise any construction from the date till
disposal of the suit, they may be suitably compensated therefor. E
(Para31] [386-H;387-A,BJ
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 4886 of
2007.
From the final Judgment and Order dated 6.11.2006 of the High F
Court ofKarnataka at Bangalore in M.F.A. No. 8773/2006 (CPC) and
C/W M.F.A. No. 8939of2006 (CPC).
Indu Malhotra, Kashi Vishweshwara, Sunieta and Dr. Kailash Chand
for the Appellants. G
Ravindra Keshavrao Adsure and A. Sumathi for the Respondents.
,J.
The Judgment of the court was delivered by
S.B. SINHA, J. 1. Leave granted.
~\
380 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 11 S.C.R.

~___,

A 2. This appeal is directed against a judgment and order dated
6.11.2006 passed by a learned Single Judge of the Kamataka High Court '
ih MF A Nos. 8773 of 2006 and 8939 of 2006.
3. Contesting defendant in the suit is Appellant No. 1 before us.
Principally, the dispute relates to site No. 433 measuring 30 ft. x 5(J ft.
B
appurtenant to Survey No. 15/1 situate in Kattriguppa Village, Hobli
Uttarahallai in the District of Bangalore. By a noti~cation dated ~

28.10.1971, Bangalore Development Authority (The Authority) in exercise ..,...
of its power under Section 18 of the Bangalore Development Authority
c Act purported to have acquired Survey No. 15/1.
4. The Authority allegedly allotted the said site to Respondent No.
2 Leela Prabhakar Rao on 1.11.1979. Plaintiff- Respondent No. 1 is said
to be in possession of site Nos. 434 and 435. He has raised constructions
thereupon. A notice was issued by the Authority directing demolition of
D some alleged unauthorized construction made by him. He filed a writ
petition thereagainst which was marked as W.P. No. 32227of1992. The
said writ petition, however, in absence of the counsel of Respondent No. '!--.
1, was dismissed.

E 5. Respondent No. 1 later on sought permission to raise
constructions in Site Nos. 434 and 435 wherefor he expressed his
readiness and willingness to pay the requisite charges.
A deed of sale was executed in favour of Respondent No. 2 on
23 .08.1996 and a possession certificate was issued in her favour in respect
F of the said site No. 433 on 5.03.1997. A deed of sale was registered in
the name of Smt. Vishala Raj for Site No. 432 on 15.09.1997 and ·-)_
possession certificate was issued on 22.10.1997. Appellant No. 1 herein
purchased Site Nos. 433 and 432 from Respondent No. 2 and Smt.
Vishala Raj by registered deeds of sale dated 11.06.2004 and 8.06.2006
G respectively. Allegedly, her name was also mutated in the record of rights. .
A building plan was submitted by her which was sanctioned for
construction of a residential house on the said plots. ~
6. Allegedly, Respondent No. 1 again on 7.07.2006 sought for
H reconveyance of Site Nos. 434 and 435. As he apprehended that
,
J
SHRIDEVI v. MURALIDHAR [SINHA, J.] 381

Appellant No. 1 herein would raise constructions on Site No. 433, he A
filed a suit against Appellant Nos. 1 and 2, Respondent No. 2 and the
Authority in the Court of the City Civil Judge at Ba'lgalore inter alia
praying for the following reliefs:
(i) directing them not to use the Borewell put up in site No. 433 B
for any purpose for all time to come.
(ii) Directing them not to put up any compound wall or ,
construction in site No. 433 and also not ch~ge the nature
of site in any manner.
7. Plaintiff- Respondent No. 1 inter alia averred that one Kapinaya : C
was the original owner of the property. He transferred the said property
in favour of one Laxmi Devamma Laxmi Devamma transferred her right,
title and interest in favour of A.R. Upadhyay, father of plaintiff -
Respondent No. 1 by a registered deed of sale dated 12.06.1960. The 'D
said purchased land consisted of three sites admeasuring 90 ft. x 50 ft.
pertaining to Survey No. 15/1. A 'No Encumberance Certificate' was
also issued in respect of the three sites, viz., Site Nos. 433, 434 and 435
for the period 01.04.1960 and 28.03.1999. Survey No. 15/1 in the
revenue records was shown to be belonging to the following persons:
E
(i) Nagamma w/o Javarayappa 2 Acre 9 Are
(ii) Venkata Reddy and B.S. Subba Rao - 1Acre16 Are
(lii) Kapinayya s/o Nanjundaiah - 1·Acre 4 J\.re
(iv) A.R. Upadhyaya - 90 ft. x 50 ft.
8. After the death of the father of Respondent No. 1, his name was
entered into the record of rights as owner thereof by an order dated
25.06.1974.
9. The Authority sought to acquire 2 J\.cres 20 Gunthas of land by 0
a notification dated 28. l 0. l 971 which was said to be belonging to
14 Venkata Reddy and B.S. Subba Rao. In the said notification itself, the
northern boundary was shown as part of Survey No. 15/1. An award
was made therein only in respect of2 Acres 20 Gunthas ofland wherein
B
~'·
382 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 11 S.C.R.

A.~
A the names of the awardees were shown as Venkata Reddy and B.S.
Subba Rao. In the said award again, the northern boundary was shown
as part of Survey No. 15/1.
10. Contention of the plaintiff is that the aforementioned Site Nos.
433, 434 and 435 were not the subject matter of the.acquisition
.
-
B
proceedings.
11. An application for grant of interim injunction was filed by the ....

plaintiff- Respqndent No. 1 in the said suit. Allegedly at the time of filing . ...,....

of suit, Site No. 433 was vacant. An order of status quo was granted
c by the Trial Court by an order dated 13.07.2006 which was extended
on 17.07.2006. By an order dated 16.08.2006, the Trial Court rejected
the application for grant of temporary injunction in the said suit. Aggrieved
thereby, plaintiff- Respondent No. 1 filed MF A Nos. 8777 and 8939
of 2006 before the Karnataka High Court.
D
12. The High Court, however, opining that a triable case has been
made out by the plaintiff directed maintenance of status quo. A Special
Leave Petition was filed on 23.02.2007 before this Court. By an order
dated 8.03 .2007, a Bench of this Court while issuing notice on the
E application for condonation of delay as also the special leave petition
directed:
"Issue notice on the application for condonation of delay as well
as on the Special Leave Petition returnable within four weeks.

F It is stated by Counsel for the petitioners that substantial
construction has been raised on the site in question after obtaining
necessary permission of the Bangalore Development Authority
(B.D.A.). The impugned order of the High Court is stayed but any
construction raised on the site in question will be subject to the
G result of the appeal and at the risk and cost of the petitioners."
13. Before embarking upon-the rival contentions of the parties, we
may notice certain disturbing features. ~
'
Although this Court, on the basis of the representation made by
H Appellant No. 1 herein, permitted them to carry on the constructions on
SHRIDEVI v. MURALIDHAR [SINHA, J.] 383

Site No. 433 at their own risk, no process fee was deposited. Appellant A
herein obtained certified copy of the said order from the Supreme Court
Registry and commenced construction thereupon in a post haste manner.
Even a copy of the paperbook was not handed over to the learned
Advocate for the respondents. The learned counsel for Respondent,No.
I asked the Advocate - On - Record of the appellant to supply a copy B
of the paperbook which was refused. A letter of request thereafter was
served on the Advocate-On-Record on 4.04.2007. The matter was then
mentioned before this Court whereupon by an order dated 05.04.2007,
this Court directed the learned Advocate on Record for the appellant to
supply the copies of the paperbook to the learned Advocate appearing C
for the respondents. Despite the same, allegedly only first volume of the
paperbook was served upon the learned Advocate for Respondent No.
I and the second volume, which had already been filed, was not served.
14. Processes were filed only on 13.04.2007. An application for D
condonation of delay therefor was filed. The matter came up before this
:A Court on 23.04.2007 and by an order dated 27.04.2007 this Court
vacated the interim order dated 08.03.2007, whereupon the Advocate-
On-Record was changed A personal affidavit was filed by one Adv~te
Kashi Vishweshwar. An application was also filed for recalling the order E
dated 27.04.2007 and for restoration of the order dated 08.03.2007. This
Court on 17.05.2007 recalled the said order dated 27.04.2007 and the
interim order dated 8.03.2007 was restored. Liberty, however, was
granted to the respondents for moving before the Vacation Bench in view
of the extreme urgency. F
~· 15. Although the High court directed expeditious disposal of the suit
by the Trial Court, the defendant- respondent (vendor of the appellant)
filed an application for deferring the hearing of the suit inter alia on the
premise that the matter is pending before this Court. A Vacation Bench
of this Court upon hearing the counsel for the parties by an order dated G
21.06.2007 directed maintenance of status quo and the order dated
~- 8.03.2007 permitting construction was recalled. It was thereafter only a
memo was filed before the Trial Court for withdrawal of their application
dated 12.06.2007.
H
(

~
384 SUPREME COURT REPORTS . [2007] 11 S.C.R.

. .j

A 16. Ms. Indu Malhotra, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf
of the appellants, would submit that the High Court committed a serious
error in reversing a well-considered judgment of the Trial Judge. It was
contended that the respondents, even as far back in 1992, having not
claimed any ownership in respect of Site No. 433, were not entitled to
B an order of injunction. It was pointed out that the learned Trial Judge had
fou.'1d as of fact that the plaintiff-respondent had failed to show his right,
title and interest in respect of Site No. 433. "'
---,.-
17. According to the learned counsel, as about 80% of the
c construction is already over, this Court should allow the appellant to
complete the same.as otherwise she will suffer irreparable injury.
18. Mr. Ravindra Keshavrao Adsure, learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the respondent No. 1, on the other hand, would submit that it is
incorrect to contend that the entire Survey No. 15/1 has been acquired,
D which would be evident from the fact that the name of the plaintiffs father
was shown as owner of 90 ft. x 50 ft. of land appurtening to the said .
Survey No. 15/1. It would also appear from the records that the land of ~ "
Venkata Reddy and B.S. Subba Rao had only been acquired.

E 19. The Authority appears to have been impleaded as a party to
the suit.
20. It is stated that the plaintiff had filed an interlocutory application
calling upon the Authority to produce the documents in original and the
same had been allowed by an order dated 23.02.2007.
F
21. The principal question which is necessary to be determined in ~-
the suit would be as to whether Site No. 432 was the subject matter of
any Land Acquisition proceeding or not. Prima fade, it does not appear
that the said plot was acquired. Had entire Survey No. 15/1 been the
G subject matter of Land Acquisition proceeding, the portion of the land
belonging to the plaintiff- respondent would have also been acquired. Their
names also would have found place in the notification. Possession would ~
have been taken from them and an award would have been made in their
favour. The very fact that the northern boundary of the land sought to be
H acquired has been shown as Survey No. 1511,primafacie, it appears
/
>-
SHRIDEVI v. MURALIDHAR [SINHA, J.] 385

that the entire Survey No. 15/1 had not been the subject matter of A
acquisition.
22. In that view of the matter the High Court was right in opining
that an arguable case has been made out. While considering an application
for injunction, existence of a prima facie case, balance of convenience B
of parties, irreparable injury were required to be considered by the Civil 1

Court. Grant of a relief in regard to the nature and extent thereof will
depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. [See M Gurudas ,
& Ors. V. Rasaranjan & Ors., reported in 2006 AIR sew 4773]
23. This Court, however, is not oblivious of the fact that ordinarily · C
a court of appeal does not interfere with the discretionary jurisdiction
exercised by the learned Trial Judge. However, in this case the learned 1

Trial Judge while passing the order dated 16.08.2006 failed to consider
the relevant question, viz., as to whether the Authority had acquired Site
No. 432 or not. That was the principal question on the basis whereof the 'D
learned Trial Judge ought to have proceeded with the matter. It did not
do so; as a result whereof it misdirected itself. Title claimed by the
appellants herein is said to have been derived from the Authority. If Site
No. 433 was not the subject matter of acquisition, the question of
execution of any deed of sale in favour of Respondent No. 2 herein by E ·
the Authority did not or could not arise. Consequently, Respondent No. ,
2 could not have transferred her right, title and interest in favour of the
appellant herein.
24. Omission on the part of the learned Tiial Judge to consider the F
respective cases of the parties, in this behalf, in our opinion, deserved ,
interference by the First Appellate Court. If that be the legal position,
whether the plaintiff- Respondent No. 1 herein had prayed for raising
any construction on Site No. 433 or not may not strictly arise for '
consideration. G
25. We may furthem1ore notice that although in the application for
permission to raise construction, such a prayer had not been made, which
according to Mr. Adsure, was an inadvertent error.
26. The fact remains that the ownership of Site No. 433 whether . H
~
386 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 11 S.C.R.

.r
A vested in the plaintiff - Respondent No. 1 or Venkata Reddy and B.S. \

Subba Rao is the core question which would fall for detennination of the
learned Trial Judge.
27. Ordinarily this Court having regard to the fact that the appellant
B has raised substantial constructions would have allowed her to complete
the same but the fact remains that she did not question the said order
before this Court for a long time. The application for grant of special leave I'-

was barred by limitation. In a situation of this nature, ordinarily, the
aggrieved party is expected to approach this Court without any loss of "'
c time. We have noticed hereinbefore that in the meanwhile the plaintiff - ..,..
Respondent No. 1 had sought for production of certain original documents
from the Authority which has been allowed. I

28. The conduct of the appellant must be deprecated. Upon
r
obtaining an interim order from this court, she with a view to complete
D the construction so as to make the situation irretrievable, not only did not
file processes; even without any rhyme or reason a set of complete
paperbooks had not been served on the Advocate for the plaintiff - ,L
respondent. Although ad interim order passed by this Court had nothing
to do with the hearing of the suit, which in tenns of the direction issued
E by the High Court deserved expeditious disposal; an application was filed
through Respondent No. 2 herein for deferring the hearing of the suit on I
the premise that the matter is pending before this Court. Evidently, such r
j..
an application was filed at the behest of the appellant.

F 29. It is stated at the Bar that Mr. Nandkishore J., Advocate
appeared before this Court on 8.03.2007 on behalf of the appellant but t
'i-
the same learned Advocate had appeared for Respondent No. 2 before
the court below.

G
30. The very fact that the appellant and the said respondent have a f
?

common Advocate also goes a long way to show that the said application t::
must have been filed at the instance of the appellants themselves paiticularly
I
"""
having regard to the fact that Respondent No. 2 had transferred her right ~ I

title and interest in favour of the appellant herein.
H 31. Furthermore, no construction could be raised in view of the order
SHRIDEVI v. MURALIDHAR [SINHA, J.] 387

of a Division bench of this Court dated 21.06.2007. In that view of the A
matter, in our opinion, interest of justice would be subserved ifthe said
order is made absolute. We would, however, direct the plaintiff -
Respondent No. 1 to furnish security for a sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- (Rupees
two lakhs only) within four weeks from date so that in the event, the suit
is dismissed and in the proceedings the appellants prove that she has B
suffered any damages by reason of not being able to raise any construction
:from the date till disposal of the suit, they may be suitably compensated
therefor.
: 32. The appeal is dismissed subject to the aforementioned directions C
with costs. Counsel's fee assessed at Rs. 25,0001- (Rupees twenty five
only).
S.K.S. Appeal dismissed.