SIDHARTHA SARAWGIversusBOARD OF TRUSTEES FOR THE PORT OF KOLKATAAND OTHERS

                   (2014] 14 S.C.R. 1493



                  SIDHARTHASARAWGI                           A

                               v.
             BOARD OF TRUSTEES FOR THE
            PORT OF KOLKATAAND OTHERS
                                                             B
       (Special Leave Petition (C) No.1834 7 of 2013) _
                                                     ....
                       APRIL 16, 2014
   [GYAN SUDHA MISRA AND KURIAN JOSEPH, JJ.]
      Administrative Law:                                    c
      Delegation - Meaning of - Discussed.
    Delegation of legislative powers and non-legislative/
administrative powers - Distinction between - Discussed.
      Major Port Trust Act, 1963 : -                         D
      Object of - Discussed.
        s.21 - Delegation of power to terminate the lease and
  issue ejectment notices - Lease granted by Port Trust to
  petitioner - Lease d,eeds issued by the Land Manager - E
  Termination of lease by the Land Manager- Challenged on
  the ground that Land manager has no competence to issue
  ejectment notices - Held: s.21 provides for delegation of
  power of Board on the Chairman - Every contract is to be
  made by Chairman who is authori?ed to issue ejectment F
  notices - In the instant case, the decision to terminate was
  taken by the Chairman only - In implementation of the
  decision taken by the Chairman to terminate the leases, the
  Chairman authorized the Land Manager to issue the
  ejectment notices - The issuance of such notices was a mere G
  ministerial act for the implementation of a decision already
  taken by the Chairman as delegated by the Board - The
  Chairman having duly authorized the Land Manager in that
'regard, it cannot be said that the ejectment notice issued by
                                                             H
                             1493
1494      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2014) 14 S.C.R.


 A the Land Manager was without jurisdiction - It was not a case
   of sub-delegation - It was merely a ministerial exercise of
   issuance of a notice in implementation of the decision, as
    per the specific authorization in that regard ~ Viewing the
    situation from another angle, s.21 of the General Clauses
 B Act, 1897 provides that power to issue would include power.
    to.add, amend, vary or rescind-Admittedly, in the case of ·
  . the petitioners, the. lease deed was executed by the Land
    Manager - The execu_tion of the lease deed was as per the
    decision by the competent authority- The lease, therefore,
.C could be terminated by the same authority who execu,ted the
    lease deed, after a decision has been made in that regard
    by the competent -authority - General Clauses Act, 1897 -
    s.21 ""-Administrative law- Delegation of power.
                                 '       1

         In the year 1990, lease was granted by the Kolkata
 D Port Trust to the petitioners. The lease deeds were
   .·executed by the Land Manager of the Trust. In 2008, ·.
    notices terminating the lease were issued by the Land
     Manager.. The said notices were challenged on the
     ground that the same was illegal and without jurisdiction
 E as the Land Manager was not competent to issue such
    ejectment notices. The High Court held in favour of the
     Kolkata Port Trust.
         The questions which have arisen in the special
 F leave petitions were whether there is any exception to
   the well settled principle that a delegate has no power to
   delegate and whether there is any distinction between
   delegation of legislative and non-legislative powers.


 G
                     '              .
          Dismissing the Special Leave Petitions, the Court
          HELD: 1 .. Delegation is the act of making or
      commissioning a delegate. It generally means parting of
  · . powers by· the pers(;>n who grants the delegation and·
      conferring of an authority to do things which otherwise
      that person .would have to do himself. There is a subtle
 H
  SIDHARTHASARAWGI v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES FOR                1495
            THE PORT OF KOLKATA

  distinction between delegation of legislative powers and A
  delegation of non-legislative/administrative powers. As
  far as delegation of power to legislate is concerned, the
  law is well-settled that the said power cannot be sub-
  delegated. The Legislature cannot delegate essential
  legislative functions which consist in the determination B
  or choosing of the legislative policy and formally
  enacting that policy into a binding rule of conduct.
  Subordinate legislatio·n which is generally in the realm
 ,of Rules and Regulations dealing with the procedure on ·
  implementation of plenary legislation is generally a task c
· entrusted to a specified authority. Since the Legislature
  need not spend its time for working out the details on
  implementation of the law, it has thought it fit to entrust
  the said task to an agency. That agency cannot entrust ·
  such task to its subordinates; it would be a breach of o
  the confidence reposed on the delegate. Regarding
  delegation of non-legislative/administrative powers on
  a person or a body to do certain things, whether the
  delegate himself is to perform such functions or whether
  after taking decision as per the terms of the delegation, E
  the said agency can authorize the implementation of the
  same on somebody else, is the question to be
  considered. Once the power is conferred, after
  exercising the said power, how to implement the decision
  taken in the process, is a matter of procedure. The F
  Legislature may, after laying down the legislative J?Olicy,
  confer discretion on an administrative agency as to the
  execution of the policy and leave itto the agency to work
  out the details within the framework of that policy. So
  long as the essential functions of decision making is G
  performed by the delegate, the burden of performing tne
  ancillary and clerical task need not be shouldered by the
  primary delegate. It is not necessary that the. primary
  delegate himself should perform the ministerial acts as
  well. In furtherance of the implementation of the decision H
1496      SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2014] 14 S.C.R.


 A already taken by the prim~ry delegate as per the.
   delegation, ministerial or clerical tasks may be performed·
   by authorized officers. The complexity of modern day
   administration and the expansion of functions of the
   State to the economic and social spheres have made it
 B necessary that the Legislature gives wide powers to
   various authorities when the situation requires it.
   Practical necessities or exigenc_ies of administration
   require that the decision making authority who has been
   conferred with statutory power, be able to delegate tasks
 C when the situation so requires.' Thus, the maxim .
   delegatus non potest delegare, gives way in
   the performan·ce of administrative or ministerial
   tasks by subordinate authorities in furtherance of the
   exercise of the delegated power by an authority,
 D [Paras2to4, 6][1499-H; 1500-A, G•H; 1502-A, 1503-F]
          Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing (Wvg.) Co. Ltd.
          v. The Assistant Commissioner ()f Sales Tax and
                                                             .   .
          Ors. (1974) 4 sec 98 : 1974 (2) seR 879,;
          Harishanker Bag/av. State of M.P. (1955) 1 SeR
 E        380; Jamal Uddin Ahmad v. Abu· Saleh
          Najmuddin and Anr. (2003) 4 sec 257 : 2003 (2).
           SCR 473 ; Barium Chemicals Limited and Anr.
          v. The Company Law Board and Anr. AIR.1967
          SC 295: 1966 SCR 311 - relied on.
 F.       Black's Law Dictionary; P. Ramanatha Aiyar's,
        · The Law Lexicon - referred to.               '
        2. The Constitution confers power and imposes
   duty on the Legislature to make laws and the said
   functions cannot be delegated by the Legislature to the ·
 G executive. The Legislature is constitutionally required to ·
   keep in its own hands the essenti_al legislative functions
   which·cor;isist of the determination of legislative policy
   and its formulation as a binding rule of conduct. After
   the pei'formance of the essential legislative function by
 H the Legislature and laying the guiding policy, the
  SIDHARTHASARAWGI v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES FOR                 1497
            THE PORT OF KOLKATA

  Legislature may delegate to the executive or A
  administrative authority, any ancillary or subordinate
  powers that are necessary for giving effect to the policy
  and purposes of the enactment. In construing the scope
  and extent of delegated power, the difference between
  the essential and non-essential functions of the delegate B
  should also be borne in mind. While there cannot be sub-
  delegation of any essential functions, in order to achieve
  the intended object of the delegation, the non-essential
  functions can be sub-delegated to be pe~ormed under
  the authority and supervision of the delegate. C
· [Para 8][1504-C-F]
      3. The Major Port Trusts Act, 1963 is an Act intended
 "to make provision for the constitution of port authorities·
 for certain major ports in India and to yest the ·
 administration, control and management of such ports D
 in such authorities and for matters connected
 therewith". Section 3 of the Act provides for the
 constitution of a Board of Trustees. Section 21 of the
 ~ct provides for delegation of powers of the Board with
 the approval of the Central Government on the Chairman E
 and specification of exercise of such pow.ers conferred
 on the Chairman by the Deputy Chairman or any other
 officer of the Board. Section 34 of the Act provides for ·
 the mode of executing contracts on behalf of Board. It is
 provided therein that every contract is to be made by F
 the Chairman or any other officer of the Board not below
 the rank of the Head of a Department as authorized by
 the Chairman, on behalf of the Board. In exercise of the
 power under Section 21 on delegation of powers, the
 Board of the Kolkata Port Trust passed Resolution No. G
 82 dated 26.05.1988 delegating the power to terminate
 any lease on the Chairman. The Chairman was also
 authorized by the said Resolution to issue ejectment
 notices. [Paras 11, 12, 13 and 14][1506-A-B, D-E; 1507-B;
 1508-A-B]                                                    H
1498       SUPREME COURT REPORTS             ' [2014] 14 S.C.R.


 A .       4. The power delegated to the Chairman as per
     Resolution No. 82 is the power to terminate a lease. The
     decision to terminate was taken by the Chairman only
     and there is no dispute in that regard, In implementation
     of the decision thus taken by the Chairman to terminate
 B the leases, the Chairman authorized the Land Manager
     to issue·the ejectment notices. The issuance of such
     notices was a mere ministerial act for the implementation
     of a decision already taken by the Chairman as delegated
     by the Board. The Chairman having duly authorized the
 C Land Manager in that regard, it cannot be said that the
     ejectment notice issued by the Land Manager was
     witt:Joutjurisdiction. It is not a case of sub-delegation. It
     was mer.ely a ministerial exercise of issuance of a notice
     in implementation of the decision, as per the specific
 o · authorization in that regard. The situation can be viewed
     from another angle as well. Section 21 of The General
     Clauses Act, 1897 provides that power to issue would
     include power to add, amend, vary or rescind. Admittedly,
     in the case of the petitioners, the lease deed was
 E executed by. the Land Manager. The execution of the·
     lease deed is as per the decision by the competent
     authority. If that be so, the lease can be terminated by
     the same ~uthority who executed the lease deed, after a
     decision has been made in that regard by the competent
 F authority. There was no legal infirmity in the impugned
     notices issued by the Land Manager of the Kolkata Port
     Trust, as noted by the Division Bench of the High Court,
     in the impugned judgment. The power is exercised only
     as duly authorized by the Chairman. The Land Manager
 G is .also otherwise competent to issue notices after due
     decision has been taken in that regard by the competent
     authority since he is the one who executed the lease
     deed. [Paras 16to19][1509-B-E; 1510-A-B]
          P.     Saibaba Rao S/o Amruth Rao v.
 H        Dr.   Ougyala Srinivasa Rao S/o Swami Rao and
                                                                        •


 SIDHARTHASARAWGI v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES FOR                       1499
           THE PORT OF KOLKATA

     Dr. N. Sudhakar Rao S/o. Late N. Yethiraja Rao              A
     v. Dr. Dugyala Srinivasa Rao S/o Swami Rao and
     Ors. Election Petition Nos. 1 and 3 of 2004,
     Judgment dated 30.08.2007 - relied on.
                   Case Law Reference
                                                                 B
     1974 (2) SCR 879 -            relied on     Para 2
     (1955) 1 SCR 380              relied on     Para 3
     2003 (2) SCR 473              relied on      Para 5
     1966 SCR 311                  relied on     Para 7          c
    CIVIL APPELLATE JURiSDICTION: SLP (Civil) No.
18347 of2013.
     From the Judgment and Order dated 28.01.2013 of the
High Court at Calcutta in W. P. 18793 (W) of 2007.               D
                            WITH
     SLP (C) Nos. 19458-19459, 19600 & 19652 of 2013
       Shyam Divan, Jayant Bhushan, T. R. Andhyarujina, Parag
P. Tripathi, Sr.Advs., Manoj, Ms.Aparna Sinha,Amatva Mitra,      E
Soumya Mazumdar, Abhijat P. Medh, Anirudh Roi, Ratnesh Rai,
Ajay Bhargava, Ms. Nanita Bhargava,. Karun Mehta (for Mis.
Khaitan & Co.), A. V. Rangam, Buddy A. Ranganadhan, Advs.,
for the appearing parties.
     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                  F
      KURIAN,-J.1. Delegatus Non Potest De/egare: A
delegate has no power to delegate, is a well-settled principle~
Is there any exception and is there any distinction between
delegation of legislative and non-legislative powers, are the
moot issues arising for consideration in these cases.           ·G
     2. Delegation is the act of making or commissioning a
delegate. It generally means parting of powers bythe person
who grants the delegation and conferring of an authority to do
                                                                  H
1500           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   (2014]14 S.C.R.


 A things which otherwise that person would have to do himself.
   Delegation is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as "the act of
   entrusting another with authority by empowering another to act
   as an agent or representative". In P. RamanathaAiyar's, The
   Law Lexicon, "delegation is the act of making or
 B commissioning a delegate. Delegation generally means
   parting of powers by the person who grants the delegation,
   but it also means conferring of an authority to do things which
   oth.erwise that person would have to 1do himself'. 'Justice
   Mathew in Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing (Wvq.) Co.
 C Ltd. v. The Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax and
   Others 1, has succinctly discu~sed the concept of delegation.
   Paragraph 37 reads as follows:
              "37,. ... Delegation is not the complete handing over or
               tr_ansference of a power from one person or body of ·
 D             persons to another. Delegation may be defined as the
  '
               entrusting, by a person or body of persons, of the exercise
               of a power residing in that person or body of persons, to
               another· person or body of persons, with complete power
             . of revocation or amendment remaining in the grantor or
 E             delegator. It is important to grasp the implications of this,
               for, much confusion of thought has unfortunately resulted
               from assuming that delegation involves or may involve,
               the complete abdication or abrogation of a power. This
               is precluded by the definition. Delegation often involves
 F             the granting of discretionary authority to another, but such
               authority is purely derivative. The ultimate power always
               remains in the delegator and is never renounced."
            3. There is a subtle distinction between delegation of
       legislative      · 'powers       and        delegation          of
 G     non-legislative/administrative powers. As far as delegation of
       power to legislate is concerned, the law is well-settled: the said
       power cannot be sub-delegated. The Legislature cannot
       delegate essential legislative functions which consist in the
 H     1
           (1974)4SCC98
    SIDHARTHA SARAWGI v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES FOR                           1501
          THE PORT OF KOLKATA [KURIAN, J.]

determination orchoosingofthe.legislative policy and formally A
enacting that policy into a binding rule of conduct2 • Subordinate
legislation which is generally in the realm of Rules and
Regulations dealing with the procedure on implementation of
plenary legislation is generally a task entrusted to a specified .
authority. Since the Legislature need not spend its time for B
working out the details on implementation of the law, it has
thought it fit to entrust the said task to an agency. That agency
cannot entrust such task to its subordinates; it IQ/Ould be a
breach of the confidence reposed on the delegate.
       4. Regarding delegation of non-legislative/administrative C
powers on a person or a bpdy to do certain things, whether
the delegate himself is to perform such functions or whether
after taking decision as per the terms of the delegation, the
said agency can authorize the implementation of the same on
somebody else, is the question to be considered. Once the D
power is conferred, after exercising the said power, how lb
implement the decision taken in the process, is a matter of
procedure. The Legislature may, after laying down the
legislative policy, confer discretion on an administrative agency
as to the execution of the policy and leave it to the agency to E
work out the details within the framework of that policy 3 . So
long as the essential functions of decision making is performed
by the delegate, the burden of performing the ancillary and
clerical task need not be shouldered by the primary delegate.
It is not necessary that the primary delegate himself should F
perform the ministerial acts as well. In furtherance of the
implementation of the decision already taken by the primary
delegate as per the delegation, ministerial or clerical tasks
may be performed by authorized officers. The complexity of
modern day administration and the expansion of functions of G
the State to the economic and social spheres have made it
2
  Harishanker Bag la v. State of M.P. - (1955) 1 SCR 380 (Page 388)
 Agricultural Market Committee v. Shalimar Chemical Works Limited-
 (1997) 5 SCC 516 (Paragraph 24)
3
  Khambalia Municipalitv v. State of Gujarat-AIR 1967 SC 1048 (P.1051)
                                                                          H
1502       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2014) 14 S.C.R.


 A necessary that the Legislature gives wide powers to various
   authorities when the situation requires it. Today's governmental
   functions are a lot more complex and the need for delegation
   of powers has become more compelling. It cannot be expected
   that the head of the administrative body performs each and
 B every task himself.                          •
          5. The issue was considered by this Court ,in Jamal
   Uddin Ahmad v. Abu Saleh Najmuddin and Another4 in
   the context of the procedure for filing of the election petitions
   under Section 81 of the Representation of Peoples Act, 1951.
 C It was held that the ministerial or administrative functions of
   the authority on whom the powers are conferred by the s;tatute
   can be exercised by the authorized officers. It was held that:
          "13. The functions discharged by a High Court can be
 D        divided broadly into judicial and administrative functions.
          The judicial functions are to be discharged essentially
         ·by the Judges as per the Rules of the Court and cannot
          be delegated. However, administrative functions need
          not necessarily be discharged by the Judges by
          themselves, whether individually or collectively or in a
 E
          group of two or more, and may be delegated or entrusted
          by authorization to subordinates unless there be some
          rule of law restraining such delegation or authorisation.
          Every High Court consists of some administrative and
          ministerial staff which is as much a part of the High Court
 F
          as an institution and is meant to be entrusted with the
          responsibility of discharging administrative and
          ministerial functions. There can be "delegation" as also
          there can be "authorization" in favour of the Registry and ·
          the officials therein by empowering or entrusting them
 G        with authority or by permitting a few things to be done by
          them for and on behalf of the Court so as to aid the Judges
          in discharge of their judicial functioning. Authorization
          may take the form of formal conferral or sanction or may
 H '(2003) 4 sec 257
 SIDHARTHA SARAWGI v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES FOR . 1503
       THE PORT OF KOLKATA [KURIAN, J.]

     be by way of approval or countenance. Such delegation          A
     or authorization is not a matter of mere convenience but
     a necessity at times. The Judges are already
     overburdened with the task of performing judicial
     functions and the constraints on their time and energy
     are so demanding that it is in public interest to allow them   B
     to devote time and energy as much as possible in
     discharging their judicial functions, relieving them of the
     need for diverting their limited resources of tirfre and
     energy to such administrative or ministerial functions,
     which, on any principle of propriety, logic, or necessity      C
     are not required necessarily to be performed by the
     Judges. Receiving a cause or a document and making
     it presentable to a Judge for the purpose of hearing or
     trial and many a functions post-decision, which functions
     are administrative and ministerial in nature, can be and       D
     are generally entrusted or made over to be discharged
     by the staff of the High Court, often by making a provision
     in the Rules or under the orders of the Chief Justice or by
     issuing practice directions, and at times, in the absence
     of rules, by sheer practice. The practice gathers the          E

        .
      strength of law and the older the practice the greater is
     the strength ... "
       6. Practical necessities or exigencies of administration
require that the decision making authority who has been
conferred with statutory power, be able to delegate tasks when      F
the situation so requires. Thus, the maxim de/egatus non potest
delegare, gives way in the performance of administrative or
ministerial tasks by subordinate authorities in furtherance of
the exercise of the delegated power by an authority.
     7. It would also be useful in this context to refer to the     G
decision of this Court in Barium Chemicals Limited and
Another v. The Company Law Board and Another•
wherein it is held at paragraph 36 as follows:
5 AIR 1967 SC 295
                                                                    H
1504         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2014] 14 S.C.R.


 A          " ... the maxim delegatus non potest delegare must not
            be pushed too far. The maxim does not embody a rule of
            law. It indicates a rule of construction of a statute or other
            instrument conferring an authority. Prima facie, a
            discretion conferred by a statute on any authority is
 B          intended to be exercised by that authority and by no other.
            But the intention may be negatived by .any contrary
            indications in the language, scope or object of the statute.
            Tt:ie construction that wquld best achieve the purpose
            and object of the statute should b_e adopted.;'
 c       8. The Constitution confers power and imposes duty on
   the Legislature to make laws and the said functions cannot be
   delegated by the Legislature to the executive. The Legislature
   is constitutionally required to keep in its own hands the ·
   essential legislative functions which consist of the
 D determination of legislative policy and its formulation as a
   binding rule of conduct. After the performance of the essential
   legislative function by the Legislature and laying the.guiding
   policy, the Legislature may delegate to the executive or
   administrative authority, any ancillary or subordinate powers
 E that are necessary for giving effect to the policy and purposes
   of the .enactment. In construing the scope and extent of
                                                           •
   delegated power, the difference between the essential and
   non-esseniial functions of the delegate should also be borne
   in mind. While there cannot be sub-delegation of any essential
 F functions, in order to achieve the intended object of the
   delegation, the non-essential functio_ns can be sub-delegated
   to be performed under the authority and supervision of the
   delegate.
 G           9. Som'etimes, in the plenary legislation itself, the
       lawmakers may provide for such sub-delegation. That is what
       we see under Section 21 and 34 of the Major Port Trusts Act,
       1963, which we shall be discussing in more detail at a later
       part of this judgment.

 H
  SIDHARTHA SARAWGI v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES FOR                     1505
        THE PORT OF KOLKATA [KURIAN, J.]

      10. Having analysed the legal position as above, we shall A
 now deal with the factual position in these cases. The challenge
 is on the judgment dated 28,01.2013 of the Division Bench of
 the. Calcutta High Court. The issue pertains to the determi.nation
 of leases granted by the Kolkata Port Trust to the petitioners.
 In the case of Universal Autocrafts Private Limited, they were B
 granted lease of a plot of land for 30 years, on 19.08.1990.
 The lease deed was executed by the Land Manager of the
  Kolkata Port Trust. On 05.02.2008, a letter was issued to the
  said petitioner to demolish. an alleged unauthorized
  construction and eject the sub-tenants from the premises. The   c
  petitioner submitted its reply on 02.05.2008. Not satisfied with
 the reply, on 30.01.2009, a notice terminating the lease was
  issued. The ejectment notice was signed by the Land Manager. ·
  The main contention is that the ejectment notice issued by the
  Land Manager is illegal and without jurisdiction as he is not D
  competent to issue such ejectment notices. In the case of
  Siddhartha Sarawgi, the leases were terminated during the
  subsistence of the renewed period of 30 years, on the ground
  of sub-letting without consent of the Kolkata Port Trust. In his
  case also, the ejectment notices were issued by the Land E
  Manager and, hence, it is contended that there can be no
  eviction on the basis of ejectment notice issued by a person
  who is not competent to do so, th.e same being without
 jurisdiction. The said ejectment notices were challenged by
  both the petitioners before the Calcutta High Court. In the case F
  of UniversalAutocrafts Private Limited, the learned Single
  Judge of Calcutta High Court allowed the writ petition holding
  that the Land Manager was not competent to issue the ·
  ejectment notice. In the writ petition filed by Sidhartha Sarawgi,
. the learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court found a G
  conflict betWeen ~o earlier decisions and referred the matter
  to a Division Bench. The Division Bench vide common
 judgment dated 28.01.2003 held in favour of the Kolkata Port
  Trust in the case of both the petitioners, which is challenged in
  these Special Leave Petitions.
                                                                  H
          )




1506          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2014] 14 S.C.R.


 A           11. The Major Port Trusts Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred
       to as, 'the Act') is an Act intended "to make provision for the
       constitution of port authorities for c_ertain major ports in India
       and to vest the administration, control and management of such
       ports in such.authorities and for matters connected therewith".
 B     Section 3 of the Act provides for the com:;titution of a Board of
       Trustees (hereinafter referred to as 'the Board'). Section 5
       provides that:
              "5. Board to be body corporate.-Every Board
              constituted under this Act shall·be a body corporate
 c            having perpetual succession and a common seal with
              power, subject to the provisions of this Act, to acquire,
              hold or dispose of property and may by the name by
              which it is constituted, sue or be sued.".
 D            12. Section 21,of the Act provides for delegation of
       powers of the Board with the approval of the Central
       Government on the Chairman and specification of exercise of
       such powers conferred on the Chairman by the Deputy
       Chairman or any other officer of the Board. The provision reads
 E     as follows:
              "21. Delegation of powers.-A Board may, with the
              approval of the Central Government, specify-
                 (a) the powers and duties conferred or imposed upon
                    the Board by or under this Act, which may also be
 F                  exercised or performed by the Chairman; and
                 (b) the powers and duties conferred or imposed on
                    the_ Chairman by or under this Act, which may also
                    be exercised or performed by the Deputy Chairman
                    or any officer of the Board and the conditions and
 G
                    restrictions, if any,·subject to which such powers
                    and duties may be exercised ar:id performed:
              Provided that any powers and duties conferred or
              imposed upon the Deputy Chairman or any officer of the
 H            Board under clause (b) shall be exercised and performed
     •
 SIDHARTHA SARAWGI v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES FOR                          1507
       THE PORT OF KOLKATA [KURIAN, J.]

     by him subject to the supervision and control of the ·A
     Chairman."
      13. Section 34 of the Act provides for the mode 'of
executing contracts on behalf of Board. It is provided therein
that every contract is to be made by the Chairman or any other
officer of the Board not below the rank of the Head of a             B
Department as authorized by the Chairman, on behalf of the
Board. The provision reads as follows:
     "34. Mode of executing contracts on behalf of
     Board.-(1) Every contract shall, on behalf of a Board,          c
     be made by the Chairman or by any such officer oJ the
     Board not below the rank of the Head of a Department
     as the Chairman may,· by general or special· order,
     authorise in this -behalf and shall be sealed with the
     common seal of the Board:                                       D
     Provided that no contract whereof the value or amount
     exceeds such value or amount as the Central Government
     may from time to time fix in this behalf shall be made
     unless it has been previously approved by the Board:
     Provided further that no contract for the acquisition or        E
     sale of immovable property or for the lease of any such
     property for a term exceeding thirty years, and no other
     contract whereof the value or amount exceeds s.uch value
     or amount as the Central Government may from time to
     time fix in this behalf, shall be made unless it has been       F
     previously approved by the Central Govern men~ ..
    · (2) Subject to the provisions of sub- section (1 ), the form
      and manner in which any contract shall ~e made u_nder
    . this Act shall be such as may be prescribed by regulations     G
      made in this behalf.
     (3) No contract which is not made in accordance with ·
     the provisions of this Act and the regulations made
     thereunder shall be bindin'g on the Board."
                                                                     .H
                                                                •

1508         SUPREME COURT REPORTS
                                                 ,. [2014] 14S.C.R.
 A           14: In exercise of the power under Section 21 on
       delegation of powers, the Board of the Kolkata Port Trust
       passed Resolution No. 82 dated 26.05.1988 delegating the
       power to terminate any lease on the Chairman. The Chairman
       was also authorized by the said Resolution to issue ejectment
 B     notices. The text of the Resolution reads as follows:
             ".. Resolution No. 82- Resolved to sanction the proposal
             for delegation of powers to the Chairm'an by invocation
             of section 21 (a) of the Major Port.Trust Act, 1963, the
             power to terminate leases sanctioned by the Trustees
 C.        . and to authorizing him to issue ejectment notices, subject
             to the sanction of the Government."            - •
          15. It is the contention of the petitioners that the power to
   terminate the lease having been specifically conferred on the
 0 'Chairman, the steps now taken by the Land Manager by issuing
   the impugned notices for eviction, are clearly without jurisdiction
    and, hence, illegal and inoperative. On behalf of the Board of
    Kolkata Port Trust, it is contended that the decision to terminate
    the lease has actually been taken by the Chairman and the
 E issuance of notice of termination in furtherance of the decision
    taken by the Chairman alone, has been delegated to the Land
    Manager. Our attention is also ir:ivited to Office Order No~ 6480/
    310 dated 22.01.1990, which reads as under: -
                             "CALCUTTA PORT TRUST
 F          No. 6480/3/0 .                         January 22, 1990
                               OFFICE ORDER
            Henceforth ejectment (sic) notices in respect of leases
       determined with my approval may be signed by any one of the
 G     undernoted officers:                               ·
            Calcutta
               (1) Deputy Chairman (Calcutta)
               (2) Land Manager
 H
 SIDHARTHA SARAWGI v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES FOR                    1509
       THE PORT OF KOLKATA [KURIAN, J.]

     Haldia                                                     A
        (1) Deputy Chairman (Haldia)
        (2) General Manager (Mas)
        (3) Manager (l&C.F)"
                                                                B
     16. The power that is delegated to the Ch.airman as per ._
Resolution No. 82 is the power to terminate a lease. The
decision ,to terminate has been taken by the Chairman only
and there is no dispute in that regard. In implementation of the
decision thus taken by the Chairman to terminate the leases,    c·
the Chairman has authorized the Land Manager to issue. the.
ejectment notices. The issuance of such notices. is amere
ministerial act for the implementation of a decision already
taken by the Chairman as delegated by the Board .. .The
Chairman having duly authorized the Land Manager in that
regard, it cannot be said that the ejectment notice issued by D
the Land Manager is without jurisdiction. It is not a Case of
                            a
sub-delegation. It is merely ministerial exercise of issuance
of a notice in implementation of the decision, as per the
specific ?Uthorization in that regard.
                                                                 E
      17. The situation can be viewed from another angle as
well. Section 21 of The General Clauses Act, 1897 provides
that power to issue would include power to add, amend, vary
or rescind. The provision reads as follows:
    "21. Power to issue, to include power to add to, F
    amend, vary or rescind notifications, orders, rules
    or bye-laws.-Where, by any Central Act or Regulations
    a power to issue notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws
    is conferred, then that power includes a power,
    exercisable in the like manner and subject to the like G
    sanction and conditions (if any), to add to, amend, vary
    or rescind any notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws so
  ' issued."

                                                                H
1510         SUPREME COURT REPORTS ·                   [2014] 14 S.C.R.


 A       18. Admittedly, in the case of the petitioners, the lease
   deed has been executed by the Land Manager. The execution
   of the lease deed is as per the decision by the competent
   authority. If.that be so, the lease can be terminated by the same
   authority who executed the lease deed, after a decision has
 B been made in that regard by the competent authority. In P.
   Saiba'ba Rao S/o Amruth Rao v. Dr. Dugyala Srinivasa
   Rao S/o Swami Rao and Dr. N. Sudhakar Rao S/o. Late
   N. Yethiraja Rao v. Dr. Dugyala Srinivasa Rao S/o Swami
   Rao and Ors. 6 High Court of Andhra Pradesh considered the
 C situation of termination of a contract. The contention was that
   the Superintendent Engineer was not competent to terminate
   the contract in terms of the guidelines.' His authority was only
   to execute the contract. Negating the same; it was held as·
   follows:                                   '
 D            "It is very interesting to notice that entry 5(b) of the
              Government order as above speak.s of instruments
              relating to execution of works including Highways. The
              officer authorized to execute these instruments among
              others is SE. ·chapter II of P)IVD Code deals with,
 E            "Works". It coritains paragraphs 88 to 224. Nowhere has
              it mentioned any authority, who is conferred with power
              to terminate/cancel the contract entered into by SE as
              per Paragraph 159 of PWD Code read with executive
              instructions. Petitioners have failed to bring any evidence
 F          . in this regard. Furthermore, in G.O.Ms. No; 2209, dated
              24.9.1965, it was clarified that SE is competent to
              execute contracts and.piece work agreements upto the
              limitoftenders accepted by the competent authority
              regardless of whether they were accepted by SE and
 G            irrespective of restrictions imposed on the powers of SE
              in the matter of acceptance of contract. This means that
              SE· is competent to enter into contract and also for
              terminating/ dosing/cancelling the contract. The power
       •Election Petition Nos: 1 and 3 of 2004, Judgment dated 30.08.2007.
 H
   SIDHARTHASARAWGI v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES FOR                            1511
         THE PORT OF KOLKATA [KURIAN, J.]

        to enter into contracts or the authorisation to execute         A
        instruments also includes the power to.execute contracts
        or instruments cancelling a contract. It may also be
        noticed that under preliminary specification Nos. 7 and
      · 8 of APSS, SE is competent to alter the standard
        specifications for a particular contract. Thus authorization    B
        given to SE underG.0.Ms. No. 1632, dated 24.10.1958,
        is all pervasive and the same cannot be interpreted in a
        restrictive manner.''
       We respectfully endorse the legal principle.
                                                                        c
       19. We do not find any legal infirmity in the impugned
  notices iss1Jed by the Land Manager of the Kolkat9 Port Trust,
  as noted by the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court, in
  the impugned judgment. The power is exercised only as duly
  authorized by the Chairman. The Land Manager is also
                                                                        0
  otherwise competent to issue notices after due decision has
  been taken in that regard by the competent authority since he
' is the one who executed the lease deed. There is no merit in
  these Petitions.
      20. The Special Leave Petitions are hence dismissed.              E
 There is no order as to costs.


 Devika Gujral                                       SLPs dismissed .




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