SIMRANJIT SINGH MANNversusUNION OF INDIA AND ANR.

A                        SIMRANJIT SINGH MANN
                                   v.
                        UNION OF INDIA AND ANR.

                             SEPTEMBER 16, 1992

B               [A.M. AHMADI AND K. RAMASWAMY, JJ.]
                                                                                   :~

         Constitution of India, 1950:

         Article 32-Locus standi-Criminal Case-Murde~rosecution cul-
C   minating in convictiort-Award of death sentence convicts not prefering ap-
    peal-Third party a total stranger-Whether could challenge the conviction
    and sentence.

          The accused in General Vaidya's murder case, were charge-sheeted
    for his murder and for causing bullet injury to his wife. They were tried
D   for the offences under various provisions of !PC, Terrorist and Disruptive
    Activities Act, and the Passport Act. The Designated Court convicted two
    of the accused under secs.302 and 307, IPC and sentenced them to death
    and rigorous imprisonment for 10 years, respectively. The other accused
    were acquitted.

E         The State preferred an appeal before this Court against the acquit-
    tal whereas the two convicts sentenced to death did not prefer an appeal.
    But the death sentence came up for confirmation by this Court. On
    reassessment of the entire evidence, this Court dismissed the State's
    appeal, and confirmed the conviction and sentences of the two convicts.
F
          The petitioner, President of a political party, claiming to be inter-
    ested in upholding the Rule of Law, filed the present Writ Petition chal-
    lenging the conviction and sentence awarded to the two convicts on
    various grounds including alleged violation of Fundamental Rights
    guaranteed under Articles 14, 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India.
G
          Dismissing the petition on the question of locus, this Court,

          HELD: 1.1. The petitioner has no 'locus standi' to invoke this Court's
    jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution. [599-D)

H         1.2. Ordinarily, the aggrieved party which is affected by any order
                                        592
                      ,
                       SIMRANJIT MANN       v. U.0.1.                    593

has the right to seek redress by questioning the legality, validity or cor-     A
rectness of the order, unless such party is a minor, an insane person or is
suffering from any other disability which the law recognises as sufficient
to permit another person to move the Court on his behalf. If a guardian
or a next friend initiates proceedings for and on behalf of such a disabled
aggrieved party, it is in effect proceedings initiated by the party aggrieved   B
and not by a total stranger who has no direct personal stake in the
outcome thereof. (596 G-H, 597-A]

      13. In the present case no fundamental right of the petitioner is
violated; if at all the case sought to be made out is that the fundamental
rights of the two convicts have been violated. The two convicts could, if so    C
minded, have raised the contention in the earlier proceedings but a third
party, a total stranger to the trial commenced against the two convicts,
cannot be permitted to question the correctness of the conviction recorded
against them. If that were permitted any and every person could challenge
convictions recorded day in and day out by courts even if the persons
convicted do not desire to do so and are inclined to acquiesce in the           D
decision. (597 A-Bl

    S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, (1981] Suppl. SCC 87; M.Krishna
Swami v. Union of India & Ors., JT (1992) 5 SC 92 and Janata Dal v. H.S.
Chowdhary & Ors., (1991] 3 SCC 756, relied on.                                  E
      A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak & Anr., [1988] 2 SCC 602, referred to.

      2.1. Neither under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code
nor under any other statute is a third party stranger permitted to question
the correctness of the conviction and sentence imposed by the Court after       F
a regular trial. [597 F-G]

      2.2. In the instant case, there is nothing on record to suggest that
the two convicts have authorised the petitioner to move this Court on their
behalf. (596-FJ                                                             G

      ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 536 of 1992.

      (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India).

      R.S. Sodhi for the Petitioner.                                            H
    594                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS[1992] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

           AHMADI, J. Does a Petitioner-third party who is a total stranger to
    the prosecution culminating in the conviction of the accused have any 'locus
    standi' to challenge the conviction and the sentence awarded to the convicts
    in a petition brought under Article 32 of the Constitution? If the answer
B
    to this poser is in the negative this petition must fail on that preliminary
    ground. Before we proceed to answer the same it would be advantageous
    to notice a few facts.

          The assassins of General Vaidya were charge-sheeted under Sections
c 120B, 302, 307, 465, 468, 471 and 212, I.P.C. read with sections 3 and 4 of
    the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act; 1985, (hereinaftet referred to
    as 'the TADA Act') and section 10 of the Passport Act. Five persons
    besides the absconding accused were put up for trial before the Designated
    Court, Pune. The Designated Court acquitted all the accused of the
D   charges levelled against them except accused No.1 Sukhdev Singh@ Sukha
    and accused No.5 Harjinder Singh @ Jinda who were convicted for the
    murder of General Vaidya and for causing bullet injury to his wife
    Bhanum~ti. Accused No.1 was convicted under Sections 302 and 307, l.P.C.
    and accused No.5 was convicted under the said two provisions with the aid
    of section 34, l.P.C. The Designated Court, bearing in mind the gravity of
E the crime came to the conclusion that the crime falls into the category of
    'the rarest of rare' and awarded the capital punishment, death penalty, for
    the murder of General Vaidya and rigorous imprisonment of ten years for
    the injury caused to his wife Bhaunumati. The death penalty was ofcourse
    subject to confirmation by this Court. The State preferred an appeal insofar
F   as the order of acquittal was concerned but the accused Nos.l and 5 did
    not prefer any appeal against their conviction. However, the entire case
    was thrown open before this Court in the reference arising from the death
    sentence imposed on the two convicts by the Designated Court which
    sentence was subject to confirmation by this Court. This Court on a
    reassessment of the entire evidence dismissed the State's appeal but af-
G   firmed the conviction of the aforesaid two accused and confirmed the death
    sentence for reasons stated in its judgment dated 15th July, 1992.

          On 19th August, 1992, the petitioner filed this petition under Article
    32 of the Constitution complaining of violation of Articles 22, 21 and 14 of
H   the Constitution. The locus pleaded in paragraph 2 of the petition is as
               SIMRANJIT MANN v. U.O.l. [AHMADI, J.)                     595

under:                                                                           A
         "The petitioner is the President of Akali Dal (M) and is an
         acknowledged political leader and, therefore, is vitally in-
         terested in upholding the rule of law and ensuring that the
         same is applied equally with fairness, equity and good
         consciousness to all."
                                                                                 B

The main thrust of the petitioner's case is that once the Designated Court's
finding that no case for conviction under sections 3 and 4 of the TADA
Act was made out was affirmed by this Court, this Court had no jurisdiction
to confirm the death sentence as the reference for confirmation could only C
be disposed of by the High Court of Maharashtra. This Court, avers the
petitioner, deviated from this course in the case of the two convicts thereby
violating the rule of law as well as Aritcles 22, 21 and 14 of the Constitution.
Secondly, contends the petitioner, if the case came to_be decided by this
Court under the TADA Act, since the constitutional validity of that law D
was under challenge, it was incumbent on this court to await the court's
adjudication on that point before disposing of the death reference. The
petitioner has also questioned this Court's view that the case belongs to
the rarest to rare category and hence the sentence of death was justified.
On this line of reasoning the petitioner seeks certain declarations, namely,
(a) that the trial of the two convicts wa.; bad in law and violative of Articles E
14, 21 and 22 of the Constitution as the Designated Court had no jurisdic-
tion to proceed with the case on its holding that no offence under sections
3 and 4 of the TADA Act was made out (b) the reference to the Supreme
Court was bad in law and violative of Articles 14 and 22 of the Constitution
and (c) the sectence imposed by the Designated Court and confirmed by F
this Court was bad in law and violative of Articles 21, 22 and 14 of the
Constitution.

       Before we proceed to deal with this petition we must refer to the fact
that this very petitioner had addressed a letter dated 1st February, 1990 to     G
the Hon'ble Chief Jnstice of India requesting that he may be heard on the
propriety, validity and constitutionality of the trial as well as the sentence
imposed on the two convicts which was awaiting confirmation by this Court.
Mr. R.S. Sodhi, the present counsel for the petitioner, was appointed
Amicus Curiae at State expense to argue and assist the Court. However, at
the hearing of the State's appeal as well as the death reference, no H
    596                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS[1992] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A submission was made by Mr. Sodhi on the petitioner's application dated
    1st February, 1990. If that had been done, the need for this petition could
    !:.ave been obviated.

          We now proceed to deal with the present petition. As stated earlier
B this is a petition under Article 32 of the Con;titution. That article which
  fmds a place in Part III of the Constitution entitled 'Fundamental Rights'
  provides that the right to move the Sureme Court for the enforcement of
  the rights conferred in that part is guaranteed. It empowers the Supreme
  Court to issue directions or orders or writs for the enforcement of any of
  the fundamental rights. The petitioner does not seek to enforce any of his
C fundamental rights nor does he complain that any of his fundamental rights
  is violated. He seeks to enforce the fundamental rights of others, namely,
  the two condemned convicts who themselves do not complain of their
  violation.

D         Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, sections 303 and 304, a right
    is conferred on a person accused of an offence before a Criminal Court or
    against whom proceedings are instituted under the Code, to be defended
    by a pleader of his choice and an obligation is cast on the Court to assign
    to such person a pleader for his defence at State expense if he is not
    represented by a pleader or where it appears that he has no means to
E   engage one of his choice. Similarly, sections 384, 385 and 386 of the Code
    provide for affording an opportunity to the appellant-accused's pleader to
    be heard in support to his appeal. So also Order XXI of the Supreme Court
    Rules makes provision for assigning an advocate to an accused who is
    unrepresented. But there is no provision in the Code or the Rules which
F   permits an accused to be represented by a person other than a lawyer, like
    the petitioner before us. There is nothing on record to suggest that the two
    convicts have authorised the petitioner to move this Court on their behalf.

         Ordinarily, the aggrieved party which is affected by any order has the
  right to seek redress by questioning the legality, validity or correctness of
G the order, unless such party is a minor, an insane person or is suffering
  from any other disability which the law recognises as sufficient to permit
  another person, e.g. next friend, to move the Court on his behalf. If a
  guardian or a next friend initiates proceedings for and on behalf of such a
  disabled aggrieved party, it is in effect proceedings initiated by the party
H aggrieved and not by a total stranger who has no direct personal stake in
              S!MRANJIT MANN v. U.0.l. [AHMADI, J.]                    597

the outcome thereof. Jn the present case no fundamental right of the A
petitioner before us is violated; if at all the case sought to be made out is
that the fundamental rights of the two convicts have been violated. The two
convicts could, if so minded, have raised the contention in the earlier
proceedings but a third party, a total stranger to the trial commenced
against the two convicts, cannot be permitted to question the correctness B
of the conviction recorded against them. If that were permitted any and
every person could challenge convictions recorded day in and day out by
courts even if the persons convicted do not desire to do so and are inclined
to acquiesce in the decision. If the aggrieved party invokes the jurisdiction
of this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution, that may stand on a
different footing as in the case of A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak & Anr., [1988] C
2 SCC 602. However, we should not be understood to say that in all such
cases the aggrieved party has a remedy under Article 32 of the Constitu-
tion. Unless an aggrieved party is under some disability recognised by law,
it would be unsafe and hazardous to allow any third party to question the
decision against him. Take for example a case where a person accused D
under section 302, l.P.C. is convicted for a lesser offence under section 324,
1.P.C. The accused is quite satisfied with the decision but a third party
questions it under Article .32 and succeeds. The conviction is set aside and
a fresh trial commenced ends up in the conviction of the aceused under
Section 302, 1.P.C. The person to suffer for the unilateral act of the third
party would by the accused! Many such situations can be pointed out to E
emphasise the hazard involved if such third party's unsolicited action is
entertained. Cases which have ended in conviction by the apex court after
a full gamut of litigation are not comparable with preventive detention
cases where a friend or next of kin is permitted to seek a writ of Habeas
Corpus. We are, therefore, satisfied that neither under the provisions of F
the Code nor under any other statute is a third party stranger permitted
to question the correctness of the conviction and sentence imposed by the
Court after a regular trial. On first principles we find it difficult to accept
Mr. Sodhi's contention that such a public interest litigation commenced by
a leader of a recognised political party who has a genuine interest in the
future of the convicts should be entertained. In S.P. Gupta v. Union of G
India, [1981] Suppl. SCC 87, Bhagwati, J. observed:

        "But we must be careful to see that the member of the
        public, who approaches the court in cases of this kind, is
        acting bona fide and not for personal gain or private profit         H
    598                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS[1992] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A           or political motivation or other oblique consideration. The
            Court must not allow its process to be abused by politicians
            and others ......."

    These observations were made while discussing the question of 'locus
    standi' in public interest litigation. These words of caution were uttered
B   while expanding the scope of the 'locus standi! mle. These words should
    deter us from entertaining this petition. This accords 'with th.e view ex-
    pressed by this Court in M. Krishna Swami v. Union of India & Ors., JT
    (1992) 5 SC 92.

C         More apposite is the view expressed by a Division Bench of this
    Court in Janata Dal v. HS. Chowdhary & Ors., [1991) 3 SCC 756. That was
    a public interest litigation for quashing a F.l.R. lodged by the C.B.I. on
    22nd January, .1990 based on the core allegation that certain named and
    unnamed persons had entered into a criminal conspiracy in pursuance
D   whereof they had secured illegal gratification of crores of rupees from
    Bofors, a Swiss Company, through their agents as a motive or reward. The
    C.B.I. had moved an application before the learned Judge, Delhi, for the
    issuance of a letter rogatory to the Swiss authorities for assistance in
    conducting investigation, which request was conceded. An advocate, Shri
    Harinder Singh Chowdhary, filed a criminal revision application before the
E   High Court of Delhi for quashing the F.I.R. and the letter rogatory on
    certain grounds. Several questions of law and fact were raised in support
    of the challenge. The High Court came to the conclusion that the said third
    party litigant had no 'locus standi' to maintain the action and so also the
    interveners had no right to seek impleadment/intervention in the said
F   proceeding. However, the learned Judge took suo moto cognizance of the
    matter and for reasons stated in his order directed issue of show cause
    notice to the C.B.I. and the State why the F.l.R. should not be quashed.
    On appeal this Court came to the conclusion that the learned Judge in the
    High Court was right in holding that the advocate litigant as well as the
    interveners had no 'locus standi'. The relevant observations found in para-
G   graph 26 of the judgment read as under:

             "Even if there are million questions of law to be deeply
             gone into and examined in a criminal case of this nature
             registered against specified accused persons, it is for them
H            and them alone to raise all such questions and challenge
               SIMRANJIT MANN v. U.0.1. [AHMADI, J.]                     599

        the proceedings initiated against them at the appropriate               A
        time before the proper forum and not for third parties under
        the garlJ of public interest litigants."

                                                       (Emphasis supplied)

In that case besides the advocate litigant certain political parties like the   B
Janata Dal, the C.P.I. (Marxist), the India Congress (Socialist) and one Dr.
P. Nalla Thampy Thera also approached this Court questioning the High
Court's rejection of their request for impleadment/interventioo. It was in
this context that this Court was required to examine the question whether
third parties had any 'locus standi' in criminal proceedings and answered
the same as stated above. This decision clearly negatives the submission        C
made by Mr. Sodhi in support of the maintainability of this petition. We
are, however, in respectful agreement with the view expressed in the
observations extracted hereinbefore.

      For the above reasons we hold that the petitioner has no 'locus D
standi' to invoke this Court's jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitu-
tion. We, therefore, summarily reject this petition.

G.N.                                                     Petition dismissed.