SINGARENI COLLIERIES CO. LTD.versusVEMUGANTI RAMAKRISHAN RAO & ORS.

                        [2013] 9 S.C.R. 658


A              SINGARENI COLLIERIES CO. LTD.
                                v.
            VEMUGANTI RAMAKRISHAN RAO & ORS.
              (Civil Appeal No. 7212-7213 of 2013)
                         AUGUST 29, 2013
B
           [T.S. THAKUR AND VIKRAMAJIT SEN, JJ.]

        LAND ACQUISITION ACT, 1894:

c       s. 11-A, Explanation, read with ss. 4 and 6 - Limitation to
  make award - Time taken for obtaining copy of stay order -
  Held: Cannot be excluded to bring the award within limitation
  -- Explanation to s. 11-A permits exclusion of the period
  during which the court had stayed the acquisition proceedings
0 for the purpose of reckoning the period of two years prescribed
  for making the Award, but it does not provide for exclusion of
  the time taken to obtain a certified copy of the judgment or
  order by which the stay order was either granted or vacated -
  s. 12 of Limitation Act has no application to making of an
  award under LA Act - Doctrine of casus omissus also cannot
E be applied - In the instant case, award made stood elapsed -
  Limitation Act, 1963 - s. 12 - Interpretation of Statutes -
  Incorporation by reference - Casus omissus.

       Notification u/s. 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act,
F 1894 was issued on 30.08.1992 for acquisition of certain
  land for the purpose of the appellant, a Government
  company. A final declaration in terms of s. 6 was made
  on 02.03.1994, validity whereof was unsuccessfully
  assailed by four land-owners-respondents in a writ
G petition before the High Court. The Collector made the
  award on 05.11.1999. Respondents Nos. 1 to 4 filed
  another writ petition challenging the validity of the award
  on the ground that the same was beyond the period of
  two years stipulated uls. 11-A of the Act. The single Judge
H                             658
   SINGARENI COLLIERIES CO. LTD. v. VEMUGANTI             659
           RAMAKRISHAN RAO & ORS.
 of the High Court held that the award having been               A
 passed beyond the period of limitation as provided u/s.
 11-A of the Act, the land acquisition proceedings had
 lapsed. The Division Bench of the High Court affirmed the
 said view.
                                                                 B
      In the instant appeals, it was contended for the
 appellant that the period taken to obtain the copy of the
 order by which the High Court vacated the stay earlier
 granted by it, ought also to be excluded from
 consideration and when so excluded the Award would
 fall within the outer limit of two years stipulated u/s 11-A.   C

      Dismissing the appeals, the Court

       HELD: 1.1 Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act,
  1894, in terms does not provide for exclusion of the time      D
  taken to obtain a certified copy of the judgment or order
  by which the stay order was either granted or vacated.
  Section 11-A prescribes that in order to be valid, the
  award must be made within a period of two years from
  the date of the publication of the declaration u/s. 6 of the   E
  Act. Explanation to s. 11-A permits exclusion of the
  period during which the court had stayed the acquisition
  proceedings for the purpose of reckoning the period of
  two years prescribed for making the award. The
  declaration in the instant case was published on
                                                                 F
  02.03.1994 while the award was made on 05.11.1999. The
  interim order of stay issued by the High Court on
  06.12.1995 and vacated on 28.07.1999, with the dismissal
  of the writ petition, remained in force for a period of 3
  years, 7 months and 22 days. That period shall have to
  be added to the period of two years prescribed for             G
. making the Award in the light of Explanation to s. 11-A.
  However, even if the said period is added to the time
  allowed for making the award, the same stands beyond
  the period prescribed. [Para 8 and 15] (666-F-G, H; 667-
  A-C; 672-C-D]                                                  H
    660    SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2013) 9 S.C.R.

A        R. Indira Saratchandra v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors.
    (2011) 10 SCC 344; Padma Sundara Rao (dead) and Ors.
                                               =
    v. State of T.N. and Ors. 2002 (2) SCR 383 (2002) 3 SCC
    533 - relied on.

8       N. Narasimhaiah and Ors. v. State of Kamataka and Ors.
    Union of India and Ors. 1996 (1) SCR 698 = (1996) 3 SCC
    88; State of Kamataka v. D.C. Nanjudaiah 1996 (5) Suppl.
    SCR 222 = (1996) 10 sec 619 - stood overruled.

       1.2 Section 12 of the Limitation Act has no application
C to the making of an award under the Land Acquisition
  Act. In the absence of any enabling provision either in s.
  11-A of the Land Acquisition Act or in the Limitation Act,
  there is no room for borrowing the principles underlying
  s. 12 of the Limitation Act for computing the period or
D determining the validity of an award by reference to s. 11-
  A of the Act. [Para 15) [672-D-E]

        Ravi Khullar and Another v. Union of India & Ors. 2007
    (4) SCR 598 = (2007) 5 sec 231- relied on.
E      1.3 Plea of casus omissus cannot be of any avail.
  Firstly, because while applying the doctrine of casus
  omissus the court has to look at the entire enactment and
  the scheme underlying the same. In the case at hand,
  Parliament has, wherever it intended, specifically
F provided for exclusion of time requisite for obtaining a
  copy of the order. [Proviso to s.28-A]. Absence of a
  provision analogous to proviso to s.28A in the scheme
  of s. 11-A, makes the position clear. Secondly, this Court
  has in several decisions held that casus omissus cannot
G be supplied except in the case of clear necessity and
  when reason for it is found within the four corners of the
  statute itself. [para 18-19) [672-F-G; 673-B; 674-F]

       Padma Sundara Rao (dead) and Ors. v. State of T.N. and
H Ors. 2002 (2) SCR 383 = (2002) 3 SCC 533; Commissioner
  SINGARENI COLLIERIES CO. LTD. v. VEMUGANTI             661
          RAMAKRISHAN RAO & ORS.
Of Income Tax, Central Calcutta v. National Taj Tradus 1980     A
(2) SCR 268 = (1980) 1 sec 370 - relied on.

      Union of India v. Dharmendra Textile Processors 2008
              =
(14) SCR 13 (2008) 13 SCC 369, Nagar Palika Nigam v.
Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti & Ors. 2008 (14) SCR 419 = (2008) B
12 SCC 364, Sangeeta Singh v. Union of India 2005 (2)
Suppl. SCR 823 = (2005) 7 SCC 484, State of Kera/a & Anr.
v. P. V. Nee/akandan Nair & Ors. 2005 (1) Suppl. SCR 426
=  (2005) 5 SCC 561, UO/ v. Priyankan Sharan and Anr. 2008
(13) SCR 237 = (2008) 9 SCC 15, Mau/avi Hussein Haji
Abraham Umarji v. State of Gujarat (2004) CriLJ 3860, C
Unique Butyle Tube Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. U.P. Financial
Corporation and Ors. 2002 (5) Suppl. SCR 666 = (2003) 2
SCC 455, UOI v. Rajiv Kumar with UOI v. Bani Singh (2003)
SCC (LS) 928, Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society, Nagpur
v. Swaraj Developers and Ors. 2003 (3) SCR 762 = (2003) 6 D
SCC 659, Prakash Nath Khanna and Anr. v. Commissioner
of Income Tax and Anr. 2004 (2) SCR 434 = (2004) 9 SCC
686, State of Jharkhand & Anr. v. Govind Singh 2004 (6)
Suppl. SCR 651 = (2005) 10 SCC 437, Trutuf Safety Glass
Industries v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. 2007 (8) SCR E
860 = (2007) 7 sec 242 - relied on.

     Wentworth Securities v. Jones (1980) AC 1974; lnco
Europe v. First Choice Distribution (2000) 1 All ER 109-
referred to.                                                    F

     Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes (12th Edn.) pg. 33
- referred to.

    1.5 There is, in the case at hand no ambiguity nor is
there any apparent omission in s. 11-A to justify, G
application of the doctrine of casus omissus and by that
route re-write s. 11-A providing for exclusion of time
taken for obtaining a copy of the order, which exclusion
is not currently provided by the said provision. The
omission of a provision uls. 11-A analogous to the proviso H
    662      SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2013] 9 S.C.R.


A   u/s. 28A is obviously not unintended or inadvertent which
    is the very essence of the doctrine of casus omissus.
    [Para 22] [677-F-H]

         1.6 The High Court was perfectly justified in holding
8   that the award made by the Collector/Land Acquisition
    Officer was non est and that the acquisition proceedings
    had elapsed by reason of a breach of s. 11-A of the Act.
    However, it is made clear that the declaration granted by
    the High Court and proceedings initiated by the Collector
    shall be deemed to have elapsed only qua the writ
C   petitioners-respondents. [Para 23] [678-A-C]

       State of Tamil Nadu and Ors. v. L. N. Krishnan and Ors.
  1995 (4) Suppl. SCR 663 = 1996 (1) SCC 250; Executive
  Engineer, Jal Nigam Central Stores Division, UP. v. Suresha
D Nand Juyal alial Musa Ram (Deceased) by Lrs. and Ors.
  1997(2) SCR 1128 =1997 (9) SCC 224; Municipal
  Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Industrial Development
  Investment Co. Pvt. Ltd. and Others 1996 (5) Suppl. SCR 551
  = 1996 (11) SCC 501; Municipal Council, Ahmednagar v.
E Shah Hyder Beig and Ors. 1999 (5) Suppl. SCR 197 = 2000
  (2) SCC 48; Tej Kaur and Ors. v. State of Punjab 2003 (4)
  sec 48 - cited.
                        Case Law Reference:
F         2002 (2) SCR 383          relied on      para 8
          1996 (5) Suppl. SCR 222   stood overruled     para 8
          (2011) 10 sec 344         relied on      para 9
          1996 (1) SCR 698          stood overruled     para 8
G
          1995 (4) Suppl. SCR 663   cited          para 10
          1997 (2) SCR 1128         cited          para 10
          1996 (5) Suppl. SCR 551   cited          para 10
H
 SINGARENI COLLIERIES CO. LTD. v. VEMUGANTI            663
         RAMAKRISHAN RAO & ORS.
    1999 (5) Suppl. SCR 197    cited         para 10         A
   2003 (4) sec 48             cited         para 10
   2007 (4) SCR 598            relied on     para 12
   (2000) 1 All ER 109         referred to   para 18
                                                             8
   (1980) AC 1974              referred to   para 18
    1980 (2) SCR 268           relied on     para 19
   2008 (14) SCR 13            referred to   para 20
                                                             c
   2008 (14) SCR 419           referred to   para 20
   2005 (2) Suppl. SCR 823     referred to   para 20
   2005 (1) Suppl. SCR 426     referred to
                                             para 20         D
   2008 (13) SCR 237           referred to   para 20
   (2004) CriLJ 3860           referred to   para 20
   2002 (5) Suppl. SCR 666     referred to   para 20
                                                             E
   2003 (3) SCR 762            referred to   para 20
   2004 (2) SCR 434            referred to   para 20 '
   2004 (6) Suppl. SCR         referred to   para 20
   2007 (8) SCR 860            referred to   para 20         F

    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
7212-7213 of 2013.

    From the Judgment and Order dated 21.08.2009 of the
                                                             G
High Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad in
Review W.A.M.P. No. 2901 of 2008 in W.A. No. 936 of 2006.

    Altaf Ahmad, Anurag Mathur, P.Parmeswaran for the
Appellant.
                                                             H
    664      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013) 9 S.C.R.


A       Sridhar Potaraju, Gaichangpou Gangmei, Nisha Pandey,
    C.K. Sucharita, Rumi Chanda for the Respondents.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

          T.S. THAKUR, J. 1. Leave granted.
B
          2. These appeals arise out of a judgment and order dated
    7th September 2006 passed by the High Court of Judicature
    of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Writ Appeal No.936 of
    2006 and an order dated 21st August 2009 passed in
c   W.A.M.P. No.2901 of 2008 in W.A. No.936 of 2006 whereby
    the High Court has dismissed the Writ Appeal and the review
    petition filed by the appellant holding that the LAO/Collector,
    Land Acquisition having made the Award beyond the period
    of two years stipulated in Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition
D   Act, the acquisition proceedings initiated by the authorities
    have lapsed.

          3. The appellant happens to be a Government company
    engaged in coal mining operations in the State of Andhra
    Pradesh. In terms of a notification dated 30th August, 1992
E   issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, a large
    extent of land measuring 35 acres and 09 gts. in Survey
    Nos.285, 287 and 288 situated in village Jallaram, Kamanpur
    Mandal and Karimnagar Districts was notified for acquisition
    for the benefit of the appellant-company. A final declaration in
F   terms of Section 6 was made on 2nd March, 1994, the validity
    whereof was assailed by four owners (Pattadars), respondents
    in this appeal in Writ Petition No.27/483 of 1995 primarily on
    the ground that the declaration under Section 6 had been
    issued beyond the period of limitation stipulated for the
G   purpose. An application for interim stay was also moved by the
    writ-petitioners, in which a Single Judge of the High Court of
    Andhra Pradesh granted an interim stay on 6th September,
    1995. The writ petition was finally dismissed by the High Court
    by a judgment and order dated 20th July, 1999. Aggrieved by
H   the said order of dismissal the respondent filed Writ Appeal
 SINGARENI COLLIERIES CO. LTD. v. VEMUGANTI                665
  RAMAKRISHAN RAO & ORS. [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
No.1228 of 1999 which too failed and was dismissed by the         A
Division Bench on 13th August, 1999.

     4. With the dismissal of the writ petition and the appeal
arising out of the same, the Collector made an Award under
Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act on 5th November, 1999.
                                                                  B
The appellant-company's case is that all the owners, except the
four respondents who had moved the High Court, sought a
reference of the dispute regarding the quantum of
compensation payable to the11'1 to the Civil Court in which
Senior Civil Judge, Manthani, District Karimnagar, A.P. held
the expropriated owners entitled to receive compensation @        c
Rs.60,000/- per acre besides enhanced value of the structure,
wells and trees standing on the same. The appellant-company
claims to have deposited one third of the enhanced value of
compensation in the appeal preferred by it against the Award
made by the Civil Court. The appeal is, according to the          D
appellant, pending for disposal by the High Court.

     5. In the meantime respondents 1 to 4 in this appeal who
apparently did not seek any reference to the Civil Court for
enhancement of the compensation filed Writ Petition No.22875      E
of 1999 challenging the validity of the Award made by the LAO/
Collector on the ground that the same was beyond the period
of two years stipulated under Section 11-A of the Act. That
contention found favour with the learned Single Judge of the
High Court before whom the matter was argued. The Single          F
Judge held that the Award having been passed beyond the
period of limitation stipulated under Section 11-A of the Act,
the land acquisition proceeditlgs had lapsed.

     6. Aggrieved by the judgment of the learned Single Judge,
the appellant filed Writ Appeal Nos.1315 of 2001 and 936 of       G
2006 before the Division Bench of the High Court who affirmed
the view taken by the Single Judge and dismissed the appeals
by its order dated 7th September, 2006. The appellant-
company then appears to have filed review petition No.2901
of 2008 which too failed and was dismissed by the Division        H
    666       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2013] 9 S.C.R.


A   Bench by its order dated 21st August, 2009 as already
    indicated. The present appeals call in question the said two
    judgments and orders.

        7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length.
8   Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act reads as follows:

          "11-A. Period within which an Award shall be made.
          - (1) The Collector shall make an Award under section 11
          within a period of two years- from the date of the publication
          of the declaration and if no Award is made within that
c         period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the
          land shall lapse:

          Provided that in a case where the said declaration has
          been published before the commencement of the Land
D         Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, the Award shall be
          made within a period of two years from such
          commencement.

          Explanation - In computing the period of two years referred
          to in this section, the period during which any action or
E         proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said
          declaration is stayed by an order of a Court shall be
          excluded."

       8. It is evident from the above that in order to be valid, the
F Award must be made within a period of two years from the date
  of the publication of the declaration under Section 6 of the Act.
  The declaration in the instant case was published on 2nd
  March, 1994 while the Award was made on 5th November,
  1999. The same was, therefore, clearly beyond two years'
G period stipulated under the above provisions. Even so the
  Award could be held to be valid if the same was within two
  years of the declaration after excluding the period during which
  the High Court had stayed the proceedings in the writ petition
  filed by the respondent-landowners. That is because
H Explanation to Section 11-A (supra) permits exclusion of the
  SINGARENI COLLIERIES CO. LTD. v. VEMUGANTI                  667
   RAMAKRISHAN RAO & ORS. [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
period during which the Court had stayed the acquisition             A
proceedings for the purpose of reckoning the period of two
years prescribed for making the Award. In the case at hand the
interim order of stay was issued by the High Court on 6th
December, 1995 which order was finally vacated on 28th July,
1999 with the dismissal of the writ petition. This means that the    B
restraint order remained in force for a period of 3 years, 7
months and 22 days. That period shall have to be added to the
period of two years prescribed for making the Award in the light
of Explanation to Section 11-A. The difficulty is that even if the
said period is added to the time allowed for making an Award,        c
the Award stands beyond the period prescribed. Confronted
with this proposition Mr. Altaf Ahmad argued that the period
taken to obtain a copy of the order by which the High Court
vacated the stay earlier granted by it ought also to be excluded
from consideration and when so excluded the Award would fall         D
within the outer limit of two years stipulated under Section 11-
A. Reliance in support of that submission was placed by Mr.
Altaf Ahmad on the decision of this Court in N. Narasimhaiah
and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors. Union of India and
Ors. (1996) 3 sec 88. It was contended that although the said
decision was reversed by a Constitution Bench of this Court in       E
Padma Sundara Rao (dead) and Ors. v. State of T.N. and Ors.
(2002) 3 SCC 533, the law declared by this Court was made
applicable prospectively. This would, according to Mr. Altaf
Ahmad, imply that on the date the Award in question was
made, the legal position stated in Narasimhaiah's case (supra)       F
would hold the field. It would also, according to the learned
counsel, mean that the time taken for obtaining a copy of the
order of the High Court would have to be excluded in the light
of the judgment in Narasimhaiah's case (supra).
                                                                     G
     9. On behalf of the respondents, on the contrary, learned
counsel placed reliance upon a decision c.if this Court in R.
Indira Saratchandra v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors. (2011)
10 SCC 344 to contend that this Court having noticed the
previous decisions on the subject had clearly repelled the           H
    668     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013) 9 S.C.R.


A contention that a stay order vacated by the Court should all the·
  same remain operative till delivery or receipt of a copy of such
  order by the Collector/LAO. It was submitted that the view
  expressed in N. Narasimhaiah's case (supra) which was
  followed in State of Kamataka v. D. C. Nanjudaiah (1996) 10
B sec 619 having been overruled by this Court in case of
  Padma Sundara Rao's case, there was no question of placing
  reliance upon the ratio of the said two decisions. The contrary
  view expressed in A.S. Naidu and Others v. State of Tamil
  Nadu and Others (2010) 2 SCC 801 having been found to be
c the correct view, not only by the Constitution Bench in Padma
  Sundara Rao's case (supra) but also in R. Indira Sartchandra's
  case (supra), the ratio of the said decisions alone stated the
  correct legal position, which was squarely applicable to the case
  at hand.
D        10. It is, in our opinion, not necessary to delve deep into
    the merits of the contention urged on behalf of the appellant
    which is founded entirely on the ratio of the decision of this
    Court in N. Narasimhaiah's case (supra). Correctness of the
    view taken in N. Narasimhaiah's case (supra) was examined
E   by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Padma Sundara
    Rao's case (supra) and overruled. If the matter rested there, we
    may have examined the question whether the prospective
    overruling of the decision in N. Narasimhaiah's case (supra)
    was of any assistance to the appellant in the facts and
F   circumstances of the case at hand. That exercise is rendered
    unnecessary by the decision rendered by this Court in R. Indira
    Sartchandra's case (supra), which places the matter beyond
    the pale of any further debate on the subject. In R. Indira
    Sartchandra's case (supra) also the Award made by the
G   Collector was sought to be supported on the ground that the
    period of two years prescribed under Section 11-A of the Act
    should be counted, not from the date of the Judgment by which
    the interim stay order was vacated but from the date on which
    a copy thereof was supplied to the Collector. The High Court
H   had accepted that contention relying upon the decisions of this
  SINGARENI COLLIERIES CO. LTD. v. VEMUGANTI                 669
   RAMAKRISHAN RAO & ORS. [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
Court in N Narasimhaiah and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and          A
Ors. Union of India and Ors. (1996) 3 SCC 88; State of Tamil
Nadu and Ors. v. L. N. Krishnan and Ors. 1996 (1) SCC 250;
Executive Engineer, Jal Nigam Central Stores Division, U.P.
v. Suresha Nand Juyal alial Musa Ram (Deceased) by Lrs.
and Ors. 1997 (9) SCC 224; Municipal Corporation of Greater         B
Bombay v. Industrial Development Investment Co. Pvt. Ltd.
and Others 1996 (11) SCC 501; Municipal Council,
Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig and Ors. 2000 (2) SCC 48;
Tej Kaur and Ors. v. State of Punjab 2003 (4) SCC 48.

     11. This Court, however, reversed the view taken by the        C
High Court ·holding that Section 11-A did not admit of an
interpretation by which the period of two years would start
running from the date a copy of the order vacating the stay
granted by the Court is served upon the Collector. This Court
observed:                                                           D

    "10. There is nothing in Section 11-A from which it can be
    inferred that the stay order passed by the court remains
    operative till the delivery of copy of the order. Ordinarily,
    the rules framed by the High Court do not provide for supply    E
    of copy of the judgment or order to the parties free of cost.
    The parties to the litigation can apply for certified copy
    which is required to be supplied on fulfillment of the
    conditions specified in the relevant rules. However, no
    period has been prescribed for making of an application         F
    for certified copy of the judgment or order or preparation
    and delivery thereof. Of course, once an application is
    made within the prescribed period of limitation, the time
    spent in the preparation and supply of the copy is excluded
    in computing the period of limitation prescribed for filing     G
    an appeal or revision."

     12. The above, in our opinion, is a complete answer to the
contention urged on behalf of the appellant that not only the
period during which the interim order of stay remains in force
but also the time taken for obtaining the copy of the order         H
    670     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 9 S.C.R.


A   vacating the stay should be excluded for reckoning the period
    of two years stipulated under Section 11-A of the Act.

          13. There is yet another dimension to the contention urged
    before us which too in our opinion stands concluded by the
    decision of this Court in Ravi Khu/far and Another v. Union of
8
    India & Ors. (2007) 5 sec 231. That was a case where a
    preliminary notification under Section 4 was issued on 23rd
    January, 1965 and a declaration under Section 6 published on
    26th December, 1968 i.e. before the commencement of the
    Amendment Act of 1984. In terms of sub-section (1) of Section
C   11-A applicable to such a declaration, an Award was required
    to be made within a period of two years from such
    commencement. So calculated, the Award ought to have been
    made on or before 28th September, 1986 when the period of
    two years from the commencement of the Amendment Act of
D   1984 expired. The land owner however had filed a writ petition
    before the High Court on 12th September, 1986 in which an
    order for maintenance of status quo was made on 18th
    September, 1986 restraining the Land Acquisition Officer from
    announcing the Award. That order continued to remain in force
E   till 13th February, 2003. The High court, eventually, dismissed
    the writ petition on 13th February, 2003. An application was
    made for obtaining a certified copy of the judgment which was
    ready only on 27th February, 2003. The Award was then
    pronounced on 1st March, 2003 after excluding the period
F   during which the interim stay order was operative. The Award
    should have been pronounced on or before 18th February,
    2003. Having been pronounced on 1st March, 2003, the Award
    was made beyond the period prescribed under Section 11-A.
    The contention urged on behalf of the Land Acquisition Officer
G   was that a public functionary had to look into the contents of
    the order passed by the Court before taking any action,
    including the pronouncement of the Award and, therefore, the
    time taken between 14th February, 2003 and 27th February,
    2003 must also be excluded which meant that the Award could
H   have been made up to any date till 4th March, 2003. Support
 SINGARENI COLLIERIES CO. LTD. v. VEMUGANTI                671
  RAMAKRISHAN RAO & ORS. [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
was drawn for that proposition from the provisions of Section     A
12 of the Limitation Act which according to the Land
Acquisition Officer ought to have applied for computing the
period of limitation under Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition
Act. Rejecting that contention, this Court observed:
                                                                  B
    "54 ....... The Land Acquisition Collector in making an
    Award does not act as a court within the meaning of the
     Limitation Act. It is also clear from the provisions of the
     Land Acquisition Act that the provisions of the Limitation
    Act have not been made applicable to proceedings under C
    the Land Acquisition Act in the matter of making an Award
     under Section 11-A of the Act. However, Section 11-A of
    the Act does provide a period of limitation within which the
    Collector shall make his Award. The Explanation thereto
    also provides for exclusion of the period during which any
    action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the D
    declaration is stayed by an order of a court. Such being
    the provision, there is no scope for importing into Section
    11-A of the Land Acquisition Act the provisions of Section
    12 of the Limitation Act. The application of Section 12 of
    the Limitation Act is also confined to matters enumerated E
    therein. The time taken for obtaining a certified copy of the
    judgment is excluded because a certified copy is required
    to be filed while preferring an appeal/revision/review, etc.
    challenging the impugned order. Thus a court is not
    permitted to read into Section 11-A of the Act a provision F
    for exclusion of time taken to obtain a certified copy of the
    judgment and order. The Court has, therefore, no option
    but to compute the period of limitation for making an Award
    in accordance with the provisions of Section 11-A of the
    Act after excluding such period as can be excluded under G
    the Explanation to Section 11-A of the Act."

    14. This Court drew a comparison between Section 11-A
and Section 28-A of the Act, and based on the difference
between the two provisions, observed:
                                                                  H
    672      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2013] 9 S.C.R.

A         "56. It will thus be seen that the legislature wherever it
          considered necessary incorporated by express words the
          rule incorporated in Section 12 of the Limitation Act. It has
          done so expressly in Section 28-A of the Act while it has
          consciously not incorporated this rule in Section 11-A even
B         while providing for exclusion of time under the Explanation.
          The intendment of the legislature is therefore unambiguous
          and does not permit the court to read words into Section
          11-A of the Act so as to enable it to read Section 12 of
          the Limitation Act into Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition
C         Act."

         15. We are in respectful agreement with the above line of
    reasoning. Section 11-A in terms does not provide for exclusion
    of the time taken to obtain a certified copy of the Judgment or
    order by which the stay order was either granted or vacated.
D   Section 12 of the Limitation Act has no application to the
    making of an Award under the Land Acquisition Act. In the
    absence of any enabling provision either in Section 11-A of the
    Land Acquisition Act or in the Limitation Act, there is no room
    for borrowing the principles underlying Section 12 of the
E   Limitation Act for computing the period or determining the
    validity of an Award by reference to Section 11-A of the Land
    Acquisition Act.

         16. Mr. Altaf Ahmad made a feeble attempt to argue that
F   omission of a specific provision in Section 11-A excluding the
    time taken in obtaining a copy of the order passed by the Court
    was casus omissus and that this Court could while interpreting
    the said provision supply the unintended omission of the
    Parliament. There is, in our view, no merit in that contention.
G   We say so for more than one reasons. Firstly, because while
    applying the doctrine of casus omissus the Court has to look
    at the entire enactment and the scheme underlying the same.
    In the case at hand, we find that Parliament has, wherever it
    intended, specifically provided for exclusion of time requisite
H   for obtaining a copy of the order. For instance, under Section
  SINGARENI COLLIERIES CO. LTD. v. VEMUGANTI               673
   RAMAKRISHAN RAO & ORS. [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
28A which provides for re-determination of the amount of           A
compensation on the basis of the Award of the Court, the
aggrieved party is entitled to move a written application to the
Collector within three months from the date of the Award of the
Court or the Collector requiring him to determine the amount
of compensation payable to him on the basis of the amount          B
Awarded by the Court. Proviso to Section 28A specifically
excludes the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the Award
while computing the period of three months within which the
application shall be made to the Collector. It reads:

    "28A. Re- determination of the amount of                       C
    compensation on the basis of the Award of the
    Court.- (1) Where in an Award under this part, the court
    allows to the applicant any amount of compensation in
    excess of the amount Awarded by the collector under
    section 11, the persons interested in all the other land       D
    covered by the same notification under section 4, sub-
    section (1) and who are also aggrieved by the Award of
    the Collector may, notwithstanding that they had not made
    an application to the Collector under section 18, by written
    application to the Collector within three months from the      E
    date of the Award of the Court require that the amount of
    compensation payable to them may be re- determined on
    the basis of the amount of compensation Awarded by the
    Court:
                                                                   F
         Provided that in computing the period of three
    months within which an application to the Collector shall
    be made under this sub- section. the day on which the
    Award was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining
    a copy of the Award shall be excluded."                        G

                                          (emphasis supplied)

    xxx                        xxx                   xxx
    17. Absence of a provision analogous to proviso to             H
    674       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013] 9 S.C.R.


A Section 28A (supra) in the scheme of Section 11-A militates
  against the argument that the omission of such a provision in
  Section 11-A is unintended which could be supplied by the
  Court taking resort to the doctrine of casus omissus.

        18. Secondly, because the legal position regarding
8
  applicability of the doctrine of casus omissus is settled by a
  long line of decisions of this Court as well as Courts in England.
  Lord Diplock in Wentworth Securities v. Jones (1980) AC
  1974, revived the doctrine which was under major criticism, by
  formulating three conditions for its exercise namely, (1) What
C is the intended purpose of the statute or provision in question;
  (2) Whether it was by inadvertence that the draftsman and the
  Parliament had failed to give effect to that purpose in the
  provision in question; and (3) What would be the substance of
  the provision that the Parliament would have made, although
D not necessarily the precise words that the Parliament would
  have used, had the error in the Bill been noticed. The House
  of Lords while approving the above conditions in lnco Europe
  v. First Choice Distribution (2000) 1 All ER 109, went further
  to say that there are certain exceptions to the rule inasmuch
E the power will not be exercised when the alteration is far-
  reaching or when the legislation in question requires strict
  construction as a matter of law.

        19. The legal position prevalent in this country is not much
F different from the law as stated in England. This Court has in
  several decisions held that casus omissus cannot be supplied
  except in the case of clear necessity and when reason for it is
  found within the four corners of the statute itself. The doctrine
  was first discussed by Justice V.D. Tulzapurkar in the case of
G Commissioner Of Income Tax, Central Calcutta v. National
  Taj Tradus (1980) 1 sec 370. Interpretative assistance was
  taken by this Court from Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes
  (12th Edn.) pg. 33 and 47. The Court said:

          "10. Two principles of construction-one relating to casus
H         omissus and the other in regard to reading the statute as
SINGARENI COLLIERIES CO. LTD. v. VEMUGANTI                 675
 RAMAKRISHAN RAO & ORS. [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
  a whole-appear to be well settled. In regard to the former       A
  the following statement of law appears in Maxwell on
  Interpretation of Statutes (12th Edn.) at page 33:

  Omissions not to be inferred-"lt is a corollary to the general
  rule of literal construction that nothing is to be added to or
                                                                 8
  taken from a statute unless there are adequate grounds
  to justify the inference that the legislature intended
  something which it omitted to express. Lord Mersey said:
  'It is a strong thing to read into an Act of Parliament words
  which are not there, and in the absence of clear necessity C
  it is a wrong thing to do.' 'We are not entitled,' said Lords
  Loreburn LC., 'to read words into an Act of Parliament
  unless clear reason for it is to be found within the four
  corners of the Act itself.' A case not provided for in a
  statute is not to be dealt with merely because there seems
  no good reason why it should have been omitted, and the D
  omission in consequence to have been unintentional.

  In regard to the latter principle the following statement of
  law appears in Maxwell at page 47:
                                                                   E
  A statute is to be read as a whole-"lt was resolved in the
  case of Lincoln College (1595) 3 Co. Rep. 58 that the
  good expositor of an Act of Parliament should 'make
  construction on all the parts together, and not of one part
  only by itself.' Every clause of a statute is to 'be construed   F
  with reference to the context and other clauses of the Act,
  so as, as far as possible, to make a consistent enactment
  of the whole statute.' (Per Lord Davey in Canada Sugar
  Refining Co., Ltd. v. R: 1898 AC 735)

  In other words, under the first principle a casus omissus G
  cannot be supplied by the Court except in the case of clear
  necessity and when reason for it found in the four corners
  of the statute itself but at the same time a casus omissus
  should not be readily inferred and for that purpose all the
  parts of a statute or section must be construed together H
    676      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 9 S.C.R.


A         and every clause of a section should be construed with
          reference to the context and other clauses thereof so that
          the construction to be put on a particular provision makes
          a consistent enactment of the whole statute. This would be
          more so if literal construction of a particular clause leads
B         to manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not
          have been intended by the Legislature. "An intention to
          produce an, unreasonable result", said Danckwerts L.J. in
          Artemiou v. Procopiou [1966] 1 Q.B. 878 "is not to be
          imputed to a statute if there is some other construction
c         available." Where to apply words literally would "defeat the
          obvious intention of the legislation and produce a wholly
          unreasonable result" we must "do some violence to the
          words" and so achieve that obvious intention and produce
          a rational construction, (Per Lord Reid in Luke v. l.~.-
          1968 AC 557 where at p. 577 he also observed: "this is
D
          not a new problem, though our standard of drafting is such
          that it rarely emerges. In the light of these principles we
          will have to construe Sub-section (2)(b) with reference to
          the context and other clauses of Section 338."

E        20. Arijit Pasayat, J. has verbatim relied upon the above
    in Padmasundara Rao v. State of Tamil Nadu 2 (2002) 3 SCC
    533, Union of India v. Dharmendra Textile Processors (2008)
    13 SCC 369, Nagar Palika Nigam v. Krishi Upaj Mandi
    Samiti & Ors. (2008) 12 SCC 364, Sangeeta Singh v. Union
F   of India (2005) 7 SCC 484, State of Kera/a & Anr. v. P. V.
    Neelakandan Nair & Ors. (2005) 5 SCC 561, UO/ v. Priyankan
    Sharan and Anr. (2008) 9 SCC 15, Mau/avi Hussein Haji
    Abraham Umarji v. State of Gujarat (2004) CriLJ 3860,
    Unique Butyle Tube Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. U.P. Financial
G   Corporation and Ors. (2003) 2 SCC 455, UO/ v. Rajiv Kumar
    with UOI v. Bani Singh (2003) SCC (LS) 928, Shiv Shakti
    Coop. Housing Society, Nagpur v. Swaraj Developers and
    Ors. (2003) 6 SCC 659, Prakash Nath Khanna and Anr. v.
    Commissioner of Income Tax and Anr. (2004) 9 SCC 686,
H   State of Jharkhand & Anr. v. Govind Singh (2005) 10 SCC
  SINGARENI COLLIERIES CO. LTD. v. VEMUGANTI                   677
   RAMAKRISHAN RAO & ORS. [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
437, Trutuf Safety Glass Industries v. Commissioner of Sales           A
Tax, U.P. (2007) 7 sec 242.

     21. In Padma Sundara Rao's (supra) this Court examined
whether the doctrine of casus omissus could be invoked while
interpreting Section 6(1) of the Land Acql•:siUon Act so as to         8
provide for exclusion of time taken for service of copy of the
order upon the Collector. Repelling the contention this Court
said:

    "12. The court cannot read anything into a statutory
    provision which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is an          C
    edict of the legislature. The language employed in a statute
    is the determinative factor of legislative intent. The first and
    primary rule of construction is that the intention of the
    legislation must be found in the words used by the
    legislature itself. The question is not what may be                D
    supposed and has been intended but what has been said.

          xxx                      xxx                xxx
    14. While interpreting a provision the court only interprets
    the law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is          E
    misused and subjected to the abuse of process of law, it
    is for the legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if
    deemed necessary."                                         ·

     22. There is in the case at hand no ambiguity nor do we           F
see any apparent omission in Section 11-A to justify application
of the doctrine of casus omissus and by that route re-write 11-
A providing for exclusion of time taken for obtaining a copy of
the order which exclusion is not currently provided by the said
provision. The omission of a provision under Section 11-A              G
analogous to the proviso under Section 28A is obviously not
unintended or inadvertent which is the very essence of the
doctrine of casus omissus. We, therefore, have no hesitation
in rejecting the contention urged by Mr. Altaf Ahmad.
                                                                       H
    678     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                (2013] 9 S.C.R.


A      23. The High Court was in the above circumstances
  perfectly justified in holding that the Award made by the
  Collector/Land Acquisition Officer was non est and that the
  acquisition proceedings had elapsed by reason of a breach of
  Section 11-A of the Act. We, however, make it clear that the
B declaration granted by the High Court and proceedings initiated
  by the Collector shall be deemed to have elapsed only qua the
  writ petitioners-respondents herein. With those observations,
  these appeals fail and are hereby dismissed but in the
  circumstances without any orders as to costs.
c R.P.                                      Appeals dismissed.