Holding

The lease covenant places the entire burden of substantial repairs on the tenant, so the deduction for repairs is governed by s.24(1)(i)(b) and not by s.24(1)(i)(a).

Summary

Sir Shadi Lal and Sons, a Hindu undivided family, leased a house and the lease required the tenant to keep the premises in good repair, while the lessor would handle major structural repairs. The Assessing Officer initially allowed a deduction for repairs under s.24(1)(i)(a) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, but on reopening the assessment reduced the deduction, applying s.24(1)(i)(b) on the ground that the tenant bore the repair costs. The assessee appealed, arguing that the covenant did not place the entire repair burden on the tenant and that s.24(1)(i)(a) should apply. The Supreme Court examined the meaning of “repair” and the nature of the lease covenant, holding that the tenant alone was responsible for substantial repairs, making s.24(1)(i)(b) applicable. Consequently, the allowance for repairs must be limited to that provision and the appeals were dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether the lease covenant obligates the tenant alone to bear the cost of repairs within the meaning of s.24(1)(i)(b) of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
Whether the deduction for repairs should be allowed under s.24(1)(i)(a) or limited to s.24(1)(i)(b).
Whether the assessments for the years in question were validly reopened under s.147(a) of the Act (though not finally decided).

Legislation cited

Income Tax Act, 1961s. 147(a), s. 24(1)(i)(a), s. 24(1)(i)(b), s. 261

Subjects

Income TaxRepair DeductionSection 24Lease CovenantTenant RepairsAssessment ReopeningHindu Undivided FamilyTax Deduction Limitation

Judgment

SIR SHADI LAL AND SONS, SHAMLI A
v.
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, KANPUR

NOVEMBER 27, 1987

[M.H. KANIA AND M.N. VENKATACHALIAH, JJ.] B

Income Tax Act, 1961: Section 24(1)(i)(a) and (b)-Tenant
undertaking to 'bear cost of repairs'-Deduction towards cost of
'repairs'-Whether owner entitled to claim deduction on assessable

1
income-Idea of 'repair' -Meaning of.

Words & Phrases: 'Repair'-Meaning.
c
The appellants, a Hindu undivided family, leased out a house
owned by them. The covenant in the lease deed stated that the tenant
will maintain and keep the demised premises in good and habitable
condition, tenantable, repair, execute all repairs including annual D
white washing, repairs of electric and sanitary fittings etc. at the
lessee's expenses, and that the lessors shall undertake at their own cost
major repairs such as repairs against collapse of the house.

Originally in the assessments for the years 1954-55, 1960-61 and
1961-62, the annual letting value of the properly was arrived at E
Rs.36,000 and a deduction of Rs.6,000 was allowed for repairs under
'
~.-.."""'- s. 24(1)(i)(a) of the Income Tax, Act, 1961. Subsequently, the assess-
ments were re-opened on the ground that the assessee had got excess
relief.

In the re-assessments, the Income Tax Officer held that as the F
lessee had undertaken to keep the premises in good and habitable
condition, execute all repairs, the deduction of Rs.6,000 was imper-
missible. He accordingly determined the annual letting value of the
property at Rs.40,000 and allowed a deduction of Rs.4,000 towards
repairs under s.24(1)(i)(a) of the Act. In the reopened assessment for
the year 1954-55, the assessee's claim for deduction of Rs.5,645 being G
the cost of the repairs undertaken by them was disallowed on the
ground that this was a case where the tenant bad undertaken to bear
the cost of the repairs and, therefore, the allowance for repairs was
limited to the limit permissible under s. 24(1)(i)(b). The Appellate
Assistant Commissioner and the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal
affirmed the above view. H
87
88 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1988] 2 S.C.R.

A At the instance of the assessee, the Tribunal stated a case and
referred it to the High Court which though answered against the
assessee, granted a certificate under s. 261 of the Act, regarding the
applicability of s. 24(l)(i)(b) and reconsideration of deduction of the
expenditure which was not allowed in the original assessment in the
course ofreopened assessments.
B
In the appeal by special leave, it was urged that the covenant for
repairs embodied in lease deed did not cast the burden to carry out the
repairs exclusively on the lessee and that since the lessor had also
undertaken to carry out some of the repairs, s. 24(l)(i)(b) was not

r
attracted and the benefit of s. 24(1)(i)(a) was therefore available.
c
On the question whether, having regard to the terms of the
covenant, it could be said that the tenant had undertaken to bear the
cost of repairs within the meaning, and for purposes, of s. 24(l)(i)(b)
of the Act.

D Dismissing the appeals,

HELD: 1.1 This is clearly not a case where the burden of carry-
ing out repairs as understood in the context of s. 24(l)(i)(b) of the
Income Tax Act, 1961 is shared between the lessor and the lessee. The
obligation is on the lessee alone. The obligation under the latter part of y
E the covenant does not relate to such repairs. l93G-H]

1.2 The idea of 'repair' may include replacement or even a
renewal. But the converse may not be true. All replacements or
'
-
renewals need not necessarily be 'repairs'. In the case of a building,
restoration of stability of safety of a subordinate or subsidiary part
}
F of it or any portion of it can be considered as repair while the re-
construction of the entirety of the subject matter may not be so
regarded. [93B-C]
+
A general covenant to repair without any such words as tenan-
table or habitable or good repair is satisfied if the premises are kept in
G a substantial state of repair. l92H]

Having regard to somewhat comprehensive nature of the obliga- j
lions that go with and are attachment to and recognised under the
tenant's covenants for 'repairs', it must be held that the covenant in
the present case is one under which the tenant has undertaken 'snb-
H stantial repairs' and it must, accordingly, be held to fall within clause
SHAD! LAL v. COMMR. OF INCOME-TAX (VENKATACHALIAH, J.] 89

(b) of s. 24(1)(i) of the Act and not under clause (a) of the section and A
that the allowance for repairs must be one under, and limited to that
provision. [93F)

Commissioner of Income-tax v. Parbutty Churn Law, 57 ITR
609; Lurcott v. Wakely and Wheeler, [19ll) l K.B. 905; Rodesia
Railway Ltd. v. Income-tax Collector. [1933 I Appeal Cases 368; B
··i Ravenseft Properties Ltd. v. Davstone (Holdings) Ltd., 119801 Q.B.
12 and Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn., paragraph 2G6, refer-
red to

t CIVIL .APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 960
to 962 (NT) of 1975.

From the Judgment and Order dated 2.3.1973 of the Allahabad
High Court in Income Tax Reference No. 721 of 1970.
c

S.L. Aneja, Pawan Aneja and K.L. Taneja for the Appellants.
D
·;.- C.M. Lodha, M~. A. Subhashini and K.C. Dua for the Res-
pondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

VENKATACHALIAH, J. These assessee's appeals, by certifi- E
cate, arise out of the Judgment and Order dated 2.3.1973 of the
Allahabad High Court in I.T.R. No. 721 of 1970 answering certain
questions of law referred for the opinion of the High Court against
the assessee.

2. The assessee is a· Hindu Undivided Family. The assessment F
years are 1954-55, 1960-61 and 1961-62. The principal controversy in
these appeals pertains to the allowance of and deduction for 'repairs'
in respect of a house property at Delhi leased out to the Chinese
Embassy under a deed of lease dated 30.5.1952.

Originally assessments were completed including therein the G
annual letting value of this property at Rs.36,000 and allowing a
.\- deduction of Rs.6,000 for repairs under Section 24(1)(i)(a) of the
Income-tax Act, 1961 (Act) or the corresponding provisions of the Act
of 1922. Subsequently, the assessments were reopened on the ground
that the assessee had got excess of relief. In the re-assessments the
Income-tax Officer held that as the lessee had undertaken 'to keep H
90 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 2 S.C.R ..

A the premises in good and habitable condition, execute all repairs', the
deduction of Rs.6,000 was impermissible. The Income-tax Officer
accordingly determined the annual letting value of the property at
Rs.40,000 and allowed a· deduction at Rs.4,000 towards 'repairs'
under Section 24( l)(i)(b) of the Act. In respect of the assessment
B year 1954-55, the assessee claimed unsuccessfully that he had under-
taken' considerable repairs and that a sum of Rs.5,645 should be
allowed. This claim was negatived by the Income-tax Officer who
confined the allowance for repairs to the limit permissible under
Section 24( l)(i)(b) of the Act on the premise that this was a case
where the tenant had undertaken to bear the cost of repairs. This
view was affirmed by the Appellate Asst. Commissioner of Income-
C tax and the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal ('Tribunal').

It is, perhaps, relevant to mention that some of the assessment
years are governed by the provisions of the 1922 Act. But, having
regard to the similarity of the provisions, this does not assume any
D significance or affect the substance of the matter.

3. At the instance of the assessee, the Tribunal stated a case
and referred the following three questions of law for the opinion of
the High Court:

E (I) "Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case,
the assessments for the years 1954-55, 1960-61 and 1961-62
were validly reopened under Section 147(a) of the Income-
tax Act, 1961 ?"

(2) "Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case,
F the provisions of Section 24(1)(i)(b) of the Income-tax Act,
1961, were applicable?"

(3) "Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case,
the expenditure which was not allowed while completing
the original assessments could be considered for allowance
G in course of assessments re-opened under Section 147(a)?"

As stated earlier, the High Court answered the questions against the .f
assessee, but granted a certificate under Section 261 of the Act as in
its opinion two important questions arose out of the judgment. The
questions the High Court had in mind are questions No. 2 and 3,
t-1 supra.
SHAD! LAL v. COMMR. OF INCOME-TAX [VENKATACHALIAH, J.] 91

4. It must, at the outset, be observed that the question as to the A
validity of the re-opening of the assessments which was raised before
the High Court was not, in our opinion rightly, re-agitated here.
Learned counsel for the appellants urged that the High Court was in
error in its opinion on questions ·2 and 3. The third question referred
was whether where once an assessment is re-opened by a valid n0tice,
the whole proceedings of assessment were at large and all the claims B
and allowances which had been disallowed in the original-assessment
could be re-agitated by the assessee. The High Court has answered
this proposition against the assessee. ·

We may take up and dispose of this contention first. It is seen
from the order of the Tribunal that though certain reliefs were C
claimed by the assessee before the authorities, the matter before the
Tribunal was, however, confined to the question of allowance for
repairs. The relief on the claim for repairs, if otherwise tenable, can
be granted even without going into this larger question. It is,
therefore, unnecessary to consider this contention in this case.
D
5. We may now turn to question No. 2 as formulated in the
reference. Learned counsel urged that the covenant for repairs
embodied in the lease-deed did not cast the burden to carry out the
repairs exclusively on the lessee and that since the lessor had also
undertaken to carry out some of the repairs, Section 24(1)(i)(b) was
not attracted and that in the circumstances the benefit of Section E
24(1)(i)(a) was available to the assessee. Counsel relied upon
Commissioner of Income-tax v. Parbutty Churn Law, 57 ITR 609.

6. Section 24( l)(i)(b) of the Act provides that where a property
is in the occupation of a tenant "who has undertaken to bear the cost
of repairs", the deduction towards repairs which the assessee-owner F
is entitled to is either the excess of the annual value over the amount
of rent payable for a year by the tenant; or a sum equal to one-sixth
of the annual value whichever is lesser. There is no dispute that if
Section 24( l)(i)(b) is applicable the computation would be correct.

The only question, therefore, is whether, having regard to the G
terms of the covenant, it could be said that the tenant had under-
taken to bear the cost of repairs within the meaning and for purposes
of Section 24(1)(i)(b) of the Act. The covenant in this behalf in the
lease deed dated 9.9.1952 is in terms following:

"To maintain and keep the demised premises in good and H
92 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 2 S.C.R.

A habitable condition, tenantable, repair execute all repairs
including annual white washing, repairs of electric and
sanitary fittings etc., at the lessee's expenses. Major
repairs such as repairs against collapse of the house etc.,
shall be undertaken by the lessors at their own cost.·•

B The view of the High Court, in substance, is that this covenant
satisfies the requirements of and attracts Section 24(1)(i)(b). The
correctness of this view turns upon what in the law of landlord and
tenant is, the content of a coveoont for 'repairs' and whether by the
terms of the present agreement, the tenant is said to have undertaken
the burden of such 'repairs'.
Referring to what is implicit in and carried with the covenant
c for "repairs", Halsbury states:
"Under a covenant to repair, a tenant is liable to-repair
but not to renew. 'Repair' in this sense means the restora-
tion by renewal or replacement of subsidiary parts of the
D whole, whereas 'renewal' as distinguished from repair,
means the re-construction of the whole or of substantially
the whole. Where the demised building is erected on in- •
herently defective foundations, the tenant is not liable to
substitute new foundations .............. "
(See Halsbury's Laws of England 14th Edn. paragraph 285)
E
In regard to the Standard of Repairs, Halsbury, at paragraph
286, states:
"If he has expressly covenanted to put a house into
tenantable repair ar.d to keep it in such repair, and it is
not in tenantable repair at the commencement of the
F tenancy, the tenant must do the necessary repairs, notwith-
standing that the building is thereby put in a better condi-
tion than when the landlord let it. The effect is the same if,
without expressly covenanting to put it into repair, the
tenant only covenants to keep the house in tenantable
repair. Such a covenant presupposes putting the house in _,
G such repair, and keeping it in repair during the term. The
construction of the covenant is the same whether the
covenant specifies 'tenantable' or 'habitable' or 'good' )
repair. A g~neral covenant to repair without any such
words is satisfied if the premises are kept in a substantial
state of repair.
H (emphasis supplied)
SHAD! LAL v. COMMR. OF INCOME-TAX [VENKATACHALIAH, J.] 93

7. The oft quoted observations in Lurcott v. Wakely and A
Wheeler, [1911] 1 K.B. 905 as to what is meant by 'repairs' are
' generally considered apposite. This has been referred to and relied
upon by the High Court. The observations in Lurcott's case was
referred to with approval by the Privy Council in Rodesia Railway
Ltd. v. Income-tax Collector, I1933] Appeal cases 368.
B
The idea of 'repair' may include replacement or even a renewal.
But 'the converse may not be true. All replacements or renewals need
not necessarily be 'repairs'. In the case of a building, restoration of
stability or safety of a subordinate or subsidiary part of it or any
portion of it can be considered as repair while the re-construction of
the entirety of the subject matter may not be so regarded. The C
somewhat comprehensive import of the word 'repair' in this context
is evident from the reliance by Forbes J. in Ravenseft Properties Ltd.
v. Davstone (Holdings) Ltd., [ 1980] Q.B. 12 on the following obser-
vations of Sir Herbert Cozens-Herdy MR in Lurcott's case (supra):

"It seems to me that we should be narrowing in a most D
.. dangerous way the limit and extent of these covenants if
we did not hold that the defendants were liable under
covenants framed as these are to make good the cost of
repairing this wall in the only sense in which it can be
repaired, namely, by re-building it according to the re-
quirements of the county council." E

Having regard to somewhat comprehensive nature of the obligations
that go with and are attached to and recognised under the tenant's
covenants for 'repairs', it must be held that the covenant in the
present case is one under which the tenant has undertaken 'sub-
stantial repairs' and it must, accordingly, be held to fall within F
Section 24( l)(i)(b) of the Act and that the allowance for repairs must
be one under, and limited to, that provision. The case of the assessee
that it should fall under Section 24(l)(i)(a), we are afraid, is very
nearly unarguable. There is no substance in the contention.

This is clearly not a case where the burden of carrying out G
repairs as understood in the context of Section 24(l)(i)(b) is shared
between t)le lessor and the lessee. The obligation is on the lessee
alone. The obligation under the latter part of the covenant does not
relate to such repairs. The appellant's reliance on Commissioner of
Income-tax v. Parbutty Churn Law, supra is in the facts of the present
case misplaced. H
94 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 2 S.C.R.
-,
A 9. In the result, for the foregoing reasons these appeals fail and
are dismissed, but in the circumstances, without an order as to costs.

N.P.V. Appeals dismissed.

B
\
I