SITA RAMversusCHHOTA BHONDEY AND OTHERS

                                  SITA RAM
A
                                        v.
                   CHHOTA BHONDEY AND OTHERS

                              OCTOBER 9, i990

B                (P.B. SAWANT AND S.C. AGRAWAL, JJ.]

          U.P. Consolidation. of Holdings Act, 1953: Sections 4(2), 5(2)
    and 49-Declaration and adjudication of tenure holders-Whether falls
    within scope of adjudicatory functions of consolidation authorities.

          In the course of consolidation proceedings under the U.P. Con-
e solidation of Holdings Act, 1953, questions arose amongst the members
    of a family regarding the title to certain properties. Respondent No. 1
    filed objections to the original entries in respect of lands in Khata
    No. 72 and 73 on the basis that he was the son of Chhota, one of the sons
    of Teja, the common ancestor. Similarly, respondents Nos. 2 and 3 filed
D   objections claiming shares in the lands in Khata No. 73 on the ground
    that the said holding was jointly acquired but was recorded in the name
    of Nanha in a representative character. The _appellant contested the
    claims of respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3.

          The objections were considered by the Consolidation Officer, who
E   held that respondent No. 1 was the son of Heera_alias Chhota, brother
    of Nanha, and granted him his share in certain plots of the Khata
    No. 73. The appellant as well as respondents Nos. 2 and 3 filed appeals
    against the said order of the Consolidation Officer. The Assistant Settle-
    ment Officer (Consolidation) allowed the appeal of the appellant and
    directed that lands in Khata No. 73 will be continued in the name of the
F   appellant alone.

          The respondents went in rev1s1on against the order of the
    Assistant Settlement Officer. The Deputy Director of Consolidation
    allowed the revision of respondent No. 1 in full in respect of share in
    Khata No. 72. As regards plots in Khata No. 73 the Deputy Director
G   held that the name of Nanha was entered only in a representative
    capacity.

          The appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court to challenge
    the decision of the Dtiputy Director of Consolidation which was dismis-
    sed in limine.
H           ;
            I,


                                       184
                        SITA RAM '· C. BHONDEY                           185

      The appellant, thereafter, filed the civil suit for a declaration that
the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation was without juris-            A
diction. Contesting the suit, respondent No. I raised a preliminary
objection that the suit was barred by section 49 of the Act. The Munslff
decided the preliminary objection in favour of respondent No. 1. The
Additional District and Sessions Judge In appeal, affirmed the order of
the Munsiff. The second appelll filed by the appeUant was dismissed by          B
the High Court in lirnine.                                            -

      Before this Court, it was contended on behalf of the appellant that
the bar of section 49 of the Act was not applicable to the suit of the
appellant because the orders passed by ihe consolidation authorities
were without jurisdiction inasmuch as the consolidation authoi;ities
could not decide questions as to title to the lands as well as the que'stion    C
relating to the parentage of respondent No. 1 which the civil coons
alone could decide.

      Dismissing the appeal, this Court,
                                                                                D
      HELD: (1) The language used in section 49 of the U .P. Consolida-
tion of Holdings Act, 1953 is wide and comprehensive. Declaration and
adjudication Of rights of tenure-holders in respect of land lying in the
area covered by the notification under section 4(2) of the Act and
adjudication of any other right arising out of consolidation proceedings
and in regard to which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken           E
under the Act, would cover adjudication of questions as to title In
respect of the said lands. Accordingly, the jurisdiction of the civil or
revenue courts to entertain any suit or proceeding with respect to rights
in such land or with respect to any other matter for which a proceeding could
or ought to have been taken under lite Act has been taken away. [1890-E; Cl
                                                                                F
    Suba Singh v. Mahendra Singh and Others, [1974) 1 SCC 418;
Gorakh Nath Dube v. Hari Narain Singh, [1974] 1 S4!:R 339, referred
to.

      (2) In the instant case, respondent No. 1 was clahning an interest
in the land lying In the area covered by the notification issued under          G
section 4(2) on the basis that he was the son of Chhota, brother of
Nanha, and that the lands were recorded in the name of Nanha in a
representative capacity on behalf of himself and his other brothers.
This claim which fell within the ambit of section 5(2) had to be
adjudicated by the ·consolidation authorities under the Act, and the
jurisdiction Of the Civil Court to entertain the suit in respect of the said    H
    186        SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [ 1990] Supp. 2 S.C.R.

    matter was expressly barred by section 49 of the Act and the suit onhe
A   appellant was rightly dismissed on that ground. [194C-D]

          CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1811
    of 1975.

B        From the Judgment and Order dated 18.4.1975 of the Allahabad
    High Court in Second Appeal No. 734 of 1975.

        R.K. Mehta, Ms. Mona Mehta and S.K. Bagga (NP) for the
    Appellant.

          P.K. Bajaj and Mrs. Rani Chhabra (NP) for the Respondents.
c
          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

        S.C. AGRAWAi,, J. This appeal by special leave arises from the
  judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad dated April 18,
D 1975, dismissing the Second Appeal filed by the appellant.

          Teja, the common ancestor, had five sons: Nanha, Mulle,
    Manna, Chhota and Ram Sahai. All of them have died. Appellant Sita
    Ram is the son of Nanha. Mulle had a son Nokhey who died in 1953
    without any issue. Respondent No. 2 Soney Lal is the son of Manna.
E   Smt. Kailasho Devi, respondent No. 3 is the widow of Ram Sahai.
    Chhota Bhondey respondent No. I, claims to be the son of Chhota
    which is disputed by the appellant. The dispute in the appeal relates to
    sirdari holdings in Khata No. 72 and 73 in village Sambhalpur Sheoli in
    the State of Uttar Pradesh. Lands in Khata No. 72 were originally
    entered in the names of Nanha, Manna and Ram Sahai in the revenue
F   records and on their deaths the names of the appellant and respon-
    dents Nos. 2 and 3 were entered. Respondent No. 3 sold her shares in
    these lands. The lands in Khata No. 73 were entered in the name of
    N anha alone and on his death the same were entered in the name of
    the appellant. Consolidation proceedings under the provisions of U .P.
    Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (U.P. Act No. 5 of 1954)
G   hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' commenced in Village Sambhalpur
    Sheoli in the year 1969. Respondent No. 1 filed objections to the
    entries and claimed one fourth share in the holdings in both the Khatas
    on the basis that he is the son of Chhota and that the said lands
    belonged to the joint hindu family consisting of the sons of Tej Ram.
    Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 filed objections claiming shares in the lands
H   in Khata No. 73 on the ground that the said holding was jointly
·-                  SITA RAM v. C. BHONDEY [AGRAWAL, J.]                  187

     acquired by Nanha and his brothers, Manna and Ram Sahai, and the
                                                                                 A
     name of Nanha was recorded in a representative character. The appel-
     lant contested the said claims and claimed that lands in Khata No. 73
     were acquired by Nanha in his individual capacity and not on b.ehalf of
     his family. The appellant further claimed that respondent No. 1 could
     claim no interest in the holdings as he is not a member of the family.
     The case of the appellant was that respondent No. I is not the son of       B
     Chhota but is the son of one Heera who was a resident of a different
     village. The objections were considered by the Consolidation Officer,
     who, by order dated August 31, 1970, held that respondent No. I is the
     son of Heera alias Chhota. He gave half share to the appellant and one
     fourth share each to respondents Nos. 1 and 2 in all the plots of the
     Khata No. 73 except plots Nos. 140, 141, 142/2., 142/3 and 143/3 which
     were given to the appellant exclusively. The appellant as well as           c
     respondents Nos. 2 and 3 filed appeals against the said order of the
     Consolidation Officer. The Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolida-
     tion), by Order dated February 8, 1971, allowed the appeal of the
     appellant and directed that Khata No. 73 will be continued in the name
     of the appellant alone inasmuch as the lands of the said Khata were         D
     acquired by Nanha between 1927 and 1931 before the birth of respon-
     dent No. I and the said land was not the ancestral acquisition nor
     Nanha had acquired it in a representative capacity. The Assistant Set-
     tlement Officer, however, agreed with the findings of the Consolida-
     tion Officer that respondent No. 1 is the son of Heera alias Chhota and
     belongs to the family to which the appellant and respondent No. 2           E
     belong. The respondents went in revision against the said order of the
     Assistant Settlement Officer. The said revisions were decided by the
     Deputy Director of Consolidation by his Order dated May 13, 1971.
     The Deputy Director allowed the revision of respondent No. 1 in full
     and held that he has got a share in Khata No. 72 along with the
     appellant and respondent No. 2 and since respondent No. 3 has               F
     already sold her share of Khata No. 72 the remaining three branches
     namely the appellant and respondents Nos. 1 and 2 are entitled to one
     third share each in the lands included in this Khata. As regards lands in
     Khata No. 73 the Deputy Director disallowed the claim of the respon-
     dents in respect of plots Nos. 140, 141, 142 and 143. But with regard to
     other plots of Khata No. 73 the Deputy Director held that the name of       G
     Nanha was entered only in a representative capacity and that the
     branches of Manna, Chhota and Ram Sahai also had a share in these
     plots and that the respondents had acquired equal shares along with
     the appellant in these plots and their names may also be recorded over
     the same. The appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court to
     challenge the said decision of the Deputy Dire~or of Consolidation,         H
    188         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [ 1990] Supp. 2 S.C.R.

    but the said writ petition was dismissed in limine by the High Court by
A
    order dated July 23, 1971. The application filed by the appellant for
    grant of certificate of fitness to appeal to this Court under Article 133
    of the Constitution was also rejected by the High Court by its order
    dated November 9, 1972.

B         The appellant, thereafter, filed the civil suit giving rise to this
    appeal on January 25, 1973 for a declaration that the order of the
    Deputy Director of Consolidation dated May 13, 1971, is without
    jurisdiction. The said suit was contested by respondent No. I. He
    raised a preliminary objection that the suit was barred by Section 49 of
    the Act. The Munsiff Hawaii, Kanpur, by judgment dated August 16,
    1974 decided the said preliminary objection in favour of respondent
c   No. I and dismissed the suit on the ground that ii was barred by
    Section 49 of the Act. The said judgment and decree of the Munsiff
    Hawaii was affirmed in appeal by the Additional District and Sessions
    Judge, Kanpur-Etawah by judgment dated January 17, 1975.· The
    second' Appeal filed by the appellant against the said judgment was
D   dismissed in /imine by the High Court by the judgment under appeal.

          The only question which arises for consideration in this appeal is
    whether. the suit filed by the appellant was barred by Section 49 of the
    Act. In the instant case the consolidation proceedings under the Act
    were taken during the period 1969 to 1971 and the suit was filed in
E   1973. At that time Section 49 read as under:

           '    "49. Bar to civil jurisdiction-Notwithstanding anything
           i ·l contained in any other law for the time being in force, the
                declaration and adjudication of rights of tenure-holders in
                respect of land lying in an area, for which a notification has
F               been issued under sub-section (2) of Section 4 or adjudica-
           ' ' lion of any other right arising out of consolidation pro-
                ceedings and in regard to which a proceeding could or
                ought to have been taken under this Act, shall be done in
                accordance with the provisions of this Act and no civil or
           ' • revenue court shall entertain any suit or proceeding with
G               respect to rights in such land or with respect to any other
           ' ' matters for which a proceeding could or ought to have been
             '' taken under this Act."

         Shri R.K. Mehta, the learned counsel for the appellant, has
    urged that the bar of Section 49 of the Act is not applicable to the suit
H   of the appellant because the orders passed by the consolidation
               SITA RAM v. C. BHONDEY !AGRAWAL, J.l                   189

authorities were without jurisdiction inasmuch as the consolidation
authorities could not decide questions as to title to the lands as well as   A
the question relating to the parentage of respondent No. 1 which the
Civil Courts alone could decide. The submission of Shri Mehta is that
the bar of Section 49 of the Act is applicable in respect of only those
matters which could be adjudicated upon by the consolidation
authorities. Shri Mehta has placed reliance on the decision of this          B
Court in Suba Singh v. Mahendra Singh and Others, I 1974] 1SCC418.

      From a perusal of Section 49 it is evident that declaration and
adjudication of rights of tenure-holders in respect of land lying in an
area for which a notification has been issued under Section 4(2) and
adjudication of any other right arising out of consolidation proceed-
ings and in regard to which a proceeding could or ought to have been         c
taken under the Act, had to be done in accordance with the provisions
of the Act only and the jurisdiction of the civil or .revenue courts to
entertain any suit or proceeding with respect to rights in such land or
with respect to any other matter for which a proceeding could or ought
to have been taken under the Act, has been taken away. The language          D
used in Section 49 is wide and comprehensive. Declaration and adjudi-
cation of rights of tenure-holders in respect of land lying in the area
covered by the notification under Section 4(2) of the Act and adjudica-
tion of any other right arising out of consolidation proceedings and in
regard to which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under
the Act, would cover adjudication of questions as to title in respect of     E
the said lands. This view also finds support from the other provisions
of the Act and the amendments that have been introduced therein.

       In the Act, as originally enacted, Section 12 made provision for
filing of objections against the statement of plots and tenure-holders
prepared by the consolidation authorities and in sub-section (4) of          F
Section 12 it was prescribed that where the objection filed under sub-
section ( 1) involves a q uesti<;m of title and such question has not
already been determined by a competent court, the Consolidation
Officer shall refer the question for determination to the arbitrator.
Sub-section (5) of Section 12 laid down that all suits or proceedings in
the Court of first instance or appeal in which a question of title in        G
relation to some land has been raised shall be stayed. Under sub-
section (6) bf Section 12 finality was given to the decision of the
Arbitrator under sub-section (4). Similarly Seeton 20 made provision
for filing of objections against statement of proposals prepared by the
consolidation authorities under Section 19 of the Act. Section 22 pre-
scribed that where any objection filed under Section 20 involves a           H
    190         SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [ 1990] Supp. 2 S.C.R.

A question of title in or over land and such question has not already been
  finally determined by a competent court, the Consolidation Officer
  shall refer it to the Arbitrator for determination and all suits or pro-
  ceedings of the first instance or appeal in which a question of title in
  relation to the same had been raised shall be stayed and the decision of
  the Arbitrator shall be final. There was a similar provision for refe-
B rence to arbitrator in Section 36. These provisions indicate that
  initially the Act envisaged that questions of title, if not finally
  determined by a competent court, shall, instead of being decided by
  the Courts, be decided by an Arbitrator and the decision of the
  Arbitrator would be final. As a result the determination of questions
  of title was withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the Courts. On a consi-
c deration  of the scheme of the Act and the policy behind the legislation,
  in the light of the provisions referred to above, this Court has
  observed:

                "The scheme of that Act, the policy behind that legislation
                and the language of the relevant provisions clearly show
D               that the Legislature did not want questions of title to be
                decided by the Civil Court when the consolidation pro-
                ceedings were under way. It is perfectly plain that the
                fragmented holdings being converted into consolidated
                parcels of land is a complicated operation to be conducted
                by administrative authorities, and if long and frequent pro-
E               ceedings in Civil Courts hold up consolidation operations,
                the very transformation of land holdings in villages the
                legislature desired to produce would have been indefinitely
                postponed and messed up. It is thus obvious that at this
                stage Civil Courts should not intervene even if the questions
                were of heirship or title to property. At the same time, the
F               Legislature did not want to hand over these complicated
                questions of title and the like to mere consolidation
                agencies, and so under Sections 12(4) and 22(1), it was
                provided that objections relating tu title to land, if they
                cropped up at intermediate stages of these operations,
                were to be referred to arbitration."
G                                                                  (p.420-21)

          Extensive amendments wer.e made in the Act by the U.P. Con-
    solidation of Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1958 (U.P. Act No. 38 of
    1958) whereby a number of sections including section 36, were deleted
    and various provisions, including sections 5, 7 to 12 and 22, were
H   substituted. As a result of these amendments the provisions with
               SITA RAM v. C. BHONDEY [AGRAWAL, J.)                   191

 regard to arbitration contained in Sections 12, 22 and 36 of the original
                                                                             A
 Act were removed. In sub-clause (i) of Clause (b) of Section 5, as
 substituted, it was provided that all proceedings for correction of the
 records and all suits for declaration of rights and interests over land, or
 for possession of land or for partition, pending before any authority or
 court, whether of first instance, appeal, or reference, or revision, shall
 stand stayed, but without prejudice to the rights of the person~ B
 affected to agitate the right or interest in dispute in the said proceeding
 or suits before the consolidation authorities under and in acco.rdance
 with the provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder. In
sub-clause (ii) of Clause (b) it was further provided that the findings of
 consolidation authorities in proceedings under the Act in respect of
 such right or interest in the land, shall be acceptable to the authority or
 court before whom the proceeding or suit was pending which may, on
                                                                             c
 communication thereof by the parties concerned, proceed with the
 proceeding or suit, as the case may be. In Section 9 as substituted,
 provision was made for issuing notice of the statement prepared under
 Section 8 of the Act to tenure-holders concerned and to persons
interested calling upon them to file before him objections, if any, D
disputing the correctness or nature of the entries in the extracts· and
pointing out of any omission therefrom. In Section 10 of the Act provi-
sion was made tor adjudication by the Consolidation Officer of the
said objections in disputed cases. In Section 11 provision was made for
 appeal agains! the orders passed by the Assistant Consolidation
 Officer and the Consolidation Officer under Sections 9 and 10. Section E
 12, as substituted, prescribed that all matters relating to changes and
transfers affecting any of the rights or interests reco.rded in the revised
records published under Section I IB for which a cause of action was
non-existent when proceedings under Sections 7 to IO were started or
were in progress may be raised before the Assistant Consolidation
Officer as and when they arise but not later than the date of notifica- F
tion under Section 52 or under sub-section ( 1) of Section 6 and that the
provisions of Sections 7 to 11 shall mutatis mutandis, apply to the
hearing and decision of any matter praised under Section (I) as if it
were a matter raised under the aforesaid Sections. The scheme of the
above-mentioned amendments introduced in the Act by the Amend-
ment Act of 1958 was to empower the consolidation authorities to G
ai\judicate on matters involving declaration of right and interests.over
land or for possession of land or for partition and suits or proceedings
in that regard pending before any Court were to be stayed till such
determination and after such determination the Court was to proceed
with the said proceedings in the light of the findings of the consolida-
tion authorities. In other words the question as to title which were H
    192         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [1990] Supp. 2 S.C.R.

A earlier required to be determined by arbitration were to be adjudi-
  cated upon by the consolidation authorities under the Act. From the
  Statement of Objects and Reasons for th~ Amendment Act of 1958 it
  appears that it become necessary to do away with the provisions for
  arbitration because it used to cause great delay and in order to inspire
  greater confidence in the people in the adjudication of rights of tenure-           F
B holders by-mnsolidation authorities provision was made for a Second                 'D

  Appeal against orders passed by the Consolidation Officer.

          Further amendment was made in Section_~ of the Act by U.P:
    Act No. 21 of 1966 whereby clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 5,
    as renumbered, was omitted and sub-section (2) was added in Section
C   5, By clause (a) of the said sub-section (2) it has been provided that
    upon the publication of the notification under sub-section (2) of
    Section 4 every proceeding for the correction of the records and all
    suits and other proceedings in respec~ of declaration of rights and
                                                                                  r
                                                                                  \
    interests in any land lying in the area, or for declaration or adjucica-
    tion of any other right in regard to which proceedings can or ought to
D   be taken under the Act, pending before any Court or authority
    whether of the first instance or of appeal, reference or revision, shall,
    on an order b..,ing passed iri that behalf by the Court or authority
    before whom such suit or proceeding is pending, stand abated, In
    clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 5 it 1s turther provided that such
    abatement shall be without prejudice to the rights of the persons
E   affected to agitate the right or interest in dispute in the said suit or
    proceedings before the appropriate consolidation authorities under
    and in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules made
    thereunder. As a result of the said amendment which has been intro-
    duced in Section 5 the right of the Courts to adjudicate in respect of
    declaration of rights or interest in any land lying in the area for which
F   the notification has been issued under Section 4(2) or for declaration
    or adjudication of any other right in regard to which proceedings can
    or ought to be taken under the Act has been completely taken away
    and the adjudication of these rights is to be done by the consolidation
    authorities under and in accordance with the provisions of the Act and
    the Rules· made thereunder. Section 49 of the Act which bars the
                                                                                  •
G   jurisdiction of the civil and revenue Courts gives effect to the aforesaid
    provisions contained in Section 5(2) of the AcL As a result of these
     amendments civil and revenue Courts have no role in the matter of
     determination of rights or interests in any land lying in the area for
    which notice has been issued under Section 4(2) of the Act or for the
     declaration or adjudication of any other right in regard to which pro-       (


H    ceedings can or ought to be taken under the Act.
.,
                     SITA RAM v. C. BHONDEY (AGRAWAL, l.]                    193

           In {lam Adhar Singh v. Ramroop Singh and Others, [19681 2
     S.C.R. 95 this Court has dealt with the question wheiher a suit for           A
     recovery of possession filed by the-plaintiff claiming to be 'Bhoomidar'
     of the land and asserting that the defendant was a trespasser and not
     entitled to remain in possession of the property was covered by Section
     5(2) of the Act as amended by U.P. Act No. 21of1966. After consi-
     dering the various provisions of the Act this Court held that "disputes       B
     of the nature which exists between the parties in the present litigation
     are all now within the jurisdiction of the authorities, constituted under
     the Act, to adjudicate upon" and on that basis it was held that the suit
     had abated under Section 5(2).

           In Gorakh Nath Dube v. Hari Narain Singh and Others, [1974) 1
     S.C.R. 339 this Court was concerned with a suit for cancellation of a         c
     Sale Deed to the extent of half share claimed by the plaintiff in fixed
     rates tenancy plots and for award of possession of the plaintiff's share.
     This Court held that the said suit had abated under Section 5(2) of the
     Act inasmuch as the claim made in the said suit could be adjudicated
     upon by consolidation courts. Referring to Section 5 of the Act this          D
     Court has observed:
•
                  "The whole object of this provision of the Act was to
                  remove from the jurisdiction of ordinary civil and revenue
                  courts, for the duration of consolidation operations, all dis-
                  putes which could be decided in the course of consolidation      E
                  proceedings before special courts governed by special prci-
                 ·cedure. Such ad judicatidn by consolidation authorities
                  were considered more suitable, just and efficacious for
                  speedy decisions which had to be taken in order to enable
                  consolidation operations to be finalised within a reasonable
                  time."                                                           F
                                                                       (P.341)

           This Court has held that questions relating to the validity of sale
     deeds, gift deeds and wills could be gone in proceedings before the
     consolidation authorities because such questions naturally and .neces-
     sarily arose and had to be decided in the course of adjudication on           G
     rights or interests in land which are the subject matter of consolidation
     proceedings. A distinction has, however, been. made between cases
     where the document is wholly or partially .invalid so that it can be
     disregarded by any court or authority and one where it has to be
     actually set aside before it can cease to have legal effect. With regard
     to cases falling in the first category it was held that such a claim can be   H
    194         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [ 1990] Supp. 2 S.C.R.

A   adjudicated by consolidation courts on the view that an alienation           •
    made in excess of power to transfer would be, to the extent of the
    excess of power, invalid and an adjudication on the effect of such a
    purported alienation would be necessarily ·implied in the decision of a
    dispute involving conflicting claims to rights, or interests in land which
    are the subject matt.er of consolidation proceedings. But as regards
B   cases falling in the second category where there is a document the legal
    effect of which can only be taken away by setting it aside or its cancel-
    lation, it was held that the consolidation authorities would have no
    power to cancel the same and it must be held to be binding on them so
    long as it is not cancelled by a court having the power to cancel it.

C       In the instant case respondent No. 1 was claiming an interest in
  the land lying in the area covered by notification issued under Section
  4(2) on the basis that he is the son of Chhota, brother of Nanha and
  that the lands were recorded in the name of Nanha in a representative
  capacity on behalf of himself and his other brothers. This claim which
  fell within the ambit of Section 5(2) had to be adjudicated by the
D consolidation authorities. Since it was a matter falling within the scope
  of ad judicatory functions assigned to the consolidation authorities
  under the Act the jurisdictibn of the Civil Court to entertain the suit in
  respect of the said matter was expressly barred by Section 49 of the Act
  and the suit of the appellant was rightly dismissed on that ground.

E         Suba Singh v. Mahendra Singh, (Supra), on which reliance has
    been placed by the learned counsel for the appellant, has no applica-
    tion to the present case. That case related to the year 1956 i.e. before
    the Amendment Act of 1958. At that time provision relating to arbitra-
    tion were contained in Sections 12( 4) and 21( 1) of the Act. The provi-
    sions of Section 49 of the Act which were in force at that time had a
F   narrower scope and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was barred
    "with respect of any matter arising out of consolidation proceedings or
    with respect to any other matter in regard to which a suit or application
    could :be filed under the provisions of the Act." In that case after the
    scheme for consolidation under Section 23 of the Act had been con-
    firmed one Jag Ram, who was held to be a Bhoomidar under the
G   Scheme, had died. Jag Ram had four sons including Ram Bhajan who
    had pre-deceased Jag Ram. The plaintiff-appellant claimed himself to
    be the son of Ram Bhajan and had applied for mutation in the consoli-
    dation proceedings on that basis which was allowed. Thereafter he
    approached the Civil Court for partition of the property of Jag Ram.
    The question was whether the said suit was barred by Section 49 of the
H   Act. This Court held that it was not so barred on the view that the
                   SITA RAM v. C. BHONDEY [AGRAWAL, J.]                  195

    question as to who were the heirs of Jag Ram was not a matter arising      A
    out of consolidation proceedings and further that the said question of
    inheritance to the estate of Jag Ram arose after the consoliqation
    operations had been substantively completed. In this context this
    Court has observed that there is no provision in the Act for any dispute
    of title which arises subsequent to confirmation of the statement under
                                                                               B
    Section 23 to be decided by way of arbitration or otherwise and that
    the consolidation authorities had no jurisdiction to determine finally
    the complicated question of title when the cause of action had arisen
    subsequent to the finalisation, publication and even implementation of
    the consolidation scheme so far as Jag Ram was concerned. This would
    show that in this case this Court was considering the question whether
    a dispute as to title which arises subsequent to confirmation of the       c
    statement under Section 23 could be adjudicated upon by the consoli-
    dation authorities. As pointed out earlier the position has been
    changed after the amendments that have been introduced in the Act by
    the Amendment Acts of 1958 and 1966.

           For the reasons aforesaid we find no substance in this appeal and   D
)   it is accordingly dismissed with costs.

    R.S.S.                                               Appeal' dismissed.