Holding

A widow’s limited interest granted in lieu of maintenance is a recognition of a pre‑existing right and, under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, crystallises into an absolute title, making her competent to transfer the property.

Summary

The father of the appellant executed a 1935 will granting his house to the respondent after the death of his wife, Bhagwati Bai, who was given a life interest in lieu of maintenance. In 1962 Bhagwati Bai executed a gift deed transferring the house to her daughter, the appellant. The respondent sued to declare the gift deed void. The trial court held that the widow's life interest, being a recognition of her pre‑existing right to maintenance, became an absolute title under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, and dismissed the suit. The first and second appellate courts reversed, applying Section 14(2) on the ground that the right was conferred for the first time. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, held that Section 14(1) applies where a widow’s limited interest is granted in lieu of maintenance, thereby converting it into an absolute right, and declared the gift deed valid, dismissing the suit.

Issues considered

Whether a widow's limited interest in property granted in lieu of maintenance under a will is governed by Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
Whether the widow, under the applicable provision, becomes an absolute owner competent to execute a gift deed.

Legislation cited

Hindu Succession Act, 1956s. 14(1), s. 14(2)
Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937

Subjects

Hindu Succession ActSection 14widow's rightmaintenancelimited interestabsolute ownershipgift deedpre‑existing right

Judgment

SMT. BENI BAI A
v.
RAGHUBIR PRASAD

FEBRUARY 24, 1999

[V.N. KHARE AND S.S. MOHAMMED QUADRI, JJ.) B

Hindu Law-Hindu Succession Act, 1956-Sections 14( 1),
14(2}--Hindu Women's Right to Prope1ty Act, 1935-Confennent of limited
interest by Will on a widow----ln lieu of maintenance-Whether the right is
absolr;te--Held, since the limited interest is by vinue of pre-existing right of C
maintenance and not a fresh 1ight the said right is trans/onned into an absolute
right.

The father of the Appellant executed a Will in 1935, bequeathing the
suit property in favour of Respondent. In the said Will a life interest was
given for appellant's mother in lieu of her maintenance. In 1962, the D
appellant's mother executed a gift deed in respect of the suit property in
favour of the appellant. The respondent filed a suit for declaration that
the Gift Deed was illegal and void. The Trial Court dismissed the suit on
the ground that the mother of the appellant having possessed the house
in lieu of he pre-existing right she became the absolute owner under E
Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and the Gift Deed executed
by her was valid.

The first appeal filed by the Respondent was allowed and suit was
decreed on the ground that the present case is governed by Section 14(2)
of the Act of 1956, as the source of right was conferred for the first time F
on the widow by virtue of the Will. On second appeal, the judgment of First
Appellate Court was upheld.

The appellant before this Court contended that once the widow of
the testator had been given the right of possession in lieu of her main-
tenance, it was in recognition of her pre-existing right, that the said limited G
right was transformed into an absolute right by virtue of Section 14(1) of
the Act of 1956 and as such she was legally competent to gift the property
in favour of her daughter. The respondent contended that since the widow
got the right by virtue of a Will for the Qrst time her rights would be
governed by Section 14(2) of the Act 1956, and in that case she was not H
889
-i

890 SUPREME COURl REPORTS [1999) 1 S.C.R.

A legally competent to execute the Gift Deed in favour of the appellant. > --'._

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD : 1. The judgment of the First Appellate Court as well as the
Second Appellate Court is set aside and the suit filed by the plaintiff·
B respondent is dismissed. [894-F-D]
J.
2. Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act applies to cases where
the conferment of right to a Hindu widow was in lieu of maintenance or in
recognition of her pre-existing right as provided under the Shastric law
and Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act. Section 14(2) of the Act would
c apply only to such cases where grant conferred a fresh right or title for
the first ~ime and while conferring the said right certain restrictions were
placed by the grant or transfer. [894-B·C]

V. Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddi, [1997) 3 SCC 99(125); Ram Kali v.
D Choudhri Ajit Shankar, [1997) 9 SCC 613 and Raghubir Singh v. Guiab
Singh, ~1998) 6 SCC 314, referred to. "'
3. The widow was conferred the limited right in lieu of maintenance
in recognition of her pre-existing right. The limited interest conferred upon
her by virtue of the Will being in lieu of maintenance and in recognition
E of her pre-existing right, the said right transformed into an absolute right
by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Act. The said right was not conferred on
her for the first time. Thus sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act has no
application to the present case. Under such circumstances, the widow
became the absolute owner of House No. 27 and was fully competent to
execute . the Gift Deed in favour of her daughter. The Gift Deed executed
F ~'

~
by the widow was thus valid. [894·D·E]
--- r
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2595 of
1983.

G From the Judgment and Order dated 19.2.82 of the Allahabad High
cciurt in S.A. No. 2643 of 1974.

Mrs. Shobha Dikshit, Pradeep Misra and T. Mahipal for the Appel-
!ant. ...
H Manoj Swarup, Ms. Lalita Kohli and Ms. Maulina Swaru,p for the
BENIBAlv. RAGHUBIR PRASAD [V.N.KHARE,J.) 891
Respondent. ·A
· The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
-•;

· ·V.N. KHARE, J. One Nanho Dubey, father of the appellant herein,
was the owner in possession of House No. 27 situate.in Mohalla purani B
Kotwali, in the town of Jhansi. Durllig his life time Nanho Dubey eiecuted
a Will on 16.12.1935 in respect of his properties, including House No. 27,
which was duly registered. It was the last Will of Nannho Dubey
whereunder Raghubir Prasad, the respondent herein, Was to be the owner
of the Hou5e-No. V only after the death of testator's wife Smt. Bhagwafr
Bai. Smt. Bhagwati Bai, widow of Nanho Dubey was given only life interest C
in the said house in lieu of her maintenance. Nanho Dubey died in May,
1943. After the death of the testetor, his widow Smt. Bhawwati Bai entered
into the possession of the house for her life time. On 28.3.62, Smt. Bhagwati
Bai executed a Gift Deed in respect of House No. 27 in favour of her
daughter ":ho is the appellant before us. It is at this stage, the plaintiff- D
respondent filed a suit for declaration that the Gift Deed dated 28.3.62
eiecuted by Smt: Bhagwati Bai in favour of her daughter is illegal and void.
The Trial Court dismissed the suit on the ground that Smt. Bhagwati Bai
having possessed the house in lieu of her pre-existing right she became the
absolute owner tinder sub-section (1) of Section i4 of the Hmdu Succes-
sion Act (herein'after ref~rred to as 'the Act') and the Gift Deed exeruted E
0

by her was Wlld. The First. Appellate Court. allowed the appeal and
decreed the suit on the premise that' the present case' is ·to govern by
sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act as ·the source of right was conferred ·
for the first time on Smt. Bhagwati Bai by virtue of the Will. The judgment
of the First Appellate Court was affirmed by the High Court in the second F
appeal ·· · ,.

. . Learned counsel appearing for the appellant urged that once Smt.
Bhagwati Bai - widow of Nanho Dubey had· been given the right of
was
possession in lieu of )ltt. infilntenance, it in recognition of her pre-ex-
isting right. ThctWU-iimited right was transformed into an absolute right G
by virtue of kub-~eclion (1) of Section 14 of tlie Act and as such she was
legally competent to gift the property' in favour of her daughter. On the
other hand, the contention on behalf of respondent in that since the \\idow
of · Nanho Dubey got the right by virt~e of i Will for the first time, her
rights would be governed by sub-section (2) of Section·14 of the Act and H
892 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1999) 1 S.C.R.

A in that case, she was not legally competent to execute the Gift Deed in
favour of the appellant.

According to old Shastric Hindu law, marriage between two Hindus
is not a contract but a sacrament. The marriage is regarded as a holy union
B of wife and husband and by such union the wife becomes part and parcel
of the husband. Under the Shastric Hindu law, after marriage it is a pious
obligation on the part of the Hindu husband to maintain his wife during
his life time and after his death the widow is to be maintained out of the
property of the husband if the husband has left any property. This was on
account of spiritual relationship between a Hindu husband and wife. This
C principle was statutorily recognized by the enactments known as Hindu
Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937 and Hindu Married Women's
Rights to Separate Residence and Maintenance Act, 1946. Under these
two Acts, the right to maintenance of a Hindu widow was preserved as a
pre-existing right. After independence it was felt necessary to assure the
D equality of right in property to a Hindu female and to remove the artificial
disparity in right to property where a male was entitled to obtain full
ownership in the property and a Hindu female would only be contained by
limited ownership because of the restrictions imposed on her by the Hindu
law. With this object in mind, Parliament enacted the Hindu Succession
E Act, 1956. After the Act came into force, the question arose whether the
right to maintenance given to a widow would crystalised into a full-fledged
right by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Act. After a number of decisions by
this Court, the said question is no longer res integra.

F This Court in V. Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddi, [1997) 3 SCC 99 at 125
has held as under :

"38 Thus the following propositions emerge from a detailed dis-
cussion of this case :

G (1) that the widow's claim to maintenance is undoubtedly a tangible
right though not an absolute right to property so as to become a
fresh source of title. The claim for maintenance can, however, be
made a charge on the joint family properties, and even if the
properties are sold with the notice of the said charge, the sold
H properties will be burdened with the claim for maintenance;
>--

BENI BAI v. RAGHUBIR PRASAD [V.N. KHARE, J.) 893

(2) that by virtue of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, A
1937, the claim of the widow to maintenance has been crystallized
into a full-fledged right and any property allotted to her in lieu of
maintenance becomes property to which she has a limited interest
which by virtue of the provisions of Act of 1956 is enlarged into
an absolute title;
B
,\,
(3) Section 14(2) applies only to cases where grant is not in lieu
of maintenance or in recognition of pre-existing rights but confers
a fresh right or title for the first time and while conferring the said
title certain restrictions are placed by the grant or transfer. Where,
however, the grant is merely in recognition or in implementation c
of a pre-existing right to claim maintenance, the case falls beyond
the purview of Section 14(2) and com~s squarely within the ex-
planation to Section 14(1).

The aforesaid case was followed in Ram Kali v. Choudhri Ajit
~ Shankar, (1997] 9 SCC 613. This Court held in Ram Kali's case as under : D

"16. The only argument raised before us by the learned counsel for
the respondents was that on the facts of this case Section 14(2) of
the Hindu Succession Act applies and not Section 14(1). Accord-
ing to the learned counsel for the respondents the Hindu women
E
have no pre-existing right for maintenance and assuming she had
so, that must be pursuant to Hindu Women's Right to Property
Act, 1937 and not earlier. This argument is not available in view
of the clear pronouncement to the contrary in Tulasamma case."

F
.. ~ This Court in Raghubar Singh v. Guiab Singh, (1998] 6 SCC 314, held
as under:

"26. It is by force of Section 14(1) of the Act, that the widow's
limited interest gets automatically enlarged into an absolute right
notwithstanding any restriction placed under the document or the
instrument. So far as sub-section (2) of Section 14 is concerned, it G
applied to instruments, decrees, awards, gifts, etc., which create
an independent or a new title in favour of the female for the first
-r time. It has no application to cases where the instrument/document
either declares or recognizes or confirms her share in the property
or her "pre- existing right to maintenance" out of that property. As H
894 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999) 1 S.C.R.

A held in Tulasamma case sub-section (2) of Section 14 is in the ')>-

nature of a proviso and has a field of its own, without interfering
,with the operation of Section 14(1) of the Act."

From the aforesaid pronouncement of law by this Court, it is clear
that sub-section (1) of Section 14 applies to the cases where the conferment
B of right to a Hindu widow was in lieu of maintenance or in recognition of
her pre-existing right as provided under the Shastric law and Hindu ~

Women's Rights to Property Act. Sub-sections (2) of Section 14 of the Act
would apply only to such cases where grant conferred a fresh right or title
for the first time and while conferring the said right certain restrictions
c were placed by the grant or transfer.

In the present case, the widow was conferred the limited right in lieu
of maintenance in recognition of her pre-existing right. The limited interest
conferred upon her by virtue of the Will being in lieu of maintenance and
in recognition of her pre-existing right, the said right transformed into an
D absolute right by virtue of Section 14 (1) of the Act. The said right was not
conferred on her for the first time. Thus sub-section (2) of Section 14 of •
the Act has no application to the present case. Under such circumstances,
the widow became the absolute owner of House No. 27 and was fully
competent to execute the Gift Deed in favour of her daughter. The Gift
Deed executed by the widow was thus valid.
E
For the foregoing reasons, the view taken the First Appellate as well
as the Second Appellate Court deserve to be set aside. We accordingly set
aside the judgment of the First Appellate Court as well as the Second
Appellate Court and the suit filed by the plaintiff-respondent shall stand
F dismissed. The appeal is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.
t
._
V.M. Appeal allowed.