Holding

Chandrakantaben was in adverse possession of the Naroda Chawl from 1946 to 1960, and the High Court’s reversal was erroneous.

Summary

The dispute concerned the ownership of a 7‑acre Naroda Chawl, claimed by the plaintiff Vadilal Modi as part of a partition suit against his siblings and their heirs. Defendant Chandrakantaben (Def. No.6) asserted that the property had been gifted to her in 1946 and that she had acquired title by adverse possession, relying on a revenue mutation, rent receipts, and her exclusive possession through her agent (Def. No.1) and later her husband and son. The trial court held that she was in adverse possession from 1946 and dismissed the suit; the Gujarat High Court reversed, finding exclusive possession only from 1952 and denying adverse possession. The Supreme Court examined the evidentiary value of the revenue entry, account books, and rent receipts, held that the agent’s possession is deemed the principal’s, and concluded that Chandrakantaben was in adverse possession from 1946 to 1960, satisfying the limitation period. Consequently, the High Court’s decision was set aside and the trial court’s decree restored.

Issues considered

The revenue entry (mutation) creates a presumption of title in favour of the claimant.
The admissibility and reliability of the account books as evidence of possession.
Whether the agent (Def. No.1) can be treated as in joint possession with the principal.
Whether Chandrakantaben acquired title by adverse possession covering the period 1946‑1960.
Whether the period of exclusive possession satisfies the limitation period under the Limitation Act.

Legislation cited

Indian Contract Act, 1872s. 182, s. 188
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 114, s. 34, s. 61
Limitation Act, 1908s. Article 144
Limitation Act, 1963s. Article 65

Subjects

adverse possessionrevenue mutationaccount booksjoint possessionlimitation periodpartition suitevidenceIndian Evidence ActLimitation ActIndian Contract Act

Judgment

A SMT. CHANDRAKANTABEN ETC.
v.
VADILAL BAPALAL MODI & OTHERS.

MARCH 30, 1989

B [M.H. KANIA AND L.M. SHARMA, JJ.]

Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Sections 34, 61and114. ~
Books of account-Entries-Proof of-Nobody supporting
correctness of entries-Account books liable to be rejected.
c Title-Proof-Presumption on basis of revenue entry-When
arises.

Limitation Act, 1963. Article 65-Adverse possession-Proof-
Actual physical possession by claimant not necessary-Fact that pro-
D perty was in possession of tenants would be of no consequence.

Indian Contract Act, 1872. Sections 182 and 188-Joint posses-
sion-Claim by agent-Agent actually collecting rent from tenants-
Cannot claim joint possession of property. -,t

E Respondent No. 1 in the appeals instituted a suit for partition
against his younger brothers and sisters, and the heirs of his deceased
brothers. The plaintiff was the eldest among the brothers and sisters.
The 1st and 2nd Defendants were his brothers, the 3rd Defendant his
sister, the 4th and 5th Defendants, the widow and son respectively of
the third brother. Defendant 6 was the widow of the fourth brother, and
F Defendants 7 to 12 were his children, while Defendant No. 14 was the
wife of Defendant No. 1, and Defendants 13, 15, 16 and 17 were their
children.

The subject matter of the appeals related only to one item of
property known as "Naroda Chawl" measuring 7 acres and 2 gunthas
G of land, where 115 rooms and huts stood constructed, out of which 114
rooms had been let out to tenants, and one room was retained for the
caretaker.

According to Defendants No. 6 to 12 this property exclusively
belonged to defendant No. 6 and was not liable to partition. The other
H defendants however supported the plaintiff's case that it belonged to the

232
CHANDRAKANTABEN v. V.B. MODI 233

joint family and was liable to partition.
A
Defendants 6 to 12 pleaded that the plaintiff's father-Bapalal
orally gifted this property to his daughter-in-law Defendant No. 6 in
March 1946 and made a statement before the Revenue authorities on
the basis of which her name was mutated and she was put in possession
thereof, that although she came in peaceful possession, the management B
which included realisation of rent was in the hands of Defendant No. 1,
that as some dispute arose in 1952 she assumed direct charge of the
chaw I and had remained in possession thereafter, and that she had
acquired good title therein by adverse possession before the suit was
filed in 1960.

The City Civil Judge who tried the suit, held that there was a joint c
Hindu family and a business was carried on for the benefit of the family
and the income therefrom was thrown into the common pool and all the
properties including the disputed chaw! were treated as belonging to the
family. As the case of Defendant No. 6 about the gift, the mutation of
her name, and her exclusive possession from 1946 till the date of the suit D
was found correct, it was held that she had acquired title by adverse
possession, and the suit was dismissed with respect to the disputed
chaw I.

The plaintiff appealed to the High Court. Some of the defendants
also filed appeals in respect of the other items of property. All these E
appeals were heard and disposed of by a common judgment.

The High Court reversed the finding of adverse possession in
regard to the disputed chaw! and granted a decree for partition. It held
that Defendant No. 6 remained in exclusive possession of the property
only since 1952, the period was thus short of the time required for F
prescription of title. It further held that since the rents of the chaw!
from 1952 were collected by her husband and after his death by her son
(Defendant No. 7), she was liable to render accounts till the death of her
husband, and she along with Defendant No. 7 would be jointly liable for
the period thereafter.
G
Separate Appeals were preferred by Defendant Nos. 6 and 7 to
this Court.

Allowing the Appeals, setting aside the decision of the High Court
and restoring that of the Trial Court.
H
234 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R.

HELD: 1. The principle that revenue entry furnishes presump-
A
tive evidence of title is inapplicable in the instant case. It cannot be
denied that title to Naroda Chawl could not have passed to Defendant
No. 6 by virtue of the entry Ext. 247. The value of the chawl even in
1946 was large and no registered instrument of transfer was executed.
Besides Ext. 247 describes the plaintiff's father (Bapalal) and Defen-
B dant No. 6 (Chandrakanta) as Kabjedar, that is occupant. In such
circumstances, the presumption which can be raised in favour of
Defendant No. 6 from this entry is with respect of her possession and
possession only. [238F-G J

Gangabai and others v. Fakirgowda Somaypagowda Desai and
others, AIR 1930 Privy Council 93; and Desai Navinkant Kesarlal v.
c Prabhat Kabhai, 9 Gujarat Law Reporter 694, referred to.

2. The account books have to be rejected as not reliable. It is
apparent from the evidence that nobody takes the responsibility of
supporting the correctness of the entries therein. Many of the
D documents produced by Defendant No. 1 were accepted, but the
account books which were S. Nos. 123-75 to 123-97 of Ext. 123 were in
express terms not admitted. The plaintiff Died his objection-Ext. 172.
Defendant No. 6 also tiled her objection-Ext. 275. The books were
admitted in evidence and marked as exhibits on the statement of the .)
plaintiff which he made in croSs-examination. The plaintiff by saying
E that he had written as per the instructions of Defendant No. 1 made it
clear that he could not vouchsafe for its reliability. Defendant No. 1
could not summon courage to support them either personally or
through any witness. No reason has been suggested as to why he did not
produce other important documents in his possession which could have
supported the account books and the joint case of the parties resisting J
F the appellant's claim. [243B-E] -\

3. Defendant No. 1 cannot be treated to be in joint possession as
he was actually collecting the rents from the tenants. it is well settled
that the possession of the agent is the possession of the principal and in
view of the fiduciary relationship, Defendant No. 1 cannot be permitted
G to claim his own possession. [247D-E] ,

David Lyell v. John Lawson Kennedy, [1889] XIV H.L.(E) 437;
Williams v. Pott, L.R. XII Equity Cases 149 and Secretary of State for
India v. Krishnamoni Gupta, 29 Indian Appeals 104, referred to.

H 4(a). It is the intention to claim exclusive title which makes
CHANDRAKAN'l'ABEN v. V.B. MODI 235

·)-- possession adverse and this animus possidendi most be evidenced aud
A
effectuated by the manner of occupancy which again depends upon the
nature of the property. The manner of possession depends upon the
kind of possession which the particular property is susceptible. That
possession to the extent to which it is capable of demonstration must be
hostile and exclusive and will cover only to the extent of the owner's
\ possession. [246E-F] B
\ .
'"· (b). The title to the chaw! as owner, subject to the tenancy was an
interest in immovable property so as to be covered by Article 144 of the
Indian Limitation Act, 1908, which specifically mentioned, " ••. or any
interesttherein". [246E]

In the instant case, the parties have been fighting for the rent C
~ · from the chaw! so long as it continued in possession of the tenants.
Before the gift of 1946 the Defendant No. I was collecting the rent and
he continued to do so even thereafter till 1952. The appellant has,
however, established her case that the Defendant No. 1 acted as her
agent after 1946 and when he repudiated this agency in 1952 he was D
effectively removed from the management of the chaw!. Since 1946 the
tenants attorned to the Defendant No. 6 and paid rent to her under
printed receipts announcing her ownership, bnt of course through her
agent the Defendant No. 1. The fact that the tenants have been in actual
physical possession of the chaw! is, in the circumstances, of no assis-
tance to the respondents. What is material is that they paid the rent to E

- the Defendant No. 6. Defendant No. 6 was in adverse possession from
the period 1946 to 1952 through her agent Defendant No. 1 and there-
after through her husband and son Defendant No. 7 till 1960 when the
suit was filed, the total period being more than 12 years. [246G-H; 248G I
I
-""\
'~ Uppalapati Veera Venkata Satyanarayanaraju and another v. F
. Josyula Hanumayamma and another, [1963] 3 SCR 910 and Hari
Prasad Agarwal/a and another v. Abdul Haw and others, A.I.R. 1951
Patna 160, referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 410
ii.- and 520(N) of 1973. G

From the Judgment and Decree dated 21/22/23.11.1972 of the
Gujarat High Court in First Appeal Nos. 454 and 455 of 1970.

B.K. Mehta, D.N. Misra, J.B. Dadachanji & Co. and N.J.
Modi, for the Appellants. H
236 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R.
-{
A S.K. Dholakia, P.H. Pareklr, J.H. Parekh, Ms. Sunita Sharma,
Krishan Kumar, Vim al Dave and H.J. Javeri, for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

B SHARMA, J. These appeals are directed against the decision of
the Gujarat High Court in an appeal arising out of a suit for partition
instituted by the respondent No. 1, Vadilal Bapalal Modi (since ~
deceased).
~

2. The father of the plaintiff Vadilal was Bapalal who had 5
sons-the plaintiff, Ramanlal, Gulabchand, Kantilal and Jayantilal;
c and a daughter-Champaben. Gulabchand was impleaded as the first
defendant in the suit and on his death his heirs and legal representa- ~
tives have been substituted. Kantilal and Champaben are defendants
No. 2 and 3 respectively. Ramanlal predeceased Bapalal and his wife
and son are defendants No. 4 and 5. Jayantilal also died earlier and his
D wife Smt. Chandrakantaben, defendant No. 6 is the appellant in Civil
Appeal No. 418 of 1973. Their children are defendants No. 7 to 12.
Civil Appeal No. 520 of 1973 has been preferred by the 7th defendant,
Narendra.
.f-
3. The suit by Vadilal was instituted in 1960, claiming share in
E the considerably large properties detailed in the Schedule to the plaint,
but the present appeals are not related to any other item excepting the
property described as a chaw! admeasuring 7 acres and 2 gunthas of
land with 115 rooms and huts, situated in the Naroda locality in
Ahmedabad under Lot No. 8 of the plaint which has been referred to
-
F
by the counsel for the parties before us as the chaw! or the Naroda
chaw!. According to the case of the defendants No. 6 to 12, this pro-
r
perty exclusively belongs to defendant No. 6 and is not liable to parti- i
tion. The other defendants contested the claim of the plaintiff with
respect to some other items, but so far the disputed chaw! is con-
cerned, they supported the plaintiffs' case that it belonged to the joint
family and is liable to partition.
G f
4. The land of Lot No. 8 was acquired by Bapalal in 1932 for a
sum of Rs.9,450 and the rooms were constructed thereon in about
1934. It has been held by the High Court, and the finding has not been
challenged before us, that Bapalal acquired the property and built the
chaw I with the aid of ancestral joint funds, and the property, there-
H fore, belonged to the family. According to the case of the defendants

r
CHANDRAKANTABEN v. V.B. MODI [SHARMA, J.l 237

~)-- No. 6 to 12, Bapalal orally gifted the property to his daughter-in-law A
Chandrakanta the 6th defendant, in March, 1946 and made a state-
ment before the Revenue authorities on the basis of which her name
was mutated, and she was put in possession thereof. Admittedly 114
rooms in the Naroda chaw I had been let out to tenants, and one room
was retained for the caretaker. According to Chandrakanta's case,
B
\. although she came in peaceful possession, the management which
l included realisation of rent was in .the hands of Gulabchand
...
· _ (defendant No. 1). It appears that in 1952 some dispute arose and
Chandrakanta assumed direct charge of the Naroda chaw! and has

- remained in possession thereafter. Thus she has been in exclusive
possession of the disputed chaw! since 1946, and acquired good title
therein by adverse possession before the suit was filed in 1960. c
5. The learned Judge, City Civil Court, Ahmedabad, who tried
the suit, held that Bapalal and his sons constituted a joint Hindu family
and the business carried on by Bapalal was for the benefit of the family
and the income from the business was thrown in the common pool and
D
all the properties including the disputed chaw! were treated as belong-
ing to the family. Proceeding further it has been found that the case of
the defendant No. 6 about the gift, the mutation of her name, and her
exclusive possession from 1946 till the date of the suit was correct. She
was accordingly held to have acquired a title by adverse possession.
The suit, therefore, was dismissed with respect to the disputed chaw!.
E
For the purpose of the present appeal it is not essential to mention the

-
findings of the trial court relating to the other items of the suit pro-
perty. The plaintiff appealed before the Gujarat High Court. Some of
the defendants also filed two separate appeals against the judgment of
the trial court dealing with other items of property with which we are
not concerned. The appeals were heard and disposed of together by a
....., common judgment in November 1972. The High Court reversed the
( finding of adverse possession in regard to the disputed chaw! and
granted a decree for partitton, It was held that the defendant No. 6
remained in exclusive possession of the property only since 1952 and
the peirod was thus short of the time required for prescription of title.
Dealing with the relief for rendition of accounts, the Court held that
G
since the rents of the chaw! from 1952 were collected by Jayantilal,
Chandrakanta's husband and after his death by her son Narendra
(defendant No. 7), Chandrakanta was liable to render accounts till the
death of her husband and she along with defendant No. 7 would be
jointly liable for the period thereafter. The present appeals are
directed against this judgment. H
238 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R.

5. According to the case of the defendant no. 6, her husband, --1.
A
Jayantilal, used to indulge in speculative business and he was, there-
fore, not considered a dependable person. To ensure economic stabi-
lity of Chandrakanta and her children, her father-in-law, Bapalal
decided to make a gift of the Naroda chaw! to her. Both Bapalal and
Chandrakanta appeared before the Talati of Naroda on 5.3.1946 and
8 made statements. The original statement of Bapalal recorded by the
Talati and signed by Bapalal was produced and marked as Ext. 268 in
the trial court and similarly the statement of Chandrakanta as Ext. _,,\
269. Bapalal has stated in Ext. 268 that Chandrakanta had loyally
served him and, therefore, he was making the gift. A prayer was
made for substitution of her name in the revenue records. A similar
prayer was made by the lady in Ext. 2o9. The extract from the
c Record of Rights is Ext. 247 which mentions Bapalal as the occupant
of the Naroda chaw!. The entry was made in May 1933. This entry ap- -I
pears to have been placed within brackets and a second entry inserted
mentioning Chandrakanta 'wife of Jayantilal Bapalal'. Mr. B.K.
Mehta, the learned counsel for the appellant has strongly relied upon
D the revenue entry as proof of her title. Reference was made to the
decision in Gangabai and others v. Fakirgowda Somaypagowda Desai
and others, A.I.R. 1930 Privy Council 93; and Desai Navinkant Kesar-
lal v. Prabhat Kabhai, 9 Gujarat Law Reporter 694. It was pointed out
by the learned counsel that in the Privy Council case also the revenue \
records, which were under consideration, were prepared under the -t-
E Bombay Land Revenue Code, that is the same Code under which Ext.
247 was prepared and it was observed in the judgment that the revenue
entry furnished presumptive evidence of title. The Gujarat case also
indicated that a presumption as to the rights in the concerned property
arose in favour of the person whose name was entered. We are not
very much impressed by this part of argument of the learned counsel as ~
F it cannot be denied that title to Naroda chaw! could not have passed to /
the defendant no. 6 by virtue of the entry Ext. 247. The value of the A
chaw! even in 1946 was large and no registered instrument of transfer
was executed. Besides Ext. 247 describes Bapalal and thereafter
Chandrakanta as Kabjedar, that is, occupant. In these circumstances
the presumption which can be raised in favour of Chandrakanta from
G this entry is with respect to her possession and possession only.

7. There is a serious dispute between the parties as to the actual
physical possession of the chaw! during the period 1946 to 1952 and we
will have to consider the evidence on this aspect in some detail. In 1952
there was direct confrontation between Chandrakanta and the
H defendant no. 1, Gulabchand. On 14.4.1952 a public notice was
CHANDRAKANTABEN v. V.B. MODI !SHARMA, J.J 239

}'- published in a local daily named 'Sandesh' vide Ext. 254 wherein
A
· Gulabchand informed and called upon the tenants in the chaw! to pay
the rent to him within 3 days against receipts to be issued, failing which
legal steps would 'be taken against them. On the very next day
'Sandesh' carried another public notice Ext. 255 issued by Ch~dra-
kanta asserting her title and exclusive possession and, repudiating i)le
\ claim of Gulabchand. The tenants w~re warned that Gulabchand or B
\ any other person on his behalf had no right or authority to dispute her
';... claim. On the same day, i.e., on 15.4.1952 another public notice was
published in 'Sandesh' at the instance of Gulabchand reiterating his
claim and asserting that his father Bapalal (who was then alive) was
the owner. It appears that no further action was taken by any of the
parties. The evidence on the record shows that Bapalal had withdrawn
himself from wordly affairs and was staying in Vrindavan near c
)- Mathura. The evidence led by Chandrakanta of her exclusive posses-
sion from 1952 through her husband and son till the date of the suit was
accepted as reliable by the High Court. Thus there is concurrent find-
ing of both the two courts below accepting her exclusive possession
from 1952 onwards. The learned counsel for the plaintiff has, there- D
fore, rightly not challenged before us this finding which we are
independently also satisfied is a correct one.

8. The actual position of the chaw! from 1946 to 1952 becomes
-+ crucial, as Chandrakanta is bound to fail if she is not successful in
proving her adverse possession for this period. As has been stated E

-
earlier, the suit was filed in 1960 and her possession since 1952 cannot
be treated long enough for a prescriptive title to accrue. The parties
have, therefore, taken great pains to prove before us their rival cases
as to the possession of the chaw! from 1946 to 1952.
-...\ 9. The defendant no. 1 was admittedly managing the properties F
~ belonging to the family. Out of 115 rooms in Naroda chaw! only 114
were let out to tenants and one room was retained in which, according
to the case of Chandrakanta, a caretaker known as Gangia Pathan,
engaged by Bapalal, was stayirtg. After collecting the rent from the
tenants the Pathan used to hand over the money to the defendant no.
1. After the gift, it was decided that the same arrangement would G
": continue but the defendant no. 1 would be managing the property on
her behalf and after receipt of the rent he would deliver the same to
her. She claims that this ~rrangement was acted upon. Admittedly the
total rent collection from the chaw! was not large and after deducting
the expenses including the maintenance and repair costs and the salary
of the Jamadar (caretaker) the money left was not a considerable sum. H
240 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R.

A According to the evidence of Chandrakanta the Pathan left the service
and his· whereabouts are not known and another Jamadat with the
name of Maganji came in his place. He looked after the chaw! till
1950. Thereafter he was substituted by Nathu Singh. Maganji's present
whereabouts are also not known. In 1952 Gulabchand made a claim to
B the chaw! repudiating the ownership of Chandrakanta and he was,
therefore, removed.
, I
10. The appellant has relied on a large number of rent receipts A.
filed by her and her learned counsel laid great stress on five of them
which have been marked as Exts. 240 to 243 and 250 issued in
December 1947, January 1948, June 1948 April 1949 and July 1947 •
c respectively. It is significant to note that the defendant no. 1 was in
charge of the collection of the rent upto 1952 according to the case of
all the parties. The parties contesting the claim of the appellant con-
tend that he was so doing on behalf of the entire family and not on
behalf of Chandrakanta as claimed by her. The defendant no. 1, how-
D ever, did not choose to enter the witness box nor did he produce any
document which could have supported his case. The counter-foil
receipts were in his possession and neither they were filed by the
defendant no. 1 nor the plaintiff called for the same. Defendant no.
6 was able to examine two of the tenants-Vajesingh (D.W. 1) and
Nathaji (D.W. 2). They filed a large number of receipts issued to them
evidencing payment of rent. The list of documents ·filed by them are
E
printed on pages 394 to 395 of the paper book and have been marked

-
as Exts. 237 and 239. 12 receipts in the list Ext. 237 are for the period
1.6.1946 to 30.5.1949 and 7 of the list Ext. 239 are from 1.1.1947 to
30.9.1949. They support the case of Chandrakanta inasmuch as on the
top of these receipts are printed the following words:
F
" CHAWL OF BAI CHANDRAKANTA THE WIFE OF (
r
MODI JAYANTILAL BAPALAL"
•
Out of them the receipts Exts. 240 to 243 were admittedly issued when
the defendant no. 1 was incharge of collection of rent and it is not
denied that they were issued at his instance during the crucial period. ·
G
The other receipt Ext. 250 was issued for the period 1.6.1947 to
1.7.1947 under the signature of the plaintiff Vadilal and this also simi- I
larly carried the description of the chaw! as belonging to Chandra-
kanta. No explanation is forthcoming on behalf of either the defendant
no. 1 or the plaintiff as to how they were issuing receipts of the above
H description.
CHANDRAKANTABEN v. V.B. MODI [SHARMA, J.] 241

11. From the evidence it appears that although defendant no. 1
A
was in-charge of the management of the chaw! during 1946 to 1952, the
actual collection from the individual tenants was made by the Jamadar
(caretaker) who generally signed the receipts and handed over the
collected amount to the defendant no. 1. The tenant Nathaji (D.W. 2)
has said that Maganji Jamadar nsed to prepare the receipts. It has been

\
\ argued before us on behalf of the plaintiff that the receipts were filed B
after the examination of the plaintiff was over and so he could not
;... explain the same, specially the one receipt issued under his signature.

- It is significant to note that the cases of the plaintiff, the defendant no.
1 and the other defendants excepting defendants 6 to 12 are common
so far the Naroda chaw! was concerned and the turn of these
defendants leading evidence at the trial of the suit came later. The
c
evidence of Chandrakanta was closed on 29.9.1964 and the witnesses
for the defendant no. 1 were examined on 20.10.1964. Besides, the
plaintiff could have re-examined himself if he had any explanation to
offer. The cross"examination of D. W. 2 on his behalf also indicates
that no suggestion to the witness by way of explanation was made. In
his evidence plaintiff stated that he was also collecting the rent from D
the different tenants in chaw! at the instance of defendant no. 1 and he
used to hand over the collections to him. He admitted the fact that
there were counter-foils which ramained with the defendant no. 1. The
High Court while examining this aspect accepted and relied on Ext.
250 signed by the plaintiff, but failed to appreciate the significance of
the description of the N aroda chaw! on the receipt as the property of E

- the defendant no. 6. Similar is the position of the defendant no. 1 who
did not come to the witness box at all. Chandrakanta examined herself
as D.W. 3 and supported her case. Although there are some minor
discrepancies in her deposition, the same is consistent with the
-\_ .. documents and the circumstances in the case and appears to be
lreliable. F

12. While reversing the finding of the trial court that Chandra-
kanta was in exclusive possession of the chaw! not only from 1952
onwards but even earlier since 1946, the High Court was mainly
impressed by three items of the evidence, namely, i) certain account
-.. books claimed to be the books at the joint family, ii) several Income- G
Tax returns filed by the defendant no. 1, and iii) a document of agree-
ment, Ext. 167. So far the Income-Tax papers are concerned, they are
of the period after 1952 and it has already been stated earlier that the
High Court has agreed with the trial court that since 1952 •the
defendant no. 6 was in adverse possession of the chaw!. In view of this
finding, with which we fully agree, the Income-Tax documents do not H
242 SUPREME COURT REPORTS I1989] 2 S.C.R.
h!lve any impact, except showing that the author of these returns was
A
falsely including income therein which did not accrue to the family. So
far the account books and the deed of agreement are concerned, it will
be necessary or appreciating their true nature and impact on this case,
to consider some more facts.

B 13. The account books were produced by the defendant no. 1
witn a list of documents, Ext. 123. The defendant no. 1, however, did
not lead any evidence with respect to the same when his turn at the
trial came. As mentioned earlier, he personally avoided the witness
box, but examined some witnesses who did not attempt either to prove •
the books or speak about their authenticity. The books were admitted
in evidence and marked as exhibits on the statement of the plaintiff
c which he made in cross-examination. Some of the books were shown
to him and he admitted that they were in his hand writing, but
immediately added;

"I have written them as per the instructions of defendant
D No. 1 and as directed by him. They are maintained from
month to month."

The income from the Naroda chaw! which was admittedly very small as
compared to the vastness and the present value of the property, was
included in the account books. According to the case of the respon-
E dent the books are authentic, and disclosed the true state of affairs.
There was considerable discussion at the bar before us as well as
before the High Court as is apparent from the judgment under appeal,
relating to the law of evidence dealing with account books. Reliance
was placed on Sec. 34 of the Indian Evidence Act which provides that
entries in books of account regularly kept in the course of business are / .
F relevant whenever they refer to a matter into which the Court has to .•
enquire. It has been contended on behalf of the respondents that since
the plaintiff stated that the books were being maintained from month
to month the requirement of law was satisfied. Mr. Mehta, the learned
counsel for the appellant argued that apart from the formal proof of
the execution of the document, the party relying thereon was under a
G duty to lead evidence in support of the correctness of the entries in the
books which is completely lacking here. Besides, it was pointed out
that the relevant books are merely joint khatabahis of Samvat 2005 to
2006 equivalent to 1948 to 1949 without the support of primary
evidence of the cash books .. The other relevant documents which are
admittedly in possession of the defendant no. 1 have not been pro-
H duced, including the account books of other years during the crucial
CHANDRAKANTABEN v. V.B. MODI [SHARMA, J.] 243
'r period, the Income-tax returns and assessment orders for the period
A
1946 to 1952 and the counter-foil rent receipts.

14. It is apparent from the evidence that nobody takes the re-
sponsibility of supporting the correctness of the entries in the account
books. When they were produced in Court the plaintiff filed his objec-
tion as per his purshis, Ext. 172 (page 368 of the paper book). Many of B
the documents produced by the defendant no. 1 were accepted, but the
account books which were serial nos. 123-75 to 123-97 of the list Ext.
123 were in express terms not admitted. The plaintiff said that they
might be exhibited, but subject to his objection. The defendant no. 6
'
also filed her objection as per the purshis Ext. 275. The plaintiff did
not make any statement supporting the books in his examination in C
.__ chief and only in reply to the question of the cross-examining lawyer of
I the defendant no. 1, he stated as mentioned earlier. It is significant to
note that by saying that he had written as per the instructions of the
defendant no. 1 he made it clear that he could not vouchsafe for their
reliability. In spite of this situation, the defendant no. 1 could not
sommon courage to support them either personally or through any D
witness. No reason has been suggested at all on his behalf as to why he
did not produce the other important documents in his possession which
would have supported the account books and the joint case of the
...\- parties resisting the appellants' claim. In view of all these cir-
cumstances we have no hesitation in rejecting the account books as not
reliable. E

- 15. So far Ext. 167 is concerned, the High Court has relied upon
it as the Naroda chaw! has been treated by the document as belonging
to the joint family. It was executed on 24.10.1954 by the plaintiff and
-"\ his three brothers but not by Jayantilal, the husband of defendant no.
~ 6, although he is also shown as a party thereto. The brothers appear to F
·have settled their dispute with respect to different items of property
and the disputed Naroda chaw! is shown as the seventh item in the list
of properties. Although the four brothers personally signed the docu-
ment, so far J ayantilal's branch was concerned the signature of
Narendra, defendant no. 7, who was a minor then, was taken.
"". Reliance has been placed on the attestation of Bapalal, the father of G
the executants. Two days earlier, i.e., on 22.10.1954, he had executed
a release deed, Ext. 222 giving up his right in the family properties for
a sum of money named therein. He was already staying in Vrindavan
for sometime past and proposed to spend the rest of his life there. The
release deed, however, did not contain any list of properties and the
document, therefore, is not of any help to either side. So far the H
244 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R.

argreement Ext. 167 is concerned, it has not been stated by anybody
A
that Bapalal went through its contents or that somebody.read the same
to him before he attested it. There is no presumption that an attesting
witness of a document must be assumed to be aware of its contents.
What is significant, however, is that it was executed in 1954 when the
defendant no. 6 was in adverse possession to the exclusion of the
B defendant no. 1 and the other members of the family, and Jayantilal
did not join the document and his brothers chose to get the signature
of his minor son. This is consistent with their dishonest attempt to
include the income from the chaw! in the Income-Tax returns of the
period after 1952, when the defendant no. 6 undoubtedly was in exclu-
sive possession. As has been stated earlier, in 1952 there was a direct
confrontation between them on the one hand and the defendant no. 6
c on the other, when public notices were published in 'Sandesh'. If their
case about their earlier possession had been true they would have
produced their Income-Tax returns and the assessment orders of that
period, i.e. 1946 to 1952. The family was possessed of vast properties
and was paying Income-Tax. The. entire circumstances lead to the
D irresistible conclusion that after the defendant no. 1 was removed by
the defendant no. 6 from the management of the disputed Naroda
chaw! he and the other members of the family started creating
evidence in support of their false claim. We do not in the circumst-
ances place any reliance on this deed of agreement.

E 16. So far the oral evidence in the case is concerned, the
plaintiff, Vadilal examined himself as a witness, but was not supported
by any other member of the family, although his brothers, Gulabchand
and Kantilal, defendants 1and2 respectively, were alive when the case
was heard in the trial court. Even his nephew, Rajnikant, defendant
no. 5, son of deceased Ramanlal did not prefer to come to the witness
F box. The husband of the defendant no. 6, Jayantilal had died in 1956,
i.e., about 3-4 years before the institution of the suit. Chandrakanta
examined herself in support of her case and was cross-examined at
'
considerable length. Her son, Narendra defendant no. 7, who was
minor in 1954 when Ext. 167 was executed, was also examined as a
witness. After the death of his father, Jayantilal in 1956, he started
G collecting the rent of the chaw!, and as stated earlier both the courts
have concurrently held in favour of the exclusive possession of the
defendant no. 6 from 1952 onwards. The plaintiff, however, claimed
that the chaw! was in the possession of the family even later than 1952.
We have been taken through his evidence and the evidence of
Chandrakanta in extenso by the learned counsel for the parties, who
H mad~ long comments thereon during their arguments. Both the judg-
CHANDRAKANTABEN v. V.B. MODI [SHARMA, J.[ 245 ·

'r ments of the trial court and the High Court have discussed the
evi.dence at length and we do not consider it necessary to once more A
deal with them in detail. We agree with the reasons given by the trial
court for accepting the case and the evidence of the defendant no. 6
and rejecting the planitiffs oral evidence and the case of the respon-
dents. The plaintiff contradicted himself so seriously during his
f examination that at one stage he had to expressly admit that several of B
, the statements made in his examination in chief were 'false' (see
). paragraph 25). It was demonstrated by the further cross-examination
that he had made many more incorrect statements. On the other hand,
Chandrakanta's evidence is far superior. Although she also made some
inconsistent statements, but the discrepancies did not relate to any
matter of vital importance. Her evidence substantially is reliable and is
~ supported by important circumstances of (i) the mutation of her name
c
( in place of Bapalal on the basis of a statement of the latter; (ii) the
description of the chawl as belonging to her on the printed rent
receipts given to the tenants out of which some were issued by the
defendant no. 1 and the plaintiff, and (iii) the suppression of vital
materials in possession of the defendant no. 1 which were withheld D
from the Court. The conduct of the parties in not filing the suit before
1960 is also consistent with the correctness of her case. When the
defendant no. 1 was effectively removed from the management of the
•
-4- property by the defendant no. 6 in 1952, Bapalal was alive. The
defendant no. 1 as also the other members of the family contesting her
claim kept quiet and did not risk starting a litigation during his life E
time. Even in 1960 it was the plaintiff and not the defendant no. 1 who
instituted the present suit in which he included the Naroda chaw! in the
schedule of properties to be partitioned. The defendant no. 1 was man-
aging the affairs of the family, but did not take any steps to dislodge
- ...,. the defendant no. 6 from the chawl. The impugned judgment indicates
, that there were serious differences between the plaintiff and the f
.i defendant no. 1 on other items of property and the main reason for the
plaintiff to file the suit does not appear to be his claim to the Naroda
chaw!.. We do not consider it necessary to reiterate the other reasons
given in the trial court judgment in support of the decision in favour of
the appellant, with which we agree. We, therefore, hold that the
y defendant no. 6 remained in exclusive adverse possession of the dis- G
puted Naroda chaw! right from 1946 onwards till the suit was filed in
1960.

17. Mr. Dholakia, the learned counsel for the contesting respon-
dents contended that since the chaw) has remained in actual possession
of the tenants, Bapalal or the family must be held to be in symbolic H
246 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19891 2 S.C.R.

possession in 1946 and for that reason the defendant no. 6 also can not ~
A
be treated to have come in actual possession of the property, which
could have permitted her to prescribe a title in the chaw!. The learned
counsel further argued that since the defendant no. 1 and the plaintiff
were actually collecting rent from the tenants they also must be held to
be in joint possession and, therefore, the aefendant·no. 6 can not
B succeed as she has not been able to prove their ouster. The other
members of the joint family will also be entitled to rely on this aspect
so as to successfully defend their right. Reliance was placed on the ~.
decision of the Patna High Court in Hari Prasad Agarwa/la and
another v. Abdul Haq and others, A.LR. 1951Patna160; in support of
the argument that for adverse possession actual physical possession is
C necessary and mere constructive possession is not sufficient. We are
afraid, it is not possible to accept the argument.

18. The subject matter of dispute in the present case is the title
to the chaw! as the owner-landlord subject to the tenancy of the
tenants in possession. Neither the plaintiffs nor the defendants are
D claiming the actual physical possession of the chaw! by eviction of the
tenants. Any reference to the actual physical possession of the tenant
is, therefore, wholly irrelevant for the purpose of the present con-
troversy. It has to be remembered that the title to the chaw! as owner,
subject to the tenancy was an interest in immovable property so as to +
be covered by Article 144 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, which
E specifically mentioned, " .... or any interest therein". These words
were retained in Article 65 of the new Limitation Act. It is true that it
is the intention to claim exclusive title which makes possession adverse
and this animus possidendi must be evidenced and effectuated by the
manner of occupancy which again depends upon the nature of the
property. The manner of possession depends upon the kind of posses- )"
F sion which the particular property is susceptible. That possession to
the extent to which it is capable of demonstration must be hostile and •
exclusive and will cover only to the extent of the owner's possession.
In the present case the parties have been fighting for the rent from the
chaw! so long as it continues in possession of the tenants. Before the
gift of 1946 the defendant no. 1 was collecting the rent and he con-
G tinued to do so even thereafter till 1952. The appellant has, however, )'
established her case that the defendant no. 1 acted as her agent after
1946 and when he repudiated this agency in 1952 he was effectively
removed from the management of the chaw!. Since 1946 the tenants
attorned to the defendant no. 6 and paid rent to her under printed
receipts announcing her ownership, but of course through her agent
H the defendant no. 1. The actual physical possession of the tenants in
CHANDRAKANTABEN v. V.B. MODI [SHARMA, J.] 247

'r the circumstances would enable the appellant to establish her prescrip- A
tive title. The decision in Uppalapati Veera Venkata Satyanarayanaraju
and anotherv. Josyula Hanumayamma and another, [1963] 3 SCR 910,
indicates that if a tenant makes an attomment in favour of a person
who is not the true owner and follows and paying the rent to him, such
a person must be held to have effective possession. The landlord must
\ be deemed to be in possession throngh his tenant is also demonstrated B
t by another illustration. If the tenant trespasses over the neighbour's
''). land treating it to be covered by his tenancy and remains in possession
·for the requisite period so as to prescribe a title thereto, his interest
therein is limited to the interest of the tenant and his landlord acquires
the title of the owner. The conduct of such a tenant has been aptly
described as stealing for the landlord (see I.L.R. 10 Calcutta 820 and
(1949) 54 C.W.N. 879). The fact that the tenants have been in actual
c
)- physical possession of the chaw! is, in the circumstances, of no assis-
tanee to the respondents. What is material is that they paid the rent to
the defendant no. 6.

19. There is no merit in the further argument that the defendant D
no. 1 must be treated to be in joint possession as he was actually
collecting the rent from the tenants. It is well settled that the posses-
sion of the agent is the possession of the principal and in view of the
fiduciary relationship the defendant no. 1 cannot be permitted to claim
~- his own possession. This aspect was well emphasised in David Lyell v.
John Lawson Kennedy, [1889] XIV H.L. (E) 437, where the agent who E

- was collecting the rent from the tenants on behalf of the owner and
depositing it in a separate earmarked account continued to do so even
after the death of the owner. After more than 12 years of the owner's
death his heir's assignee brought the action against the agent for
_..__. possession and the agent defendant pleaded adverse possession and
•. limitation. The plaintiff succeeded in the first court. But the action was F
l dismissed by the Court of Appeal. The House of Lords reversed the
decision of the Court of Appeal and remarked: "For whom, and on
whose behalf, were those rents received after Ann Duncan's death?
Not by the respondent for himself, or on his own behalf, anymore than
during her life time". Em phasing the fiduciary character of the agent
his possession was likened to that of trustee, a solicitor or an agent G
": receiving the rent under a power of attorney. Another English case of
Williams v. Pott, L.R. XII Equity Cases 149, arising out of the
circumstances similar to the present case was more interesting. The
agent in that case was the real owner of the estate but he collected the
rents for a considerably long period as the agent of his principal who
was his mother. After the agent's death his heir claimed the estate. H
248 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R.

A The mother (the principal) had also by then died after purporting by
her will to devise the disputed lands to the defendants upon certain
trusts. The claim of the plaintiff was dismissed on the plea of adverse
possession. Lord Romilly, M.R., in his judgment observed that since
the possession of the agent was the possession of the principal, the
agent could not have made an entry as long as he was in the position of
B the agent or his mother, and that he could not get into possession
without first resigning his position as her agent which he could have t
done by saying: "The property is mine; I claim the rents, and I shall 1
apply the rents for my own purposes". The agent had thus lost his title
by reason of his own possession as agent of the principal. A similar
situation arose in Secretary of State for India v. Krishnamoni Gupta, 29
Indian Appeals 104, a case between lessor and lessee. There the
c proprietors of the land in dispute, Mozumdars were in actual physical
possession but after getting a settlement from the Government in
ignorance of their title. The Government contended that the posses-
sion of the Mozumdars was, in circumstances, the possession of the
Government claiming the proprietory right in the disputed land and
D that such possession was in exclusion and adverse to the claim of the
Mozumdars to be proprietors thereof. The plea succeeded. It was
observed by the Judicial Committee.

"It may at first sight seem singular that parties should be -i.
barred by lapse of time during which they were in physical
E possession, and estopped from disputing the title of the
Government. But there is no doubt that the possession of
the tenant is in law the possession of the landlord or
superior proprietor, and it can make no difference whether

F
the tenant be one who might claim adversely to his landlord
or not. Indeed, in such a case it may be thought that the
adverse character of the possession is placed beyond
r
controversy."

We are, therefore, of the view that the defendant No. 6 was in
adverse possession from the period 1946 to 1952 through her agent
defendant No. 1 and thereafter through her husband, Jayantilal and
G son, defendant No. 7 till 1960 when the suit was filed, the total period
being more than 12 years.

21. For the reasons mentioned above, the decision of the High
Court must be held to be erroneous. Consequently the decrees for
accounts against the defendants No. 6 and 7 must also go. Accord-
H ingly, the appeals are allowed, the decision of the High Court, so far
CHANDRAKANTABEN v. V.B. MODI [SHARMA, J.] 249
·~
the subject matter of the present appeals is concerned, is set aside and A
that of the trial court restored. In view of the close relationship of the
parties and the other circumstances, the parties are directed to bear
their own costs throughout.

N.V.K. Appeals allowed.
B

- /

----...;

l.