Holding

The phrase "to the possession of which he is entitled" refers to an ownership right, not mere tenancy, so the landlord may evict even though he occupies another leased premises.

Summary

The respondent landlord sought eviction of the appellant tenant under the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 on three grounds, including a bona‑fide requirement for personal occupation of the non‑residential premises. The Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority found the landlord’s requirement bona‑fide and ordered eviction; the High Court set aside the default ground but upheld the bona‑fide requirement. The tenant appealed, contending that the landlord already occupied another shop on lease and therefore could not invoke Section 10(3)(a)(iii) which requires the landlord to be "entitled to possession" of a building. The Supreme Court held that "entitled to possession" means a right of ownership, not mere tenancy, and that the landlord’s existing lease does not bar eviction. Relying on M. Padmanabha Setty v. K.P. Papiah Setty and the parallel provision in the Mysore Rent and Accommodation Control Act, the Court affirmed the lower courts' findings and dismissed the appeal, granting the tenant time to vacate.

Issues considered

Whether a landlord who is already in possession of another non‑residential premises on lease is "entitled to possession" of a building for the purpose of evicting a tenant under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960.
Interpretation of the phrase "to the possession of which he is entitled" in the said provision.
Whether the landlord's requirement for the premises is bona‑fide despite his existing business premises.

Legislation cited

Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960s. 10(3)(a)(iii), s. 22

Subjects

evictionrent controlbona fide requirementpossessionlandlordtenantinterpretation of statutenon‑residential premises

Judgment

k

SMT. G. KAUSHALYA DEVI A
v.
GHANSHYAMDAS

JANUARY 12, 2000

[S. SAGIR AHMED AND D.P. WADHWA, JJ.] B

Rent Control & Eviction :

Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act,
196<r--Section 10(3)(a/(iii)--Bonafide requirement of Landlord 'to the pos- C
session of which he is entitled"~onnotation of-Held: does not include
possession otherwise than as owner.

The respondent landlord filed an eviction petition against the appel-
lant tenant under the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Evic-
tion) Control Act, 1960 on the ground of wilful default in payment of rent, D
bonafide requirement for personal occupation and that the tenant had
secured alternative accommodation. The suit premises was non-residen-
tial.

Before the Rent Controller, the ground of securing alternative ac- E
commodation was not pressed. The Rent Controller held that there was
default in payment of rent, and that the premises was required bonafide
by the landlord for conducting his business, and accordingly ordered
eviction. On appeal by the tenant the Appellate Authority affirmed the
findings of the Rent Controller and upheld the eviction order. On revision,
the High Court under Section 22 of the Act, held that there was no wilful F
default in the payment of rent by the tenant, but concurred with the
findings of both the courts below on the ground of bonafide requirement
of. the landlord, and dismissed the revision petition.

In appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the tenant that
the order of eviction of the tenant on the ground of bonafide requirement G
of the landlord was bad in law as it was contrary to the provisions of
Section 10(3)(a)(iii) as the landlord was already in occupation of certain
shop prembes though on lease, in the same city where he was running his
businl!ss in partnership. Under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) it was immaterial
whether the landlord was in possession of the premises as tenant or H
193
194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] 1 S.C.R.
A otherwise.
Dismissing the Appeal, this Court

HELD : 1. The provisions of Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the A.P. Rent
Control Act are in pari materia with the provisions of Section 8(3) (a) (ii) of
B the Mysore Rent and Accommodation Control Act, 1951. The expression
"to the possession which he is entitled" is found in the said provision in
the Mysore Act and was the subject matter of interpretation by the
Constitution Bench in M. Padmanabha Setty's case wherein it was held that
the words "entitled to possession" have a more positive content and are
C more akin to the right of possession which an owner has in respect of the
building owned and occupied by him. [197-C-E; 199-A-B]

M. Padmanabha Setty v. KP. Papiah Setty, [1966) 3 SCR 868 relied
on.

D 2. The contention of the appellant that since the respondent is already
having his business in a leased premises of which he is in possession, he
cannot seek eviction of the appellant, cannot be accepted. [199-B-C]

3. The High Court upheld the findings of the courts below that the
respondent required the suit premises for his personal occupation for
E conducting his business and that these findings were neither perverse nor
based on any extraneous or irrelevant material. [199-D-E]

4. The High Court was also of the view that the Act did not prohibit
eviction of the tenant by the landlord if the members of the family of the
F landlord possessed other non-residential premises. Even though the
respondent and his brothers were conducting business on partnership
basis yet it was no ground that the requirement of respondent is not
bonafide. [199-E-F]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 194 of
G 2000.
From the Judgment and Order dated 5.11.99 of tht: Andhra Pradesh
High Court in C.R.P. No. 1906 of 1999.

Dhruv Mehta, Ms. Shobha, Srinivas Rao, S.K. Mehta for the Appd-
H Iant.
SMT. G.K DEVI v. GHANSHYAMDAS [D.P. WADHWA,J.] 195

F.S. Nariman, Krishna Mandwal, P. Venugopal, P.S. Sudheer and A
K.J. John and M/s. K.J. John & Co. for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

D.P. WADHWA, J. Leave granted.
B
Appellant is a tenant. His eviction from suit premises has been
affrrmed by the High Court in revision filed by him. Feeling aggrieved, he
has filed this appeal.

Respondent-landlord filed eV1ct10n petition against the appellant
under the provisions of Andhra Pradesh Building (Lease, Rent and Evic- c
tion) Control Act, 1960 (for short, the 'Act') on three grounds, namely, (1)
willful default in payment of rent; (2) bona fide requirement for personal
occupation; and (3) the tenant 'does not require the premises as he had
secured alternative accommodation. Premises are non-residential. During
the course of proceedings before the Rent Controller, the ground of D
securing alternative accommodation was not pressed. Rent Controller held
that there was default in payment of rent and also that the premises were
required bona fide by the landlord for conducting his business. He ordered
eviction of the appellant. The Appellate Authority under the Act affirmed
the findings of the Rent Controller upholding the eviction of the appellant. E
Against that order, the appellant filed revision in the High Court under
Section 22 of the Act. High Court by the impugned judgment was of the
view that there was no willful default in payment of rent by the appellant
and on that finding order of eviction on that ground was set aside. On the
remaining ground of bona fide requirement of the landlord, High Court
concurred with the findings of both the courts. This finding has been F
assailed before us by the Appellant.

Mr. Dhruv Mehta, learned counsel appearing for, the appellant,
; submitted that the order of eviction of the appellant on the ground of bona
fide requirement of the landlord was bad in law as it was contrary to the
provisions of sub-clause (iii) of clause (a) of sub-section (3) of Section 10 G
of the Act. He said the landlord was already in occupation of certain shop
premises, though on lease, in the same city where he was running his
business in partm:rship. It was, therefore, submitted that the landlord was
thus entitled to remain in possession uf the shop premises. Section
10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act provides for eviction of the tenant when it is found H
196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2000) 1 S.C.R.
A that the landlord requires the building whether residential or non-residen-
tial for his own occupation. This section, in relevant part, we set out as
under:

10. Eviction of tenants : (1) ......

B (2) .....

(3)(a) A landlord may subject to the provisions of clause (d), apply
to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the
landlord in possession of the building --

c (i) .... .

(ii) .... .

(iii) in case it is any other non-residential building, if the landlord
is not occupying a non-residential building in the city, town or
D village concerned which is his own or to the possession of which
he is entitled whether under this Act or otherwise -

(a) for the purpose of a business which he is carrying on, on the
date of the application; or

E (b) for the purpose of a business which in the opinion of the
Controller, the landlord bona fide proposes to commence :

Provided that a person who becomes a landlord after the
commencement of the tenancy by an instrument inter vivas shall
not be entitled to apply under this clause before the expiry of three
F
months from the date on which the instrument was registered :

Provided further that, where a landlord has obtained possession
of a building under this clause he shall not be. entitled to apply
again under this clause -
G
(i) in case he has obtained possession of a residential building,
for possession of another residential building of his own;

(ii) in case he has obtained possession of a non-residential build-
-
ing, for possession of another non-residential building of his
H own.
SMT. G.K DrVI v. GHANSHYAMOAS [O.P. WADHWA,J.) 197

... (b) to (e) ... A

(4) to (8) ... "

Suit premises wt:n:: purchased by the respondt:nt-landlord by sale
deed dated 4.11.1991 wherein it was providt:d that respondent was purchas-
B
ing the premises to provide accommodation for himself for the purpose of
carrying on his own independent business. Admittedly respondent was
already having an established business dealing in Readymade Garments in
the name and style of M/s. Sectha Traders in partnership in the premises
which were leased by the partnership. It was thus submitted that since the
respondent was already in possession of a non-residential premises in the c
same very town, ground for eviction as contained in Section 10(3)(a)(iii)
of tht: Act was not available to him. It was submitted that it was immaterial
whether the respondent was in possession of the premises as tenant or
otherwise. We do not think the expression "to the possession of which he
is entitled" would mean possession otherwise than as an owner or in that D
capacity or having a superior right or under any of the grounds under the
Act. The expression "to the possession of which he is entitled" was con-
strued by the Constitution Bench of this Court in M. Padmanabha Setty v.

-. KP. Papiah Setty, [1966) 3 SCR 868.

This expression was also found in the Mysore House Rent and E
Accommodation Control Act, 1951 and was the wbject matter of inter-
pretation in the case of M. Padmanabhai Setty v. KP. Papiah Setty, (1966]
3 SCR 868. ln that case, landlord filed an application under Section
8(3)(a)(ii) of the Mysort: Act for eviction of the tenant on the ground that
he required the premises in dispute for his own right and occupation. This F
section in the Mysore Act is as under :

''(3)(a) A landlord may, subject to the provisions of clause ( d) apply

- to the court for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord
in possession of the house -
G
(i) in case it is a residential building, if the landlord requires
it for his own occupation or for the occupation of a member
of his family and if he or such member, as the case may be, is
not occupying a residential building of his own in the city, town
or village concerned ; H
198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2000] 1 S.C.R.

A (ii) in case it is a non-residential building, if the landlord requires
it for a business which he or a member of his family is carrying on
and if for the purposes of the said business is not in occupation
of a non-residential building which is owm:d by or to the posses-
sion of which the landlord or such member, as the case may be, is
entitled whether under this Act or otherwi&e" ..... .
B
''Provided further that where a landlord has obtained possession
of a house for his own use or occupation or for the use or -
occupation of a member of his family under this clause he shall
not be entitled to apply again under this clause -
c (i) ...

(ii) for possession of another non-residential building of his own,
for himself or for the same member of his family, in case he has
obtained possession of a non-residential building."
D
The Court held :

"A tenant who can be evicttd under the conditions prescribed in
s.8(2) of the Act cannot be said, in our view, to be entitled to the
possession of the premises of which he is a tenant. No doubt he
E cannot be evicted till one or more of the conditions prescribed by
the section are fulfilled, but it is difficult to equate his right to stay
in tht: premises till he is i:victed to an entitli:ment of the posst:ssion
of the premises. Section 8(3)(a)(ii) deals with two types of cases;
first where the landlord is in occupation of a non-residential
F building which is owned by him, and secondly, a non-residential
building of which he is in occupation not as a landlord but other-
wise. The object of the Act is to prevent unreasonable evictions of
tenants. Can i: be said that the Legislature is considering it to be

G
unreasonable for a landlord to shift to his own premisi:s while he
is in occupation of tenanted premises over which he has not an
absolute right of possession but only a right to remain in possession
-
till one of the conditions in &.8(2) is satisfied, and over one of which
he has no control. For instance, the landlord may require the
premises for repairs or r::construction or the nt:ighbours may
complain that the tenant is guilty of nuisance or annoyance, or the
H landlord may think that the tenant has committed some acts of
SMT. G.K. DEVI v. GHAN SHYMIDAS [D.P. WADHWA, J.j 199

.. waste as are likely to impair materially the value or utility of the A
house. If any of these conditions is proved, he is liable to be evicted.
ln our view, in the context the words "entitled to possession" have
a more positive content and are more akin to the right of posses-
sion which an owner has in respect of the building owned and
occupied by him.''
B
lt will be seen that provisions of Section 8(3)(a)(ii) of the Mysore
Act are quite in pari materia with the provisions of Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of
the Act. We, therefore, cannot accept the contention of the appellant that
since the respondent is already having his business in a leased premises of
which he is in possession, he cannot seek eviction of the appellant. lt is not
disputed that other conditions of Section 10(3)(a)(iii) are satisfied in favour
c
of the landlord. A contention was also raised that another shop had been
purchased by the mother of the respondent with the amount loaned by the
respondent and that on that ground it could also be said that the respon·
dent was entitled to possession of that shop as well. This contention has
been repelled by the High Court and rightly so. High Court upheld the D
· finding of the courts below that the respondent required the suit premises
for his pi::rsonal occupation for conducting the business and that these
findings were neither perverse or based on any extraneous or irrelevant
material. High Court was also of the view that the Act did not prohibit
eviction of the tenant by the landlord if the members of the family of the E
landlord possessed other non-residential premises. Even though the
respondent and his brothers were conducting business on partnership basis
in M/s. Seetha Traders, yet it was no ground to contend that the require-
ments of respondent is not bona fide. We agree. No other submission has
been made before us to take any diffen:nt view other than that taken by
the High Court. F

We, therefore, dismiss this appeal. However, with the consent of both
the parties, we grant time up to October 31, 2000 for the appellant to vacate
the suit premises on his filing of a usual undertaking within four weeks from
today. There will be no order as to costs.
G
P.K.S. Appeal dismissed.