Holding

Under SAFEMA, a notice under Section 6(1) need only state the authority’s reason to believe the property is illegally acquired, without expressly linking it to the detenu’s illicit proceeds, and a spouse’s forfeiture cannot be contested by attacking the COFEPOSA detention order, so the forfeiture order stands.

Summary

The appellant, Kesar Devi, wife of a smuggler detained under COFEPOSA, challenged the forfeiture of three properties under SAFEMA, arguing that the notice under Section 6(1) failed to show a nexus between the properties and the illicit proceeds of her husband and that she could also contest the COFEPOSA detention order. The Supreme Court held that a notice need only record the authority’s reason to believe the property is illegally acquired, without expressly linking it to the detenu’s money, and that the burden of proving the property is not illegally acquired lies on the person served. The Court further ruled that a COFEPOSA detention order cannot be attacked in a proceeding under SAFEMA. Since the appellant could not demonstrate an independent source of income, the inference was that the properties were bought with her husband’s illicit funds, and the forfeiture order was upheld. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether a COFEPOSA detention order can be challenged while contesting forfeiture proceedings under SAFEMA.
Whether the notice under Section 6(1) of SAFEMA must disclose a link or nexus between the property and the illegally acquired money of the detenu.
Whether the burden of proof under Section 8 of SAFEMA rests on the person affected.
Whether the competent authority complied with the condition precedent of Section 6(1) by recording reasons for belief in writing.
Whether the forfeiture order is valid when the spouse fails to prove an independent source of income.

Legislation cited

Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (COFEPOSA)s. 12-A, s. 3(1)
Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976s. 2(2)(c), s. 6(1), s. 7(1), s. 8

Subjects

SAFEMACOFEPOSAforfeiture of propertynotice under Section 6burden of prooflink nexus requirementdetention order challengespouse propertyillegal acquisitionspecial leave petition

Judgment

SMT. KESAR DEVI A
v.
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

JULY 31, 2003

[S. RAJENDRA BABU AND G.P. MATHUR, JJ.] B

Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture ofProperty)
Act, 1976-Sections 6(1), 7(1) and 8-Conservation of Foreign Exchange and
1

Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974-Section 3(1): C
Detention order-Forfeiture ofproperty-Detention order not challenged
during detention period or unsuccessfully challenged-Forfeiture order under
SAFEMA-Not open to challenge the detention order while challenging the
forfeiture order.

Notice for forfeiture-Issuance of-Condition precedent-Held:
D
Competent authority should have reason to believe that such properties are
illegally acquired properties and the reasons/or such beliefhave to be recorded
in writing-Further the burden ofproof is on the person affected-However,
authority not required to show existence of any link or nexus between the
properties sought to be forfeited and alleged illegally acquired money of the E
detenu.

Appellant's husband was found dealing with smuggled goods.
Detention order was passed against him under Conservation of Foreign
Ex£hange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (COFEPOSA).
Thereaf~er, proceedings were initiated under Smugglers and Foreign F
Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976 (SAFEMA) for

-
,
forfeiture of property. Competent Authority issued notice to the appellant
under Section 6(1) with regard to one property and her husband (detenu)
with regard to others. Detenu replied that the properties did not belong
to him but his wife. Thereafter notice was issued to the appellant with the G
copy of notice given to the detenu, calling upon her to produce the evidence
with regard to the ownership of the properties forfeited. Competent
Authority then passed forfeiture order with regard to all the properties.
Aggrieved appellant filed an appeal. Appellate Tribunal allowed the appeal
qua two properties and set aside the forfeiture order. It however, dismissed
1 H
2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A the appeal with regard to the other property and upheld the forfeiture
order. Appellant then filed writ petition assailing the detention order on
the ground that when challenge is made regarding forfeiture of the
property under SAFEMA, the Court is competent to examine the orders
passed urider COFEPOSA Act; that the detention order passed under
COFEPOSA Act was bad in law; and that the grounds of detention were
B not communicated. It was also contended that reasons for belief had not
been recorded as provided under Section 6(1) of the Act; and the finding ~
/

of the authorities that the appellant had failed to establish that she had i
purchased the property from her own income is not correct. Single Judge
of High Court dismissed the writ petition. Division Bench of the High
c Court also dismissed the special appeal. Hence the present appeal.

Appellant contended that the notice issued under Section 6(1) of
SAFEMA does not show as to how any link or nexus is established between
the properties sought to be forfeited and the alleged illegally acquired
money of the detenu; and that unless the notice itself showed the link or
D nexus between the illegally acquired money of the detenu and the property ,.
sought to be forfeited, no order for forfeiture under Section 7 could be
passed.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court

E HELD : 1. It cannot be accepted that it is open to a person to assail
the validity of a detention order passed under Conservation of Foreign
Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (COFEPOSA)
while challenging the proceedings initiated under Smugglers and foreign
Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976 (SAFEMA).
(7-A, B)
F
Attorney General for India v. Amratlal Prajivandas, 11994) 5 SCC 54, ,,,
followed.

Union of India v. Haji Mastan Mirza, (1984) 2 SCC 427, referred to.

G 2.1. The condition precedent for issuing a notice by the competent
authority under Section 6(1) is that he should have reason to believe that
all or any of such properties are illegally acquired properties and the
reasons for such belief have to be recorded in writing. The language of
the Section does not show that there is any requirement of mentioning any
H link or nexus between the convict or detenu and the property ostensibly
.,
KESAR DEVI v.U.0.1. 3
standing in the name of the person to whom the notice has been issued. A
Section 8 of the Act which deals with burden of proof is very important.
It lays ~own that in any proceedings under the Act, the burden of proving
that any property specified in the notice served under Section 6 is not
illegally acquired property, shall be on the person affected. The combined
effect of Section 6(1) and Section 8 is that the competent authority should B
have reason to believe (which reasons have to be recorded in writing) that
properties ostensibly standing in the name of a person to whom the Act
applies are illegally acquired properties, he can issue a notice to such a
person. Thereafter, the burden of proving that such property is not illegally
acquired property will be upon the person to whom notice has been issued.
The statutory provisions do not show that the competent authority, in iC
addition to recording reasons for his belief, has to further mention any
nexus or link between the convict or detenu (as described in sub-section
(2) of Section 2) and the property which is sought to be forfeited in the
sense that money or consideration for the same was provided by such
convict or detenu. [8-H; 9-A-D) D
2.2. Where the relationship is very remote one, the competent
authority may have to indicate some link or nexus while recording reasons
for belief that the property is illegally acquired property. But cases where
relationship is close and direct like spouse, son or daughter or parents,
no link or nexus has to be indicated in the reasons for belief between the E
convict or detenu and the property as such an inference can easily be
drawn. [11-B)

Union of India v. Haji Mastan Mirza, [1984) 2 SCC 427, referred to.

2.3. In the instant case, the appellant is the wife of the detenu and F
she has failed to establish that she had any income of her own to acquire
the three properties. In such circumstances, no other inference was possible
except that it was done so with the money provided by her husband.
Further, the notice clearly records the reasons for belief and, therefore,
it fully complies with the requirement of law and there is no infirmity in G
the same. (11-D; 12-G)

Smt. Fatima Mohd. Amin (dead) through L.R. v. Union of India and
Anr., (2003) 7 SCC 436, distinguished.

3. The competent authority as also the appellate authority considered H

-
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A the evidence adduced by the appellant and came to the conclusion that
there was no evidence to support the appellant's claim that she was
carrying on any business and that any savings were thus available to her
for making investment in the acquired property. The finding is based upon
a thorough and proper appraisal and consideration of the evidence on
record, and there is no reason to differ from the same. [7-E-F)
B
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2455 of 1997.

1
..
From the Judgment and Order dated 12. l.1996 of the Rajasthan High
Court in D.B.C.S.A. W. No. 699 of 1995.
c Sushi! Kumar Jain, Ms. Anjali Doshi, Ms. Ruchi Kohli and Pradeep
Aggarwal for the Appellant.

Ranjit Kumar, Ms. Binu Tamta, Ms. Sushma Suri, B.K. Prasad and Ms.
Sandhya Goswami for the Respondents.
D
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
"
G.P. MATHUR, J. I. This appeal has been preferred by special leave
against the judgment and order dated 12.1.1996 of a Division Bench of
Rajasthan High Court by which the special appeal preferred by the appellant
E against the judgment and order dated 19.7.1995 of a learned Single Judge
was dismissed and the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal for Forfeited
Property, New Delhi, was affirmed.

2. The appellant is widow of late Jagannath Sharma. The Customs and
;.
Central Excise Authorities of Jaipur recovered 5 gold bars from Jagannath
F Sharma on 24.7.1969. On 8.4.1972 Police Authorities recovered 15 gold bars
from Radha Ballabh and on 15.11. I 972 two gold bars of foreign origin were
recovered from Ram Parekh and both of them gave statements that they had
bought the same from Jagannath Sharma. On 11.10.1973 police recovered 38 ~
gold bars from one Ram Prasad Shanna and the documents showed that the
G same belonged to Jagannath Sharma. Jagannath Shanna was then detained
under MISA on 8.10.1974, but the detention order was revoked and he was
released in November, I 974. Thereafter, he was again detained on 4.8.1975
under COFEPOSA Act by an order passed by the Deputy Secretary to the
Home Department, Government of Rajasthan, Jaipur. The detention order -
was passed on the ground that the State Government was satisfied that with
H
KESARDEVI v.U.0.1. [G.P. MATHUR,J.] 5
a view to prevent Jagannath Sharma from dealing in smuggled goods and A
engaging in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods, it was
necessary to make an order under Section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act to
detain him.

3. Proceedings for forfeiture of three properties, namely, (I) House
property No. D-48, Bapu Nagar, Jaipur; (2) House property known as Haldia B
House, Johari Bazar, Jaipur (Municipal No.JD-JMC-1/10611948); and (3)

·~
House Property in Mehandi Ka Chowk, Ramganj Bazar, Jaipur (Municipal :
No.GD-JMC-1/276/1948) were initiated under the Smugglers and Foreign I
Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976 (for short .
"SAFEMA"). A notice under Section 6( l) of SAFEMA (hereinafter referred c
to as "the Act") was issued to the appellant Smt. Kesar Devi with regard to
Bapu Nagar property arid a similar notice was issued to the appellant's husband
Jagannath Sharma with regard to the other two properties, namely, Haldia
House and Mehandi Ka Chowk. Jagannath Sharma gave a reply that the
aforesaid two properties did not belong to him but belonged to his wife.
l.
D
. Thereafter, the competent authority issued a letter dated 27.4.1977 purporting
to be a notice under Section 6(2) of the Act to the appellant. In this letter
apart from enclosing a copy of the notice under Section 6( l) issued to
Jagannath Sharma as required by clause (2) of Section 6, the competent
authority called upon the appellant "to produce evidence if she was the real
owner of the aforesaid property, and if so, to indicate the source of her E
income, earnings or assets out of which or by means of which she had
acquired the properties." In her reply dated 5.5.1977, the appellant asserted
that she was the absolute and exclusive owner of all the three propeities and
the same had been purchased out of her own individual income and they had
nothing to do with her husband Jagannath Sharma. The competent authority, F
after considering the material on record passed an order under Section 7(1)
of the Act on 28. 7.1977 against the appellant forfeiting Bapu Nagar property.
A separate order was passed against Jagannath Sharma on the same date
;
forfeiting the other two properties. The orders were passed on the finding that
though the ostensible owner of the properties was Smt. Kesar Devi but the
real owner was her husband Jagannath Sharma. In appeal, the appellate G
Tribunal vi de its order dated 26. l 0.1977 set aside the order and remanded the
llJI
) matter to the competent authority to enable the appellant and her husband to
I
cross-examine the witnesses and also to produce such witnesses in support of
their case, as they may desire. Thereafter, the competent authority, after
affording an opportunity of hearing and leading evidence, passed a fresh H
6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A order, forfeiting all the three properties, namely, properties at Bapu Nagar,
Haldia House and Mehandi Ka Chowk.

4. Feeling aggrieved by the said order, the appellant preferred an
appeal before the appellate Tribunal. The appellate Tribunal held that in the
notice issued to the appellant under Section 6(1) ofthe Act, two properties,
B

-
namely, Haldia House and Mehandi Ka Chowk were not included. The
Tribunal did not accept the contention of the representative of the Department
that the Jetter dated 27.4.1977 forwarding to the appellant a copy of the 1
notice under Section 6(1) issued to her husband· Jagannath Sharma, was not
only a notice under Section 6(2) to her but also a notice under Section 6(1)
c in respect of these two properties. After consideration of the evidence adduced
by the parties, the Tribunal agreed with the finding of the competent authority
that there was no evidence to support the assertion that the appellant was
carrying on any business and that any savings were thus available to her for
making investment in the properties acquired. Accordingly, the appeal was
allowed qua (1) Haldia House property and (2) Mehandi Ka Chowk properties .l
D
and the order of forfeiture passed regarding the aforesaid properties was set ~
aside. The appeal was, however, dismissed with regard to house property
No.D-48, Bapu Nagar, Jaipur and its forfeiture as directed by the competent
authority was upheld.

E 5. The appellant then preferred a writ petition before the Jaipur Bench
of Rajasthan High Court challenging the orders of the competent authority
and of the appellate authority. During the course of hearing of the writ
petition, three main contentions assailing the detention of Jagannath Sharma
were raised, namely, (1) when challenge is made regarding forfeiture of the
property under SAFEMA, the Court is competent to examine the orders
F
passed under COFEPOSA Act; (2) the order passed by the State Government
for detaining the appellant's husband under COFEPOSA Act was bad in law;
and (3) the grounds of detention under COFEPOSA Act were not
'
communicated. It was also urged that reasons for belief had not been recorded
as provided under Section 6(1) of the Act. The finding of the authorities that
G the appellant had failed to establish that she had purchased the property from
her own income, was also assailed. The learned Single Judge did not accept
;.,.
the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant and after a detailed (
I
consideration of the same dismissed the writ petition. The special appeal
preferred by the appellant was dismissed summarily by the Division Bench
H of the High Court.
KESAR DEVI v. U.0.1. [ G.P. MA THUR. J.] 7
6. In support of the contention that it is open to a person to assail the A
validity of a detention order passed under COFEPOSA Act while challengirig
the proceedings initiated under SAFEMA regarding forfeiture of property,
the appellant before the High Court had placed reliance on Union of India v.
Haji Mastan Mirza, [1984] 2 SCC 427. However, this decision has been
expressly overruled by a Bench of nine Judges in Attorney General for India B
v. Amrat/al Prajivandas, [1994] 5 SCC 54, wherein i: ha:. been held as under:

"Thus the conclusion is that an order of detentlon to which Section
12-A is applicable as well as an order of detention to which Section
12-A was not applicable can serve as the foundation, as the basis, for
applying SAFEMA to such detenu and to his relatives and associates C
provided such order of detention does not attract any of the sub-
clauses in the proviso to Section 2(2)(b ). If such detenu did not
choose to question the said detention (either by himself or through
his next friend) before the Court during the period when such order
of detention was in force, - or is unsuccessful in his attack thereon - D
he, or his relatives and associates cannot attack or question its validity
when it is made the basis for applying SAFEMA to him or to his
relatives or associates."

In view of this authoritative pronouncement by this Court, the main
grounds of challenge raised before the High Court have no legs to stand. E
7. The competent authority as also the appellate authority considered
the evidence adduced by the appellant and came to the ccnclusion that there
was no evidence to support the appellant's claim that she was carrying on
any business and that any savings were thus available to her for making
investment in the acquired property. The finding is based upon a thorough F
and proper appraisal and consideration of the evidence on record and we find
no reason to differ from the same. In the special leave petition, the grounds
taken relate to the validity of the detention order passed under COFEPOSA
Act against Jagannath Sharma and also to the correctness of the finding
recorded by the authorities that the appellant did not have any individual G
income of her own to purchase the properties. These grounds, in our opinion,
have no substance for the reasons indicated above and they were rightly not
very seriously pressed by the learned counsel before us.

8. An application was moved by the appellant on 24.3.2003 for
producing additional documents and for urging additional grounds. Learned iI
8 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A counsel has submitted that the notice issued under Section 6(1) of SAFEMA
does not show as to how any link or nexus is established between the properties
sought to be forfeited and the alleged illegally acquired money of the detenu
Jagannath Sharma. It has been urged that unless the notice itself showed the
link or nexus between the illegally acquired money of the detenu and the
B property sought to be forfeited, no order for forfeiture under Section 7 could
be passed. In support of his submission, learned counsel has placed reliance
on a decision of this Court in Civil Appeal No.7400-7401 of 1996 (Smt.
Fatima Mohd Amin (dead) through LR v. Union of India & Anr.) decided
on 16.1.2003.

C 9. Section 2(1) ofSAFEMA Jays down that the provisions of the said
Act shall apply only to the persons specified in Sub-section (2) of that Section.
Sub-section (2) of Section 2 gives a long list of different categories of persons
to whom the Act shall apply and they include those who have been convicted
under the Customs Act, 1962; Sea Customs Act, 1878; Foreign Exchange
D Regulation Act, 1947 or 1973, where the value of goods or the amount
involved exceeds Rs.I liikh or have been convicted subsequently under the
aforesaid Acts. Clause (b) of this Sub-section includes a person against whom
an order of detention has been made under COFEPOSA Act and is not
covered by the proviso to this clause. Clause (c) to Sub-section (2) includes
every person who is a relative of the person referred to in clause (a) or clause
E (b). Explanation (2) gives a long list of relatives for the purpose of clause (c)
and in view of clause (i) thereof, Kesar Devi being the spouse of Jagannath
Sharma is clearly covered by the provisions of the Act. Section 6 of the Act-
lays down that if, having regard to the value of the properties held by any
person to whom the Act applies, either by himself or through any other
F person on his behalf, his known source of income, earnings or assets, and any
other information or material available to it as a result of action taken under
Section 18 or otherwise, the competent authority has reason to believe (the
reasons for such belief to be recorded in writing) that all or any of such
properties are illegally acquired properties, it may serve a notice upon such
G person calling upon him to indicate the sources of his income, earnings or
assets, out of which or by means of which, he has acquired such property and
to show cause why all or any of such properties, as the case may be, should
not be declared to be illegally acquired properties and forfeited to the Central
Govemment. The condition precedent for issuing a notice by the competent
authority under Section 6(1) is that he should have reason to believe that all
H or any of such properties are illegally acquired properties and the reasons for
KESAR DEVI v.U.0.1. [ G.P. MATHUR, J.] 9
such belief have to be recorded in writing. The language of the Section does A
not show that there is any requirement of mentioning any link or nexus
between the convict or detenu and the property ostensibly standing in the
name of the person to whom the notice has been issued. Section 8 of the Act
which deals with burden of proof is very important. It lays down that in any
proceedings under the Act, the burden of proving that any property specified B
in the notice served under Section 6 is not illegal!~; acquired property, shall
be on the person affected. The combined effect of Section 6(1) and Section
, 8 is that the competent authority should have reason to believe (which reasons
have to be recorded in writing) that properties ostensibly standing in the
name of a person to whom the Act applies are illegally acquired properties,
he can issue a notice to such a person. Thereafter, the burden of proving that C
such property is not illegally acquired property will be upon the person to
whom notice has been issued. The statutory provisions do not show that the
competent authority, in addition to recording reasons for his belief, has to
further mention any nexus or link between the convict or detenu (as described
in Sub-section (2) of Section 2) and the property which is sought to be
forfeited i.n the sense that money or consideration for the same was provided D
by such convict or detenu. If a further requirement regarding establishing any
link or nexus is imposed upon the competent authority, the provisions of
Section 8 regarding burden of proof will become otiose and the very purpose
of enacting such a Section would be defeated.

10. The requirement of establishing a "link or nexus" between the
E
illegally acquired money of the convict or detenu as described in Sub-section
(2) of Section 2 of the Act and the properties sought to be forfeited is sought
to be derived from certain observations made by this Court in Attorney General
for India v. Amratlal Prajivandas, (supra) in paragraph 44 of the Reports. If
paragraph 44 is read as a whole, it will be clear that no such requirement of F
establishing any link or nexus on the part of the competent authority has been
laid down therein. In the said paragraph, the Bench dealt with contention of
the counsel for the petitioners that extending the provisions of SAFEMA to
the relatives, associates and other "holders" is again a case of overreaching
or of over-breadth, as it may be called - a case of excessive regulation. The G
relevant part of para 44 (page 92 of the Reports) is being reproduced below:

" ....... The language of this section is indicative of the ambit of
,. the Act. Clauses (c) and (d) in Section 2(2) and the Explanations (2)
and (3) occurring therein shall have to be construed and understood
in the light of the overall scheme and purpose of the enactment. The H
IO SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A idea is to forfeit the illegally acquired properties of the convict/detenu
irrespective of the fact that such properties are held by or kept in the
name of or screened in the name of any. relative or associate as
defined in the said two Explanations. The idea is not to forfeit the
independent properties of such relatives or associates which they may
have acquired illegally but only to reach the properties of the convict/
B detenu or properties traceable to him, wherever they are, ignoring all
the transactions with respect to those properties. By way of illustration,
take a case where a convict/detenu purchases a property in the name
of his relative or associate - it does not matter whether he intends that
such a person to be a mere name lender or whether he really intends
c that such person shall be the real owner and/or possessor thereof - or
gifts away or otherwise transfers his properties in favour of any of his
relatives or associates, or purports to sell them to any of his relatives
or associates - in all such cases, all the said transactions will be
ignored and the properties forfeited, unless the convict/detenu or his
relative/associate, as the case may be, establishes that such property
D or properties are not "illegally acquired properties" within the meaning
of Section 3(c)............................................................................. It is
equally necessary to reiterate that the burden of establishing that the
properties mentioned in the show-cause notice issued under Section
6, and which are held on that date by a relative or an associate of the
E convict/detenu, are not the illegally acquired properties of the convict/
detenu, lies upon such relative/associate. He must establish that the
said property has not been acquired with the monies or assets provided
by the detenu/convict or that they in fact did not or do not belong to
such detenu/convict. We do not think that Parliament ever intended
to say that the properties of all the relatives and associates, may be
F illegally acquired, will be forfeited just because they happen to be the
relatives or associates of the convict/detenu. There ought to be the
connecting link between those properties and the convict/detenu, the
burden of disproving which, as mentioned above, is upon the relative/
associate ............... "
G 11. The judgment of a Court has not to be interpreted like a Statute
where every word, as far as possible, has to be given a literal meaning and
no word is to be ignored. The observations made have to be understood in
the context of the facts and contentions raised. As mentioned earlier,
Explanation (2) appended to Clause (c) of Sub-section (2) of Section 2 gives
H a very long list of relations. The combined effect of clauses (iii) and (vii) of
KESAR DEVI v. U.0.1. [ G.P. MATHUR, J.] 11
the Explanation is that a convict or detenu's wife's sister's lineal descendant A
whether male or female and howsoever low is also included even though the
relationship is quite remote. In those cases where the relationship is very
remote one, the competent authority may have to indicate some link or nexus
while recording reasons for belief that the property is illegally acquired
property. But cases where relationship is close and direct like spouse, son or B
daughter or parents stand on altogether different footing. Here no link or
nexus has to be indicated in the reasons for belief between the convict or
t detenu and the property as such an inference can easily be drawn.

12. We are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that under the Scheme of
the Act, there is no requirement on the part of the competent authority to C
mention or establish any nexus or link between the money of the convict or
detenu and the property sought to be forfeited. In fact, if such a condition is
imposed, the very purpose of enacting SAFEMA would be frustrated, as in
many cases it would be almbst impossible to show that the property was
purchased or acquired from the money provided by the convict or detenu. In
the present case, the appellant is the wife of the detenu and she has failed to D
establish that she had any income of her own to acquire the three properties.
In such circumstances, no other inference was possible except that it was
done so with the money provided by her husband.

13. In order to examine whether the notice issued by the competent
authority satisfies the requirement of Section 6, it is necessary to reproduce E
the same and the same reads as under :

"I. Kesar Devi alias Kani Devi, of DG-JMC-1/169/1948, Bakshiji-
Ki-Gali, Mehandi Ka Chowk, Ramganj Bazar, Jaipur is the wife of
Jagan Nath Sharma in respect of whom an order of detention under
the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling F
Activities Act, 1974 was made on 4.8.1975. She is, therefore, a person
covered by Sec. 2(2)(c) of the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange
Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred
to as the SAFEMA).

2. The Commissioner of Income-tax, Jaipur has, vide his D.O.
G
No.ADI/JPR/COFEPOSA/350 dated 1.9.1976, furnished information
under Sec. 16(2) of the SAFEMA regarding the illegally acquired
properties of Kesar Devi.

3. Kesar Devi has never been assessed to tax nor has she ever filed H
12 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A her return of income. Kesar Devi is the holder of house property D-
48, Bapu Nagar, Jaipur. Kesar Devi, in her statement on 22. 7.1976
before Sh. S.P. Gupta, Inspector, Jaipur has stated that she purchased
the plot of land D-48, Bapu Nagar, about 13 years back and
immediately thereafter constructed a house on this plot. She admitted
that she did not remember the price paid for the purchase of the
B above plot but stated that the house, including the plot, cost her about
Rs. 30,000. She further stated that she received money from her
mother-in-law and father-in-law for the construction of the house,
besides the sale proceeds of her ornaments. She also asserted that she
used to earn income from stitching of gota on sarees and that this
c income was available to her. When specifically questioned about
evidence in respect of the assertions made by her regarding the source
of investment in the plot or the coristruction of the house, she in no
unequivocal terms, admitted that she ·had no evidence. Kesar Devi is
reported to have had no known sources of income. The source of
investment in the house, therefore, remains unproved. The house
D property thus constitutes property which has, wholly or partly, come
out of or by means of any income, earnings or assets, the source of
whizh cannot be proved and which cannot be shown to be attributable
to any act or thing done in respect of any matter in relation to which
Parliament has no power to make laws and accordingly is a property
E within the meaning of Sec. 3(1)(c)(iii) of the SAFEMA.

4. I have, therefore, reason to believe that the property mentioned
below held by Kesar Devi is illegally acquired property within the
meaning of Sec. 3(I)(c) of the SAFEMA in respect of which a notice
under Section 6(1) of the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange
F Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976 should be served on
her to indicate the sources of her income, earnings or assets, out of
which or by means of which she acquired this property, the evidence
on which she relies and other relevant information and particulars
and to show cause why this property should not be declared to be
illegally acquired property and forfeited to the Central Government."
G
The notice clearly records the reasons for belief and, therefore, it fully
complies with the requirement of law and there is no infirmity in the same.

14. The judgment in ,Civil Appeal No.7400-7401 of 1996 relied upon
by the learned counsel for the appellant can be of no assistance to him. On
H facts, the Court found that the notice issued by the competent authority did
KESARDEVI v.U.O.I. [G.P. MATHUR,].] 13
not disclose any reasons and thus the same did not meet the requirement of A
Sub-section ( l) of Section 6 of the Act. As shown above, this is not the case
here as the reasons for belief have been clearly recorded by the competent
authority.

We, therefore, find no merit in the appeal and the same is hereby
~m~~ B
N.J. Appeal dismissed.