Holding

The Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 is intra vires as it falls within Entry 32 (and residuary Entry 97) of the Union List, giving Parliament competence to legislate.

Summary

SMT. Saiyada was allotted a parcel of land on licence by Hindustan Steel Ltd., a government company, but the licence was cancelled on allegations of encroachment and illegal construction. The company initiated eviction proceedings under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971, leading to orders of eviction, dismissal of appeals, and a series of default judgments. The petitioner filed a writ petition under Article 32 challenging the constitutional validity of the Act, contending that Parliament lacked legislative competence because the subject matter fell within Entry 18 of the State List. The Supreme Court examined the pith and substance of the legislation and held that it pertains to providing a speedy procedure for evicting unauthorized occupants from Union property, which falls within Entry 32 (and, alternatively, the residuary Entry 97) of the Union List. Consequently, the Act was held intra vires, and the petition was dismissed.

Issues considered

The constitutional validity of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971.
Whether Parliament has legislative competence to enact the Act under the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution.
Under which entry of the Union, State or Concurrent List the subject matter of the Act falls.

Legislation cited

Subjects

constitutional validitylegislative competenceUnion ListState Listpublic premisesevictionunauthorised occupantsArticle 32pith and substanceresiduary powergovernment companylicence cancellation

Judgment

SMT. SAIYADA MOSSARRAT
A
v.
HINDUSTAN STEEL LTD. BHILLAI STEEL PLANT,
BHILLAI (M.P.) & ORS.

OCTOBER 31, 1988
B
[M.P. THAKKAR AND K.N. SINGH, JJ.]

Constitution of India, 1950: Article 32 and Seventh Schedule List
I Entry 32, 43, 95 and 97-Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized
Occupants) Act, 1971-Constitutional validity of-Fresh consideration
on different ground. · · ·
c
Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act,
1971: Constitutional v«lidity of-Speedy eviction of unauthorized
occupants from property of Union Government in the State-Necessity
for. ;: .
D
The petUloner was allotted a piece of land on licence by the
respondent-company. The licence was cancelled on the allegation that
the petitioner had illegally made encroachment on further land and had
Illegally raised a structure on the land granted on licence. Proceedings
were initiated against the petitioner under the Act, and the competent
E authority passed an order of eviction. The Appellate Authority dismis·
sed the appeal, the High Court dismissed the petitioner's petition, and
this court refused to grant him special leave. The petitioner then filed a
Civil Suit which was dismissed for default of appearance. His special
leave against this order too was dismissed by this Court for default of
appearance.
F
In the present petition under Art. 32, the JJ.etltloner hllli challenged
the constitutional validity of the Act on the ground that Parliament does
not have the legislative competence to legislate on the subject.

The Solicitor-General raising a preliminary objection. It was con·
G tended that the Constitution Bench of this Court had already upheld the
constitutionality of the Act, in Hari Singh v. Military Estate. Officer,
(1973] l SCR 515, relied upon.

Dismissing the writ petition, it was,

H HELD: (1) In the present petition the petitioner has contended
690
SMT. SAIYADA v. HINDUSTAN STEEL LTD. 691

that since the subject matter falls squarely under Entry 18 of List II
(State List) and it does not fall under any Entry under List I or List III,
A
the Parliament bas no competence to legislate in respect of the subject
matter. Since this specific aspect was not debated before the Constitu-
tion Bench, it would not be proper to shut out the petitioner from
raising the plea by recourse to the argument that the point was con-
cluded in Hari Singh's case. 16950; 696A-B] B

(2) The Public Premises Act is concerned with the eviction of
those persons who have no authority in law to remain in possession of
the land belonging to the Union of India. The unauthorised persons may
be squatters, persons having no rights whatsoever, or persons wlto were
in occupation by virtue of any agreement but whose right under the
agreement had come to an end. [699F-G] c
(3) In order to ascertain under which entry the Act in question
would fall, it is necessary to ascertain what is the subject matter of
legislation applying the 'pitch and substance' test. [696CJ
D
(4) The subject matter of the legislation, as pronounced in Hari
Singh's case, is "providing a speedy procedure for eviction of persons in
unauthorised occupation of public premises." [6960]

(5) On an analysis of Entry 32 of List I it inter alia emerges that
while the State can legislate in respect of Union property situated in a E
State, with regard to such legislation In respect of the Union property
Parliament can enact a legislation in respect of the property belonging
to the Union of India and the revenue therefrom and in that event the
legislation enacted by Parliament will prevail as against the law enacted
by the State. (697G-H; 698A]
F
(6) Entry 32 Is wide enough to cover all legislation pertaining to
the property of the Union of India including the'leglslation for eviction
of unauthorised occupants from the property belonging to the Union of
India. Once the conclusion is reached that the legislation falls under
Entry 32 of List I, it is unnecessary to examine the scope of Entry 18 of
List III. [699B-CJ G
(7) In so far as the legislation for "providing a speedy procedure
for eviction of an unauthorised occupant of public premises" is con-
cerned, it is not shown that there is any legislation enacted by the State
legislature which deals with this subject in s0 far as the property belong-
ing to the Union of India Is concerned. Since there is no such legislation, H
692 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1988] Supp. 3. S.C.R.

the legislation enacted by the Centre under the authority of entry 32 of
A List I cannot be successfully assailed. Even if there was such a legisla-
tion, the Act enacted by the Parliament would prevail. J698B-D]

(8) The Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, does
not pertain to the subject-matter of providing a speedy remedy for
B eviction of "unauthorised occupants" from public premises belonging
to the Union of India. It only deals with eviction of tenants from pre-
mises. owned by landlords other than the Government. Therefore, there
is no question of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act
prevailing vis-a-vis the Public. Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised
Occupants) Act. [698G-H; 699AJ

C (9) A legislation pertaining to a Government Company including
one pertaining to eviction of trespassers, or unlawful occupants of pro-
perties belonging to Government Companies can .be enacted by the
Parliament. Government Companies are governed by the Indian Com·
panies Act which has itself been enacted in exercise of the legislative
D authority conferred by Entry 43 of the Union List (List I) of the Seventh
Schedule of the Constitution. [701A-B]

• (10) The need to speedily evict trespassers or unauthorised occu-
pants Qf such properties is self evident. The States cannot legislate for
such properties in "respect of properties situated in more than one State
E or Government companies situated in different states all over India.
Surely, the Parliament, in obeisance of its obligation to protect· and
safeguard the national and overall public interest, can legislate in this
respect under the residuary all-pervasive entry-Entry 97 of the Union
List (List I) of the Constitution of India-which clothes the Parliame!lt
with the requisite legislative authority in regard to "any other matter
not enumerated in List II or List III including any tax not mentioned in
F
either of these lists." The source of authority can thus in any case be
traced to Entry 97 read with Entry 95 of List I of the Constitution of
India. [701C-D; E]

L.S. Nair v. Hindustan Steel Ltd. Bhillai, A.I.R. 1980, Madhya
Pradesh 106 concurred.
0
lndu Bhushan Bose v, .Ram Sundari, A.I.R. 1970 SC 228.

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Civil) No. 3615 of
1978.

(Under Article 32 of the Constitution oflndia).
SMT. SAIYADA v. HINDUSTAN STEEL LTD. !THAKKAR, J.] 693

Altemesh Rein for the Petitioner.
A
Milon K. Banerjee, Solicitor General, V.C. Mahajfil\, Amlan
Ghosh, L.K. Gupta, S.R. Grover and .Miss. A. Subhashini for the
Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B
THAKKAR, J. A Seven-Judge Constitution Bench decision in
Hari Singh & Ors. v. The Military Estate Officer & Anr., [1973]
1 SCR, S15 upholding the constitutionality of the Public Premises
(Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 Act 40 of 1971 Act
notwithstanding, the petitioner has renewed the challenge by way of
this petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India. Of course c
the epicentre of the present challenge has shifted and is now located
in the plea that Parliament does not have the legislative competence
to legislate on the subject of the impugned legislation which dimen-
. sion was not in focus in Hari Singh's case.

The petitioner was allotted a piece of land on licence by the D
Respondents. The licence was cancelled on the allegation that
petitioner had illegally made encroachment on further land and had
illegally raised a structure on the land granted on licence. The respon-
dent terminated the licence. Proceedings were jnitiated against the
petitioner under the Act. The competent· authority passed an order of
eviction against the petitioner. Petitioner's appeal to the appellate
authority under the Act was dismissed. The High Court also dismissed
the petition preferred by the petitioner. This Court refused to grant
special leave and dismissed petitioner's Speeial Leave Petition.
Petitioner even so filed a Civil Suit which came to be dismissed for
default of appearance. Meanwhile the petitioner had approached this
court by way of a Special Leave Petition against an interlocutory order F
passed by the Civil Court. The said special leave petition also came to
be dismissed for default of appearance. And thereafter the present
Writ Petition has been instituted under Art. 32 of the Constitution of
India. In the petition as originally framed the constitutionality of the
Act was not challenged. The sfild challe11ge was incorporated by
amending _the :petition. When the matter came up for hearing this G
Court issued a Rule Nisi limited to the question of constitutionality of
the Act as _is evident from the relevant part of the order extracted
hereinbelow:

Application for amendment allowed. Rule Nis1 on the
H
694 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] Supp. 3 S.C.R.

question of constitutional validity of the Public Premises
A
(Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971. Notice to
the Attorney General and the Union of India ordered."

Thus the only question before the court presently is as regards
the constitutional validity of the Act. The scheme of the Act as set out
B in Hari Singh's case is as under:

"The scheme of the 1971 Act is that it confers power on
Estate Officer to issue notice to persons who are in
unauthorised occupation of any public premises to show
cause why an order of eviction should not be made.
'Unauthorised occupation' under the Act in relation to any
c public premises means the occupation by any person of the
Public premises without authority for such occupation, and
includes the continuance in occupation by any person of
the public premises after the authority (whether by way of
grant or any other mode of transfer) under which he was
allowed to occupy the premises has expired or has been
determined for any reason whatsoever. 'Premises' are
defined to mean any land or any building or part of a build-
ing and includes the garden, grounds and outhouses,
appertaining to such building or part of a ouilding and fitt-
ing affixed to such building or part of a building for the
more beneficial enjoyment thereof. 'Public premises'
means any premises belonging to or taken on lease or re-
quisitioned by, or on behalf.of-the Central Government as
enumerated in Section 2(e) of the Act. The notice to show
cause against order of eviction shall specify the grounds on
which the order of eviction is proposed to be made. The
F Estate Officers under the Act are appointed by the Central
Government. The Estate Officers are Gazetted Officers or
officers of equivalent rank. 'Corporate authority' under
the Act means any company or Corporation or any com-
mittee or the Authority as mentioned in the Act. The
Estate Officer shall, for the purpose of holding any inquiry
under this Act, have the same powers as are vested in a civil
court under the Code of CivirProcedure, 1908 while trying
a suit, in respect of matters mentioned in Sec. 8 of the Act.
These matters are summoning and enforcing _the atten-
dance of any person and examining him on oath; secondly,
requiring the discovery and production of document; and
thirdly, any other matter which may be prescribed. Sec. 10
SMT. SAIYADA v. HINDUSTAN STEEL LID. !THAKKAR, J.] 695

of the Act provides for finality of orders in circumstances A
mentioned in Sec. 10 of the Act therein."

The learned Solicitor General has raised a preliminary objection
on the threshold. It is contended that the Constitution Bench in Hari
Singh's case has already pronounced that the legislature had the
legislative competence to enact the impugned Act. Reliance in this B
' context is placed on the following passage from the Majority Judgment
ofRay,J:

"Therefore, a validating law is upheld first by finding out
whether the legislature possesses competence over the subject
matter, and, secondly, whether by validation the legislature C
has removed the defect which the courts had found in pre·
vious law.

The legislature had legislative competence to enact the
1971 Act. It means that it could legislate on the subject of
providing a speedy procedure for eviction of persons in D
unauthorised occupation of public premises."
(Emphasis added)

Now a perusal of the judgment reveals that the debate centred on
the issue as to whether Sec. 15 of the Act provided only one procedure
for ejectment of all persons in unauthorised occupation oft.he public E
premises or whether there was the further option to make recourse to
the ordinary law. This court has concluded .that Sec. l5 of the Act
provides oniy one procedure for ejectment of persons in unauthorised
occupation of the premises for public purposes, unlike Sec. 5 of the
Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act,
!959 which was held to be unconstitutional in Northern India Caterers F
Pvt. Ltd., [1967] 3 SCR 399. Debate did not at all centre around the
issue of legislative competence. While it is true that in Hari Singh's
case it has in terms been stated that the concerned legislature, that is to
say the Parliament, has legislative competence to enact the impuged
Act, as is evident from the passage extracted hereinabove, it is equally
true that the legislative competence of the Parliament to enact the Act G
does not appear to have been debated at all before the court as is
evident from the circumstances that there is no discussion whatsoever
as to under wbfch entry of which List the subject matter of the Act
would fall. In the present mat\er the petitioner has contended that the
subject matter does not fall under any entry either in List I (union list)
or List III (Concurrent List), but it squarely falls under entry 18 of the H
696 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] Supp. 3 S.C.R.

List II, that is to say, the State List. It has been argued that since the
A subject matter falls squarely under the State List (List HJ and it does
not fall under any entry under List I or List III, the Parliament has no
competence to legislate in respect of the subject' matter. Since this
specific aspect was not debated before the Constitution Bench, it would
not be proper to shut out the petitioner from raising the plea by
B recourse to the argument that the point was concluded in Hari Singh's
case regardless of whether the matter was debated or not. Accordingly
we .will deal with this point in the light of the submissions urged before
us bearing in mind that the Constitution Bench has categorically
observed that the Parliament has legislative competence to enact the
Act, albeit in the absence of any debate on this point.

c Before turning to the entries in List I, List II and List III, with a
view to ascertain under which entry the Act in question would fall, it is
necessary to ascertain what is the subject matter of legislation applying
the 'pith and substance' test. Now so far as this question is concerned •.
the Constitution Bench in Hari Singh's case has in clear and
D unequivocal terms pronounced that the subject matter of the legisla-
tion is "providing a speedy procedure for eviction of persons in
unauthorised occupation of public premises." As is evident from the
pa~sage extracted earlier.

Apart from the name of the Act, the.preamble to the Act itself
E makes it abundantly clear that the Act is designyd to "provide for the
eviction of unauthorised occupants from the public premises and for
certain incidental matters." The scheme of the Act also indicates that
the central theme of the legislation is to provide for speedy procedure
in or.der to evict persons in unauthorised occupation of public pre-
mises. The scheme of the Act shows that apart from the dictionary of
F terms and expressions used in the Act, the vital provisions of the Act
pertain to eviction of unauthorised occupants in exercise of powers
conferred by Section 5 after following the procedure under Section 4.
The incidental provisions are: ( 1) with regard to the disposal of the
property left in the public premises oy the ~nauthorised occupants and
(2) recovery of arrears referable to the point of time prior to the
G occupation becoming unauthorised and damages in respect of the
period of unauthorised occupation as provided in Section 7. Section 8
pertains to the incidental powers of summoning witnesses etc, And
Section 9 provides for the appeals. Section 15 excludes the jurisdiction
of the Civil Courts. There are similar provisions in regard to incidental
and ancillary matters. It is, therefore, evident that the whole Act
H revolves around the issue of eviction of unauthorised occupants and
SMT. SAJYADA v. HINDUSTAN STEEL LTD. [THAKKAR, J.] 697

incidental matters. In any view of the matter it is not open to contend
that the subject-matter of the legislation is other than the designing of A
speedy procedure for eviction of persons in unauthorised occupation
of public premises and incidental matters in view of the Jaw declared
by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Hari Singh's case. It is in the
light of this perspective that the question as to under 'which entry' of
'which list' the subject matter falls, will have to be examined. B

It has to be realised that if the subject matter of the legislation
falls under List I, the Union of India will have jlirisdiction-to legislate
on thy subject, having regard to the mandate embodied in Article
246( 1)1 of the Constitution of India which provides that the Parliament
has exclusive power to make laws with respect to any of the matters
enumerated in List I of the Seventh Schedule. We must, therefore, c
address ourselves to the issue as to whether the subject matter of the
legislation falls in any of the entries in the Union List (List!).

A scrutiny of the contents of entry 32 of List I is essential in.this
connection. The entry is in the following terms: D

"Property of the Union and the revenue therefrom, but as
regards property situated in a State subject to legislation by
the· State, save in so far as Parliament by law otherwise
provides."
E
On an analysis of the entry, it emerges that: ..

( 1) The Parliament can legislate in respect of property of the
Union and revenue therefrom regardless ·of whether the:jiroperty
is situated in Union Territory or in a State.
F
(2) But as regards the property situated in a State the property
will be subject to legislation made by the State subject to the
rider which follows.

(3) While the State can legislate in respect of Union .property
situated in a State, with regard to such legislation in respect of G
the Union property Parliament can enact a.legislation in respect
of th_e pro11erty belonging to the Union of India and the revenu_e
"(l) Art. 246(1)-"Notwithstanding anything in clauses (2) and (3), Parlia-
ment has exclusive power to make laws with respect to any of the
matters enumerated in List I in· the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitu-
tion referred to as the ''Union List'')."· .H
698 SUPREME COURT REPORTS I1988] Supp. 3 S.C.R.

therefrom and in that event the legislation enacted by the Parlia-
A inent will prevail as against the law enacted by the State.

ln so far as the legislation for "providing a speedy procedure for ,
eviction of an unauthorised occupant of public premises" is concerned,
it is not shown that there is any legislati<;m enacted by the State Legis-
B lature which deals with this subject in so far as the property belonging
to the Union of India is concerned. When the challenge to the Act
came µp for scrutiµy inJhe Madhya Pradesh High.Court in L.S. Naitv.
Hindustan Steel Ltd., Bhilai and Ors., A:l.R. 1980 Madhya Pradesh
106 it was not the basis of the challenge that there was any State
legislation in regard to this subject matter. Nor has it been contended
before us that there is any legislation for eviction of unauthorised
c occupants enacted by the State Legislature which deals with the
aforesaid subject matter, or that the properties belonging to the Union
of India are covered of any such State Act.. Since there is no such
le_gislation, the legislation enacted by the Centre under the authority of
Entry 32 of List I cannot be successfully assailed. What is more, even if
D there was such a legislation, the Act enacted by the Parliament would
prevail as per proposition Nos. 2 and 3 which have emerged on the
analysis of Entry 32 made a short while ago. It may be mentioned that
in L.S. Nair's case it was contended before the Madhya Pradesh High
Court that the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act of 1961
would prevail as against the Public Premises (Eviction of Unautho-
E rised O~cµpants) Act of 1971 enacted by the Parliament inasmuch as
the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act was enacted later.
The High Court rightly repulsed the plea. In the first place, the
Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act has an altogether diffe-
reni perspective. It is an act for the Regulation and Control of letting
on rent accommodation in respect of tenants as revealed by the Pream-
F ble. In the second place the Act does not apply to property which is the
property of the Government having regard to the provision cpntained
in Section 3(1)(a)l. Since the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Con-
trol Act does not apply to the property of the Government, there is no
question of the said Act prevailing vis-a-vis the Central Act. What is
more' the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act does not per-
G tain to the subject-matter of providing a speedy remedy for eviction of
"unauthorised occupants" from public premises belonging to the
Union of Indfa. It deals merely with eviction of tenants from premises
owned by landlords other than the Government. Under the circums-
I. ''3. Act not !O apply certain accommodation (1) Nothing in this Act shall
apply to-
H (a) ~ccommodatior which is the property of the Government;''
I
SMT. SATYADA v. HINDUSTAN STEEL LTD. [THAKKAR, J.] 699

tances, there Is no question of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation
A
Control Act prevailing vis-a-vis the Public Premises (Eviction of
Unauthorised Occupants) Act. It cannot be gain-said that even if both
the legislations pertain to the same subject-matter, the legislation
enacted by the Parliament in regard to the property belonging to
Union of India would prevail having regard to the mandate contained
in Entry 32 as has been discussed earlier. Under the circumstances it is B
futile to contend that the Parliament has no legislative competence to
legislate in respect of providing for a speedy remedy for eviction of
unauthorised occupants from the property belonging to the Union of
India. Entry 32 is wide enough to cover all legislations pertaining to
the property of the Union of India including the legislation for eviction
of unauthorised occupants from the property belonging to the Union
of India. Once the conclusion is reached that the legislation falls under
c
Entry 32, of List I, it is unnecessary to examine the scope of Entry 18
of List III, pertaining to land that is to say rights in or over land
tenures including the relationship of land-lord-tenant and the collec-
tion of rents, transfer and alienation of agricultural land, land
improvement, agricultural lands and acquisitions. Again, as· explained D
by this Court in Indu Bhushan Bose v. Ram Sundari & Anr.; A.LR.
1970 SC 228 "the relation of landlord and tenant" as mentioned in this
Entry, is with reference to land tenures which would not appropriately
cover tenancy of buildings or of house accommodation and that the
expression is only used with reference to relationship between land-
lord and tenant in respect of vacant lands. E

At the cost of repetition it may be stated that the 'pith and
substance' of the legislation under scrutiny viz. Public.Premises (Evic-
tion of Unauthorised Occupants) Act of 1961 is eviction of unautho-
rised occupants from properties belonging to the Union of India and
incidental and ancillary matters.:lt does not pertain to any matter F
relating to rights in relation to-landlord and tenants for eviction of
tenants from lands which have been leased. The Public Premises Act is
concerned with the eviction of. those persons who have no authority in
law to remain in possession of the !arid belonging to the Union of
India. The unauthorised persons may be squatters, persons having no
rights whatsoever, or persons who were in occupation by virtue of any G
agreement but whose right under the agreement had come to an end.
Thus, there is no substance in the contention that the Parliament had
no legislative competence to enact Public Premises Act.

The learned counsel for the petitioner has however urged an
argument in the context of the definition of 'Public Premises' as H
700 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] Supp. 3 S.C.R.

embodied in Section 2(e)(l)(i) of the Act. The definition envelops
A
premises belonging to or taken on lease by or on behalf of any Com·
pany as defined in Section 3 of the Companies Act of 1956 in which not
Jess than 51 % of the paid-up capital is held by the Central Govern-

B
ment. This contention was raised before the Madhya Pradesh High
Court in L.S. Nair's case and has been repulsed by' the High Court on
the reasoning unfolded in the passage extracted from paragraph 4 of
,
the judgment: .
"The first contention raised by the learned counsel for the
petitioner is that the Act in so far as it includes in the
definition of public premises "any premises belonging to or
taken on lease by or on behalf of any company as defined in
S, 3 of the Companies Act, 1956, in which not less than
c 51 % of the paid-up share capital is held by the Central
Government," is ultra vires and void, as to that extent the
Act is beyond the legislative competence of Parliament.
The argument of the learned counsel is that the Act was
enacted under Entry 32, List I of the VII Sche.dule to the
D Constitution, which relates to "property of the Union and
the revenue therefrom", and that this entry cannot be con·
strued to include the property of a Government company
" which is a different and distinct legal entity from the
Union. It may .be conceded that the expression "property
of the Union", as used in Entry 32, List I, cannot be con·
E strued to include the property of a Government Company.
But if Entry 32 gives jurisdiction to Parliament to enact the
Act in respect of Government premises, as contended by
the learned counsel for the petitioner, Entry 43 which
relates to incorporation, regulation and winding up of trad·
ing jurisdictions read with Entry 9.5 which relates to juris· .
F diction and powers of all courts except the Supreme Court,
, with respect to any of the matters in List I, can be con·.
strued to confer power on Parliament to enact the Act in
respect of prell\ises belonging to a Government company,
It seems however, more appropriate that in so far as the
Act deals with a lessee or licensee of premises belonging to
G a Government company, the subject-matter of the Act
would be covered by Entries 6, 7 and 46 of List III. These
entries broadly- deal with transfer of property, contracts
and jurisdfction ·and powers of Courts with respect to any
'of the matters in.List III. Taking either view in our opinion
· it is not correct to say that the Act in so far as it relates to
H . premises belonging to a Government company suffers from
want of legislative competence."
-;- -
..." SMT. SAIYADA v. HINDUSTAN STEEL LTD. [THAKKAR, J.I 701

· Learned counsel for the Petitioner has not been able to show that there A
is any infirmity in the reasoning of the High Court. Besides, a legisla·
tion pertaining to a Government Company including one pertaining to
eviction of trespassers, or unlawful occupants of properties belonging
to Government Companies speedily can be enacted by the Parliament.
Government Companies are governed by the Indian Companies Act
which has itself been enacted in exercise of the legislative authority 8
conferred by Art. 43 of the Union List (List I) of the Seventh Schedule
of the Constitution. It is idle to contend and it has accordingly not
been contended, that a State can legislate under the authority to
legislate conferred by the State List (List II) in regard to properties of
a Government Company which may have properties in more than one
State and even in Union Territories. The need to 8peedily evict C
trespasser~ or unauthorised occupants of such properties Is selt evl·
dent. The States cannot legielate for such properllen in re1peet of
properties situated in more than one State or Government companies
situated In different states all over India. Surely, the Parliament, In
obeisance to itB obligation to protect and safeguard the National and
overall public Interest, can legiolate In this respect under the reelduary D
all·pervl!Bive entry-l'!ntry 97 of the Union List (List I) of Con1tltut!on
of India which clothes the Parliament with the requisite le118111tive
authority In regard to "any other matter not enumerated In List II or
Liet Iii lneludln11 any tax not mentioned In either of these ll1ts". It h111
not been shown that any of the entries In List n or List mwould be
ttttrnctetl to the eubjeet·m11tter of speedy evktlon of unAuthorl1ed I'!
occupa!lte from propertle1 b~lon11ln11 to n Government Company
wherein Centflll. Government llftl more than Sl % ot the p11ld·up eh11re
e11pltal. The souree of authority e11n thus in nny ease be tr11eed to l!ntry
97 rend with Entry \l! of tile Constitution gf lndl11,
In 11ny view of the matter therefgre It Is futile to eontend th11t fl
P11rllameflt h11d no le11lslatlve competence In thl8 beh11lf. We therefore
eoneur with the eoncluGlon reached by the H111h Court In L.S. Nair!~
, ease (eupr11) and repel the challen11e unhesitatingly,
The petition accordingly falls nnd Is dlsml8sed. The Interim order
will stand vacated. No costs. 0

R.S.S. Petition di1mlHed.