Holding

Section 482 CrPC may be exercised only sparingly and with circumspection; the expression "rarest of rare cases" merely reinforces this principle and does not restrict the power to death‑penalty cases, and extraneous recommendations are not enforceable directions.

Summary

The appellant, Managing Director of M/s Hewlett Packard Global Soft Ltd., was the subject of a complaint under section 200 CrPC for alleged violation of the Karnataka Shops & Commercial Establishments Act, 1961. He sought quashal of the complaint and the FIR under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but the High Court rejected the petition and altered the charge. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court, which dismissed the appeal and clarified that the power under section 482 must be exercised sparingly and with circumspection, with the phrase "rarest of rare cases" serving only as an emphatic qualifier, not a limitation to death‑penalty contexts. The Court also held that the concurring judge's recommendations on anticipatory bail and enforcement of Joginder Kumar directions were not binding orders as they lay outside the subject matter of the appeal. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and no direction was issued to the executive.

Issues considered

Whether the power under section 482 CrPC should be exercised "sparingly" or "sparingly with circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases"?
Whether the Supreme Court may issue recommendations and directions on anticipatory bail and the enforcement of Joginder Kumar guidelines in a criminal appeal that does not concern those matters?

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 200, s. 482

Subjects

Section 482 CrPCquashing of criminal proceedingsrarest of rare casesjudicial restraintanticipatory bailJoginder Kumar guidelinesappellate jurisdictionKarnataka Shops & Commercial Establishments Actinherent powers of court

Judgment

[2008] 3 S.C.R. 130
.....
~

A SOM MITTAL
v.
GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA
(Criminal Appeal No. 206 of 2008)
FEBRUARY 21, 2008
B
(K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI, R.V. RAVEENDRAN \.
AND J.M. PANCHAL, JJ.)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973:
c S. 482 - Quashing of criminal proceedings - Judgment
of Supreme Court dated 29.1.2008 1 dismissing the appeal
against judgment of High Court of Karnataka declining to
quash the proceedings - In the concurring judgment one of
the Judges comprising the Bench observing that he was not
D in agreement with the view of the other Judge that power u/s ,,.
482 shou.ld be used only in "rarest of rare cases" as the phrase
is used only with reference to death penalty and its use
referring to scope of power uls 482 was inappropriate - The
Judge, in para 17 to 39 of his concurring judgment, further
E making recommendations and giving directions relating to
anticipatory bail in U.P. and enforcement of directions relating
to arrest as laid down in Joginder Kumar's 2 case - Held :
When the words 'rarest of rare cases' are used after the words
'sparingly and with circumspection' while describing the scope ~

F of section 482, those words merely emphasize and reiterate
what is intended to be conveyed by the words 'sparingly and
with circumspection'- They mean that the power under Section
482 to quash proceedings should not be used mechanically
or routinely, but with care and caution, only when a clear case
for quashing is made out and failure to interfere would lead to
G
a miscarriage of justice- The expression "'rarest of rare cases"

1. Som Mittal v. Government of Karnataka (2008) 2 SCR 323. ...
2. Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P (1994) 4 SCC 260.

H 130
SOM MITTAL v. GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA 131
,,,_
. [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI.]
is not used in the sense in which it is used with reference to A
punishment for offences under Section 302 /PC, but to
emphasize that the power under Section 482 Cr. PC. to quash
the FIR or criminal proceedings should be used sparingly and

~ with circumspection - Judgment - Interpretation of
Kurukshetra University v. State of Haryana (1977) 4 SCC B
_j
451 and State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp. (1) SCC
335 - relied on.
Bachan Singh v. State of Puojab AIR 1980 SC 898 -
referred to. c
JUDGMENT
Judgment of superior Courts - Interpretation of -
Judgments are not to be construed as statutes- Nor words or
phrases in judgments to be interpreted like provisions of a
....,,: D
statute-Words used in a judgment should be read and
understood contextually and are not intended to be taken
literally- Ratio decidendi of a judgment is not to be discerned
from a stray word or phrase read in isolation - Ratio decidendi.
APPEAL E
Appellate Court - Jurisdiction of - Held: The subject ·
matter of an appeal, whether civil or criminal, is the correctness
of the decision of the court below - There is no question of
·~·
appellate court traveling beyond and making observations
alien to the case - Any opinion, observation, comment or F

~
recommendation de hors the subject of the appeal, may lead
to confusion in the minds of litigants, members of public and
authorities as they will not know how to regulate their affairs, or
whether to act upon it - In the instant case, the appeal did not
relate to grant of anticipatory bail nor did it relate to rights of G
arrested persons - This Court has repeatedly cautioned that
while rendering judgments, courts should only deal with the
subject matter of the case and issues involved therein - Courts
should desist from issuing directions affecting executive or
legislative policy, or general directions unconnected with the H
132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 3 S.C.R.

A subject matter of the case - A court may express its views on
a particular issue in appropriate cases only where it is relevant
to the subject matter of the case -Another aspect that requires
to be kept in view is the fact that even when it becomes
necessary for a court for whatsoever reason, to decide or
B comment upon an issue not raised by the parties, it may do
so only after notifying the parties concerned so that they can
put forth their views on such issue - In so far as the
observations, recommendations, and directions in paras 17
to 39 of the concurring judgment*, suffice it to say that they do
C not relate to the subject matter of the criminal appeal and being
the expression of an expectation or hope by only one of the
Judges constituting the Bench and not agreed to by the other,
is not a decision, order or direction of the Court- That being
so, the directions issued to the Secretary General of the
Supreme Court, State Governments and Union Territories,
D and recommendations to the Government of UP in the "aside"
contained in Paras 17 to 39 of the concurring judgment are
not directions to be complied with - Practice and Procedure-
Judicial restraint-Principles of natural justice.
E * Som Mittal Vs Government of Karnataka (2008) 2 SCR
323 - clarified.
WORDS AND PHRASES:
Expressions "sparingly and with circumspection" and "in ¥
F rarest of rare cases" used in the judgment of Supreme Court
with reference to exercise of power uls 482 Cr. PC. -
Connotation of
CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 206/2008
G
From the final Judgment and Order dated 28.3.2006 of
the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Crl. P. No. 1535/
2006. ....
K.K. Venugopal, K.G. Raghavan, Amit Dhingra and Aman
H Leekha (for M/S. Dua Associates) for the Appellant.
SOM MITTAL v. GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA 133
..,.. [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI.]
"
Sanjay R. Hegde, Vikrant Yadav, Amit Kr. Chawla and Arul A
Varma for the Respondent.
The Order of the Court was delivered by
K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI. Government of Karnataka
represented by Senior Labour Inspector, 81h Circle, Bangalore, B
_)
lodged a complaint under section 200 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure against the appellant, who was the Managing
Director of M/s. Hewlett Packard Global Soft Ltd., in the court of
the Metropolitan Magistrate (TC-3), Bangalore, for taking
cognizance of an offence punishable under section 30(3) of the c
Karnataka Shops & Commercial Establishments Act, 1961 ('Act'
for short) for violation of section 25 of the said Act. Learned
Magistrate took cognizance by order dated 30.12.2005 and
directed issue of notice to the appellant. The appellant filed a
petition under section 482 of Cr.P.C. for setting aside the said
D
order dated 30.12.2005 and for quashing the complaint. The
High Court, by order dated 28.3.2006, rejected the prayer for
quashing the complaint, but altered the offence in respect of
which cognizance was taken as one under section 30(1) read
with section 25 of the said Act. The said order of the High Court
was challenged by the appellant in this appeal. E

2. The appeal was heard by a Bench consisting of
H.K.Sema and Markandey Katju, JJ. By the main judgment
4 dated 29.1.2008 Serna, J. dismissed the appeal, making it clear
that the court was not expressing any opinion on the merits of F
the case and the learned Magistrate shall decide the
maintainability of the complaint at the time of framing of the
charge uninfluenced by any observations made by this Court
or the High Court. In the course of his judgment, Serna, J.
observed:
G
"In a catena of decisions this Court has deprecated the
interference by the High Court in exercise of its inherent
powers under Section 482 of the Code in a routine manner.
It has been consistently held that the power under Section
482 must be exercised sparingly, with circumspection and H
134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 3 S.C.R.
.,
.

A in rarest of rare cases. Exercise of inherent power under "
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not the
rule but it is an exception. The exception is applied only
when it brought to the notice of the Court that grave
miscarriage of justice would be committed if the trial is
B allowed to proceed where the accused would be harassed
unnecessarily if the trial is allowed to linger ..... "
')..
3. In his concurring judgment, Katju, J. agreed that the
appeal should be dismissed without expressing any opinion on
merits. He stated that he was rendering a separate opinion as
·c he was not in agreement with the view expressed by Serna, J.
that the power under section 482 of Cr. P. C. should be used.only
in the "rarest of rare cases", though he agreed with the
observation that the said power should be used sparingly. He
was of the view that the words 'rarest of rare cases' are used
D only with reference to the death penalty for an offence under ._
section 302 IPC (See Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab -AIR
1980 SC 898) and the use of the said words was inappropriate
while referring to the scope of exercise of power under section
482. Paras 1 to 16 of his judgment related to the criminal appeal.
E However in paras 17 to 39 of his judgment, the learned Judge
expressed concern over the situation prevailing in Uttar Pradesh
on account of omission of section 438 Cr.P.C. relating to
anticipatory bail by an amendment to the Code by section 9 of
U.P.Act 16of1976 and the consequential hardship created for
~
F the public and difficulties caused to the Allahabad High Court.
He made a recommendation to the U.P.Government to
immediately issue an ordinance repealing section 9 of U.P.Act
16of1976 so as to restore section 438 Cr.P.C. in Uttar Pradesh
empowering the High Court and Sessions· Courts to grant
anticipatory bail. He directed the Registry of this Court to send
G
a copy of his judgment to the Chief Secretary, Home Secretary
and Law Secretary of State of U.P. and also to the Registrar
General of the Allahabad High Court and the President/Secretary
of Allahabad Bar Association, Allahabad High Court Advocates' "'
Association and Oudh Bar Association forthwith. He also
H
SOM MITTAL v. GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA 135
.,, . (K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI.]
•
referred to the prevailing practice of police arresting those A
suspected of involvement in a crime and the directions issued
by this Court in Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P. - 1994 (4)
sec 260 in regard to the procedure to be followed when
·arresting a person, and directed that copies of his judgment be
sent to the Chief Secretaries, Home Secretaries and Law B
~
Secretaries of all State Governments and Union Territories with
-.-< a direction to ensure strict compliance with said decision.
4. In view of the difference of opinion on legal issues, the
appeal was directed to be placed befor~ the Chief Justice of
India for appropriate orders, though both learned Judges c
concurred that the appeal should be dismissed. The matter is
accordingly placed before the bench of three Judges.
5. When the matter came up, Mr. K.K.Venugopal, learned
senior counsel for the appellant submitted that having regard to
D
"" the exemption under section 3(h) of the Act in respect of persons
in management of an establishment, the Act in entirety was
inapplicable to the appellant who was the Managing Director of
the establishment He also submitted that the question of
violation of section 25 of the Act did not arise as Appellant's
establishment was exempted from the provisions of section 25 E
of Act by Government Order dated 9.2.2005 and therefore there
was no question of violation of section 25 or commission of an
~
offence punishable under section 31 (1) of the Act by his
4 establishment. He therefore submitted that the complaint ought
,.. to have been quashed when its establishment invoked the High F
Court to exercise its power under section 482 Cr.P.C. On the
other hahd the learned counsel for the respondent State
submitted that the object of section 3(h) of the Act was to exclude
persons in management from being considered as employees
entitled to seek benefits and reliefs under the Act. He submitted G
that the intention of section 3(h) was not to exempt 'persons in
,..., management' from incurring liability under the Act. He also
submitted that the complaint disclosed violation of the provisions
of the proviso to section 25 of the Act and therefore the learned
Magistrate rightly took cognizance. It is unnecessary to examine H
136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 3 S.C.R.

•
A these contentions urged by the parties, on merits. As already
noticed, both the learned Judges have concurred and dismissed
the appeal. What is referred is only the legal issues which did
not affect the final decision of the learned Judges that the appeal
should be dismissed.
B 6. Though the learned Judges did not set down the legal
issues, we discern the following two issues from their opinions:
(i) Whether the power under section 482 Cr.P.C. should
be exercised 'sparingly' or 'sparingly with
c circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases'?
(ii) Whether the recommendations and directions
relating to anticipatory bail and enforcement of the
directions relating to arrest laid down in Joginder
Kumar were warranted in this case?
D
7. When Serna, J. observed that the power under section
482 Cr.P.C. was to be used 'sparingly, with circumspection and
in rarest of rare cases', he did not lay down any new proposition
of law, but was merely reiterating what was stated by this Court
E in several cases, including Kurukshetra University v. State of
Haryana 1977 (4) SCC 451 and State of Haryana v. Bhajan
Lal [1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335]. In Kurukshetra University
(supra), this Court observed "that the statutory power under
section 482 has to be exercised sparingly with circumspection
and "in rarest of rare cases". In Bhajan Lal, this Court reiterated
F the word of caution that the power of quashing a criminal
proceeding should be exercised "very sparingly and with
circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases". It may
not therefore be correct to say that the words 'rarest of rare
cases' are appropriate only when considering death sentence
G for an offence under section 302 IPC or that those words are
inappropriate when referring to the ambit of the power to be
exercised under section 482 Cr.P.C.
8. Quashing of a complaint or criminal proceedings under
section 482 Cr.P.C. depends on the facts and circumstances of
H
SOM MITIAL v. GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA 137
r
[K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI.)

each case. The scope and ambit of the power under section A
482 has been explained by this Court in a series of decisions
- R.PKapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866, State of
Uttar Pradesh v. R.K.Srivastava, 1989 f4) SCC 59; State of
Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335, Mrs. Rupan
Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill, 1995 (6) SCC 194; Pepsi B
_; Foods Ltd: V. Special Judicial Magistrate, 1998 (5) SCC 749; .
Zandu Pharmaceutical Works v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque 2005
(1) SCC 122; Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd. 2006
(6) SCC 736, and Sonapareddy Maheedhar v. State of Andhra
Pradesh, 2007 (14) SCALE 321. This Court in Bhajan Lal c
(supra) listed. the following categories of cases where power
under section 482 could be exercised either to prevent abuse
of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice:
"(1) Where the allegations made in the first information D
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face
value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie
constitute any offence or make out a case against the
accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report E
and other materials, if any accompanying the FIR do not
disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation
~.. by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except
under an order or a Magistrate within the purview of
Section 155(2) of the Code. F

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the
FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of
the same do not disclose the commission of any offence
and make out a case against the accused.
G
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable
offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer
without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under
Section 155(2) of the Code. H
138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008) 3 S.C.R.
.
A · (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint
are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of
which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion
that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused.
B (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any
of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under
which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution
and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is
a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act,
c providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the
aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
with ma/a fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously
D
instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance
on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private
and personal grudge."
-
It was also made clear that it was not possible to lay down
precise and inflexible guidelines or any rigid formula or to give
E an exhaustive list of the circumstances in which such power could
be exercised.
9. When the words 'rarest of rare cases' are used after the
words 'sparingly and with circumspection' while describing the
s'cope of section 482, those words merely emphasize and
F reiterate what is intended to be conveyed by the words 'sparingly
and with circumspection'. They mean that the power under
section 482 to quash proceedings should not be used
mechanically or routinely, but with care and caution, only when a
clear case for quashing is made out and failure to interfere would
G lead to a miscarriage of justice. The expression "rarest of rare
cases" is not used in the sense in which it is used with reference
to punishment for offences under section 302 IPC, but to
emphasize that the power under section 482 Cr.P.C-. to quash
the FIR or criminal proceedings should be used sparingly and
H with circumspection. Judgments are not to be construed as
.. ,... SOM MITIAL v. GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA
[K.G BALAKRISHNAN, CJI.]
139

statutes. Nor words or phrases in judgments to be interpreted A
like provisions of a statute. Some words used in a judgment
should be read and understood contextually and are not intended
to be taken literally. Many a time a Judge uses a phrase or
expression with the intention of emphasizing a point or.
'__J
accentuating a principle. or even by way of a flourish of writing B
style. Ratio decidendi of a judgment is not to be discerned from
a stray word or phrase read in isolation.
10. The seqond issue involves the recommendations made
to the Government of U.P. and directions issued to all States
and Union Territories in paras 17 to 39 of the concurring c
judgment. The appeal related to the question whether the
complaint against the appellant disclosed the ingredients of an
offence under section 25 of the Karnataka Shops & Commercial
Establishments Act, 1961. The appeal did not relate to grant of
anticipatory bail nor did it relate to rights of arrested persons. D
This Court has repeatedly cautioned that while rendering
judglTJents, courts should only deal with the subject matter of the
case and issues involved therein. Courts should desist from
issuing directions affecting executive or legislative policy, or
general directions unconnected with the subject matter of the E
case. A court may express its views on a particular issue in
appropriate cases only where it is relevant to the subject matter
~ of the case.
11. The subject matter of an appeal, whether civil or
criminal, is the correctness of the decision of the court below. F
There is no question of appellate court travelling beyond and
making observations alien to the case. Any opinion, observation,
comment or recommendation de hors the subject of the appeal,
may lead to confusion in the minds of litigants, members of public
and authorities as they will not know how to regulate their affairs, G
or whether to act upon it. Another aspect that requires to be
kept in view is the fact that even when it becomes necessary for
a court for whatsoever reason, to decide or comment upon an
issue not raised by the parties, it may do so only after notifying
the parties concerned so that they can put forth their views on H
140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 3 S.C.R.
"'{
..
A such issue.
12. When this Court renders judgments, it does so with
great care and responsibility. The law declared by this Court is
binding on all courts. All authorities in the territory of India are
required to act in aid of it. Any interpretation of a law or a
B judgment, by this Court, is a law declared by this Court. The
wider the power, more onerous is the responsibility to ensure ~

that nothing is stated or directed in excess of what is required
or relevant for the case, and to ensure that the Court's orders
and decisions do not create any doubt or confusion in regard to
c a legal position in the minds of any authority or citizen, and also
to ensure that they do not conflict with any other decision or
existing law. Be that as it may.
13. In so far as the observations, recommendations, and
directions in paras 17 to 39 of the concurring judgment, suffice
0
it to say that they do not relate to the subject matter of the criminal
appeal and being the expression of an expectation or hope by
--
only one of the learned Judges constituting the Bench and not
agreed to by the other, is not a decision, order or direction of
the Court. That being so, the directions issued to the Secretary
E General of the Supreme Court, State Governments and Union
Territories, and recommendations to the Government of U.P. in
the "aside" contained in Paras 17 to 39 of the concurring
judgment are not directions to be complied with.
\''
F 14. The two questions are answered accordingly.
R.P. Referred questions answered.