SOMNATH SARKARversusUTPAL BASU MALLICK & ANR.

                     [2013] 9 S.C.R. 935


                     SOMNATH SARKAR                                  A
                                v.
               UTPAL BASU MALLICK & ANR.
             (Criminal Appeal No. 1651 of 2013)
                     OCTOBER 07, 2013
                                                                     B
       [T.S. THAKUR AND VIKRAMAJIT SEN, JJ.]

     NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT, 1881:

      s. 138 of N. I. Act r/w s.357(3) CrPC - Dishonour of cheque    c
- Conviction - Sentence of six months simple imprisonment
and to pay compensation to complainant, affirmed by
Sessions Judge - High Court in revision filed by accused,
substituting six months sentence by imposing a further sum
equivalent to cheque amount - Held: High Court was                   0
competent to impose a sentence of fine only upon accused -
- It has rightly set aside the sentence of imprisonment -
However, as the amount of fine imposed by High Court over
and above the amount of compensation exceeds double the
cheque amount, it would violate s. 138 N. I. Act - Complainant
has received compensation as per adjudication of trial court         E
- Accused sentenced to pay further a fine of Rs.20,0001- and
on his failure to do so, he would be liable for imprisonment
for six months - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.357(3).

     s. 138 - Power of court to levy fine - Held: Is circumscribed   F
to twice the cheque amount -- Even in a case where court may
be taking a lenient view in favour of accused by not sending
him to prison, it cannot impose a fine more than twice the
cheque amount -- That statutory limit is inviolable and must
be respected -- High Court has, in the case at hand,                 G
overlooked the statutory /imitation on its power to levy a fine.

   s. 138 of N.I. Act ands. 357, CrPC - Held: Power to award
compensation is not available u/s 138 of N. I. Act -- It is only
                             935                                     H
    936      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 9 S.C.R.


A when court has determined the amount of fine that the
  question of paying compensation out of the same would arise
  -- This implies that the process comprises two stages -- First,
  when court determines the amount of fine and levies the same
  subject to the outer limit, if any, as is the position in the instant
B case -- The second stage comprises invocation of the power
  to award compensation out of the amount so levied -- In the
  instant case, High Court has not followed that process -- It has
  taken payment of compensation to be distinct from the
  amount of fine it imposed equivalent to the cheque amount -
C - High Court should have determined the fine amount to be
  paid by the accused, which in no case could go beyond twice
  the cheque amount, and directed payment of compensation
  to the complainant out of the same -- Ordered accordingly.

      The appellant was convicted uls 138 of the
D Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 for dishonour of a
  cheque drawn for Rs.69,5001-, and was sentenced to six
  months simple imprisonment and to pay compensation
  of Rs.80,0001- which was paid to the complainant. The
  order was affirmed by the Sessions Judge in appeal. The
E High Court, in the revision filed by the accused-appellant,
  substituted the sentence of imprisonment by imposing
  upon the accused an additional sum of Rs.69,500/-.

          Allowing the appeal in part, the Court
F      HELD: (Per Vikramajit Sen, J.) 1.1 A reading of the
  impugned order indicates that the intention of the High
  Court was that upon deposit/payment of the further sum
  of Rs.69,5001- (in addition to the earlier sum of Rs.
  80,000/-), the sentence of imprisonment for six months
G would stand withdrawn. However, the direction of the
  High Court to pay further sum of Rs.69,500/- over and
  above the sum of Rs.80,000/- would violate s.138 of the
  N.I. Act inasmuch as it would exceed the double of the
  cheque amount. [para 4] [941-E-G]
H
     SOMNATH SARKAR v. UTPAL BASU MALLICK &                937
                      ANR.

     1.2 The use of the word, 'additional sum' in the             A
impugned order has led to considerable confusion. To
put the matter finally at rest, this Court holds that the total
compensation payable u/s 138 of the N.I. Act read withs.
357(3), Cr.P.C. is Rs.80,000/-. i.e., the cheque amount of
Rs.69,500/- together with Rs.10,500/- which may be seen           B
as constituting interest on the dishonoured cheque. With
the receipt of Rs.80,000/-, the complainant has received
compensation for the dishonoured cheque as per the
adjudication of the trial court. In these circumstances,
any further payment would be in the nature .of fine. The          c
appellant is a man of limited financial means. He is
sentenced to pay further a fine of Rs.20,000/- and, on his
failure to make the payment, he would be liable for
imprisonment for six months. [para 4] [941-C-E; 942-A-C]

      Per T.S. Thakur, J. (Concurring and supplementing):         D

    1.1 In cases involving s. 138 of the N.I. Act, courts can
reduce the period of imprisonment depending, inter alia,
upon the nature of the transaction, the bona tides of the
accused, the contumacy of his conduct, the period for             E
which the prosecution goes on, the amount of the cheque
involved, the social strata to which the parties belong.
Some of these factors may indeed make out a case where
the court may impose only a sentence of fine upon the
defaulting drawer of the cheque. There is for that purpose        F
considerable discretion vested in the court concerned
which can and ought to be exercised in appropriate
cases for good and valid reasons. [para 7] [946-G-H; 947-
A]
    1.2 The High Court was competent on a plain reading           G
of s. 138 to impose a sentence of fine only upon the
appellant. It has rightly set aside the sentence of six
months simple imprisonment awarded to the appellant,
which has not been assailed by the complainant. [para 5
and 7] [944-H; 945-A; 947-A-B]                                    H
    938       SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2013] 9 S.C.R.


A      Damodar S. Prabhu v. Syed Baba/al H. 2010 (5) SCR
          =
    678 (2010) 5 sec 663 - relied on.

       1.3 As regards the additional amount which the High
  Court has directed the appellant to pay in lieu of the
  sentence of imprisonment, two significant aspects must
8
  be kept in view: First and foremost is the fact that the
  power to levy fine is circumscribed under the statute to
  twice the cheque amount. Even in a case where the court
  may be taking a lenient view in favour of the accused by
C not sending him to prison, it cannot impose a fine more
  than twice the cheque amount. That statutory limit is
  inviolable and must be respected. The High Court has,
  in the case at hand, overlooked the statutory limitation on
  its power to levy a fine. [para 8) [947-C-F]

D        1.4 The second aspect relates precisely to the need
    for appreciating that the power to award compensation
    is not available u/s 138 of N. I. Act. It is only when the court
    has determined the amount of fine that the question of
    paying compensation out of the same would arise. This
E   implies that the process comprises two stages: The first,
    when the court determines the amount of fine and levies
    the same subject to the outer limit, if any, as is the position
    in the instant case. The second stage comprises
    invocation of the power to award compensation out of
F   the amount so levied. The High Court has not followed
    that process. It has taken payment of Rs.80,000/- as
    compensation to be distinct from the amount of fine it
    was imposing equivalent to the cheque amount of
    Rs.69,500/-. The High Court appears to have proceeded
G   on the basis as though payment of compensation u/s 357
    of CrPC is different from the power to levy fine u/s 138,
    which assumption is not correct. The High Court should
    have determined the fine amount to be paid by the
    appellant, which in no case could go beyond twice the
H   cheque amount, and directed payment of compensation
  SOMNATH SARKAR v. UTPAL BASU MALLICK &                     939
                  ANR.
                                                                    A
to the complainant out of the same. Viewed thus, the
direction of the High Court that the appellant shall pay a
further sum of Rs.69,500/- does not appear to be legally
sustainable. Therefore, payment of a further sum of
Rs.20,000/- towards fine, making a total fine of
Rs.1,00,000/- out of which Rs.80,000/- has already been             B
paid as compensation to the complainant, should suffice.
The amount of Rs.20,000/- shall not go to the complainant
who has been suitably compensated by the amount
already received by him. [para 8-9) [947-E-H; 948-A-E]
                                                                    c
                      Case Law Reference:
     2010 (5) SCR 678             relied on            para 5
    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No.1651 of2013.                                                     D

    From the Judgment and order dated 01.04.2011 of the
High Court of Calcutta in CRR No. 2447 of 2004.

   Vikramjit Banerjee, Rishi Maheshwari, Shally Bhasin
Maheshwari for the Appellant.                                       E

    Avijit Bhattacharjee, Parthapratim Chaudhari, K.S. Rana,
Anip Sachtehy for the Respondents.

    The Judgments of the Court was delivered by
                                                                    F
     VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J. 1. Leave granted. The Appellant
before us makes what is essentially a mercy plea - to reduce
the sum of Rs.80,000/- imposed on him by way of
compensation in lieu of the six months sentence of
incarceration imposed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta.     G
The Appellant has admittedly issued a cheque in favour of the
Respondent No.1-complainant for a sum of Rs.69,500/-, which
cheque on presentation was dishonourned with the
endorsement 'insufficient funds'. After due compliance with the
statutory provisions contained in the Negotiable Instruments Act,   H
    940     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [201.3] 9 S.C.R.


A   1881 (for short, 'N.I. Act') prosecution was commenced and the
   aforementioned punishment under Section 138 thereof came
   to be passed. The payment of compensation amounting to
    Rs.80,000/- has admittedly been received by the complainant.
   The Appellant preferred an appeal to the Additional District &
B Sessions Judge, Calcutta who by judgment dated 5.7.2004
   dismissed the appeal and ordered the Appellant to surrender
   within 15 days. In these circumstances, Criminal Revision
    Record No.244 7 of 2004 was filed in the High Court of Calcutta
   which was pleased to substitute the six months' sentence by
c   an additional payment of Rs.69,500/-. C.R.R. No.2447 of 2004
   was heard and decided along with C.R.R. No.2865 of 2004
    also filed by the Appellant. Accordingly, as against the cheque
    amount of Rs.69,500/- the Appellant is liable to the extent of
    Rs.1,49,500/-. Faced with the prospects of jail the Appellant
    had earlier agreed to payment of the additional sum of
0
    Rs.80,000/- and for these reasons his plea for reduction thereto
    was turned down by the High Court in the impugned order. The
    Appellant was directed to pay a sum of Rs.19,500/- by May 31,
  · 2011 and the balance of Rs.50,000/- in five equal ihstalments
    thereafter. Unfortunately, despite repeated readings of the
E Orders and related documents, the total liability of the Appellant
    is not clear as also the payments made till date.

         2. Although the learned counsel for the complainant has
    appeared before us and has endeavoured to persuade us to
F   uphold the impugned order, we find it unnecessary to hear him
    since the complainant has indubitably already received the sum
    of the dishonourned cheque alongwith the compensation
    thereon aggregating Rupees Eighty Thousand.

G      3. It seems to us that since the Appellant has already
  faced prosecution in the Magistracy in which he presented
  virtually no defence, and has thereafter filed an appeal before
  the Sessions Court, and subsequently two Revisions before the
  High Court, the ends of justice will be met, were he be directed
H to pay a sum of Rs.20,000/- only, in default, of which he would
   SOMNATH SARKAR v. UTPAL BASU MALLICK &                      941
          ANR. [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]

be liable to undergo the punishment of simple imprisonment for A
a term of six months as imposed by the aforementioned
Magistrate. The said payment should be made within eight
weeks.

      4. As already expressed, the language employed by the            B
High Court in the impugned order raises a doubt as to the total
liability of the Appellant. A perusal of the sentence passed by
the Trial Court as well as the Sessions Judge while dismissing
the Appeal also does not completely clarify the position. The
cheque amount is Rs.69,500/- and in this regard a sum of
Rs.80,000/- has been directed towards compensation which,              C
by virtue of Section 357(3), Code of Criminal Procedure
(Cr.P.C.) would be receivable by the complainant. It appears
that this sum of Rs.80,000/- has been received by the
complainant. The use of the word, 'additional sum' in the
impugned order has led to considerable confusion. To put the           D
matter finally at rest, we hold that the total compensation
payable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act read with Section
357(3), Cr.P.C. is Rs.80,000/-. i.e., the cheque amount of
Rs.69,500/- together with Rs.10,500/- which may be seen as
constituting interest on the dishonoured cheque. In the                E
arguments addressed before us there appears to be no
controversy that this sum has been duly paid to the
Respondent-complainant. A reading of the impugned order
appears to indicate that the payment of further sum of
Rs.69,500/-, in the instalments indicated in that order would be       F
over and above the said sum of Rs.80,000/-. This would violate
Section 138 of the N.I. Act inasmuch as it would exceed the
double of the cheque amount. This leads us to conclude that
the intention of the High Court was that upon deposit/payment
of the further sum of Rs.69,500/- (in addition to the earlier sum      G
of Rs.80,000/-), the sentence of imprisonment for six months
would stand withdrawn. Learned counsel for the Appellant has
fervently submitted that the Appellant is a man of limited financial
means and this position has not been controverted. Palpably,
the convict has filed appeals all the way to the Apex Court which      H
    942      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013] 9 S.C.R.


A   would have entailed further expenses of no mean measure. We
    think that with the receipt of Rs.80,000/-, the complainant has
    received compensation for the dishonoured cheque as per the
    adjudication of the Trial Court. In these circumstances, any
    further payment would be in the nature of fine. Accordingly, we
B   clarify that the Appellant must pay a sum of Rs.80,000/-
    receivable by the complainant within four weeks from today, if
    not already paid. The Appellant is also sentenced· to payment
    of a fine of Rs.20,000/-, payable within eight weeks from today,
    and on the failure to make this payment, would be liable for
C   imprisonment for six months. The Appeal is allowed in these
    terms.

         T.S. THAKUR, J. 1. I have had the advantage of going
    through the order proposed by my esteemed Brother Vikramajit
    Sen, J. While I entirely agree that the order passed by the High
D   Court directing payment of a sum of Rs.69,500/- over and
    above Rs.80,000/- already paid under the orders of the Court
    to the complainant towards compensation needs to be modified
    to bring the same in tune with Section 138 of Negotiable
    Instruments Act, 1881, I would like to add a few words of my
E   own in support of that view. Before I do that, I may briefly set
    out the factual backdrop in which the appellant came to be
    prosecuted and convicted under the provision mentioned
    above.

         2. The appellant, who is the proprietor of M/s Tarama
F
    Medical Centre, Tarakeswar, Hooghly, issued a cheque in
    favour of the respondent/complainant bearing no.419415 dated
    6th September, 1999 drawn on SBI, Tarakeswar Branch for
    Rs.69,500/- towards discharge of existing liabilities. When the
    cheque was presented by the complainant through his banker
G   on 6th September, 1999 it was dishonoured for "insufficient
    funds", which dishonour was communicated to the complainant
    on 7th October, 1999. The complainant respondent issued a
    demand notice, which was received by the accused appellant
    within the prescribed limitation period. However, since the
H
  SOMNATH SARKAR v. UTPAL BASU MALLICK &                  943
         ANR. [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]

accused failed to repay the amount within time, the complainant A
filed a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881 on 9th December, 1999.

     3. The Metropolitan Magistrate, 6th Court, Calcutta
convicted the appellant for the offence under Section 138,        B
Negotiable Instruments Act and sentenced him to six months
simple imprisonment and to pay compensation of Rs.80,000/-
under Section 357(3) CrPC vide order dated 10th December,
2003 in Case No.C-4490/99. Both the conviction and sentence
were upheld by the Additional District & Sessions Judge of the    C
Fast Track Court in appeal vide order dated 5th July, 2004. In
a revision petition filed against the said two orders, the High
Court upheld the conviction, but imposed an additional fine of
Rs.69,500/- (cheque amount) in lieu of six months simple
imprisonment awarded by the Metropolitan Magistrate. That the
appellant has paid the compensation amount of Rs.80,000/- in      D
instalments of Rs.30,000/- and Rs.50,000/- is not disputed
before us and is evidenced by an affidavit dated 20th
November, 2006 filed in CRR No.2447 of 2004 before the
Calcutta High Court besides a receipt dated 14th February,
2008 respectively, which are on record.                           E

       4. The only question that falls for our determination in the
above backdrop is whether the High Court was justified in
directing payment of an additional fine of Rs.69,500/- which
happens to be the cheque amount also, having regard to the F
fact that the appellant has already paid the sum of Rs.80,000/-
 . to the complainant towards compensation in obedience to the
order made by the Metropolitan Magistrate. There is no
gainsaying that the High Court could have sentenced the
appellant to imprisonment extending up to two years and/or to G
payment of fine equivalent to twice the cheque amount. This is
evident from the provisions of Section 138 which reads as
under:

    "138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of
    funds in the account. Where any cheque drawn by a H
    944       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   (2013) 9 S.C.R.


A         person on an account maintained by him with a banker for
          payment of any amount of money to another person from
          out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part,
          of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid.
          either because of the amount of money standing to the
B         credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque
          or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that
          account by an agreement made with that bank, such person
          shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall,
          without prejudice. to any other provision of this Act, be
          punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend
c         to one year, or with fine which may extend to twice the
          amount of the cheque, or with both: Provided that nothing
          contained in this section shall apply unless-

          {a) the cheque has been, presented to the bank within a
D         period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or
          within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier;

          {b) the payee or the holder in due course. of the cheque
          as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of
E         the said amount of money by giving a notice, in writing, to
          the drawer of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt
          of information by him from the bank regarding the return
          of the cheque as unpaid; and

          {c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment
F         of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case
          may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within
          fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice. Explanation.-
          For the purposes of this section," debt or other liability"
          means a legally enforceable debt or other liability."
G
                                                  (emphasis supplied)

         5. In as much as the High Court set aside the sentence of
    six months simple imprisonment awarded to the appellant there
H   is no quarrel nor any challenge mounted before us. That part
   SOMNATH SARKAR v. UTPAL BASU MALLICK &                      945
          ANR. [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]

of the order could be assailed by the complainant who has not         A
chosen to do so. Whether or not the High Court was justified
in setting aside the sentence of imprisonment awarded to the
appellant is, therefore, a non-issue before us. Having said that
we have no hesitation in adding that the High Court may have
indeed been justified in setting aside the sentence of                B
imprisonment awarded to the appellant in the facts and
circumstances of the case. We say so having regard to a three-
Judge Bench decision of this Court in Damodar S. Prabhu v.
Syed Baba/al H. (2010) 5 SCC 663 where this Court briefly
examined the object sought to be achieved by the provisions           c
of Section 138 and the purpose underlying the punishment
provided therein. This Court has held that unlike other crimes,
punishment in Section 138 cases is meant more to ensure
payment of money rather than to seek retribution. The Court
said:                                                                 D
    "17 .... Unlike that for other forms of crime, the punishment
    here (in so far as the complainant is concerned) is not a
    means of seeking retribution. but is more a means to
    ensure payment of money. The complainant's interest lies
    primarily in recovering the money rather than seeing the          E
    drawer of the cheque in jail. The threat of jail is only a mode
    to ensure recovery. As against the accused who is willing
    to undergo a jail term, there is little available as remedy
    for the holder of the cheque."
                                                                      F
                                            (emphasis supplied)

     6. This Court also took note of the number of cases
involving dishonor of cheques choking the criminal justice
system of this country, especially at the level of the Magisterial    G
Courts, and held that dishonor of cheque being a regulatory
offence, aimed at ensuring the reliability of negotiable
instruments, the provision for imprisonment extending up to two
years was only intended to ensure quick recovery of the amount
payable under the instrument. The following passages from the
decision are in this regard apposite:                                 H
    946       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 9 S.C.R.


A         "4 ... lt is quite evident that the legislative intent was to
          provide a strong criminal remedy in order to deter the
          worryingly high incidence of dishonour of cheques. While
          the possibility of imprisonment up to two years provides a
          remedy of a punitive nature. the provision for imposing a
B         'fine which may extent to twice the amount of the cheque'
          serves a compensatory purpose. What must be
          remembered is that the dishonour of a cheque can be best
          described as a regulatory offence that has been created
          to serve the public interest in ensuring the reliability of
c         these instruments. The impact of this offence is usually
          confined to the private parties involved in commercial
          transactions.

          5. Invariably, the provision of a strong criminal remedy has
          encouraged the institution of a large number of cases that
D         are relatable to the offence contemplated by Section 138
          of the Act. So much so, that at present a disproportionately
          large number of cases involving the dishonour of cheques
          is choking our criminal justice system, especially at the
          level of Magistrates' Courts. As per the 213th Report of
E         the Law Commission of India, more than 38 lakh cheque
          bouncing cases were pending before various courts in the
          country as of October 2008. This is putting an
          unprecedented strain on our judicial system."

F                                                (emphasis supplied)

       7. We do not consider it necessary to examine or
  exhaustively enumerate situations in which Courts may remain
  content with imposition of a fine without any sentence of
  imprisonment. There is considerable judicial authority for the
G proposition that the Courts can reduce the period of
  imprisonment depending upon the nature of the transaction, the
  bona fides of the accused, the contumacy of his conduct, the
  period for which the prosecution goes on, the amount of the
  cheque involved, the social strata to which the parties belong,
H so on and so forth. Some of these factors may indeed make
  SOMNATH SARKAR v. UTPAL BASU MALLICK &                      947
          ANR. [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]

out a case where the Court may impose only a sentence of fine        A
upon the defaulting drawer of the cheque. There is for that
purpose considerable discretion vested in the Court concerned
which can and ought to be exercised in appropriate cases for
good and valid reasons. Suffice it to say that the High Court
was competent on a plain reading of Section 138 to impose a          B
sentence of fine only upon the appellant. In as much as the High
Court did so, it committed no jurisdictional error. In the absence
of a challenge to the order passed by the High Court deleting
the sentence of imprisonment awarded to the appellant, we do
not consider it necessary or proper to say anything further at       c
this stage.

     8. Coming then to the question whether the additional
amount which the High Court has directed the appellant to pay
could be levied in lieu of the sentence of imprisonment, we must
keep two significant aspects in view. First and foremost is the      D
fact that the power to levy fine is circumscribed under the
statute to twice the cheque amount. Even in a case where the
Court may be taking a lenient view in favour of the accused by
not sending him to prison, it cannot impose a fine more than
twice the cheque amount. That statutory limit is inviolable and      E
must be respected. The High Court has, in the case at hand,
obviously overlooked the statutory limitation on its power to levy
a fine. It appears to have proceeded on the basis as though
payment of compensation under Section 357 of CrPC is
different from the power to levy fine under Section 138, which       F
assumption is not correct.

     9. The second aspect relates precisely to the need for
appreciating that the power to award compensation is not
available under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act. It        G
is only when the Court has determined the amount of fine that
the question of paying compensation out of the same would
arise. This implies that the process comprises two stages. First,
when the Court determines the amount of fine and levies the
same subject to the outer limit, if any, as is the position in the
                                                                     H
    948      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 9 S.C.R.


A   instant case. The second stage comprises invocation of the
    power to award compensation out of the amount so levied. The
    High Court does not appear to have followed that process. It
    has taken payment of Rs.80,000/- as compensation to be
    distinct from the amount of fine it is imposing equivalent to the
B   cheque amount of Rs.69,500/-. That was not the correct way
    of looking at the matter. Logically, the High Court should have
    determined the fine amount to be paid by the appellant, which
    in no case could go beyond twice the cheque amount, and
    directed payment of compensation to the complainant out of
C   the same. Viewed thus, the direction of the High Court that the
    appellant shall pay a further sum of Rs.69,500/- does not appear
    to be legally sustainable as rightly observed by my erudite
    Brother Vikramajit Sen, J. I, therefore, entirely agree with my
    Brother's view that payment of a further sum of Rs.20,000/-
D   towards fine, making a total fine of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees one
    lac) out of which Rs.80,000/- has already been paid as
    compensation to the complainant, should suffice. The amount
    of Rs.20,000/- (Rupees twenty thousand) now directed to be
    paid shall not go to the complainant who is, in our view, suitably
    compensated by the amount already received by him. In the
E   event of failure to pay the additional amount of Rs.20,000/- the
    appellant shall undergo imprisonment for a period of six
    months. With these words, I concur with the order proposed by
    Brother Vikramajit Sen, J.

F R.P.                                       Appeal partly allowed.