Holding

The sale deed executed by a person of unsound mind is void; the lower courts correctly found Bhogirath Bora mentally imbalanced, and the Division Bench’s reversal was erroneous, so the appeal is allowed.

Summary

The widowed appellant Sona Bala Bora and her children claimed that their father‑in‑law Bhogirath Bora, who had sold three bungalows to the respondent Jyotirindra Bhatachary, was of unsound mind when he executed the sale deed and that a prior criminal‑case compromise required him to gift one bungalow to the first appellant. The trial court and a single High Court judge held the sale void on the basis of Bhogirath’s mental imbalance, dismissing the respondent’s suit and ordering the appellants to repay Rs 69,000. The Division Bench of the High Court reversed that finding, holding Bhogirath was the sole owner and that the burden of proving unsound mind lay on the appellants, and granted the respondent relief. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether unsound‑mind can be proved without medical evidence, affirmed that the lower courts’ factual assessment was reasonable, and reinstated the specific‑performance claim arising from the compromise. It held that the sale deed was vitiated by Bhogirath’s incapacity, the Division Bench erred in reversing the lower courts, and the appeal was allowed, restoring the trial court’s decision and ordering repayment with interest.

Issues considered

Whether Bhogirath Bora was of sound mind at the time of executing the sale deed under Sections 11 and 12 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872
Whether a contract of sale executed by a person of unsound mind is void or voidable
Whether evidence of unsound mind can be established without medical testimony
Whether the appellants are entitled to specific performance of the compromise that required Bhogirath to gift a bungalow
Whether the Division Bench erred in reversing the lower courts’ findings on mental capacity and ownership

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 107
Indian Contract Act, 1872s. 11, s. 12

Subjects

unsound mindcapacity to contractvoid contractspecific performancecompromise agreementproperty lawsale deedburden of proof

Judgment

A SONA BALA BORA AND ORS.
v.
JYOTIRINDRA BHATACHARJEE

APRIL 11, 2005

B [RUMA PAL AND C.K. THAKKER, JJ.]

Contract Act, 1872 :

ss. 11 and 12-Contract with consent of a person of unsound mind-
c Unsoundness of mind-Establishing of-Held, capacity of a person to execute
a conveyance has not to be established only by medical evidence-Unsoundness
of mind may be established by proving such conduct as was not only not in
keeping with the character of the person concerned but such that it could not
be explained on any reasonable basis-In the instant case, the actions of the
D head of the family surreptitiously selling the residential house and depriving
his entire family as also initiating criminal proceedings against his wife and
children without cause are irrational ones and outcome of mental disorder-
Trial court and single Judge of High Court rightly dismissed the suit of the
vendee.

E Appeal-Assessment of evidence-Held, is inevitably subjective-If the
assessment of lower courts is such thr;it it cannot be reasonably sustained, the
decision should be set aside on appeal, otherwise appellate court should be
slow to interfere with a concurrent factual inference.

Specific performance of contract-Parties entering into a compromise
F in a criminal case-Husband agreeing to gift one of the bungalows to the
wife-Later, a third person claiming to have purchased the property-Suit by
wife for declaration that sale was void and husband did not have absolute
right to transfer the property-Held, since the agreement was never challenged
either by the husband or the vendee, husband was bound by the agreement.
G Maxim-lnsanus est qui abjecta ratione omnia cum impetus et furore
facit-Applicability of

'B', the husband of appellant No. 1 and father of the other appellants,
owned three bungalows, one of which was in occupation of the appellants.
H 454
SONA BALA BORA v. JYOTIRINDRA BHATACHARJEE 455

In terms of a compromise arrived at between 'B' and appellant No. t in A
a criminal case, 'B' was inter alia, to make a gift of the said bungalow to
the first appellant. However, later the respondent filed a suit against the
appellant and 'B' for a declaration that he was absolute and exclusive
owner of the suit property; and for possession thereof, claiming that he
purchased all the three bungalows from 'B' for Rs. 69,000. The appellants
also filed a suit against the vendee and 'B' for a declaration that '8' did B
not have the absolute right to transfer the property to the respondent;
that the sale was void and be set aside; that they were not aware of the.
transaction; and that '8' was bound by the terms of the compromise in
the criminal case. The trial court dismissed the suit of the ".en dee holding
that '8' was mentally imbalanced, and that the sale and mutation of the C
property were without the knowledge of the appellants. Appellant No. 1
was directed to repay Rs. 69,000 to the vendee. The latter's appeal was
dismissed by single Judge of the High Court holding that 'B' not being
the sole owner of the property, could not sell the same; and that '8' was
mentally imbalanced when the sale deed was executed. However, the
Division Bench allowed the vendee's appeal. Aggrieved, the wife and D
children of 'B' filed the present appeal.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD : 1.1. A contract of sale, like any other contract, would be
vitiated if the consent of either party is given by a person of unsound mind E
as provided in Section 11 of the Contract Act, 1872. Under Section 12 of
the Act, a person is said to be of sound mind for the purpose of m~king
..__ the contract, if at the time when he makes it, he is capable of understanding
it and of forming a rational judgment as to its effect upon his interests. A
person of unsound mind is thus not necessarily a lunatic. It is sufficient if p
the person is incapable of judging the consequences of his acts. [462-C-D)

Black's Law Dictionary (sixth Edition) p. 795, referred to.

1.2. In a civil matter the issues have to be decided on a balance of
probabilities. The question of the capacity of 'B' to execute the conveyance G
did not have to be established only by medical evidence. The unsoundness
of the mind may be established by proving such conduct as was not only
not in keeping with the character of the person concerned but such that
it could not be explained on any reasonable basis. The appellants' evidence
to the effect that whenever '8' suffered from a fit of depression, he would
become violent and angry, seek to sell the property and dispossess his
456 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005]" 3 S.C.R.

A entire family had not been rebutted by the respondent by cross-
examination. It is said, insanus est qui, abjecta ratione, omnia cum impetu
et furore facit - he is insane who, reason being thrown away, does
everything with violence and rage. Neither the action of surreptitiously
selling the residential house and depriving his entire family nor the
B initiation of criminal proceedings against his wife and children without
cause is in accord with natural and normal affection. [462-E-G; 463-A)

1.3. The Division Bench of the High Court wrongly proceeded on
the basis that there was no pleading of the mental imbalance of 'B' in the
appellant's plaint or written statement. In fact, in both the written
C statement and the plaint, the appellants had pleaded that after B's
retirement from service in 1968, he became "abnormal and detached from
his family" and showed signs of insanity and was quarrelsome and violent.
It was the admitted case that 'B' was known to be insane which was why
the respondent thought it necessary to have him medically examined before
he purchased the property. However, the respondent did not produce the
D doctor who ·certified that 'B' was mentally normal nor did he prove the
certificate. (461-E-F; 462-A-B)

2.1. The assessment of evidence is inevitably subjective. If the
assessment of the lower courts is such that it cannot be reasonably
sustained, the decision can and should be set aside on appeal. But where
E this is not so, the appellate court should be slow to interfere with a
concurrent factual inference. The single Judge had opined that a "normal"
man would not initiate criminal proceedings against his family, particularly
when there was no evidence of any ill-feeling or discord between the two.
He was also of the view that it was not normal for a man to leave his house
F and withdraw from his near and dear ones for no discernible reason. If,
in these circumstances, a court comes to the conclusion that the irrational
conduct was indicative of a mental imbalance and that the degree of
irrationality was such that without proof to the contrary it would mean
that 'B' was incapable of rational and controlled thought, the conclusion
cannot be faulted. The Division Bench erred in reversing the decision of
G the lower courts on this issue. [463-D-G; 464-C)

Alapati Kasi Viswanatham v. Sivarama Krishnayya, CA No. 232/1961
decided by Supreme Court on 11.1.63; Asha Devi v. Dukhi Sao, AIR (1974)
SC 2048: [19741 2 SCC 492 and Sunitibala Debi v. Dhara Sundari Debi,
H AIR (1919) PC 24, referred to.
SONA BALA BORA v. JYOTIRINDRA BHATACHARJEE [RUMA PAL, .1.) 457
2.2. The appellate court wrongly rejected the evidence given by the A
appellants that the first appellant had made substantial contributions
towards the erection of the three bungalows without rejecting the lower
courts, finding that this statement was not challenged in cross-examination
by the respondent. Perhaps that is why in the compromise petition, 'B'
agreed to gift one bunglow, erect a boundary wall and pay Rs. 10,000 to B
the first appellant. (464-D-E)

Smt. Amiya Bala Dutta v. Mukul Abhikari and Ors., (1998) 2 GLJ 527,
cited.

3. In any event and assuming that 'B' was compos mentis, what the C
Division Bench overlooked was that the appellants sought enforcement of
the compromise, which has never been challenged either by 'B' or the
respondent. The appellants, thus, sought specific performance of the
agreement whereby 'B' had bound himself to transfer one of the
bungalows to the first appellant. (464-E-F)
D
4. The judgment and decree passed by the Division Bench of the High
Court are set aside and the decision of the trial court as affirmed by the
single Judge of the High Court is restored. The respondent's suit is
accordingly dismissed. However the amount of Rs. 69,000s must be paid
by the appellants to the respondent with simple interest at the rate of 6%
per annum. (465-A) E
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 2519-2520
of 2005 .

. From the Judgment and Order dated 5.4.2004 of the Gauhati High
Court at Assam in L.P.A. No. I (SH) and LP.A. No. 2 (SH) of 1994. F
Rajiv Dutta, Biswanath Aggarwal and Rajiv Mehta with him for the
Appellants.

Dr .Devi Prasad Pal. Ms. Susmita Lal, Ashesh Lal, K.K. Tiwary and
Ms. Malbika Sarkar for the Respondent. G

-- The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

RUMA PAL, J. Leave granted.

H
458 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) 3 S.C.R.

A The first appellant is the widow of Bhogirath Bora. The appellants 2-
4 are their children. They reside in a bungalow which is situated in an area
of .176 acres of land at Shillong. There are two other bungalows on the same
plot which are tenanted. The respondent claims to have purchased the three
bungalows and the land from Bhogirath in 1977 for a consideration of Rs.
B 69,ooo.

In 1978, the respondent filed a title suit against, inter a/ia the appellants
and Bhogirath, (who was named as a proforma defendant) claiming a
declaration that he was the absolute and exclusive owner of the land and
buildings, for a decree for vacant possession by evicting the appellants and
C the tenants therefrom, for mesne profits, interest thereon and costs.

The appellants also filed a suit against the respondent and Bhogirath
claiming a declaration that Bhogirath did not have the absolute right to transfer
the property to the respondent, that the sale made to the respondent was void
and should be set aside, for a declaration that Bhogirath was bound by the
D terms of a compromise petition dated IOth June, 1977 filed in Ct. case no.
3/1977 and that the appellants had a preferential right and a right of preemption
to purchase the other two houses on the land.

It is an admitted position that in 1977, Bhogirath had filed a complaint
(Case No. 3/1977) against some of the appellants before the Magistrate under
E Section 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The complaint case was
compromised on IOth June 1977 by filing of terms of settlement before the
Magistrate. In terms of the compromise Bhogirath was inter alia to make a
gift of the bungalow and land in which the appellants were residing, to the
first appellant. The deed of gift was required to be executed and registered
F at the same time when Bhogirath sold the other two houses to purchasers.
Bhogirath also agreed to build a cement brick wall at his expense as a boundary
separating the other two houses with the house to be gifted to the first appellant.
He also agreed to build and construct a sanitary latrine for the house which
was given as a gift to his wife. Additionally, Bhogirath was to open a Savings
Bank Account of Rs. I0,000 in his wife's name out of the sale proceeds of
G the other two houses. In consideration for the aforesaid the appellants agreed
not to put any hindrance in the sale of the other two houses by Bhogirath to
a purchaser of his own choice. They also agreed to give vacant possession
of the two houses to be sold to Bhogirath on or before 20th June, 1977 after
obtaining the same from the tenants occupying the two houses.

H
SONA BALA BORA v. .lYOTIRINDRA BHATACHAR.lEE [RUMA PAL, J.] 459

In breach of this agreement, Bhogirath sold the entire property together A
with all three houses standing thereon to the respondent inter a/ia without
executing a gift deed to the first appellant. In fact according to the appellants
they were not aware of the transaction nor were they given any notice of the
mutation whkh was then effected in respect of the property at the instance
of the respondent.
B
In both the suits, Bhogirath filed a written statement supporting the
respondent and denying the claim of the appellants. Both the suits were
clubbed together and heard. Two separate sets of issues were framed. After
evidence was led by both sides, counsel agreed that the suits could be decided
only on one issue namely whether on the evidence the respondent was entitled C
to get the suit property.

The District Judge delivered a common judgment in both the suits on
12th July, 1985. He held that:

(1) Bhogirath was mentally imbalanced from 1971.
D
(2) The sale and mutation of the property was without the knowledge
of the appellants.
(3) Although the respondent had had Bhogirath's mental capacity
tested by a Doctor, the Doctor was not called.
E
(4) The mutation of the suit property had been allowed in favour of
the respondent without possession.

(5) The respondent had deposed that he was willing to give up his
claim to the property on a refund of the money.

In these circumstances and as the appellants would have to suffer serious F
hardship in case they were evicted since they did not have any other house
for their living whereas the respondent had his own house at Umpling, the
respondent's suit was dismissed and the amount of Rs. 69,000 was directed
to be repaid by the appellant No. I to the respondent within six months. In
default the respondent was entitled to execute the decree for 69,000. G
The respondent preferred an appeal to a single Judge of the High Court.
While the appeal was pending, Bhogirath died on 18th August, 1988. The
appeal was dismissed on 3rd March, 1994. The First Appellate Court framed
, the following issues :-
H
460 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] 3 S.C.R.

A "(1) Whether late Bhogirath Bora-Respondent No. 6 was the sole
owner of the suit property and had saleable right, title over the property.

"(2) Whether the time of execution of the registered sale deed the
respondent No.6 was not mentally sound and whether execution of
the sale deed conferred right, title and interest to the appellant.
B
"(3) Whether the appellant obtained possession of the property".

On the first issue, the learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that
the land was settled on Bhogirath for the welfare of his family and that the
houses standing on the land were constructed out of substantial monetary
C contributions of the first appellant. In the circumstances, it was held that
Bhogirath was not the sole owner of the property and he could not transfer
the entire land to the respondent.

On the second issue, the appellants' case that Bhogirath was mentally
unbalanced when the impugned sale deed was executed was believed. This
D conclusion was based on the fact that the respondent had failed to show that
Bhogirath was mentally sound to execute the sale deed. On the other hand,
the first appellant had deposed that rent from the two houses were being
collected by her since 1971 when Bhogirath had cfeveloped fits of insanity
during which he threatened to sell the residential house, tha_t he had become
E disinterested and detached from the family, that his conduct was not normal,
that he instituted a case against his wife and children, that he was violent and
quarrelsome, that he remained away from the house for long periods that he
secretively transferred the entire property by way of sale rendering the
members of his family homeless and finally that he had tried to forcibly
dispossess his family. The learned Single Judge however was conscious of
F the fact that these factors may not necessarily show that a person was mentally
unstable but he was of the opinion that viewed as a whole Bhogirath was not
mentally sound and as such the sale deed executed by him did not confer any
right, title or interest on the respondent.

G The third issue was also decided against the respondent by holding that
Bhogirath was never in a position to deliver the entire property to him.

The respondent's further appeal before the Division Bench of the High
Court, however met with success.

H The Appellate Court, relying upon the decision of the same High Court
SONA BALA BORA v. JYOTJRINDRA BHATACHARJEE[RUMA PAL, J.) 461

in Smt. Amiya Bala Dutta v. Mukul Adhikari and Ors., (1998) 2 GLJ 527 A
held that since the patta had been issued to Bhogirath, he acquired the right
of ownership and had a permanent saleable and transferable right in the
houses including their occupancy. The Court was also of the view that mere
substantial contribution in the construction of the house not being supported
by any reliable evidence, oral or documentary, did not confer any right upon B
the appellants over the suit property. Further the compromise degree itself
proceeded on the basis that Bhogirath was the rightful owner of the property
and he had a saleable right over it. As far as Bhogirath's alleged insanity was
concerned, it was held that the burden to establish that was on the appellants,
an onus which they had failed to discharge. The learned Judges were of the
view that the mere institution of a criminal case by Bhogirath against his wife C
and children, selling the house to a stranger and the other instances given by
the appellants did not indicate that Bhogirath was not a normal person.
Emphasis was placed on the fact that there were no pleadings either in the
written statement or in the plaint filed by the appellants as regards the mental
position of Bhogirath at the time of execution of the sale deed. It was noted
that Bhogirath was never medically examined to support the contention of D
the appellants that he was of unsound mind. Finally it was held that the plea
of the right of preemption was unsustainable since the law of preemption was
not applicable in the State ofMegha/aya. Accordingly, the respondent's appeals
were allowed, the decision of the single Judge was set aside and the suit filed
by the respondent was decreed for the entire relief sought. E
We are unable to sustain the reasoning of the High Court.

Firstly- the Division Bench wrongly proceeded on the basis that there
was no pleading of the mental imbalance of Bhogirath in the appellant's
plaint or written statement. In fact in both the written statement and plaint the p
appellants had pleaded that after Bhogirath's retirement from service in 1968,
Bhogirath became "abnormal and detached from his family" and showed
signs of insanity and was quarrelsome and violent. It was pleaded that although
Bhogirath's mental condition improved, it had deteriorated again in 1977 a11d
that during his fits of insanity, Bhogirath always threatened to sell the property.
G
It is true that the respondent asserted in evidence that at the time he
purchased the land, Bhogirath was a normal man and did not suffer from any
mental defect. At the same time in cross-examination he said that :-

"I got examined Sri Bora by doctor to determine whether he had any
mental insanity. He was examined in the mental hospital only for half H
462 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005) 3 S.C.R.

A an hour and obtained certificate of his normalcy. I got him examined
because I came to know from some people that Sri Bora was suffering
from mental insanity. Being satisfied I purchased the property''.

Therefore, it was the admitted case that Bhogirath was at least reputed
to be insane which was why the respondent thought it necessary to have him
B medically examined before he purchased the property. It is in this background
that the First Appellate Court had examined the facts and had held that
respondent should have produced the doctor who certified that Bhogirath was
mentally normal.

It cannot be disputed that a contract of sale like any other contract
C would be vitiated if the consent of either party is given by a person of
unsound mind as provided in Section 11 of the Contract Act, 1872. Under
Section 12 of that Act, a person is said to be of sound mind for the purpose
of making the contract, if at the time when 'he makes it, he is capable of
understanding it and of forming a rational judgment as to its effect upon his
D interests. A person of unsound mind is thus not necessarily a lunatic. It is
sufficient if the person is incapable of judging the consequences of his acts.
Black's Law Dictionary says :-

"As a ground for voiding or annulling a contract or conveyance,
insanity does not mean a total deprivation of reason, but an inability,·
E from defect of perception, memory, and judgment, to do the act in
question or to understand its nature and consequences 1."

It must be remembered that in a civil matter the issues have to be
decided on a balance of probabilities. The question of the capacity ofBhogirath
to execute the conveyance did not have to be established only by medical
F evidence. The unsoundness of the mind may be established by proving such
conduct as was not only not in keeping with the concerned person's character
but such that it could not be explained on any reasonable basis.

The appellants' evidence to the effect that whenever Bhogirath suffered
from a fit of depression, he would become violent and angry, seek to sell the
G property and dispossess his entire family had not been rebutted by the
respondent by cross-examination. It is said insanus est qui, abjecta ratione,
omnia cum impetu et furore facit he is insane who, reason being thrown
away, does everything with violence and rage. Neither the action of

H I. Black's Law Dictionary. (Sixth Edition) Page 795.
SONA BALA BORA v. JYOTIRINDRA BHATACHARJEE [RUMA PAL, J.] 463

surreptitiously selling the residential house and depriving his entire family A
nor the initiation of criminal proceedings against his wife and children without
cause is in accord with natural and normal affection. This should have been
seen by the Division Bench as an irrational action or the outcome of mental
disorder. Had it been alleged and proved either that the relationship between
Bhogirath and every member of his family was strained or that he required
__... I money necessitating an immediate sale of his and his family's only residence,
his action would perhaps have been in keeping with sanity. In the absence of
B

any such reason, the act of dispossessing his family from property and putting
his family on the streets must be seen as intrinsically that of an unsound
mind. Interestingly the respondent, a stranger to the family, said in evidence
that if he could not get the possession of the land he was willing to take back C
the money that he had paid and that he did not desire the appellants "to go
to the street after vacating the house". The reaction of the respondent when
compared with the conduct of Bhogirath would highlight the extent of the
irrationality and abnormality of Bhogirath's conduct. The general reputation
of Bhogirath as suffering from mental disorder was acknowledged by the
respondent himself and the Appellate Court erred in not giving appropriate D
weight to this admission of the respondent.

The assessment of evidence is inevitably subjective because "we see
the evidence with nobody's eyes but our own". If the assessment of the lower
Courts is such that it cannot be reasonably sustained, the decision can and E
should be set aside on appeal. But where this is not so, the Appellate Court
should be slow to interfere with a concurrent factual inference merely because
the eyes of the Appellate Court are different2•

The learned single Judge had opined that a "normal" man would not
initiate criminal proceedings against his family, particularly when there was p
no evidence of any ill-feeling or discord between the two. He was also of the
view that it was not normal for a man to leave his house and withdraw from
his near and dear ones for no discernible reason. If in these circumstances,
a Court comes to the conclusion that the irrational conduct was indicative of
a mental imbalance and that the degree of irrationality was such that without
proof to the contrary it would mean that Bhogirath was incapable of rational G
and controlled thought, the conclusion cannot be faulted.

2. See Alapati Kasi Viswanatham v. Sivarama Krishnayaa; Ureportedjudgment in C.A. No.
232/1961 dated 11.1.63 referred to in Asha Devi v. Dukhi Sao, AIR (1974) SC 2048, 2051
: [1974] 2 sec 492, 495 and Sunitiba/a Devi v. Dhara Sundari Debi; AIR (1919) PC 24, H
26.
464 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] 3 S.C.R.

A · No doubt the burden to prove or establish at least on a balance of
probability that Bhogirath's action in executing the sale deed in favour of the
respondent was the outcome of an unsound mind was on the appellants. But
unrebutted evidence of an unnatural and inexplicable animosity to his wife

B
and children as well as of an unnatural and inexplicable fixation on selling
of all his properties probabilses that the sale was effected by when Bhogirath
\--
was incapable of rational behaviour. This was sufficient to discharge the
appellants' burden. The onus then shifted to the respondent to adduce evidence
either to show that the ostensibly irrational conduct of Bhogirath had a rational

\
explanation or that the conveyance was executed by Bhogirath in a lucid
interval. The respondent had, if his statement is to be accepted, a certificate
C of a Doctor who had medically examined Bhogirath just before the conveyance
was executed. The respondent did not seek to call the Doctor or prove the.
certificate.

We would therefore hold that the Division Bench erred in reversing the
decision of the lower Courts on this issue.
D
Secondly, the Appellate Court wrongly rejected the evidence given by
the appellants that the first appellant had made substantial contributions towards
the erection of the three bungalows without rejecting the lower Courts finding
that this statement was not challenged in cross-examination by the respondent.
Perhaps that was why in the compromise petition, Bhogirath agreed to gift
E one bungalow, erect a boundary wall and pay Rs. 10,000 to the first appellant.

In any event and assuming Bhogirath was compos mentis, what the
Division Bench overlooked was that the appellants sought enforcement of the
compromise which has never been challenged either by Bhogirath or the
respondent. In other words they sought specific performance of the agreement
whereby Bhogirath had bound himself to transfer one of the bungalows to the
first appellant. This being so the Appellate Court should have at least applied
its mind to this aspect of the matter.

Finally, the respondent had prayed for mesne profits, interest and costs
G in addition to a declaration of title and possession. Because the lower Courts
had dismissed the respondent's suit with regard to the primary prayers of
declaration and recovery of possession, they did not consider these
consequential prayers. The Division Bench granted the relief without
considering whether the respondent had laid any factual basis in that regard
and without assigning any reason in support of their conclusion.
H
SONA BALA BORA v. JYOTIRINDRA BHATACHARJEE (RUMA PAL, J.] . 465

For all these reasons the appeals are allowed and the decision of the A
trial Court as affirmed by the Single Judge of the High Court is restored. The
respondent's suit is accordingly dismissed. However the amount of Rs. 69,000
must be paid by the appellants to the respondent with interest at 6% per
annum simple interest from I st September, 1985 (being approximately 6
weeks from the date of the judgment of the Trial Court) until payment is
made. No costs.

R.P. Appeal allowed.