Holding

The settlement was a lease of the iron‑casting business, not a premises tenancy, and therefore the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 does not apply.

Summary

The dispute arose from a settlement in 1954 whereby the original lessees transferred the entire iron‑casting foundry business, together with land, building, machinery and fittings, to the appellant for a fixed term. After the term expired, the appellant failed to vacate the premises (referred to as "B Schedule property") and also occupied adjacent land ("C Schedule property"). The respondents sued for recovery of possession; the trial court decreed in their favour, the appellate court set aside the decree for B Schedule property, but the Calcutta High Court restored it, holding that the settlement was a lease of the business, not a premises tenancy under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, and that no notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was required. The Supreme Court examined whether the settlement fell within the definition of "premises" in the Act, whether notice was necessary, and whether the suit could be filed by the respondents individually after the partnership dissolved. It held that the dominant intention was to lease the business, not the premises, so the Act did not apply; it affirmed the findings of trespass and the notice requirement, but noted that the High Court erred in finding a default in rent payment without pleadings. The appeal was dismissed, leaving the High Court's decree of possession intact.

Issues considered

The nature of the settlement: whether it constituted a lease of premises within the meaning of Section 2(f) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956.
Whether a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 was required before eviction.
Whether the respondents could maintain the suit in their individual capacities after the dissolution of the partnership.
Whether a decree based on alleged default in rent payment is valid in the absence of pleadings and evidence on that point.
Whether the findings of trespass on the C Schedule property are factual and not open to appellate interference.

Legislation cited

Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 116
Transfer of Property Act, 1882s. 106
West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956s. 13(6), s. 17(i), s. 2(f)

Subjects

premises tenancybusiness leaseWest Bengal Premises Tenancy ActTransfer of Property Actevictiontrespasssettlementdefault in rentpartnership dissolution

Judgment

SPUN CASTING AND ENGG. CO. PVT. LTD. A
v.
DWIJENDRA LAL SINHA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. AND ORS.

APRIL 8, 2005

[ASHOK BHAN AND A.K. MATHUR, JJ.] B

West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956-Applicability of-Settlement
of business of iron casting foundry along v.1ith the building and machinery by
legal heirs of original lessees in favour of party by successive transfer for C
fixed period-Failure to vacate the property and non-payment of rent and
also trespassed over the other property-Grant of decree of recovery of
possession by trial court, set aside by appellate court-However, upheld by
High Court on the ground of non-payment of rent and that the party let out
business and not the premises within the Act-On appeal held: In view of the
terms of the settlement dominant intention of the parties was to create lease D
for running business of an iron casting foundry along with machinery housed
in a building and not in respect of premises constituting 'premises tenancy'
within the meaning of section 2(/) of the Act-Structures and sheds not part
of the settlement-Hence, settlement was not for the premises to run business
but business itself and as such not within the purview of the Act-Order of E
High Court upheld-Also with regard to trespass over the other property,
issue of notice under section 106 of the 1882 Act and maintainability of the
suit by the party in their individual capacity after the dissolution of the
partnership firm-However, High Court erred in passing decree on the ground
of default in payment of rent in absence of pleadings and evidence-Section
2(/)-Transfer of Property Act, 1882 section 106. F
Words and Phrases:

Premises-Meaning of in the context of West Bengal Premises Tenancy
Act, 1'956, Section 2(/).
G
Legal heirs of N-original respondent Nos.I and 2 settled the whole
Karbar (business) of iron casting foundry along with land and all fittings
and fixtures-'B' Schedule Property, in favour of predecessor-in-interest
of the appellant at a monthly rent for a fixed period. By successive
transfers, appellant acquired the interest of original lessees/settlees and
395 II
396 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] 3 S.C.R.

A thereafter, settlement came to an end by efflux of time. Appellant did not
vacate the 'B' Schedule Property nor paid rent and also trespassed over
'C' Schedule Property. Respondent No. 1 and 2 filed suit for recovery of
'B' and 'C' Schedule property. Trial Court decreed the suit in favour of
the respondent. Appellant filed an Appeal. Appellate Court upheld the
order of Trial Court with regard to 'C' Schedule property, however set
B aside the order with regard to 'B' Schedule property. Aggrieved appellant -~

filed Second Appeal and the respondents filed cross objections. High Court "/

dismissed the Second Appeal holding that the appellant ha" trespassed the
· 'C' Schedule property. However, it allowed the cross objections and upheld
the decree for recovery of possession of 'B' Schedule property. It held that
C the dominant intention of the parties while creating the lease was to lease
the karbar (business) of iron casting foundry; that the parties never
intended to settle or grant lease of the structures and sheds, and as such
was not a settlement in respect of the premises constituting premises
tenancy within the meaning of section 2(f) of the West Bengal Premises
Tenancy Act, 1956; that there was no requirement of issuance of notice
D under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act; and that after the
dissolution of the partnership firm the respondents could file the suit in
their individual capacity. Hence the present appeal.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court
E HELD: 1.1. The West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 can have
application only if what is settled by way of lease is a premises. 'Premises'
in the Act are defined under section 2(f) to mean a building or a part of
a building which includes gardens, grounds and out-houses, if any,
appertaining to the building. It also includes the furniture supplied or any ·
F fittings or fixtures in a building or a part of the building but would not
include a room in a hotel or a lodging house. It does not include the lease
of a business along with machinery in a building. (405-C; 404-F)

1.2. In the instant case, reading the terms of the settlement and
construing the same the dominant intention of the settlers who entered
G into settlement was to effect the settlement in respect of the karbar
(business) of iron casting foundry set up by them along with machinery
housed in a building. It was to create a lease for running the business of
an iron casting foundry. The intention of the parties was not to settle or
grant lease of the structures and sheds as such. Structures and sheds did
H not constitute the dominant part of the settlement. in favour of the
SPUN CASTING AND ENGG. CO. PVT.LTD. 1•. DWl.IENDRA LAL SINHA [BHAN, J.) 397

appellant. It cannot be said that the settlement was not in respect of the A
premises constituting 'premises tenancy' within the meaning of Section 2
(f) of the Act. Therefore, what was settled was not the premises for
carrying on a particular business but the businesses itself and therefore,
it cannot come within the purview of West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act,
1956. f404-E-H; 405-D)
B
Natraj Studios (P) Ltd. v. Navrang Studios and Anr., AIR (1981) SC
537, distinguished.

Uttamchandv. S.M Lalwani, AIR (1965) SC 716 and Dwarka Prasad
v. Dwarka Das Saraf, AIR (1975) SC 1758, relied on.
c
2. Finding recorded by the courts below and upheld by the High
Court that the 'C' Schedule property had not been let out to the appellant
and that the appellant had trespassed up.on the same is a finding of fact
based on evidence and, therefore, does not call for interference.
Furthermore, the finding recorded by the High Court with regard to the D
requirement of issuance of notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of
Property Act and the maintainability of the suit by the respondents in their
individual capacity after the dissolution of the partnership firm have not
been challenged before this Court and as such these two findings are also ,
upheld. (400-G-H; 401-A]
E
3. In the absence of any pleadings and evidence on record that the
appellant had committed a default in the payment of rent, the High Court
has erred in holding that the appellant committed default in payment of
rent and passing a decree for eviction on that ground.

CIVIL APPEL LA TE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 4392 of 1983. F
From the Judgment and Order dated 8.3.1983 of the Calcutta High
Court in Appeal from Appellate Decree No. 646 of 1997.

Tapash Ray, Gaurav Jain and Mrs. Abha Jain with him for the Appellant.

- S.K. Gupta, B.P. Gupta and A.N. Bardiyar, D.P. Mukherjee for the
Respondents.
G

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

BHAN, J. This appeal by grant of special leave has been filed by H
398 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] 3 S.C.R.

A defendant no. I, the appellant herein, against the judgment and decree passed
by the High Court of Calcutta. By the impugned judgment the High Court
has restored the decree for recovery of possession and mesne profits with
regard to Plaint 'B' Schedule property in favour of the plaintiffs/original
respondent nos. I and 2 (since deceased and now represented by their legal
B representatives), setting aside the judgment of the Appellate Court in Title
Appeal No. 52/1976 and restoring that of the Trial Court.

Facts necessary for the disposal of this appeal are as under :

One Hangeswar alias Narendra Nath Singha on 4th February, 1936
C obtained settlement/lease-hold interest for 'A' Schedule property, i.e. premises
no 77, Benaras Road, Howrah admeasuring 3 Bighas including a tank from
Sear Sole Raj Estate. He raised certain constructions including sheds on 'B'
Schedule property, a part of' A' Schedule property and set up an iron casting
foundry under the name and style of D.L. Singha and Company, which was
run by him till his death. After his death on 31st May, 1954, his legal heirs,
D original respondent nos. I and 2 settled the whole karbar (business) of iron
casting foundry along with land and all fittings and fixtures in favour of one
Kalipada Monda! and Bahar Bala Dassi on 27th July, 1954, for a period of
five· years starting with the month of Baisakha 1361 B.S. Bangabda Samvat
(for short "B.S.") (Bangla year) to Chaitra 1365 B.S. at a monthly rent of Rs.
466/3 annas. By successive transfers, interest of original lessees/settlees came
E to be acquired by the appellant on 18th January, 1956 (A.O.). Settlement in
favour of the appellant came to an end by efflux of time in Chaitra 1365 B.S.,
equivalent to, 13th April, 1959. Appellant failed to vacate the 'B' Schedule
property as well as to pay the rent after 1363 B.S ..

F Original plaintiff nos. 1 and 2 instituted suit no. 11/1959 against the
appellant but the same was withdrawn due to some formal defects with liberty
to file a fresh suit. After the withdrawal of said suit, appellant trespassed over
'C' Schedule property, i.e. remaining 'A' Schedule property consisting of a
tank and its three banks. Appellant filled up the tank, raised certain structures
thereon and extended its work over the said property.
G
Plaintiff respondent nos. I and 2, feeling aggrieved by the conduct of
the appellant, instituted the present suit no. 65/1965 for recovery of possession
of 'B' and 'C' Schedule properties and for mesne profits. Appellant in the
written statement, interalia denied the title of the plaintiffs to the suit property
as well as existence of relationship of landlord and tenant between them. The
H allegation that the appellant had trespassed over 'C' Schedule property was
SPUN CASTING AND ENGG. CO. PVT.LTD. t'. DWIJENDRA LAL SINHA [BHAN, J.) 399

~~- A
Subordinate Court decreed the suit with respect to both 'B' and 'C'
Schedule properties. It was held that 'C' Schedule property was not let out
to the appellant and the appellant had taken possession of the same by
committing trespass. That relationship of landlord and tenant existed between
the parties with regard to 'B' Schedule property. It was held that the B
predecessors-in-interest of the appellant became tenant of the premises by
virtue of settlement of karkhana (factory) together with the land underneath
in their favour. Appellant having stepped into their shoes is estopped under
Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act from disputing the title of the plaintiffs.
The settlement came to an end by efflux of time on 13th April, 1959. There C
was no necessity to determine the tenancy by issuing a notice under Section
106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Service of notice under Section 13 (6)
of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 (for short "the Act") was
sufficient to put an end to the relationship of landlord and tenant between the
parties. It was also held that the appellant had committed default in payment D
of rent of 'B' Schedule property.

Appellant being aggrieved preferred Title Appeal no. 52/1976
challenging the judgment and decree passed by the Subordinate Court in
favour of the plaintiff-respondents. Appellate Court partly allowed the appeal,
affinning the decision of the Subordinate Court that 'C' Schedule property E ..
was not covered by the settlement dated 27th July, 1954 and was trespassed
upon by the appellant. Appellant had raised construction on 'C' Schedule
property illegally without taking permission from the landlord. With respect
to 'B' Schedule property the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court
was set aside. It was held that since the Trial Court had found tenancy to be
a premises tenancy, it must be governed by the provisions of the West Bengal F
Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 and, therefore, neither expiry of the period of
settlement nor the assignment of the interest created thereunder in favour of
the appellant can be a ground for eviction of the appellant. That tenancy of
'B' Schedule property could not be determined without issuing notice under
Section I 06 of the Transfer of Property Act. That the settlement dated 27th G
July, 1954 was made by the respondents in their character as a partnership
firm and therefore suit for eviction filed by them in their individual capacity
was not maintainable.

Feeling aggrieved by the findings of the Appellate Com1 with respect
to the trespasser over 'C' Schedule property, appellant preferred Second H
400 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] 3 S.C.R.

A Appeal no. 646/1977 and being aggrieved by the setting aside of the decree
with respect to 'B' Schedule property, plaintiff-respondents filed cross
objections in the High Court. High Court heard the second appeal and cross
objections together and disposed them of by passing a common judgment.

Appeal filed by the appellant with regard to 'C' Schedule property was
B dismissed. It was he.Id that the evidence on record established as found
concurrently by the courts below that the occupation of the appellant on the
said property was illegal and by way of trespass. Cross objections filed by the
plaintiff-respondents were allowed granting decree for recovery of possession
of' B' Schedule propei:tY. Contention. raised by the counsel for the respondents
C that the settlement dated 27th July, 1954 entered into between Narendra Nath
Singha and predecessors-in-interest of the appellant was not the tenancy of
"premises"1 as had been held by the courts below but was the tenancy of the
karbar (business) of iron casting foundry along with the machineries and
sheds and structures wherein the foundry was set up was accepted. High
Court after construing the provisions of the settlement dated 27th July, 1954
D and relying upon the three decisions of this court in Uttamchand v. S.M
Lalwani, AIR (1965) SC 716, Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarka Das Saraf, AIR
(1975) SC 1758 and Natraj Studios (P) Ltd v. Navrang Studios, AIR (1981)
SC 537 observed that the dominant intention of the parties while creating the

E
lease was to lease the karbar (business) of iron casting foundry and not that
of the premises within the meaning of Section 2 (t) of the West Bengal
Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. Structures and sheds formed part of the settlement
,
only because the foundry was set up therein. That the parties never intended
to settle or grant lease of the structures and sheds as such and therefore, it
could hardly be said to be a settlement in respect of the premises constituting
·p a tenancy of the premises within the meaning of West Bengal Premises
Tenancy Act, 1956. Finding of the First Appellate Court with regard to the
requirement of issuance of notice under Section l 06 of the Transfer of Property
Act was set aside. It was further held that after the dissolution of the partnership
firm the respondents could file the suit in their individual capacity.

G Finding recorded by the courts below and affirmed by the High Court
that the 'C' Schedule property had not been let out to the appellant and that
the appellant had trespassed upon the same is a finding of fact based on
evidence and, therefore, does not call for interference.

Finding recorded by the High Court with regard to the requirement of
H issuance of notice .under Section l 06 of the Transfer of Property Act and the
SPUN CASTING AND ENGG. CO. PVT.LTD. v. DWIJENDRA LAL SINHA [BHAN . .I.) 40 J

maintainability of the suit by the respondents in their individual capacity A
after the dissolution of the partnership firm has not been challenged before
us. These two findings are also affirmed.

With regard to 'B' Schedule property the High Court set aside the
finding of the First Appellate Court on two counts. Firstly, that the appellant
had committed a default in payment of the rent after 1363 B.S. and secondly, B
on the ground that what was let out to the appellant was not the premises
within the meaning of Section 2 (t) of the Act but the business housed in a
building along with machinery which was not covered under the provision of
the Act.

Learned counsel for the appellant is right in submitting that the High c
Court has erred in holding that the appellant had committed a default in
payment of the rent. Plaintiff-respondents in their plaint did not take the plea
that the appellant had committed a default in the payment of the rent or seek
his eviction on the ground of failure to pay the rent. No issue had been
framed on this point. There is no material on the record to show that the D
appellant did not deposit the alleged arrears ofrent as required by Section 17
(i) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, and as such a decree on
the ground of default in payment of rent could not be passed. In the absence
of any pleadings and evidence on record that the appellant had committed a
default in the payment of rent, the High Court has erred in passing a decree
for eviction on that ground. E
This Court in Uttam Chandv. S.M. Lalwani, AIR (1965) SC 716 drawing
a distinction between the lease of a building and the lease of a business held
that what was protected under th~ Act was the lease of the building and not
the lease of the business. The question before the Court was as to whether F
the lease created of Dal Mill building with fixed machinery in sound working
condition was an 'accommodation' within the meaning of Section 3A of the
Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1955. For detennining the
nature of lease created the Court laid the test of 'dominant intention' of the
parties while creating the lease which is to be gathered in each case by
construing the tenns of the lease deed. Construing the tenns of the lease in G
the said case this Court came to the conclusion that the dominant intention
of the parties was to create the lease of the business and not that of the
building. It was held that since the lease created was of running the business,
the same was not protected under the Act. It was observed in para 12 as
under :-
H
402 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] 3 S.C.R.

A "12. What then was the <lorn inant intention of the parties when they
entered into the present transaction? We have already set out the
material terms of the lease and it seems to us plain that the dominant
intention of the appellant in accepting the lease from the respondent
was to use the building as a Dal Mill. It is true that the document
purports to be a lease in respect of the Dal Mill building; but the said
B description is not decisive of the matter because even if the intention
of the parties was to let out the Mill to the appellant, the building
would still have to be described as the bat Mill building. Jt is not a
.case where the subject matter of the lease is the puilding and along
with the leased building incidentally passes the fixtures of the
c machinery in regard to the Mill; in truth, it is the Mill which is the
subject matter of the lease, and it was because the Mill was intended
to be let out that the building had inevitably to be let out along with
the Mill. "

It was further observed in the same. paragraph :-
D : . . -
"The· fixtures described in the schedule to the lease are in no. sense
intendec:i for the more beneficial enjoym.ent ofthe bdilding. _The fixtu·res ..
.,
are the primary object which the lease ~as· intended to cover and the ..
building in which the fixtures are located comes in incidentally. That
is why we think the High Court was right in coming to the conclusion
E that the rent which the appellant had agreed to pay to the respondent
under the document in question cannot be said to be rent payable for
any accommodation to which the Act applies."

Following the aforesaid judgment in Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarka Das
Saraf. AIR (1975) SC 1758 this Court held that where a cinema theatre
F equipped with projector and other fittings is let out it would not be a lease
of 'accommodation' as defined in Section 2 (l) (d) of the U.P. (Temporary)
Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947. It was observed that, legislature
intended to cover within the meaning of word 'accommodation,' premises
simpliciter either for residential, commercial or industrial purposes but did
G not include the business accommodated in a building. Where the business
itself was let out, the same would not fall. within the meaning of the word
'accommodation' enjoying the protection of the Rent Act. That the leasing of
. a lu~rative cinema business could not be reduced to a mere tenancy of building
c~vered within the scope of the definition of 'accommodation'.

H In the present case according to the plaintiff-respondents what was
- SPUN CASTING AND ENGG. CO. PVT.LTD. v. DWIJENDRA LAL SINHA [BHAN, J.J

settled was the business of iron casting foundry along with building and the
403

A
machinery therein and not the premises within the meaning of West Bengal
Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. In order to determine the true character of the
settlement, it would be necessary to refer to the deed itself and construe the
terms thereof.

The deed has not been described as a lease but as "an agreement for B
five years." In the first paragraph of the deed, the settlers recite how the first
party having taken settlement of the land at premises no.77, Benaras Road
along with a tank had set. up an iron casting foundry valued approximately
at Rs. 75,000. It then goes on to recite that it is the said karkhana or in other
words the business which is being settled with the second party i.e. the C
appellants on terms and conditions set out therein. Clause (i) of the terms
provides that the second party is taking settlement of the business along with
all its fixtures and appliances and the interest of the settlers in the land on an
annual rent of Rs. 5,594.4 annas payable on a monthly instalment of Rs.
466.3 annas. The relevant portion of Clause (i) reads :
D
"The Second party is taking the said karbar (business) together with
all rights on the aforesaid land and all fittings and fixtures of the Iron
Foundry styled D.L. Singha & Co. from the first party with the promise
to pay a sum of Rs.5594-4 as five thousand five hundred ninety four
and four annas per annum on account of rent."
E
Under Clause (ii) the settlers undertake to pay the rent to the landlord
as also to the municipality. Clause (iii) provides for forfeiture of the settlement
for non-payment of rent for four consecutive months. Clause (iv) provides
that on the expiry of the agreement the "fittings and fixtures of the said
karbar (business) which the second party is now receiving from the first party F
(the second party) shall return the same on the expiry of the period of
agreement. If there be any loss or damage to the same the same shall be made
good by the .second party." Clause (v) provides that if necessary, second
party can bring in new fixtures and appliances with prior notice to the settlers
and on the expiry of the agreement the second party shall be entitled to
remove the fixtures and appliances brought by them. Clause (vi) provides G
that settlers will be entitled to carry on the business in their°own firm's name
but they shall have to bear all the expenses for electricity and telephone.
Clause (vii) provides that after the expiry of first term if the second party
desires to carry on the said karkhana (business) the first party shall enter into
a separate agreement for a stipulated period. Clause (ix) expressly excludes
the tank and its three banks from the settlement so made. H
404 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] 3 S.C.R.

A The High Court after referring to the above quoted terms of the
.settlement came to the conclusion that the dominant intention of the parties
who entered into the settlement was to effect a settlement in respect of the
business of iron casting factory. The structures and sheds formed a part of the
settlement only because the foundry was set up therein. The parties had never
intended to settle or grant lease of the structure and the sheds as such. The
B High Court concluded that what was let out to the appellant was the business
of running a iron casting foundry along with the building and the machinery
and not a premises constituting a 'premises tenancy' within the meaning of
Section 2 (t) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Ad, 1956.

C We have no hesitation in accepting the findings recorded by the High
Court. Premises have been defined under Section 2(t) of the Act to mean:-

"Section 2 (j) : "premises" means any building or part of a building
. or any hut or part of a hut let separately and includes-

(i) the gardens, grounds, and out-houses, if any, appertaining thereto,
D
(ii) any furniture supplied or any fittings or fixtures affixes for the
use of the tenant in such building or part of a building or hut or
part of a hut; but does not include a room in hotel or a lodging ·
house."

E Reading the terms of the settlement as aforesaid and construing the
same we are of the view that the dominant intention of the settlers was to
effect the settlement in respect of the karbar (business) of iron casting foundry
set up by them along with machinery housed in a building. 'Premises' in the
Act are defined to mean a building or a part of a building which includes
gardens, grounds and out-houses, if any, appertaining to the building. It also
F include the furniture supplied or any fittings or fixtures in a building or a part
of the building but would not include a room in a hotel or a lodging house.
It does not include the lease of a business along with machinery in a building.
The intention of the parties was not to settle or grant lease of the structures
and sheds as such. Structures and sheds did not constitute the dominant part
G of the settlement in favour of the appellant. It is evident. from the terms of
the settlement that the dominant intention of the parties was to create a lease
for running the business of an iron casting foundry. It cannot be said that the
settlement was in respect of the premises constituting 'premises tenancy'
within the meaning of the Act. Tenancy.was not being created of the premises
to run a business it was to the contrary.
H
SPUN CASTING AND ENGG. CO. PVT.LTD. v. DWIJENDRA LAL SINHA [BHAN, J.) 405

In Natraj Studios (P) Ltd v. Navrang Studios and Anr., AIR (1981) SC A
537 though this Court took the same view but keeping in view the peculiar
provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control
Act, 1947, it was held the principle laid down in the earlier two judgements
would not be applicable to the case. Referring to the amended provisions of
the said Act it was held that the tenancy created was of the premises within B
the meaning of Section 5 (8) and 5 (SA) to which Part 11 of the Act has been
made applicable by Section 6 (I) notwithstanding the fact that the building
was not let out as such. We do not agree with the learned counsel for the
appellant that this Court in Natraj Studios (P) Ltd. (supra) had revised its
earlier view. The provisions of West Beng~l Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 are
altogether different from the provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and C
Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. The West Bengal Premises Tenancy
Act, 1956 can have application only if what is settled by way of lease is a
premises and in order to decide whether the settlement is such or not, we are
governed by the well settled principle laid down by three-Judge Bench of this
Court in Uttamchand v. S.M Lalwani, AIR (1965) SC 716 followed by a
later Bench of four hon'ble Judges in Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarka Das Saraf, D
AIR (1975) SC 1758. In our view, what was settled in the present case was
not the premises for carrying on a particular business but the businesses itself
and therefore, it cannot come within the purview of West Bengal Premises
Tenancy Act, 1956
E
No other view was urged before us. For the reasons stated above we do
not find any infirmity in the judgment and decree passed by the High Court
and the same is affirmed. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed with no orders
as to costs.

N.J. Appeal dismissed. F