Holding

The High Court's order setting aside the temporary injunction and appointing joint administrators was unsustainable and was set aside.

Summary

The Jain Swetambar Terapanthi Society, which runs several schools, terminated the services of its headmaster, Phundan Singh, and expelled several members. It sued for a declaration that the headmaster had ceased to hold office and for a temporary injunction restraining the expelled members from interfering with the schools. The trial court granted the injunction after finding a prima facie case. The Calcutta High Court set aside that order, appointed two joint administrators in place of the Society’s Managing Committee, and dismissed the injunction. The Supreme Court held that the High Court could not set aside the injunction without discussing the material and recording a contrary finding, and that ousting the Managing Committee was neither legal nor just. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order and remitted the matter to the High Court for fresh disposal, allowing the appeal with costs.

Issues considered

Whether an appellate court may set aside a trial court's order granting a temporary injunction without recording a contrary finding on the prima facie case.
Whether the High Court had the jurisdiction to appoint joint administrators and remove the Society's Managing Committee pending the appeal.
Whether the trial court was justified in granting the injunction based on prima facie satisfaction of the Society's claim.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 104, s. 107, s. Order XLIII Rule I (r), s. Order XXXIX Rule I

Subjects

temporary injunctionappellate jurisdictionprima facie caseSocieties Registration Actmanagement of societyjoint administratorsCivil Procedure Codeinterim reliefequitysocial justice

Judgment

).
A SREE JAIN SETAMBAR TERAPANTHI VID (S)
v.
PHUNDAN SINGH AND ORS. ~
FEBRUARY 9, 1999

B [K.T. THOMAS AND S.S. MOHAMED QUADRI, JJ.]
,>
Code of Civil Procedure 1908, Ss. 104, 107 r/w Order XLllI Rule I (r),
Order XXXIX Rule I-Powers of appellate court to inteifere with order grant-
ing temporary injunction-Suit by plaintiff Society for declaration against
c erstwhile members and farmer employee of school run by it-Trial Court after
recording finding of prima f acie satisfaction on merits granted temporary in-
junction restraining respondents from inteifering with functioning of
school-High Court in appeal setting aside order ignoring findings recorded
by trial court and appointing two joint administrators to manage society and
schools in place of Society's Managing Committee-Held, Order of High Court
D unsustainable; it could not have set aside the order of trial court and ousted
Managing Committee from management of Society without discussing the
material on record and recording a contrary finding matter remitted to High
Court for disposal afresh.

E The appellant ('Society') in 1993 appointed PS, Respondent No. 1,
as Headmaster of the Boys School run by it. ·The executive committee of
the Society which assumed charge in 1994 terminated the membership of
Respondents 2, 4 and 6 in July, 1996 on the allegation that they were
indulging in activities harmful to the Society. On April 26, 1997 the services
of PS were terminated on the ground that he joined the camp of the
F expelled members and that he had trespassed criminally in the Boys
School premises.
..
The Society thereafter filed a civil suit against PS and the respon-
dents for a declaration that PS ceased to be the Headmaster to Boys
School; that Respondent 2 and 4 to 6 creased to be the members of the
G
Society. It also sought temporary injunction restraining them from enter-
ing into .and causing any interference in the functioning of the school.

The Trial Court granted the temporary injunction sought for by the
Society. In an appeal filed by the respondents, a Division Bench of the
H Calcutta High Court set aside the order of injunction and appointed two
498
SREEJAINSETAMBAR TERAPANTHIVID(S)v. P.SINGH 499
joint administrators in place of Society's Managing Committee to manage A
- ~
the society and its schools. The Society appealed to this Court by special
leave.

During the hearing of the appeal in this Court, all the counsel
appearing for the parties pleaded that till the matter is decided afresh by
the High Court, the order, appointing the two joint administrators may B
not be disturbed.

Allowing the appeal, this Court

HELD : 1. The order of the High Court setting aside the order of the
trial court is unsustainable. It is one thing to conclude that the trial court c
has not recorded its prima f acie satisfaction on merits but granted the
temporary injunction and it is another thing to hold that trial court has
gone wrong in recording prima f acie satisfaction on the basis of the
material on record either because it has not considered the relevant
material or because it has erroneously reached the finding or conclusion D
on the facts established. In the first situation, the appellate court will be
justified in upsetting the order under appeal even without going into the
merits of the case but in the second eventuality, it cannot set aside the
impugned order without discussing the material on record and recording
a contrary finding. [503-F-G]
E
1.2. Ousting the Managing Committee from the management of the
society and the schools run by it and appointing joint administrators,
pending disposal of the appeal by the High Court, would be neither legal
nor just and proper. [506-D]

1.3. The case is remitted to the High Court for disposal of the appeal
F
afresh in accordance with law. [506-F]

Municipal Board, Pratabgarh v. Mahendra Singh Chawla, [1982) 3
SCC 331; Chandra Bansi Singh v. State of Bihar, [1984) 4 SCC 316 and
Sadhuram Bansal v. Putin Behari Sarkar, [1984) 3. SCC 410, distinguished. G

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 730 of
... 1999.

From the Judgment and Order dated 18.9.98 of the Calcutta High
Court in F.M.A.T. No. 438 of 1998. H
500 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1999] 1 S.C.R.

A D.P. Gupta, Jaideep Gupta, Rana Mukherjee, Mrs. Sumita Mukher- ).

jee and Mrs. Manju Manot for the Appellant.

R.k. Jain, Piyusli Kanti Roy and Pranab Kumar Mullick for the ~
Respondent Nos. 1-2.

B Dr. A.M. Singhvi and S.B. Sanyal and Ambhoj Kumar for the
Respondent Nos. 4-6.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

QUADRI, J. Leave is granted.
c
The appeal is directed against order of the Division Bench of the
Calcutta High Court in FMAT No. 438 of 1998 dated 18th September,
-
1998. The plaintiff in the suit, out of which this appeal arises, is the
appellant.

D The appellant is a society, registered under the Societies Registration
Act, established some time in 1916 by certain families of Jain community
for preservation of its culture, heritage, religious philosophy etc. and for
imparting modern commercial, physical and religious education according
to the tenets of Jain Swetambar Terapanthi religion to the children of the
E community (hereinafter referred to as 'the Society'). There is also another
organisation of the jains, namely Jain Swetambar Terapanthi Mahasabha,
of the same religious community. These two are rival organisations. In this
appeal, we are concerned with the Society which is managing four schools
- three Girls schools and one Boys school.

F The Society appointed Phundan Singh (Respondent No.1) as Head-
master of the Boys school in .1993. The executive Committee which is now
running the Society was voted to office and accordingly it assumed charge
on December 24, 1994. On October 3, 1995, Respondent No. 1 attained
the age of superannuation, sixty years, but by a resolution of Joint Meeting
of Executive Committee and Board of Trustees, his services were extended
G for a period of one year. Again, on October 4, 1996, the services of the
first respondent were extended for a second term of one year expiring on
;.,
October 3, 1997.

On the allegation that Respondents No. 2, 4 to 6 and some others
H were indulging in activities harmful to the Society as well as the school,
SREEJAJN SETAMBAR TERAPANIHJ VlD (S) v. P. SINGH [QUADRI, J.] 501

their membership was terminated by a resolution adopted by the Society A
on July 13, 1996. It appears that six suits were filed challenging the
resolution terminating the membership and out of them suits filed by
Respondent No. 2 and others were dismissed; the suit filed by the fourth
respondent is pending.

While so, on April 26, 1997, the first respondent was serve.cl with the B
order of termination of his services on the ground that he joined the camp
of the expelled members and that on April 25, 1997 he trespassed criminal-
ly in the Boys school premises along with members of Mahasabha, broke
open padlocks of Conference Room and other rooms and took away some
important documents, valuable records, etc. of the Society. It is also c
mentioned that the said records etc. were recovered from the rooms of the
rival organisation.

The third respondent who was appointed as the Teacher in-charge
of the Boys school faced difficulties in running the school on account of D
the alleged interference of the first respondent and others, so he filed a
Title Suit No. 1197 of 1997 against the said persons and sought injunction
restraining them from interfering in the functioning and the administration
of the Boys school on 9th May, 1997. Though the Division Bench set aside
that order on technical ground, yet it was restored after remand by the
Trial Court on November 29, 1997. E

The Society also filed Title Suit No. 1779 of 1997 in the court of
second Judge, City Civil Court, Calcutta against the respondents herein
claiming, inter alia, declaration that the first respondent ceased to be the
Assistant Teacher and Headmaster of the Boys school; that Respondents F
No. 2 and 4 to 6 ceased to be the members of the Society; and the fifth
respondent ceased to be the member of the Executive Committee of the
Society. It also sought temporary injunction restraining them from entering
into school premises and causing any interference in the functioning of the
school. On January 29, 1998, the Trial Court granted the injunction sought
for by the Society. The respondents filed the appeal against that order. On G
18th September, 1998, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court set
. .aside the order of injunction granted by the. Civil Court, appointed two
Joint Administrators in place of the Society's Managing Committee/ Trust
issued certain consequential directions and thus disposed of the appeal. It
is the validity of that order that is assailed in this appeal. H
\
502 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999) 1 S.C.R.

A Mr. Dipankar Gupta, learned senior counsel r.ppearing for the ap-
pellant, vehemently argued that the High Court has gravely erred in setting
aside the order of the Civil Court by wrongly observing that the trial Judge
could not have granted the injunction without finding that plaintiff has
made out a prim a f acie case. He contended that the High Court went far
B beyond its jurisdiction by appointing joint administrators to manage the
society and the schools which is beyond the scope of the suit.

We have perused the order of the High Court under appeal as well
as the order of the Trial Court. The High Court observed that (i) the trial
court perhaps did not apply its mind properly or carefully to the important
C aspect of the matter and yet in the absence of any prima f acie case having
been established by the respondent in this suit, granted temporary injunc-
tion in favour of the plaintiff and passed the order of restraint against the
respondents, including the appellants before it; (ii) valuable rights of the
defendants relating to the holdings of offices were under adjudication
before the trial court and yet without prim a f acie coming to even a
D provisional conclusion as to whether they had ceased to hold such office
the temporary injunction was granted; and (iii) the trial court did not even
satisfy about the correctness of the claim of the plaintiffs in the suit or for
that matter, the person claiming to the Secretary of the Society.

E Having gone through the order of the trial court dated January 29,
1998 we noticed the following findings :

(1) "It has been alleged by the contesting Ops that LP Manot who
has verified the plaint has since been expelled from the
secretaryship, but on perusal of the documents at present the said
F allegation cannot be accepted ....... The rules and regulations and
special rules of the petitioner have also been challenged by the
contesting Ops but I find nothing to accept the said allegation at
this stage.

(2) The service of OP No. 1 as headmaster was terminated by
G resolution of the executive Committee of petitioner. That OP .
claims that he is still the headmaster. I find from the materials on
record that his service as headmaster was terminated and OP No.
6 was appointed teacher~in-charge to discharge the functions of
the headmaster. At present there is nothing to suggest that there
H is substance in the said claim of OP No. 1. It has been submitted
SREEJAINSETAMBAR TERAPANTHIVID(S)v. P. SINGH[QUADRl,J.] 503
before me on behalf of petitioner that in a suit being TS No. 1197 A
of 1997 of this Court which was instituted by OP No.6 at present
before us, that OP No. was injuncted and the said· order of
injunction passed by this Court recently was confirmed by the
Hon'ble Court. The said submission has not been disputed from
the end or' the contesting Ops. On perusal of the materials before
us in this case I am of the opinion that there are prim a f acie
B
materials to substantiate the allegations made against OP No. 1.

(3) Regarding OP No. 2 to 5 they have since been suspended/ex-
pelled by resolution of the Executive Committee of petitioner.
There is nothing to suggest that the said suspension/expulsion has C
been set aside by any competent authority. On persual of the
materials before us I am of the opinion that there is prim a f acie
case against them."

The trial court further recorded the finding :
D
"Petitioner has been successful, in my opinion, to es!ablish the
prima facie cases in its favour. I am of the opinion that if the order
of temporary injunction, as prayed for, is not passed the interest
of petitioner as well as students, staff and guardian will be adver-
sely affected in view of the fact that the allegations against OP Nos.
1 to 5 which have been established prima f acie are very serious. In
E
view of that I am inclined to allow the instant petition for tem-
porary injunction"

It may be pointed out that it is one thing to conclude that the trial
court has not recorded its prim a f acie satisfaction on merits but granted p
the temporary injunction and it is another thing to hold that trial court has
gone wrong in recording the prim a f acie satisfaction and setting aside that
finding on the basis of the material on record because it has not considered
the relevant material or because it has erroneously reached the finding or
conclusions on the facts established. In the first situation, the appellate
court will be justified in upsetting the order under appeal even without G
going into the merits of the case but in the second eventuality, it cannot
set aside the impugned order without discussing the material on record and
recording a contrary finding. The High Court proceeded to set aside the
order of the trial court on the first ground ignoring the afore- mentioned
findings of the trial court, the order under appeal is, therefore, unsus- H
504 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] 1 S.C.R.

A tainable.
Faced with this situation, learned senior counsel, Mr. R.K. Jain,
appearing for Respondents No. 1 and 2, Dr. Abhishek M. Singhvi, appear-
ing for }lespondent No. 4 pleaded that if the matter has to go back to the
High Court for fresh consideration, the status quo may be maintained.
B However, Mr.. Sanyal, learned senior counsel who appeared for the fifth
respondent did make an attempt to support the order of the High Court.
But for the reasons stated earlier, we are unable to accept the contention.
of Mr. Sanyal.

C However, all the learned senior counsel for respondents pleaded that
during the interregnum the order of the High Court appointing two joint
administrators to take charge of the society and/or trust in the place of the
Managing Committee and the directions issued to them in regard to the
management thereof may not be disturbed till the High Court decides the
matter afresh. In support of the said contention, they relied on the follow-
D ing judgments : Municipal Board Pratabgarh & Anr. v. Mahendra Singh
Chawla & Ors., [1982] 3 SCC 331, Chandra Bansi Singh & Ors. v. State of
Bihar, [1984] 4 SCC 316 and Sad/111ram Bansal v. Pulin Behari Sarkar &
Ors., (1984] 3 SCC 410.

E In Municipal Board, Pratabgarh and Another v. Mahendra Singh
Chawla and Others, an employee of the Municipal Board was dismissed
from service 0n the ground of being convicted of offence involving moral
turpitude, taking illegal gratification. However, having considered the ef-
ficiency, capability and experience, he was appointed afresh by the
Municipal Board. The Local Self Government Department directed the
F Board to terminate the services of the employee and accordingly he was
served with the order of termination. He challenged that order of termina-
tion in the suit which was dismissed by both the trial court as well as the
appellate court. In . the second appeal, the High Court decreed the suit
holding the fresh appointment as reinstatement with continuity of service
G and the order of termination bad in law. On special leave, this court held
that the judgment of the High Court on the question of law was erroneous
but having regard to the circumstances of that case, observed that it would
meet the ends of justice if the termination order be ignored and he be
allowed to continue in service.

H In Sadhuram Bansal v. Pulin Behari Sarkar and Others, what hap-
SREEJAINSETAMBAR TERAPANTIUVID (S) v. P. SINGH [QUADRI,J.] 505
pened was that the court receiver sold the property in question which was A
in the occupation of trespassers, thirty eight families, who had made pucca
constructions thereon. The receiver sold the property by private negotia-
tions with the permissicn of the court. Though the offer amount was
accepted by the receiver, the balance of the sale consideration was not paid
within time. The purchaser obtained orders for the summary eviction of
the respondents-occupiers of the land. Ort the applications of respondents,
B
Section 145 Cr.P.C. proceedings were initiated and they were pending. The
respondents offered one lakh rupees more than the sale consideration
agreed to by the purchaser. Though the learned single Judge of the High
Court rejected the offer of the respondents, the Division Bench accepted
the offer on the ground that there was no concluded contract with the c
purchaser and to do social justice as it would save eviction of thirty eight
families from their houses. On special appeal, this Court observed that by
its judgment the High Court got more money for the owners on the one
hand and on the other sought to rehabilitate the thirty eight families of the
respondents who had already built permanent structures and were in actual D
possession and hence there would be no further litigation and difficulty in
acquiring the ownership without deprivation of existing legal rights of any
party concerned, so on the facts of the case, in exercise of its discretionary
jurisdiction under Article '136, it would not interfere with the order which
promotes social justice.
E
In Chandra Bansi Singh and Other v. State of Bihar and Others, the
lands of the appellant were acquired by issuing notification under Section
4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. In view of the litigation between the
appellants and the Government, the possession of the land could be taken
only after two years. While holding that the price of the land should be F
determined under Section 23 of the Act not on the date of taking posses-
sion but on the date of Section 4(1) notification, this court granted addi-
tional compensation in equity in the form of interest @ 7 1/2 per cent per
annum for two years on the value of the land owned by the appellants,
though they were not entitled to that relief under law, taking the view that
the Supreme Court is not only the court of law but also of equity. G

From the above discussion, the principle that emerges is that where
the High Court has granted some relief by way of social justice or on
equitable grounds without violating the rights of other parties, though in
law such relief was not permissible, the Supreme Court would not interfere H
506 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999) l S.C.R.

A in its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 if the order under appeal ,.
advances the cause of justice and if it is just an equitable so to do.

We may observe that in an adversorial litigation the relief has to be
granted to the parties based on their pleadings. No relief should be granted
in interlocutory proceedings beyond the scope of the suit. It may be noted
B that the present suit out of which the appeal has arisen was filed by the
appellant-society for declaration and injunction, the suits filed by the
contesting Respondents 2, 4 to 6, challenging their expulsion from the
I society, were dismissed· except the suit of Respondent No. 4, which is
pending. No material is placed before us to show that any relief is granted
C to himl in that suit. No legal proceedings has been filed by any of the
contes~ing respondents either under the Societies Registration Act or any
other law applicable to the Society for appropriate relief in respect of the
management of the society and the schools run by it. Though we share the
concern of the Hi h Court that the rival groups are fighting with each other
and 60 cases are pending in various courts, in these circumstances of the
D case, in our view, ousting the Managing Committee from the management
of the society and the schools run by it and appointing the joint ad-
ministrators would neither be legal nor just and proper. The principle laid
down in the afore- mentioned cases will, therefore, be inapplicable. For
these reasons, we are not inclined to continue administration of
E society/trust by the joint administrators pending disposal of the appeal by
the High Court.

The order under appeal is set aside and the case is remitted to the
High Court for disposal of appeal filed by Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 afresh
in accordance with law. The appeal is accordingly allowed with costs.

S.M. Appeal allowed.