SRI GANGAI VINAYAGAR TEMPLE & ANR.versusMEENAKSHI AMMAL & ORS.

                   [2014] 12 S.C.R. 845


       SRI GANGAI VINAYAGAR TEMPLE & ANR.                     A
                             v.
              MEENAKSHI AMMAL & ORS.
             (Civil Appeal No. 4227 of 2003)
                   OCTOBER 09, 2014
                                                              B
        [ANIL R. DAVE, VIKRAMAJIT SEN AND
            PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, JJ.]

      Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Or. 2, r. 2 and s. 11 - Res
judicata - Applicability of - Plea of appellant-trust through its C
 trustees that respondents/tenants of the demised property were
 barred by principle of res judicata from challenging the
 findings of trial court especially the trust's ownership of the
 demised property, since the tenants filed only one appeal, i.e.
 arising from one suit (O.S.6178), without assailing identical D
 conclusions arrived at by trial court in two other suits (0.S. 51
 78 and 7178) - All the three suits were connected, heard
 together, and decided by the trial Court by way of a common
judgment, but by three separate decrees - Held: Plea of
 appellants tenable - Pleadings on behalf of the tenant were E
 commori in all three suits - Decree, arising from the connected
 suits and the common judgmeTJt, if not assailed,
 metamorphoses into the character of a "former suit" - Having
 failed or neglected or concertedly avoided filing appeals
 against the decrees in O.S. 5178 and O.S.7178, the cause of F _
 plaintiff tenants was permanently sealed and foreclosed since
 res judicata applied against them.

    Res Judicata - Raison d'etre and applicability of -
Discussed.         ·
                                                              G
    Allowing the appeal, the Court

    HELD: On a holistic and comprehensive reading of
the pleadings of the Tenant in all the three suits, it is
                            845                               H
   846      SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [2014] 12 S.C.R.


A inescapable that the Tenant had intendedly, directly and
  unequivocally raised in its pleadings the question of the
  title to the demised premises and the legal capacity of the
  Trustees to convey the lands to the Transferees. This is
  the common thread that runs through the pleadings of
B Tenant in all three suits. It is true that if O.S.5178 was a
  suit for injunction simpliciter, and in the wake of the
  stance of the Trustees and Transferees that no threat had
  been extended to the Tenants regarding their ouster, any
  reference or challenge to the ownership was wholly
c irrelevant. But the ownership issue had been specifically
  raised by the Tenant, who had thus caused it to be
  directly and substantially in issue in all three suits. So far
  as the Suit Nos.6/78 and 7178 are concerned, they were
  also suits sirripliciter for the .recovery of rents in which
  the defence pertaining to ownership was also riot
0
  relevant; no substantial reason for the Tenant to file an
  appeal in o.s. 6178 had· arisen because the monetary part
  of the decree was relatively insignificant. Obviously, the
  Tenant's resolve ·was to make the ownership the central
E dispute in the litigation and in these circumstances
  cannot be allowed to equivocate on the aspect of
  ownership. Logically, if the question of ownership was
  relevant and worthy of consideration in O.S. 6178, it was
  also relevant in O.S. 5178. Viewed in this manner, it is an
  inescapable conclusion that an appeal ought to have
F been filed by the Tenant even in respect of O.S. 5178, for
  fear of inviting the rigours of res judicata as also for
  correcting the "dismissal" order. The Tenant had been
  completely non-suited once it was held that no cause of
  action had arisen in its favour and the suit was
G 'dismissed'. Ignoring that finding and allowing it to
   become final makes that conclusion impervious to
  change. Having failed or neglected or concertedly ·
  avoided filing appeals against the decrees in O.S.5/78
  and O.S.7/78 the cause of the Respondents/Tenants was
H
 SRI GANGAI VINAYAGAR TEMPLE v. MEENAKSHI               847
                  AMMAL
permanently sealed and foreclosed since res judicata           A
applied against them. [Paras 23, 24] [872-F-H; 873-A-D;
874-D, E]
     Premier Tyres Limitec:J vs. Kera/a State Road Transport
Corporation 1993 (Suppl.) 2 SCC 14.6; Lonankutty vs.           B
Thomman (1976) 3 SCC 528: 1976 (0) Suppl.· SCR 74;
Narayana Prabhu Venkateswara Prabhu vs. Narayana Prabhu
Krishna Prabhu (1977) 2 SCC 181: 1977 (2) SCR 636;
Sheodan Singh vs. Daryao Kunwar (1966) 3 SCR 300;
Chitivalasa Jute Mills vs. Jaypee Rewa Cement (2004) 3 SCC
85; Sajjadanashin Sayed vs. Musa Dadabhai Ummer AIR            C
2000 SC 1238: 2000 (1) SCR 1095; /sher Singh vs. Sarwan
Singh AIR 1965 SC 948; and Pragdasji Guru Bhagwandasji
vs. Patel /shwar/albhai Narsibhai AIR 1952 SC 143: 1952
SCR 513 - referred to.
                                                               D
    Lachhmi vs. Bhulli AIR (1927) Lah 289; Panchanda
Ve/an vs. Vaithinatha Sastrial ILR (1906) 29 Mad 333; B.
Shanker Sahai v. B. Bhagwat Sahai AIR 1946 Oudh 33 (FB);
Zaharia vs. Debia ILR (1911) 33 All 51; /sup Ali vs. Gour
Chandra Deb 37 Cal LJ 184: AIR 1923 Cal 496; Mrs.              E
Getrude Oastes vs. Mrs Mil/icerit D'Si/va ILR 12 Pat 139 :
AIR 1933 Pat 78; Asrar Ahmed vs. Durgah Committee, Ajmer
AIR 1947 PC 1 and Sheoparsen Singh vs. Ramnandan
Prasad Singh (1915-16) 43 l.A.91 - referred to.

    Hoag vs. New Jersey (1958) 356 U.S. 464 - referred to.     F
                  Case Law Reference:
    . 1993 (Suppl.) 2 sec 146 referred to         Para 5
    1976 (0) Suppl. SCR 74      referred to       Para 6       G
    1977 (2) SCR 636            referred to       Para ·6
    (1966) 3 SCR 300            referred to       Para 19
    AIR (1927) Lah 289          referred to       Para 20
                                                               H
    848       SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2014] 12 S.C.R.


A         ILR (1906) 29 Mad 333       referred to        Para 20
          AIR 1946 Oudh 33 (FB)       referred to        Para 20
          ILR (1911) 33 All 51        referred to        Para 21
          AIR 1923 Cal 496            referred to        Para 21
B
          AIR 1933 Pat 78             referred to        Para 21
          (2004) 3   sec 85           referred to ·      Para 22
          2000 (1) SCR 109~           referred to        Para 23
c         (1958) 356 U.S. 464         referred to        Para 23
          AIR 1965 SC 948             referred to        Para 23
          AIR 1947 PC 1               referred to        Para 23
D         1952 SCR 513                referred to        Para 23
          (1915-16) 43 l.A.91 ·       referred to        Para 23

        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
    4227 of 2003.
E
        From the Judgment and Order dated 06-01-2003 of the
    High Court at Madras in LP.A. No. 17 of 1998.

        Jaideep Gupta, Sanjay R. Hedge, S. Nithin, Kunal Chatterji
F for the Appellanis.

        K. Rama Moorthy, Surendra Nath, Govind Manoharan,
    Senthil Jagadeesan, Shruti Iyer, V. Ramasubramanian for the
    Respondents.

G         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

         VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J. 1. A maze of facts and events, and
    a labyrinth of legal conundrums ·confront us in the course of the
    determination of this Appeal. Essentially, it is· the ambit and
    sweep of the principle of res judicata that is at the centre of
H
  SRI GANGA! VINAYAGAR TEMPLE v. MEENAKSHI                   849
          AMMAL [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]
controversy. Additionally, Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil      A
Procedure ("CPC" for brevity), which enshrines but another
complexion of res judicata, also requires to be cogitated upon.
The contention of the Appellant through its Trustees (hereafter
referred to as 'Trust') is that the Respondentsrrenants ('Tenants'
for brevity) of the demised property are barred by the principle     B
of res judicata from challenging the findings of the Trial Court
especially the Trust's ownership of the demised property, since
the said Tenants have filed only one appeal, i.e. arising from
O.S.6/78, without assailing identical conclusions arrived at by
the Trial Court in O.S.5/78 and 0.S.7/78.                            c
     2. The uncontroverted facts are that the husband of the first
Respondentrrenants (namely, Kannaiya Chettiar along with
another person Venkatarama Keddiar) the suit land on lease
from Sethurama Chettiar on 1.3.1953 for a period of 12 years
on a monthly rent of Rs.150/-. The Tenants were permitted to D
construct a cinema theatre on the sait land at their own cost,
which they have done in the name and style of 'Raja Talkies',
which is still in existence. In 1959 one of the partners died,
resulting .in the husband of Respondent No.1 assuming sole
proprietorship of 'Raja Talkies'. On 8.11.1967 a fresh E
Registered Notaire Lease Deed was executed for a period of
15 years commencing from 1.1.1968 between the husband of
Respondent No.1 and the Appellant Trust, Gangai Vinayagar
Temple through its Trustee's President namely, Shri Sethurama
Chettiar. Consequent on the death of the husband of F
Respondent No.1, she continued as the tenant along with her
children as legal representatives of her late husband: It is also
not in dispute that the Trust sold the suit property to Sarvashri
P.Lakshamanan, P.Vadivelu and .P.Saibabha who were
impleaded by the Tenants as Defendants 7 to 9 in O.S. 5/78. G
The Tenants were informed of this transaction on 14.10.1976,
calling upon them to attorn to the new owners. The
 repercussion was that in 1976 itself, the Tenants filed O.S.5/
78 (re-numbered) in which they had assailed the sale of the suit
land on the predicatiori that the legal formalities necessary for H
    850          SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2014] 12 S.C.R.


A the transfer of trust property had not been adhered to as it was
  a Public Trust, and further that, subsequent to the
  aforementioned transaction, the Tenants (Plaintiffs in O.S.5n8)
  apprehended their dispossession therefrom at the hands of the
  Defendants, including Defendants 7 to 9 {hereinafter called
B 'Transfere~s'). The Prayers have been reproduced infra. In this
  suit, the Trust as well as the Transferees pleaded in their
  respective Written Statements that they had neither threatened
  nor harboured any intention to dispossess the Tenants without
  due process of law.
c      3. The sequel of this first salvo of litigation was the filing
  of two suits by the Trust, being O.S.6/78 and O.S. 7/78, claiming
  arrears of rent from the Tenants' (Respondent Nos. 1 to 6 before
  us, in which the Transferees were not impleaded) pertaining to
  the period prior to the transfer of the suit lands by them to the
D Transferees. Despite the pleadings therein as mentioned
  above, o.s.5n8 came to !Se 'dismissed'. O.S.6n8 was partially
  decreed; whilst O.S.7/78 was dismissed on the ground that the
  alleged claim of arrears of rerit in this suit was not tenable as
  the said land was part of and encompassed in the suit land
E which was the subject matter of O.S.6/78 and, accordingly, the
  claim was covered and subsumed therein. The Tenants have
  not filed any appeal in respect of O.S.5/78 and O.S.7/78; and
  the Trust has not filed any appeal on the dismissal of their suit
  O.S.7n8. All three suits have been decided, after recording of
F common evidence, by a common Judgment passed on
  6.11.1982 by the Court of 2nd Additional District Judge at
  Pondicherry. Pursuant to this Judgment three different decrees
  have been drawn.

          4. The prayers contained in O.S.5/78 read as follows:
G
           (i)    Establishing the leasehold right of the plaintiffs and
                  to be in. possession of the schedule mentio.ned
                  property till the end of the lease period viz. 1-1-
                  1983; and
H
 SRI GANGA! VINAYAGAR TEMPLE v. MEENAKSHI                     851
         AMMAL [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]
     (ii)     For pennanent injunction restraining the defendants,   A
             ·their agents, servants and other representatives
              from interfering with the plaintiff's peaceful
              possession and enjoyment of the suit property till
               1-1-1983.

     (iii)    Directing the defendants to pay to the plaintiff the   8
              costs of the suit; and

     (iv)     Grant such other relief as this Honourable court may
              be pleased to order in the circumstances of the
              case.                                                  c
      It is. noteworthy that the Trust had not pressed for the
framing of an Issue predicated on Section 116 of the Evidence
Act. In the plaint in O.S.5/78, the Tenant had pleaded that the
Defendants "have no right to sell the property as the same is · D
Trust property belonging to the 1st Defendant and as such the
alienation would be totally void being a breach of trust.. ... The
alienation in favour of the Defendants 7 to 9 being void, they
have no title to the property ..... The cause of action arose on
30.6.1976 when Defendants 2 to 6 purported to convey the suit E
property to Defendants 7 to 9 and, thereafter, when Defendants
are threatening to disturb the plaintiffs possession." Despite the
specificity of these pleadings the Tenants had ostensibly not
prayed for any relief with regard to the title of the Transferee.
Nevertheless, on careful consideration it appears to us that,
awkwardly worded though it avowedly is, the first prayer · F
endeavours to articulate this very prayer. In any event, the
pleadings are sufficient to lay the foundations for the
assumption that the Tenants were desirous of assailing the
transfer of the title of the land. That being the position, the
embargo of Order II Rule 2 CPC would become operative G
against the Tenants. The Issue relevant for the present purposes
 (the burden of proof of which was set on the Tenants) reads
thus:-

     (2) Whether the suit property is not the personal property      H
    852       SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2014) 12 S.C.R.


A         of Sethurama Chettier and whether the plaintiffs are not
          estopped from questioning the title' of the landlord or his
          vendors.

        We hasten to clarify that ·had the Tenants (in O.S. 5/78)
  merely expressed a fear or apprehension of dispossession at
B the hands of the persons that had been arrayed as defendants,
  either collectively or individually, without touching upon the legal
  character of the suit property as well al! the legal propriety and
  capacity of Trust (Defendants 2 to 6) to transfer it to the
  Transferees (Defendants 7 to 9); Order II Rule 2 would not had
C -been attracted. These questions could then have been
  subsequently raised in the event the new owners, namely,
   Defendants 7 to 9 were to bring any action or claim before a
  court of law against the Tenants. It is foe this reason that we are
   unable to agree with the determination of the Division Bench
D in the Impugned Order that this Issue was not central to Suit
  O.S.5/78 and that, therefore, res judicata did not apply despite
  the failure of the Tenants to appeal against the verdict in o'.S.5/
  78. We cannot sustain the order of 'dismissal' of the Suit O.S.5/
   78 nay even the necessity of conducting a trial in that lis in the
E wake of the Defendants' averments in their Written Statement.
   Ergo, it seems to us that an appeal therefrom was essential.
   We also think it to be extremely relevant that the Tenants did
   not assail the judgment and decree in O.S.7n8 since it was
   reit~rated therein that the Trust was the private property of
F Sethuram Chettiar. This finding has therefore attained finality,
   both in O.S.5/78 and O.S.7n8, which thereupon assumed the
   character the "former suit". Since the Trust had also not filed
                                    1
   an appeal against O.S. 7/78 res judicata became operative
   against it on two aspects - firstly that there were two tenancies
G and secondly that any arrears of rent had separately accrued
   other than what was claimed in O.S.6/78.

        5. It is in similar circumstances that a Coordinate Bench
    had concluded.in Premier Tyres Limited vs. Kerala State Road
    Transport Corporation, 1993 (Suppl.) 2 SCC 146, that the
H
  SRI GANGAI VINAYAGAR TEMPLE v. MEENAKSHI                     853
          AMMAL [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]

effect of non-filing of an appeal against a decree is that it attains   A
finality and that this consequence would logically ensue when
a decree in a connected suit is not appealed from. It permeates,
as in the case in hand, into the sinews of all suits (O.S.5/78
and O.S.7/78) since common Issues had been framed, a
common Trial had been conducted, common evidence was                    B
recorded, and a common Judgment had been rendered. It
seems to us that the Division Bench had adopted the dialectic
of the challenge to the title being irrelevant in O.S.5178 in order
to distinguish and then digress from the decision in Premier
Tyres. Facially, all the factors are common to each suit, m!mely,       c
the commonality of Issues, Trial and Verdict rendering any effort
to differentiate them to be an exercise in futility. A reading of
the plaint and of Issue No.2 in O.S.5/78 (supra) will make it
 impossible to harbour the view that the contours of controversy
in that case concerned only the apprehension of forcible
                                                                        0
dispossession of the Tenants by the Trust as well as the
Transferees. Otherwise, Issue No.2 was palpably irrelevant to
 the decision in O.S.5/78 and an ignorable surplusage.
 Furthermore, the dismissal of the suit, even though it was on
 the specious and untenable ground that no cause of action had
 arisen to justify the filing of O.S.5178, would inexorably lead to     E
 the conclusion that the Tenants were, thereafter, bereft of any
 right in the suit property. The dismissal of O.S.5/78, arguably,
 would become fatal to the interest of the Tenant, if a pedantic·
 perspective is pursued.
                                                                        F
      6. As outlined above, in the impugned Judgment the
 Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Madras had
 highlighted that the only question argued before it was that the
 principles of res judicata applied against the Tenant since it
 negligently if not concertedly did not appeal the verdict in O.S.5/ . G
 78. At the threshold of its reasoning, it referred to the decision
 of this Court in Premier Tyres and pithily observed that the
 argument raised on behalf of the Trust would be "impeccable
·and would have to be accepted, only if the Appellant succeeds
 in establishing that Issue No. 2 in O.S. 5/78 was, in fact, an H
    854      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2014] 12 S.C.R.


A   issue which directly and substantially arose for consideration
    in that suit and that the findings had been recorded thereon in
    favour of the Appellant". It would have been expected of learned
    Counsel for the parties to have cited two decisions of different
    coordinate Benches of this Court. namely, Lonankutty vs.
B   Thomman (1976) 3 SCC 528 and Narayana Prabhu
    Venkateswara Prabhu vs. Narayana Prabhu Krishna Prabhu
    (1977) 2  sec     181, which throw considerable light on this
    subject. Regrettably, learned Senior Counsel for the parties
    have neglected to draw notice to these two precedents, even
c   before us.

        7. ·Lonankutty concerned a dispute between two owners
  of adjacent lands. The land of the Appellant was bounded on
  two sides by a river while the land of the respondents was
  landlocked, which prompted the respondents to construct a
D bund with sluice-gates on the border of their lands, so that they
  could draw water from the Appellant's land for the purposes of
  fishing and agriculture and thereafter divert the water back
  through the same land to the river. The Appellant who was
  cultivating prawn-fishing on his land aggrieved by the
E construction of the bund believing it to have hampered his
  prawn fishing; therefore, he filed a suit for perpetual and
  mandatory injunction against the respondents. The respondents
  in turn filed a suit for injunction against the appellants and
  claimed rights of easement. The two suits were disposed of
F separately by the Court of Munsif and decrees were passed in
  both the suits to the effect that the respondents were to have
  rights of easement only with' respect to agriculture but not for
  fishing. From the decrees, two set of appeals were preferred
  by both the parties, leading to four appeals altogether. The
G District Court dismissed all the appeals and thereby confirmed
  the decrees. The respondents then filed second appeals
  against the. decisions which arose from the appellant's suit but
  no second appeal was preferred from the· appeals arising from
  their own suit. Before the High Court in Second Appeal, the
H Appellant promptly pressed the preliminary objection of res
  SRI GANGA! VINAYAGAR TEMPLE v. MEENAKSHI                    855
          AMMAL [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]
judicata contending that the decrees passed by the District Court A
in the appeals arising from the respondents' suit had become
final. The High Court, however, was not impressed with that
contention, primarily keeping the case of Narhari in perspective,
and remanded the matter to the District Court after setting aside
the judgment and decree of the District Court. The District Court B
in remand confirmed the previous view taken by it, against which
the respondent again filed a Second Appeal in the High Court
which was allowed, resulting in filing of a SLP by the Appellant.
The sole and central issue canvassed before this Court was
 whether the Respondents' right to divert the flow of water through c
 the Appellant's land for fishing purposes is barred by res
 judicata, and this Court answered in the affirmative. This Court
 concluded that the Respondents, by not filing further appeals
 against the decree passed by the District Court in the appeals
 arising out of their own suit allowed that decision to become D
 final and conclusive. It observed further:

      "That decision, not having been appealed against, could
      not be reopened in the second appeal arising out of the
      appellant's suit. The issue whether respondents had the
      easementary right to the flow of water through the E
      appellant's land for fishing purposes was directly and
      substantially in issue in the respondent's suit. That issue
      was heard and finally decided by the District Court in a
      proceeding between the same parties and the decision
      was rendered before the High Court decided the second F
      appeal. .... The circumstance that the District Court
      disposed of the 4 appeals by a common judgment cannot
      affect the application of Section 11... The failure of the
      respondents to challenge the decision of the District Court
      insofar as it pertained to their suits attracts the application G
      of Section 11 because to the extent to which the District
      Court decided issues arising in the respondents' suit
    . against them, that decision would operate as res judicata
      since it was not appealed against."
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     856      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2014] 12 S.C.R.

A          8. In Prabhu, the parties were descendants of one Narayan
     Prabhu. The respondent, third son among four sons of Narayan
     Prabhu, filed a suit for partition against all the sons claiming
     all the concerned items to be joint family property. The
     appellant, the eldest son, filed a money suit only against the
B    respondent on .the ground that trade of tobacco shops run by
     the parties in that suit was his self-acquired property;
     consequently, that he was entitled to money due on account of
     tobacco delivered to the respondent's shop. The Trial Court
     tried both the suits together and determined them by way of two
c    decrees on the same date, holding that the shops in question
     belonged to the concerned individuals. The respondent
     appealed against both the decrees before the High Court, and
     the two appeals were decided in continuation under separate
     headings. The High Court while reversing the findings of the Trial
     Court held the shops to be part of joint family trade in tobacco
0
     and thus dismissed the money sµit. The appellant thereafter
     approached this Court assailing the judgment and decree
     pas'sed in the partition suit, whilst leaving the judgment and
     decree in the mo'ney suit unchallenged. Expectedly, the issue
     of res judicata was evoked by the respondent, which was
E    sought to be doused by the appellant by contending, inter alia,
     that no certificate of fitness under the unamended Article
     133(1)(c) of the Constitution of India was granted with respect
     to the money suit and also that parties were not common in both
     the suits. This Court while disagreeing with the grounds taken
F    by the appellant noted that there were two separate decrees
     and appellant could always have challenged the correctness or
     finality of the decision of the High Court in the money suit by
     means of an application for Special Leave to Appeal and
     approved the views taken by this· Court in Lonankutty and
G    reiterated:

           "The expression "former suit", according to Explanation I
           of Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, makes it clear
           that, if a decision is given before the institution of the
H.         proceeding which is sought to be barred by res judicata,
 SRI GANGA! VINAYAGAR TEMPLE v. MEENAKSHI                      857
         AMMAL [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]
    and. that decision is allowed to become final or becomes            A
    final by operation of law, a bar of res judicata would
    emerge."

       9. O.S.6n8 was a suit filed by the Trust claiming an amount
of Rs.11468/- as arrears of rent from the Tenants. Significantly,       8
the three Transferees (who were Defendants 7 to 9 in ·o.S.5/
78) had not been impleaded by the Trust palpably because no
relief had been claimed against them and additionally because
their presence was not relevant for the determination of the
Issues that had arisen in O.S.6n8 and O.S.7/78. The claims
pertained to a period prior to the assailed transfer of the             C
demised land from the Trust to the Transferees. It is also
 noteworthy that even the Tenants did not seek their
 impleadments despite the fact that they had already laid siege
 to the title of the said Transferees in their plaint in O.S.5/78 and
 had specifically pleaded so in their Written Statements in O.S.6/      D
 78 and O.S.7/78. In this Suit, it was averred.that the Trust had
 sold the suit land to the aforementioned Sarvshri P.
 Lakshamanan, P. Vadivelu and P. Saibabha (Transferees
 being Defendants 7 to 9 in O.S.5/78). It was, inter alia, pleaded
 that the advance rent of Rs.7000/- was repayable/adjustable            E
 only at the time of the handing over of the suit property by the
 Tenant to the Trust. Since relief claimed in O.S.6/78 or O.S.7/
 78 had no causality or connection with the Transferees their
  impleadment was not necessary, in our opinion. The defence
  of the Tenants was that the Trust was a public temple which           F
  could not have been sold/transferred by Shri Sethurama
  Chettiar and secondly that the amount claimed as arrears of
 _rent was not due and payable. Various other pleas had been
  raised to which we need not advert as they are not germane
  for deciding the present Appeal. It will be relevant, however, to     G
  mention that the Tenants had also denied that any additional
  land had been taken on rent. Of the six Issues which came to
  be struck in O.S. 6178 and O.S. 7/78, the following are relevant
  and, therefore, reproduced:-
                                                                        H
    858         SUPREME COURT REPORTS               (2014] 12 S.C.R.


A         "(2)    Whether the entire suit property ('A' and 'B'
                  schedule) in possession of the defendants are
                  covered by the lease deed dated 8-11-67 or
                  whether there was any subsequent oral agreement
                  in respect of '8' schedule property alone and if so,
B                 what is its lease amount?

          (3)      Whether the suit property belongs to a public temple
                   governed by the Act. If so, whether the suit is
                   maintainable for want bf sanction under Section 26
                 . of the Hindu Religious Institutions Act." .
c
        10. As already noted above, O.S.6/78 was decreed only
  for a sum of Rs.268/- holding, inter alia, that the Tenants cannot
  adjust the advance of Rs.7000/c as against the rent claim of
  Rs.11,468/- without the sanction of the landlord; that since the
D suit property was not owned by a public temple but by a private
  trust, being the personal property of Shri Sethurama Chettiar, ·
  sanction under Section 26 of the Hindu Religious Institutions
  Act was not necessary; and that the Transferees had become
  the absolute owners of the suit property by transfer/sale. Most
E significantly, it was also held that the Tenants "are stopped from
  challenging the title of the .Present landlord and they are bound
  to attorn the tenancy. They have no right to question the title of
  the landlord or his successors-in-title." It is also palpably
  perceptible that the common Judgment entered into the arena
F of title and transferability of the suit property owing to the
  Tenants' stance in all three suits, thereby rendering imperative
  the filing of Appeals against the decrees in O.S.5/78 as well ,
  as o.s.1na.

         11. In O.S.7/78, as already outlined, the Trust sought
G   recovery of Rs.2600/- as arrears of rent in respect of an alleged
    oral lease for the land mentioned in Schedule 'B' situated on
    the western side of the Schedule 'A' property. The defence of
    the Tenants was that the entire property comprising both
    Schedules 'A' and 'B' was a composite whole, and was let out
H
  SRI GANGAI VINAYAGAR TEMPLE v. MEENAKSHI                     859
          AMMAL [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]
for a period of 15 years by means of the Lease Deed -elated            A
8.11.1967. It was also pleaded that the suit had been filed by
a public trust and, thus, was not competent as framed. The Trial
Court held that the entire demised property was one, covered
by the aforementioned Registered Lease Deed, and,
accordingly, O.S. 7/78 was dismissed with costs. It             has    B
been correctly observed in the common Judgment dated
6.11.1982 by which all three Suits have been decided, that the
Issues framed in O.S.6/78 and O.S.7/78 were 'one and the
same'. In a nut-shell, the Trial Court returned the finding that the
Trust was not a Public Trust governed by the Hindu Religious           c
Institutions Act, 1972 and that the sale of the demised suit land
by the Private Trust through Shri Sethurama Chettiar to
Sarvashri P. Lakshamanan, P. Vadivelu and P. Saibabha, was
 not contrary to law.

      12. As has already been reflected and commented upon, D
the Tenants had filed an Appeal only in respect of O.S.6/78,
although common conclusions had been arrived at in.all three
Suits, except for some inconsequential differences. It is trite that
the obligation and duty to frame Issues is cast solely on the
Court which may, nevertheless, elicit suggestions from the E
litigating adversaries before it. Issues settled by the Court under
Order XIV CPC constitute the crystaliization of the conflict or
the distillation of the dispute between the parties to the lis, and
are in the nature of disputed questions of fact and/or of law.
While discharging this primary function, the Court is expected F
to peruse the pleadings of the parties in order to extract their
essence, analyse the allegations of the parties and the contents
of the documents produced by them, and, thereafter, proceed
to frame the Issues. In our opinion, so far as O.S.5/78 is
concerned, the question of the title of the property would G
ordinarily remain irrelevant to that litigation for two reasons.
Firstly, Section 116 of the Evidence Act bars the Lessee/
Licensee from constructing if not concocting a challenge vis-
a-vis the title of the Lessor/Licensor, if it is the latter who has
put the former in possession of the demised/licensed premises. H
    860      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                (2014] 12 S.C.R.

A In the case in hand, the first lease was executed by Shri
  Sethurama Chettiar and the renewal or the succeeding lease
  was between the Trust through its President, Shri Sethurama
  Chettiar, on the one hand, and the Tenants on the other. The
  Tenants, therefore, stood legally impeded and foreclosed from
B assailing the title of the Trust, as has been correctly concluded
  by the Trial Court, even though a specific Issue had not been
  struck in this context in O.S.5178. There is no gainsaying that
  where parties are aware of the rival cases the failure to formally
  formulate an Issue fades into insignificance, especially when it
c is prominently present in connected matters and extensive ·
  evidence has been recorded on it'without demur. Secondly, on
  a proper perusal of the plaint, it ought to have been palpably
  evident that the Plaintiff/Tenant in O.S.5/78 feared
  dispossession from the demised premises because of what
  they considered to be an illegal transfer; but since all the
0
  Defendants had averred in their Written Statement that they had
  no intention of doing so, the suit ought not to have been
  dismissed but ought to have been decreed without more ado
  solely so far as the prayer of injunction was concerned. But, in
  the Trial Court the title to the leased land had become the
E fulcrum of the fight, owing to the pleadings of the Tenant in which
  it had repeatedly and steadfastly challenged the title of the Trust
  as well as the Transferees. The Tenant should not be permitted
  to approbate and reprobate, as per its whim or convenience,
  by disowning or abandoning a controversy it has sought to have
F adjudicated.

       13. Chapter VIII of the Evidence Act under the he::iding
  'Estoppel' is important for the present purposes. This fascicufus
  comprises only three provisions, being Sections 115 to 117.
G For ease of reference we shall reproduce Section 116:-

          "116. Estoppel of tenant; and of licensee of person in
          possession.- No tenant of immovable property, or person
          claiming through such tenant, shall, during the continuation
          of the tenancy, be permitted to deny that the landlord of
H
       SRI GANGAI VINAYAGAR TEMPLE v. MEENAKSHI                   861
               AMMAL [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]
         such tenant had, at the beginning of the tenancy, a title to     A
         such immovable property; and no person who came upon
         any immovable property by the license of the person in
         possession thereof, shall be permitted to deny that such
         person had a title to such possession at the time when
         such license was given."                                         B

          Plainly, this provision precludes the consideration of any
     challenge to the ownership of the Trust as the claim for arrears
     of rent was restricted to the period prior to the sale of the suit
     land by the Trust to the Transferees, namely Defendants 7 to 9       C
     in O.S.5/78. The position would have been appreciably
     different, were the said Defendants 7 to 9 to lay any claim
     against the Tenants for arrears of rent or, for that matter, any
     other relief. This is for the reason that Section 116 of the
      Evidence Act would not come into play in any dispute between
     the Tenants on the one hand and the Transferees on the other.        D

         14. We think it prudent to extract the conclusion from the
     Judgment dated 6.11.1982 common to O.S.5178, O.S.6/78 and
     O.S.7178, since it is the fountainhead, the fulcrum of the legal
     nodus which we have to unravel. The Trial Court has opined thus      E

          When no trustee member or the Government is claiming
          any right over the suit property, it is not known why the
          Tenant should entertain a doubt as to whether real title has
                                                                          F
          passed on to the present.purchasers of the suit property.

          The suit property is therefore not a public temple governed
          by the Act and since the property is found to be the private
          property of Sethrama Chettiar, sanction O/S.26 of the
          Hindu Religious Institutions Act is therefore not necessary.    G
          The suit property being the personal property of Sethurama
          Chettiar and the same having been sold to defendants 7
          to 9, tlie latter have become the absolute owners of the
          suit property and the plaintiffs in O.S.5178 are stopped from
          challenging the title of the present landlord and they are      H


·-
    862 ·    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2014] 12 S.C.R.


A       bound to attorn the tenancy. They have no right to question
        the title of the landlord or his successors-in-life.

        In the result, the ample evidence produced by ihe
        defendant would prove that the suit property is the private
        property of Sethural!la Chettiar and sale deed dated
B
        30.6.76 in Ex.A.19 is valid and the defendants 7 to 9 are
        now the real owners of the property who are entitled to take
        possession of the property after expiry of the lease. In the
        result, the issues are answered accordingly.

c
        In the result, O.S.5/78 is dismissed with cost. O.S.6/78 is
        decreed in part with cost as per the calculation above.
        Regarding O.S.7/78, since the court has held that the entire
D       property is one, there cannot be any lease amount for the
        rear portion and it dismissed with cost.

          15. The Tenants filed Appeal 581 of 1983 in the High Court
    of Judicature at Madras which came to be decided oy the
    learned Single Judge on 25th April, 1997. It is indeed significant
E · that the Transferees had not been impleaded by the Tenants in·
    the First Appeal, although the former were parties before the
    Trial Court in the Tenants' own suit, viz. O.S. 5/78, and since
    any decision favourable to the Tenants as regards the legal
    propriety of the transfer of title would sev~rely impact upon if
F not annihilate the Transferees' rights, and since O.S.5/78 had
    been 'dismissed', yet, regardless; no appeal thereagainst had
    been preferred. Shri Sethurama Chettiar was representP.d
    through his legal representatives in Appeal 581 of 1983 which
    had been preferred in respect of O.S.6/78 specifically. We have
G. perused the contents of the Tenants Appeal, and as we
    expected, the gravamen of the assault was the public character
    and nature of the Trust and the legal imperfection of its transfer.
    This also fortifies the analysis that the dispute raised by the
    Tenants in their suit as well as their defence to the Trust's suits
H was that mentioned in the preceding sentenee. This is indeed
· SRI GANGA! VINAYAGAR TEMPLE v. MEENAKSHI                        863
          AMMAL [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]

remarkable since the Tenant was fully alive to the detrimental A
nature of the decision in 0.S. 5178 and that it critically crippled
its rights and interests, as is evident from the fact that the Tenant
filed a Review bearing CRA No. 1/1993, which by a detailed
Judgment dated 19.3.1999 was dismissed. So far as the
contentions of the parties are concerned, the First Appellate B
Court had noted, inter alia, that the Tenants had denied any
liability towards the arrears of rent; that the Ten~nt had argued
that the Trust's Suits were not maintainable in law for want of
necessary sanction under Section 25 of the Hindu Religious
Institutions Act, 1972; that the Tenant did not adr11it the validity c.
of the Sale Deed dated 1.7 .1976 on the grounds that, having
 regard to Section 25 of the Hindu Religious Institutions Act,
 1972, it was a nullity. The First Appellate Court conducted an
elaborate and detailed discussions as to the nature of the
Temple/Trust property in order to ascertain whether it partook 0
 of a private or a public trust. We have already highlighted that
 O.S.5/78 filed by the Tenants was "dismissed", nevertheless,
 this verdict has not been appealed against. After recording the
 detailed arguments on both sides, the First Appellate C9urt
 encapsulated the following points for consideration:-
                                                                      E·
      (i)     Whether the present appeal by the plaintiff
              canvassing the findings of the trial court on issue
              numbers 2, 3 and 4 by the learned trial Judge is
              barred by the doctrine of res-judicata as contended
              by t~e respondents?                ·                      F

      (ii)    Whether findings given by the learned trial Judge
              on the above issues are correct, valid in law and
              as such it is sustainable?

      (iii)   Whether the plaintiff is entitled to question the G
              validity of the sale"deed in favour of defendants 7
              to 9 by the second defendant?

      (iv)    What relief, if any, the parties are entitled to?
                                                                        H
    864      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 (2014] 12 S.C.R.


A          Obviously, O.S. 5/78 was as focal as the other, otherwise
    (iii) above would not have arisen. It is evident that all concerned
    erroneously assumed that 0.S.5/78 had also been carried in
    Appeal.

8         16. The First Appellate Court, in reversal, held that the
    Plaintiff in O.S.6/78 was a Public Trust and, accordingly, fell
    within the purview and sweep of the Hindu Religious Institutions
    Act, 1972. So far as the failure of the Tenants to appeal against
    the dismissal of O.S.5n8, the First Appellate Court held, in our
C   opinion questionably, that that was not necessary since there
    was no adverse findings against the Tenants. While we can
    appreciate that owing to the stands of the defendants in their
    Written Statements filed in O.S.5/78 there was, in actuality, no
    challenge to the Plaint, but nevertheless, the suit of the Tenants
    had been 'dismissed' and therefore, at the very least, it would
D   have been proper and prudent to file an appeal and at least in
    abundant caution obtain a clarification thereon. The 'dismissal'
    of suit O.S.5/78 cannot but be indicative of the opinion that all
    the asse'rtions of fact and law were in the opinion of the Trial
    Court legally untenable, perforce including that the Trust could
E   not have transferred the suit property in the manner it did. For
    this very reason the Tenant should also have appealed against
    the verdict in O.S.7n8 in respect of the findings of the Trial Court
    common to O.S.6/78; since the Trust had not assailed the
    rejection of its plea that a separate tenancy governed the claim
F   in O.S.7n8 that part of the verdict had attained finality. The First
    Appellate Court has opined, in the event erroneously, that the
    doctrine of res judicata was not attracted to the facts of the
    instant case. It appears to us that the First Appellate Court lost
    perspective of the position that Section 116 of the Evidence
G   Act rendered impermissible and incompetent any challenge to
    the title of the Trust/Landlord which had put the Appellant in
    possession of the demised property. It is also noteworthy that
    the Tenant had contested the legal capacity.of the Trust/Landlord
    to convey the property to the Transferees. Ergo,. it was nobody's
H   case that although the Trust had title to the suit property at the
  SRI GANGA! VINAYAGAR TEMPLE v. MEENAKSHI                        865
          AM MAL. [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]
inception it had lost it subsequently. There is in fact a star~           A
omission to discuss this aspect in the Judgment of the First
Appellate Court, which therefore erred in concluding that the
Trust/Landlord was a public trust and was, accordingly,
incompetent to sell the Trust property. This is all the more
significant since it reversed the opinion of the Trial Court without      B
affording any opportunity of hearing to the Transferees who had
not been impleaded by the Tenants in its Appeal although they
were defendants in the Te~ants suit; they were not before the
 High Court because the Tenant decided to not to appeal
 against the disrnissal of O.S.5/78 in which it had also raised           C
 these very questions. If it is contended that all the three suits
 were covered by a common judgment, the Tenant ought to have
 impleaded the Transferees in its Appeal.

     17. The Trust filed the Second Appeal before the Division
Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Madras, but                      D
inexplicably and conspicuously restricted its challenge only to
the opinion of the First Appellate Court vis-a-vis the impact and
effect of the principle of res judicata on that lis. The Trust had
by that time already sold the property and remarkably their only
subsisting interest was for the recovery of the paltry decretal           E
sum of Rs.268/. We would have expected the Trust to
vehemently assert that a decision adverse to its Transferees
could legally not have been delivered in their absence; and that
Section 116 of the Evidence Act disabled the Tenants from
challenging the Trust's title or legal character, since it is the Trust   F
which had put the Tenant in possession. However, as it has
transpired, the Second Appellate Court agreed with the
interpretation given by the First Appellate Court that res judicata
did not apply against the Tenants.

     18. For facility of reference Section 11 of the CPC is               G
extracted below:

     Res Judicata- No Court shall try any suit or issue in which
     the matter directly and substantially in issue has been .
     directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between H
    866       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  (2014) 12 s.c.R.


A         the same parties, or between parties under whom they or
          any of !_hem claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court
          competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which
          such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been
          heard and finally decided by such Court.
B
       Explanation 1.- The expression "former suit" shall denote
       a suit which has been decided prior to the suit in question
      _whether or not it was instituted prior thereto.·
                                             .                  .
          Explanation II.- For the purposes of .this sec.lion, the
c         competence of a Court shall be determined irrespective
          of any provisions as to a right of appeal from the decision
          of such Court.

          Explanation Ill.- The matter above referred to must in the
D         former suit have been alleged by one party and either
          denied or admitted, expressly or impliedly, by the other.

          Explanation IV.-Any matter which might and ought to have
          been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit
          shall be deemed to have. been a matter directly and
E
          substantially in issue in such suit.

          Explanation V.- Any relief claimed in the plaint, which is .
          not expressly granted by the decree, shall for the purposes
          cif this section, be deemed to have been refused.
F
       Explanation VI.- Where persons litigate bona fide in
       resp<;!c! of a public right or of a private right claimed in
      ·common for themselves and others, all persons interested
       in such right shall, for the purposes of this section, be
       deemed to claim under the persons so litigating.
G
          Explanation VII.- The provisions of this section shall apply
          to a proceeding for the execution of a decree and
          references in this sec;:tion to any suit, issue or former suit ·
          shall be construed as references, respectively, to a
H         proceeding for the executio·n of the decree; question
 SRI GANGAI VINAYAGAR TEMPLE v. MEENAKSHI                       867
         AMMAL [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]
    arising in such proceeding and a former proceeding for the           A
    e.xecution of that decree.

    Explanation VIII.- An issue heard and finally decided by a
    Court of limited jurisdiction, competent to decide such
    issue, shall operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit,           B
    notwithstanding that such Court of limited jurisdiction was
    not competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in
    which such issue has· been subsequently raised.

     The decision rendered by three Co-ordinate Benches of
this Court, namely firstly Lonankutty, secondly ~rabhu and thirdly       C
Premier Tyres have already been discussed above.

     19. We must additionally advert to a Four-Judge Bench
decision in Sheodan Singh vs. Daryao Kunwar (1966) 3 SCR
300, in which this Court has lucidly enumerated five constituent         D
elements of Section 11, namely:-

          (i) The matter directly and substantially in issue in the
     subsequent suit or issue must be the same matter which
     was directly and substantially in issue in the former suit;
                                                                         E
           (ii) The former suit must have been a suit between
     the same parties or between parties under whom they or
     any of them claim;

             (iii) The parties must have litigated under the same        F
     title in the former suit;

          (iv) The court which decided the former suit must be
     a court competent to try the subsequent suit or the suit in
     which such issue is subsequently raised; and
                                                                         G
             (v) The matter directly and substantially in issue in the
      subsequent suit must have been heard and finally decided
    . by the court in the first suit. Further Explanation 1 shows
      that it is not the date on which the suit is filed that matters
      but the date on which the suit is decided, so that even if a       H
                                          •
    868       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2014] 12 S.C.R.

A         suit was filed later. it will be a former suit if it h'as been
          decided earlier.

         The conundrum in Sheodan Singh was only marginally
    different to what has arisen before us. The Appellate Court was
B   confronted with five Appeals from five different Suits between
    the same parties in which the Issues were common. Two of the
    Appeals were dismissed, albeit, not on merits. It was in those
    premises argued and accepted by this Court that the prinC:iples
    of res judicata becanie operational with regard fo the decrees
C   passed in the two suits in respect of which the Appeals filed
    thereagainst had been dismissed. It was pithily observed that
    otherwise "all that the losing party has to do to destroy the effect
    of a decision given by the trial court on the merits is to file an
    appeal and let that appeal be dismissed on some preliminary
    ground, with the result that the decision given on the merits also
0
    becomes useless as between the parties." Sheodan Singh took
    note of several judgments of the High Courts, which preferred
    to overlook procedural technicalities ostensibly in the interests
    of the merits of the matter, but did not state its final opinion,
    which has propelled us to do so in order so that the divergent
E   opinions be interred and dissonance be removed.

          20. On the issue of applicability of res judicata in cases
  where two or more suits have been disposed of by one
  common judgment but separate decr!3eS, and where the
F decree in one suit has been appealed against but not against
  the others, various High Courts have given divergent and
  conflicting opinions and decisions. The High Court of Madras
  and erstwhile High Courts of Lahore, Nagpur and Oudh have
  held that there could be no res judicata in such cases whereas
G the High Courts of Allahabad, Calcutta, Patna, Orissa and
  erstwhile High Court of Rangoon have taken contrary views. It
  should also be noted that there are instances of conflicting
  judgments within the same High Court as well. The decision of
  Tek Chand, J. in Full Bench Judgment of the Lahore High Court
H in Lachhmi vs. Bhulli [AIR (1927) Lah 289] and Full Bench
                           •
 SRI GANGAI VINAYAGAR TEMPLE v. MEENAKSHI                  869
         AMMAL [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]
Judgment of the Madras High Court in Panchanda Velan vs. A
Vaithinatha Sastrial [ILR (1906) 29 Mad 333] and of the Oudh
High Court in B. Shanker Sahai v. B. Bhagwat Sahai [AIR1946
Oudh 33 (FB)] appear to be the leading decisions against the
applicability of res judicata. Without adverting to the details of
those cases, it is sufficient to note that the hesitancy or B
reluctance to the applicability of the rigorous of res judicata
flowed from the notion that Section 11 of the Code refers only
to "suits" and as such does not include "appeals" within its
ambit; that since the decisions arrived in the connected suits
were articulated simultaneously, there could be no "former suit" c
as stipulated by the said section; that substance, issues and
finding being common or substantially similar in the connected
suits tried together, non-filing of an appeal against one or more
 of those suits ought not to preclude the consideration of other
 appeals on merits; and that the principle of res judicata would
                                                                   0
 be applicable to the judgment, which is common, and not to the
 decrees drawn on the basis of that common judgment.

     21. On the other hand, the verdict of Full Bench of the
Allahabad High Court in Zaharia vs .. Debia ILR (1911) 33 All
51 and decisions of the Calcutta High Court in lsup Ali vs. Gour E
Chandra Deb 37 Cal LJ 184: AIR 1923 Cal 496 and of the
Patna High Court in Mrs. Getrude Oastes vs. Mrs Millicent
D'Silva ILR 12 Pat 139 : AIR 1933 Pat 78 are of the contrary
persuasion. These decisions largely proceeded on the
predication that the phraseology "suit" is not limited to the Court F
of First Instance or Trial Court but encompasses within its
domain proceedings Elefore the Appellate Courts; that non-
applicability of res judicata may lead to inconsistent decrees
and conflicting decrees, not only due to multiplicity of decrees
but also due to multiplicity of the parties, and thereby creating G
confusion as to which decree has to be given effect to in
execution; that a decree is valid unless it is a nullity and the
same cannot be overruled or interfered with in appellate
proceedings initiated against another decree; that the issue of
res judicata has to be decided with reference to the decrees, H
    870       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2014] 12 S.C.R.


A   which are appealable under Section 96 of the CPC and not with
    reference to the judgment (which has been defined differently),
    but with respect to decrees in the CPC; that non-confirmation
    of a decree in appellate proceedings has no consequence as
    far as it reaching finality upon elapsing of the limitation period
B   is concerned in view of the Explanation II of Section 11, that
    provides that the competence of a Court shall be determined
    irrespective of any provisions as to right of appeal from the
    decision of such Court: and that Section 11 of the CPC is not
    exhaustive of the doctrine of res judicata, which springs up from
C   the general principles of law and public policy.

         22. Procedural norms, technicalities and processal law
  evolve after years of empirical experience, and to ignore them
  or give them short shrift inevitably defeats justice. Where a
  common judgment has been delivered in cases in which
D consolidation orders have specific.3lly been passed, we think
  it irresistible that the filing of a single appeal leads to the entire
  dispute becoming sub judice once again. Consolidation orders
  are passed by virtue of the bestowal of inherent powers on the
  Courts by Section 151 of the CPC, as clarified by this Court in
E Chitivalasa Jute Mills vs. Jaypee Rewa Cement (2004) 3 SCC
  85. In the instance of suits in which common Issues have been
  framed and a common Trial has been conducted, the losing
  party must file appeals in respect of all adverse decrees
  founded even on partially adverse or contrary speaking
F judgments. While so opining we do not intend to whittle down
  the principle that appeals are not expect!ld to be filed against
  every inconvenient or disagreeable or unpropitious or
  unfavourable finding or observation contained in a judgment,
   but that this can be done by way of cross-objections if the
G occasion arises. The decree not assailed thereupon
  metamorphoses into the character of a "former suit". If this is
  not to be so viewed, it would be possible to set at naught a
  decree passed in Suit A by only challenging the decree in Suit
   B. Law considers it an anathema to allow a party to achieve a
H result indirectly when it has deliberately or negligently failed to
  SRI GANGA! VJNAYAGAR TEMPLE v. MEENAKSHI                 871
          AMMAL [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]
 directly initiate proceedings towards this purpose. Laws of A
 procedure have picturesquely been referred to as handmaidens
 to justice, but this does not mean that they can be wantonly
 ignored because, if so done, a miscarriage of justice inevitably
 and inexorably ensues. Statutory law and processal law are two
 sides of the judicial drachma, each being the obverse of the B
 other. In the case in hand, had the Tenant diligently filed an
 appeal against the decree at least in respect of O.S. 5/78, the
 legal conundrum that has manifested itself and exhausted so
.much judicial time, would not have arisen at all.

     23. Adverting in the impugned.Judgment to the decision
                                                                  c
of this Court in Sajjadanashiri Sayed vs. Musa Dadabhai
Ummer AIR 2000 SC 1238, the Division Bench delineated the
distinction between an aspect of the litigation that is collaterally
and incidentally, as against one that is directly and substantially
focal to the question the determination of which is the immediate D
foundation of the decision. Reference was also drawn to
enunciation of what constitutes res judicata in Hoag vs. New
Jersey (1958) 356 U.S. 464, namely that this important legal
principle is attracted "if the records of the formal trial show that
the judgment could not have been rendered without deciding the E
particular matter, it will be considered as having settled that
matter as to all future actions between the parties". The Division
Bench also garnered guidance from the observations of this
Court in lsher Singh vs. Sarwan Singh, AIR 1965 SC 948
requiring the examination of the Pleadings and the Issues in F
order to ascertain whether the question was directly and
substantially litigcited upon. The Division Bench also considered ·
Asrar Ahmed vs. Durgah Committee, Ajmer, AIR 1947 PC 1
and Pragdasji Guru Bhagwandasji vs.· Patel lshwarlalbhai
 Narsibhai, AIR 1952 SC 143, before concluding that Issue No.2 G
framed in O.S. 5/78 was wholly unnecessary and faulty. The
Division Bench held that the findings on that Issue were
unnecessary, did not constitute the minimum foundation for the
ultimate decision and, therefore, would not constitute res
judicata. We have already indicated above that, in our opinion, H
    872      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [4014] 12 S.C.R.


A if O.S.5178 was merely a suit for injunction simpliciter, since the
  Defendants therein (both the Trustees as well· as the
  Transferees) had posited in their respective Written Statements
  that they had no intention to dispossess the Plaintiffffenant, that
  suit ought not to have been dismissed but should have been
B decreed. We have also laid emphasis on the fact that the
  Tenant had made a specific and pointed assertion in the plaint
  that the transfer of the demised land by the Trust to the
  Transferees was not in consonance with Section 26 of the
  Puducherry Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1972. We have also
c noticed the foci that this was an important objection raised by
  the Tenant in their Written Statement in O:S.6178 and O.S.7178.
  It seems to be incongruous to us to consider ownership of the
  demised premises to be irrelevant in O.S.5178 but nevertheless
  constitute the kernel or essence or fulcrum of the· disputes in
0 O.S.6/78 and O.S.7/78. The dialectic adopted by the Court
  must remain steadfastly constant - if title was irrelevant so far
  as a claim for injunction simpliciter, it was similarly so in relation
  to the party having the advantage of Section 116 of the
  Evidence Act in respect of its claim for arrears of rent from its
E tenant. It would not be logical to overlook that the pleadings on
  behalf of the Tenant were common in all three suits, and that
  Issues oh this aspect of the dispute had been claimed by the
  Tenants in all the three suits. On a holistic and comprehensive
  reading of the pleadings of the Tenant in all the three suits, it is
  inescapable that the Tenant had intendedly, directly and
F unequivocally raised in its pleadings the question of the title to
  the demised premises and the legal capacity of the Trustees
  to ·convey the lands to the Transferees. This .is the corrmion
  thread that runs through the pleadings of Tenant in all three suits.
  It is true that if O.S.5178 was a suit for injunction simpliciter, and
G in the wake of the stance of the Trustees and Transferees that
  no threat had been extended to the Tenants regarding their
  ouster, any reference or challenge to the ownership was wholly
  irrelevant. But the ownership issue had been specifically raised
  by the Tenant, who had thus· caused it to be directly and
H
 SRI GANGAI VINAYAGAR TEMPLE v. MEENAKSHI                     873
         AMMAL [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]
substantially in issue in all three suits. So far as the Suit Nos.6/   A
78 and 7178 are concerned, they were also suits simpliciter
for the recovery of rents in which the defence· pertaining to
ownership was also not relevant; no substantial reason for the
Tenant to file an appeal in O.S. 6/78 had arisen because the
monetary part of the decree was relatively insignificant.              8
Obviously, the Tenant's resolve was· to make the ownership the
central dispute in the litigation and in these circumstances
cannot be allowed to equivocate on the aspect of ownership.
Logically, if the question of ownership was relevant and worthy
of consideration in O.S. 6176, it was also relevant in O.S. 51         C
78. Viewed in this manner, we think it is an inescapable
conclusion that an appeal ought to have been filed by the
Tenant even in respect of O.S. 5178, for fear of inviting the
rigours of res judicata as also for correcting the "pismissal"
order. ln our opinion, the Tenant had been completely non-
suited once it was held that no cause of action had arisen in          D
its favour and the suit was 'dismissed'. Ignoring that finding and
 allowing it to become final makes that conclusion impervious
 to change. In Sheoparsen Singh vs. Ramnandan Pr<!sad
 Singh, (1915-16) 43 l.A.91, the Privy Council opined - "Res
judicata is an ancient doctrine of universal application and           E
 permeates every civilized system of jurisprudence. This
 doctrine encapsulates the basic principle in all judicial systems
 which provide that an earlier adjudication is conclusive on the
 same subject matter between the same parties." The raison
 d'etre and public policy on which Res judicata. is predicated         F
 is that the party who has raised any aspect in a litigation and
 has had an Issue cast thereon, has lead evidence in that
 regard, and has argued on the point, remains bound by the
 curial conclusions once they attain finality. No party must be
 vexed twice for the same cause; it is in the interest of the State    G
 that there should be an end to litigation; a judicial decision
 must be accepted as correct in the absence of a challenge ..
 The aspect of law which now remains to be considered is
 whether filing of an Appeal against a common Judgment in
 one case, tantamounts to filing an appeal in all the matters.         H
    874      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2014] 12 S.C.R.


A      24. The application of res judicata, sci very often, conjures
  up controversies, as· is evident from the fact that even in this
  Court divergent opinions were expressed by the two Judge
  Bench, leading to the necessity of referring the appeal to a
  Larger Bench. It was for this reason that we thought it
B appropriate to deal with the dispute in detail. It seems to us that
  had the decisions of the three Judge Bench in Lonankutty and
  Prabhu been brought to the attention of our Learned and
  Esteemed Brothers on the earlier occasion when this appeal
  was heard by two Judge Bench, the dichotomy in opinion would .
C not have arisen. The outcome of the appeal before the High
  Court would have also shared a similar fate. On the foregoing
  analysis, especially the previous enunciation of law by three Co-
  ordinate Benches, we are in agreem13nt with the opinion of our
  Learned Brother Asok Kumar Ganguly that the appeal calls to
  be allowed. We are of the opinion that having failed or
D neglected or concertedly avoided filing appeals against the
  decrees in O.S.5/78 and O.S.7/78 the cause of the
  Respondents/Tenants was permanently sealed and foreclosed
  since res judicata applied againi;t them. We accordingly allow
  this Appeal but keeping the varying verdicts in view decline
E from mal<ing any order as to costs.

    Bibhuti Bhushan Bose                             Appeal allowed.