Holding

A CAT cannot review its own judgment once the Supreme Court has dismissed a special leave petition against that judgment; the review petitions were not maintainable.

Summary

Gopabandhu Biswal, a former military officer appointed as Assistant Commandant in the Orissa Military Police, sought promotion to the Indian Police Service (IPS) and obtained a favorable order from the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) in 1991. The Union of India, the State of Orissa and other respondents challenged that order before the Supreme Court, which dismissed their special leave petition in 1992, rendering the CAT order final. Subsequently, the respondents and other parties filed review petitions before the CAT in 1993, seeking to overturn the CAT’s earlier decision. The Supreme Court held that once a special leave petition against a CAT order is dismissed, the order attains finality and the Tribunal cannot entertain a review under Section 22(3)(f) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, which mirrors Order 47 Rule 1 of the CPC. The Court also ruled that the review petitioners were not "persons aggrieved" within the meaning of the statute and that the petitions were filed well beyond the 30‑day period prescribed by Rule 17 of the CAT Procedure Rules. Consequently, the Court set aside the CAT’s review orders and remanded the original applications for fresh consideration, allowing the civil appeals.

Issues considered

The power of a Central Administrative Tribunal to review its own earlier order after a special leave petition against that order has been dismissed by the Supreme Court.
Whether the petitioners filing review applications are "persons aggrieved" within the scope of Section 22(3)(f) of the Administrative Tribunals Act and Order 47 Rule 1 of the CPC.
Whether the review petitions filed beyond the 30‑day period prescribed by Rule 17 of the CAT Procedure Rules are maintainable.

Legislation cited

Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985s. 22(3)(f)
Central Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1987s. Rule 17
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order 47 Rule 1

Subjects

Administrative TribunalReview jurisdictionFinality of judgmentPerson aggrievedService promotionRule 17Order 47Special leave petitionAppellate jurisdiction

Judgment

A SRI GOPABANDHU BISWAL ETC.
v.
KRISHNA CHANDRA MOHANTYAND ORS. ETC.

APRIL 21, 1998

B [SUJATA V. MANOHARAND D.P. WADHWA, JJ.]

Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985/Central Administrative Tribunal
(Procedure) Rules, 1987.

C S.22(3) (j)!Rule 17-Review-Scope of-Order passed by Central
Administrative Tribunal-Special leave petition challenging the order
dismissed by Supreme Court-Review thereafter before Tribunal-Held, the
judgment of the Tribunal has attained finality and Tribunal has no power to
review that judgment-Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-0rder 47, Rule 1.

D Service Law :

Indian Police Service-Promotion to-Assistant Commandants in Orissa
Military Police-Seeking promotion to Indian Police Service Cadre-Matter
remitted to Tribunal for fresh consideration.

E Practice and Procedure :

'Person aggrieved'- Explained.

The Appellant, an ex-Military Officer, appointed as an Assistant
Commandant in the Orissa Military Police and confirmed in the service
F w.e.f. 1975, filed a writ petition before the High Court claiming that he was
eligible to be considered for promotion to India Police Service Cadre. The
petition was transferred to the Central Administrative Tribunal, Cuttack
Bench and numbered as T.A. 1189. The stand of the respondents was that
only the Superintendents of Police in the Orissa Police Force were eligible
G for promotion to IPS cadre. The Tribunal by its order dated 24.12.1991
· allowed the application holding that posts of Deputy Superintendent of Police
and Assistant Commandant of the Orissa Military Police constituted a single
cadre prior to 5th of November, 1980. It was directed that the appellant
should be considered for promotion w.e.f. 1.1.1977 in respect of each year
beginning therefrom till January, 1980. The Union oflndia, State ofOrissa
H and two of the private respondents in T.A. 1/89 challenged the said order
1108
G. Bl SW AL v. K.C. MOHANTY 1109
before this Court by filling a special leave petition which was dismissed on A
3.8.1992.

In July 1993, respondents l and 2 filed before the Tribunal an application
which was converted into a review petition and numbered as RA. 16/93. They
contended that the cadres of Deputy Superintendents of Police and Assistant
Commandants in Orissa Military Police were separate and the officers B
belonging to latter were not eligible for promotion as IPS. Similar review
petition was filed by two direct recruits to the IPS cadre. Some of the
Assistant Commandants in Orissa Military Police also filed applications,
which were numbered as OAs No. 276, 277 and 278of1993 for granting
them the benefit of the decision of the Tribunal in T.A. No. 1/89. c
The Tribunal reviewed its earlier judgment in TA 1/89 on the ground
that there was an error apparent on the face of the record and held that the
two cadres of Deputy Superintendents of Police and Assistant Commandants
of Orissa Military Police were separate from inception and the officers
belonging to the latter were not eligible for promotion to Indian Police D
Service. The Tribunal then dismissed TA 1/89 and O.As No. 276 to 278 of
1993. Aggrieved the applicants in TA 1/89 and 0. As No. 276 to 278 of 1993
filed the present appeals.

Allowing the appeals, this Court
E
HELD: I.I. The power ofreview granted to an Administrative Tribunal
under s. 22 (3)(1) of the Administrative Tribunal Act. 1985 is similar to the
power given to a civil court under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908. Once a petition for leave to appeal under Article 136 of
the Constitution is filed against an order of an Administrative Tribunal, the F
party cannot go back to the Tribunal to apply for review, and the Tribunal
cannot exercise the power of review. The rejection of a special leave petition,
in effect, amounts to declining to entertain an appeal, thus making the
judgment and order appealed against final and binding. [1115-C-B)

State of Maharashtra & Anr. v. Prabhakar Bhikaji Ingle, (1993) 3 G
S.C.C. 463; Sree Narayana Dharmasanghom Trust v. Swami Prakasananda
& Ors., (1997) 6 S.C.C. 78; K. Ajit Babu & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.,
j
(1997) 6 S.C.C. 473 and Raj Kumar Sharma & Ors. etc. etc. v. Union of India
& Ors. etc. etc., [1995) 2 SCALE 23, relied on.

1.2. In the instant case, the petition for special leave to file appeal to H
1110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] 2 S.C.R.

A this Court against the judgment of the Tribunal in T.A. No. 1 of 1989 was
rejected. As a result, the order of the Tribunal in T.A. No. I of 1989 became
final and binding. Tribunal had no power to review that judgment thereafter.
The ground on which the review was sought before the Tribunal was a
ground taken in the special leave petition as well as in the review petition
B filed in this Court. In such a situation, it was wholly inappropriate for the
Tribunal to sit in judgment on the merits of this Court's order. The judgment
of the Tribunal in the review applications cannot be sustained.
[1115-H; 1116-A; 1115-G]
2. There is no doubt that as between the parties to the main judgment
of the Tribunal in T.A. No. I oft989, the judgment is final and binding. The
C respondents, namely, the State ofOrissa and the Union oflndia, are, therefore,
bound to give effect to the judgment. In such a case it is wholly impermissible
to a third party to file a review petition to get that same judgment reviewed
and obtain an order that the appellant is not entitled to the benefits of the
directions contained in the main judgment since that judgment is now set
D aside. It will lead to re-opening a matter which has attained finality by virtue
of an order of this Court. Therefore, the applicants in the review petition,
even if they are persons aggrieved, do not have a right of review under any
part of Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code. [1116-D-F[

3.1. Right to intervene by the "person aggrieved" must be exercised
E at the appropriate time and in accordance with law. A review petition must
be within the scope of Section 22(3)(1) of the Administrative Tribunals Act
read with Order 47 Rule I of the Code, and must comply with the Rules
framed under the Administrative Tribunals Act. The present review
applications are not within the principles laid down in Order 47 Rule l. They
also .do not comply with the relevant Rules. Rule 17 of the Central
F Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1~87 prescribes, inter alia, that
no application for review shall be entertained unless it is filed within thirty r··
days from the date of the receipt of a copy of the order sought to be reviewed.
In the present case the review petitions were filed one and a half years after
the main judgment was delivered and one year after the special leave petition
G was dismissed. There is no explanation for this delay. [1117-C-E[

3.2. The applicants in tile review applications cannot be included in the
category of "person aggrieved". Only the persons who arc directly and
immediately affected by the impugned order can be considered as 'parties
aggrieved' under Section 22(3)(1) of the Act read with Order 47 Rule 1 of
H the Code. When the present appellant had joined as party respondent all
G. BI SW AL v. K.C. MOHANTY [SUJATA V. MANOHAR, J.] 1111
those persons who had superseded him for selection to the Indian Police A
Service would be persons affected in case he succeeded in his application.
The two applicants in review application No. 16of1993 were nowhere within
the zone of consideration for promotion to l.P.S. Therefore, they could not
have been made parties in T.A. No. l of 1989. Similarly, the applicants in
Review Application No. 18of1993, being direct recruits to the Indian Police B
Service of 1975 and 1976 batches and not concerned with the appointments
made within the quota of promotees form the State Police Service, cannot be
considered as persons aggrieved.11117-F; 1118-A-CI

4. The Tribunal would examine O.A.s No. 276 to 278 of 1993 filed
before it on merit and dispose them of in accordance with law. In deciding C
these applications, the Tribunal cannot ignore its earlier judgment. If the
Tribunal decides to follow its earlier judgment the respondents in these
applications can file petitions for leave to appeal if they so desire; and any
other person aggrieved may also, with the leave of the court, apply for special
leave to file an appeal. In the event of the Tribunal coming to a conclusion
that its earlier judgment requires reconsideration, the Tribunal can refer D
~ the question to a larger Bench. In either case the persons aggrieved can
apply and intervene to put forward their point ofview.11118-H; 1119-A-BJ

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: CIVIL Appeal Nos. 3451-
3455 of 1996 Etc.
E
From the Judgment and Order dated 24.6.94 of the Central Administrative
Tribunal, Cuttack in R.A. Nos. 16 and 18/93 and O.A. Nos. 276 - 278 of 1993.

A.K. Panda for the Appellant in C.A. No. 3451-55/96.

Janaranjan Das, Debasis Mohanty and K.N. Tripathy for the Appellant F
in C.A. Nos. 3456-57/96.

Biyoy Anand, Gautam Acharya and A.P. Medh for the Appellant in C.A.
Nos. 3458-60/96.

Jayant Das, Raj Kumar Mehta, P.N. Misra, S. Misra and A. Mahapatra G
for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

MRS. SUJATA V. MANOHAR, J. The appellant in Civil Appeal Nos.
3451-3455 of 1995, Gopabandhu Biswal, was in military service prior to H
1112 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] 2 S.C.R.

A November 1972. After his release from military service, he applied for the post
of Assistant Commandant in the Orissa Military Police pursuant to an
advertisement published by the Orissa Public Service Commission inviting
applications from ex-military officers. He was selected and appointed as
Assistant Commandant in the Orissa Military Police pursuant to the
B advertisement. The appellant qualified in the departmental examinations and
was confirmed as Assistant Commandant with effect from 15.11.1975.
Thereafter, according to the appellant, though he was eligible for consideration
for promotion to the Indian Police Service cadre, he was not considered for
promotion to the Indian Police Service (l.P.S.) cadre. Because according to the
respondents, only Deputy Superintendents of Police in the Orissa Police force
C were eligible for promotion to the 1.P.S. cadre. The appellant filed a writ
petition in the Orissa High Court in 1982 praying for a writ of mandamus to
consider him for promotion to the 1.P.S. cadre. The Central Administrative
Tribunal, Cuttack Bench, to which his petition was transferred after coming
into force of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, held that the post of
Deputy Superintendent of Police and Assistant Commandant of the Orissa
D Military Police constituted a single cadre prior to 5th of November, 1980. His
application was, therefore, allowed by the Central Administrative Tribunal by
its judgment and order dated 24.12.1991. The Tribunal gave a direction that
his case should be considered for promotion with effect from 1.1.1997 in
respect of each year beginning therefrom till January 1980. After 4th of
E November, 1980, the appellant, if he is not promoted earlier, does not deserve
further consideration because the post of Assistant Commandant was
bifurcated into a separate cadre with effect from 5.11.1980.

In the appellant's said application before the Tribunal which was re-
numbered as T.A.No. 1 of 1989 the respondents were the Union of India, the
F State of Orissa and 25 L>ther respondents who had superseded the appellant
for promotion to the Indian Police Service.

The State of Orissa and two other respondents filed S.L.P (C) No. 7479
of 1992 for the purpose of challenging the decision of the Tribunal dated
24.12.1991 in the appellant's T.A.No. 1 of 1989. By its order dated 3.8.1992,
G the special leave petition was dismissed by this Court.
In July 1993, one and a half years after the Tribunal's decision of 24th
of December, 1991 in T.A. No. 1 of 1989, respondents 1 and 2, Krishna
Chandra Mohanty and Rajkishore Dash, who were in the Orissa State Police
Service filed an application before the Central Administrative Tribunal at
H Cuttack which was subsequently Converted in to a review petition and
~
G. BISWAL v. K.C. MOHANTY [SUJATA V. MANOHAR, J.) 1113
numbered as R.A.No. 16of1993. These two respondents contended that the A
decision of the Tribunal in T.A.No. l of 1989 to the effect that the cadres of
Deputy Superintendents of Police and Assistant Commandants in the State
Military Police constituted a single cadre in the Orissa police Service till
4.11.1980 was incorrect and that on a proper examination and interpretation
of all relevant documents and Governments Orders in this connection it
should be held that Deputy Superintendents of Police and Assistant
B
Commandants in Orissa Military Police never constituted a single cadre at any
time. They contended that the two cadres have always been separate and that
Assistant Commandants in the Orissa Military Police are not eligible for
promotion to Indian Police Service. A similar Review Application No. 18 of
1993 was filed by Manmohan Praharaj and Anup Kumar Patnaik who were c
direct recruits to the cadre of Indian Police Service. At around the same time,
O.A. Nos. 276, 277 and 278 of 1993 were filed by three applicants who were,
at the material time, Assistant Commandants in the Orissa Military Police
praying for granting them the benefit of the decision of the Tribunal in T.A.
No. 1/89 for the purpose of promotion to the Indian Police Service.
D
.., These review petitions as well as applications were considered together
by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Cuttack. The Tribunal by its impugned
judgment dated 24th of June, 1994, has reviewed its earlier judgment dated
24.12.1991 in T.A.No. 1/89 on the ground of there being error apparent on the
face of the record. The Tribunal has held that the two cadres of Deputy
Superintendent of Police and Assistant Commandant of Orissa Military Police
E
are separate cadres from inception and that Assistant Commandants are not
eligible for promotion to the Indian Police Service, The Tribunal has thereupon
dismissed the application of the appellant, Gopabandhu Biswal, in T.A.No.
1/89. It has also dismissed the three pending applications bearing 0.A. Nos.
276, 277 and 278 of 1993. The present appeals are filed from the impugned F
judgment of the Tribunal in the two review petitions as well as the three 0.As.
"<;

Was the Tribunal entitled to review its earlier judgment dated 24.12.1991
in T.A.No. 1/89? Section 22(3) of the Administrative tribunals Act, 1985
confers on an Administrative Tribunal discharging its functions under the
Act, the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil G
Procedure while trying a suit in respect, inter alia, of reviewing its decisions.
Section 22(3) (f) is as follows :
'
"Section 22(3) (f) :

A Tribunal shall have, for the purpose of discharging its functions H
1114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] 2 S.C.R.

A under this Act, the same powers as are vested in a civil court under
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ( 5 of 1908), while trying a suit, in
respect ofthe following matters, namely, -

(a) to (e) ........................ .

B (f) reviewing its decisions;

(g) to (i) ...................... .

A civil court's power to review its won decisions under the Code of
own Civil Procedure is contained in Order 47 Rule 1. Order 47 Rule 1 provides
C as follows :

"Order 47 Rule 1 :

Application for review of judgment-

(I) Any person considering himself aggrieved-
D (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from
which no appeal has been preferred,
(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or
(c) by a decision on a reference from a court of Small Causes,
E and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence
which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge
or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree as
passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent
on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires
F to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him ,
may apply a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree
or made the order. r

(2) ··························· "

G The power of.review which is granted to an Administrative Tribunal
is similar to power given to a civil court under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code
of Civil procedure. Therefore, any person (inter alia) who considers himself
aggrieved by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from
which no appeal has been preferred can apply for review under Order 47 Rule
1(1) (a) . An appeal lies to this Court from a decision of the Administrative
H Tribunal. If.an appeal is preferred, the power to review cannot be exercised.
G. Bl SW AL v. K.C. MOHANTY [SUJATA V. MANOHAR, .I.] 1115
In the present case, a special leave petition to file an appeal was preferred A
from the judgment of the Tribunal in T.A.No. 1 of 1989 to this Court, and the
special leave petition was rejected. As a result the order of the Tribunal in
T.A.No. I of 1989 became final and binding. The rejection of a petition for
leave to appeal under Article 136 of Constitution, in effect, amounts to
declining to entertain an appeal, thus making the judgment and order appealed B
against final and binding. Once a special leave petition is filed and rejected,
the party cannot go back to the Tribunal to apply for review. In the case of
State of Maharashtra & Anr. v. Prabhakar Bhikaji Ingle, (1993] 3 SCC 463
this Court held that when a special leave petition from the order of the
Tribunal was dismissed by a non-speaking o~der, the main order was confirmed
by the Supreme Court. Thereafter the power of review cannot be exercised by C
the tribunal. The Court said that the exercise of power of review by the
Tribunal in such circumstances would be "deleterious to judicial discipline''.
Once the Supreme Court has confirmed the order passed by the Tribunal. that
becomes final. In Sree Narayana Dharmasanghom Trust v. Swami
Prakasananda & Ors., [ 1997] 6 SCC 78, the above decision was reaffirmed.
This Court held that after an order of this Court dismissing the S.L.P. in limine D
from a judgment of the High Court, the High Court cannot review it. The Court
followed the earlier judgment in State of Maharashtra & Anr. v. Prabhakar
Bhikaji Ingle, (supra).

Jn the case of K. Ajit Babu & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., [1997] 6 E
S.C.C. 473 to which one of us was party, this Court examined Section 22(3)
(f) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 and held that an application for
review under that section attracts the principles contained in Order 4 7 Rule
1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore once an S.L.P is preferred and
dismissed, review is not permissible. The same view has been taken by this
Court in Raj Kumar Sharma & Ors. etc. etc. v. Union of India & Ors. etc. F
etc., (1995) 2 SCALE 23. The Court observed in that case that the Tribunal
was in error in entertaining a review petition and allowing it after the special
leave petition against its main judgment had been dismissed by this Court and
the review petition filed in this Court against the dismissal of the special leave
petition had also been dismissed. It was undisputed that the grounds on G
which the review was sought before the Tribunal was a ground taken in the
special leave petition as well as in the review petition filed in this Court. In
such a situation, to say the least, it was wholly inappropriate for the Tribunal
to sit in judgment on the merits of this Court's order dismissing the special
leave petition giving finality to the Tribunal's main order. In the present case,
therefore, on the dismissal of the special leave petition by this Court, the H
1116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998] 2 S.C.R.

A judgment of the Tribunal in T.A. No. 1 of 1989 became final and binding as
between the parties and the Tribunal had no power to review that Judgment
thereafter.

In the present case, however, it is urged that the four applicants who
filed the two review petitions before the Tribunal were not parties to the main
B petition. They were also not parties to the special leave petition filed before
this Court which was dismissed. However they are parties aggrieved and
hence are entitled to apply for a review of the main judgment of the Tribunal.
It is contended by them that the judgment of the Tribunal holding that the
two cadres of Deputy Superintendent of Police and Assistant Commandant
C were a single cadre till 5.11.1980, has affected the chances of promotion of
the applicants and, therefore, the appellants, being persons aggrieved, are
entitled to maintain such review petitions when they had not been parties to
the earlier judgment as well as the earlier special leave petition. We will
assume for the time being that the applicants are persons aggrieved. Even so,
the question is whether they can have a judgment which has attained finality
D by virtue of an order of this Court, set aside in review. There is no doubt that
as between the parties to the main judgment, the judgment is final and
binding. Th.e respondents, State of Orissa and Union of India, are, therefore,
bound to give effect to the judgment of the Tribunal in T.A.No. 1 of 1989 in
the case of Gopabandhu Biswal. If this is so, can a third party by filing a
E review petition get that same judgment reviewed and obtain an order that
Gopabandhu Biswal is not entitled to the benefits of the directions contained
in the main judgment since that judgment is now set aside? In our view this
is wholly impermissible. It will lead to re-opening a matter which has attained
finality by virtue of an order of this Court. The applicants, even if they are
persons aggrieved, do not have, in the present case, a right of review under
F any part of Order 4 7 Rule I. Even under Order 4 7 Rule 1(2), the party not
appealing from a decree or order can apply for review only on grounds other
than the grounds of appeal which were before the appellate court, and during
the pendency of the appeal. In the present case all the grounds which were
urged in review were, in fact, urged before the Tribunal at the time when the
r
-
G Tribunal decided the main application and they were also urged by the
petitioner in the special leave petition which was filed before this Court. The
special leave petition has been dismissed. The same grounds cannot be again
urged by way of a review petition by another party who was not a party in
the main petition. •

H According to the applicants certain documents though produced before
G. BISWAL v. K.C. MOHANTY [SUJATA V. MANOHAR, J.] 1117
the Tribunal were not noticed by the Tribunal in deciding the main matter. A
Even so, once a judgment of a Tribunal has attained finality, it cannot be
reopened after the special leave petition against that judgment has been
dismissed. The only remedy for a person who wants to challenge that judgment
is to file a separate application before the Tribunal in his owr. case an
persuade the Tribunal either to refer the question to a larger Bench or, if the B
Tribunal prefers to follow its earlier decision, to file an appeal from the
Tribunal's judgment and have the Tribunal's judgement set aside in appeal,
review is not an available remedy.

Undoubtedly when the Tribunal interprets Service Rules and
Regulations, the interpretation so given may affect other members of that C
Service - past, present or future. One can understand a wider meaning in this
context being given to the phase "person aggrieved", thus enlarging the right
of persons to intervene either at the hearing before the Tribunal, or in appeal,
or for filing a review petition. Nevertheless, this right must be exercised at the
appropriate time and in accordance with law. A review petition must be within
the scope of Section 22(3) (f) of the Administrative Tribunals Act read with D
Order 47 Rule 1 and must comply with the Rules framed under the
Administrative Tribunals Act. The present review applications are not within
the principles laid down in Order 47 Rule I. They also do not comply with
the relevant Rules. Rule 17 of the Central Administrative Tribunal (procedure)
Rules, 1987 prescribes, inter alia, that no application for review shall be E
entertained unless it is filed within thirty days from the date of the receipt of
a copy of the order sought to be reviewed. In the present case the review
petitions were filed one and a half years after the main judgment was delivered
and one year after the special leave petition was dismissed. We do not find
any explanation for this delay.
F
It is difficult to include the applicants in the review applications in the
category of "persons aggrieved". The main applicant i.e. the present appellant-
Biswal had joined as party respondents all those persons who had superseded
him for selection to the Indian Police Service since they would be persons
affected in case he succeeded in his application. The Tribunal had directed G
that Biswal be considered for promotion between 1977 and 1980 and not
thereafter. During this period, the two applicants in review application No. 16
of 1993 were nowhere within the zone of consideration for promotion to I.P.S.
One of the applicants joined the police service only in 1974 and was not
eligible for further promotion till 1982. The other applicant, though eligible for
promotion, was on account of his rank in the seniority list, not within the zone H
1118 SUPREME COURl REPORTS [ 1998] 2 S.C.R.

A of consideration at any time prior to 5.11.1980. As a matter of fact the two
applicants in review application No. 16 of 1993 were selected for promNion
to l.P.S. only in 1993 when they were included in the select list of 1993.
Therefore, they could not h~ve been made parties in T.A. No. 1 of 1989. At
that point of time, these applicants had only a chance of promotion in future.
This does not confer any !~gal right on these applicants and they cannot be
B considered as parties aggrieved by the impugned judgment. however, leniently
one may construe the term 'party aggrieved', a person not directly affected
cannot be so considered. Otherwise for years to come, every person who
becomes eligible for promotion will be considered a party aggrieved' when the
Tribunal interprets any Service Rule such as in the present case. Only persons
C who are directly and immediately affected by the impugned order can be
considered as 'parties aggrieved' under Section 22(3) (f) read with Order 47
Rule I.

The same is the case with the applicants in Review Application No. 18
of 1993. These two applicants in the Review Application No. 18 of 1993 were
D direct recruits to the Indian Police Service of 1975 and 1976 batches. The
quota for direct recruits is different and these applic~nts were not concerned
with the appointments made within the quota of promotes from the State
Police Service. Therefore, it is difficult to look upon them as persons aggrieved.
If at all they would be affected by the promotion given to the original
E ap,plicant-Biswal, that would be in respect of their chance for promotion to
the next higher post. This does not confer any legal right on these applicants.
They cannot, therefore, be considered as persons aggrieved. In our view the
Tribunal was not entitled to, and ought not to have entertained the review
applications once the special leave petition from the main judgment and order
had been dismissed.
F
The Tribunal also had before it, three other applications which were
r·
filed under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act 1985. The Tribunal
had dismissed these applications in view of having allowed the review petitions
and set aside its earlier order in T.A. No. 1 of 1988. In view of the fact that
G the Tribunal's judgment in review applications cannot be sustained, the
Tribunal will be required to examine these three applications filed before it on
merit and dispose them of in accordance with law.

In deciding these applications, the Tribunal cannot ignore its earlier
judgment. "The use of precedent is an indispensable foundation upon which
H to decide what is the law and its application the individual case; it provides
G. BISWAL v. K.C. MOHANTY [SUJATA V. MANOHAR, J.] 1119

at least some degree of certainty upon which individuals can rely in the A
conduct of their affairs, as well as provide a basis for orderly development
of legal rules". (Halsubry Fourth Edn. Vol. 26 para 573). If the Tribunal decides
to follow its earlier judgment the respondents in these applications can file
petitions for leave to appeal if they so desire; and any other person aggrieved
may also, with the leave of the Court, apply for special leave to file an appeal. B
In the event of the Tribunal coming to a conclusion that its earlier judgment
requires reconsideration, the Tribunal can refer the question to a larger Bench.
In either case the persons aggrieved can apply and intervene to put forward
their point of view.

We, therefore, allow these appeals, set aside the order of the Tribunal C
in review applications and remand the Original Applications Nos. 276, 277 and
278 of 1993 for fresh consideration by the Tribunal in accordance with law.
There will, however, be no order as to costs.

R.P. Appeals allowed.

~-