Holding

A lease of less than one year that contains a contractual clause permitting termination by two months' notice is valid, and the landlord is entitled to possession of the expressly leased portion; the High Court erred in finding a split tenancy and in requiring six months' notice.

Summary

The appellant, S. Bedi, leased a specifically described portion of his industrial property to the respondent, Chopra Electricals, for 11 months under a licence deed that excluded a second, green‑coloured portion which was scored off. The respondent later occupied that green portion and claimed it formed part of the tenancy. The appellant served a notice of termination under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, giving two months' notice as stipulated in the lease clause, and sued for possession of the red‑coloured portion and mesne profits. The trial court held the notice valid, the tenancy not to be treated as a year‑to‑year manufacturing lease, and the suit maintainable. The Delhi High Court reversed, finding a split tenancy and requiring six months' notice. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court, holding that the lease was for less than a year, contained a contractual term allowing termination by two months' notice, and therefore the notice was valid; the green portion was not part of the tenancy, and the appellant’s suit for possession of the described portion was proper.

Issues considered

Whether the notice of termination served under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, giving two months' notice, was valid despite the lease being for manufacturing purposes.
Whether a lease for manufacturing purposes is deemed a year‑to‑year lease requiring six months' notice in the absence of a contrary contract.
Whether the suit for possession of only a part of the tenanted premises is maintainable or amounts to an impermissible splitting of tenancy.
Whether the green‑coloured portion, scored off in the licence deed, formed part of the tenancy.
Whether the respondent's admission in the written statement amounts to an admission of the extent of the premises leased.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order 12 Rule 1, s. Order 6 Rule 1
Transfer of Property Act, 1882s. 105, s. 106

Subjects

lease terminationSection 106manufacturing leasenotice periodsplitting tenancypossession suitadmission in pleadingsrent controlcivil procedure

Judgment

A SRI INDER SA.IN BED! (DEAD) BY LRS.
V.

MIS. CHOPRA ELECTRICALS

AUGUST 27, 2004
B [ASHOK BHAN AND S.H. KAPADIA, JJ.]

Rent Control and Eviction:

Tenancy-Extent of-Determination-Lessor leased a portion of suit
C property to a tenant-Licence deed specifically mentioned extent of
accommodation so leased-But another portion of the suit property,
although mentioned in the licence deed, was scored off and initialed by
both parties-Lessor filed suit for ejecti'on of the tenant from the portion
leased out to him-Trial court decreed the suit-However, High Court held
D that the scored off portion was also part of the tenanted premises and, •\
therefore, suit for possession for only a portion of the property amounted ,.
to splitting up oftenancy, which was impermissible in law-Therefore, trial
court decree set aside-Correctness of-Held: Even assuming that the
scored off portion did exist at the time of commencement of the tenancy,
E the High Court erred in holding that the said portion was also leased out
but was not shown apprehending trouble from the Municipal Corporation-
High Court also erred in building up a new case for the tenant by holding
that the entire portion ofthe suit property was leased out which was against
the pleadings of the party-Hence, High Court erred in holding that there
was a splitting up of tenancy-High Court's judgment set aside.
F
Transfer of Property Act, 1882:

Section 106-Lease-Termination of-Notice-Requisite period of-
Suit property leased out for manufacturing pwposes-Lessor terminated
G lease by giving two months' notice in terms ofthe lease deed and filed suit
for ejection of the lessee-Trial court decreed the suit-But High Court
held that six months' notice was required as the property was leased out
for manufacturing purposes-Therefore, trial court decree was set aside-
Correctness of-Held: In view of the terms of the lease deed it was not
H necessary to give six months' notice to terminate the lease even though the
914 -
.•,
·~
'
1.S. BEDI v. CHOPRA ELECTRICALS 915

property was leased out for manufacturing purposes-Two months• notice A
as provided in the lease deed sufficient-Manufacturing lease which was
from year to year did not require six months' notice for termination-It
would fall in the second half of S. 106 requiring fifteen days' notice of
termination.
B
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908:

Order 6 Rule 1 and Order 12 Rule 1-Admission-Pleadings-
Averments in-Defendant, in his written statement, accepted as sufficiently
correct the plainti.ffs plea regarding the extent ofthe property leased out- C
Effect of-Held: Such acceptance amounted to an admission.

The appellant-plaintiff filed a suit for seeking a decree for
possession by ejectment of the respondent-defendant with respect to a
portion of the suit property. It was averred in the plaintiff that the suit
property was taken by the respondent as a licensee for a period of D
I I months at a certain monthly licence fee and that the respondent
continued to remain in possession even after the expiry of the period
of licence and that the appellant had accepted the respondent as his
tenant. It was· also alleged in the plaint that the respondent had made
unauthorized additions/alterations to the suit property. The appellant E
had served a notice on the respondent under Section I 06 of the
Tral)sfer of Property Act, 1882.

The respf!!ldent-defendant, in his written statement, pleaded that
the premises described as suit property in the plaint was substantially F
correct; that the so-called portion shown in the plaint as unauthorised
construction was, in fact, let out to the respondent from the very
commencement of the tenancy; that the portion shown in the plaint as
unauthorised construction, although scored-off, established that it was
in existence at the time of letting out the premises; that the said
portion was scored-off since the appellant did not want to mention G
the same as he was apprehensive of trouble from the Municipal
Corporation.

\ The validity of the notice terminating the tenancy as also the right
of the appellant to claim possessitm of the suit property was disputed H
916 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A by the respondent on two grounds: (1) that the tenancy between the
parties had been created for manufacturing purposes and the
same could be terminated in terms of Section 106 of the Act by giving
six months' notice which was not done; and (2) that the suit for
possession ofa part of the tenanted premises was not maintainable and
B relief of ejectment from a part of the tenanted premises could not be
granted.

The trial court decreed the suit and held that the tenancy had
been terminated validly by giving two months' notice in terms of the
C lease/licence document. Since the lease/licence document was not a
registered document and the tenancy was from month to month, the
trial court held that the same could be terminated by giving 15 days'
notice under Section 106 of the Act. Further, the trial court held that
the suit had been filed for the entire tenanted premises and not for a
D part of it as alleged by the respondent.

The High Court allowed the appeal and held that the appellant
had let out the entire premises including the portion shown as
unauthorisedly constructed and the appellant's claim for eviction of
the respondent from only a portion of the tenancy amounted to
E splitting up of the tenancy, which was not permissible in law. The High
Court further held that for the same reasons, the notice of termination
of tenancy was invalid.

On behalf of the appellant, it was contended that the unauthorisedly
F constructed property was not included in the licence deeds and did not
form part of the tenancy and the same was unauthorisedly occupied
by the respondent; that the respondent, in his written statement,
pleaded that the premises described in the plaint as having been let out
to the respondent was substantially correct, which amounted to an
G admission; that in view of the respondent's admission the High Court
erred in recording a finding to the effect that the appellant had let out
the entire property; that the High Court had built a new case for the
respondent which was not even pleaded by him in holding that on the
expiry of the period of licence the respondent was taken as ii tenant (
H of tt.e entire property of the· appellant which was in occupation of the
I.S. BEDI v. CHOPRA ELECTRICALS 917

respondent. A

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: I. In the plaint the appellant had made a specific averment
that the respondent had taken from the appellant a portion described B
in the plaint. In the written statement filed by the respondent it was
pleaded that the premises described in the plaint as having been let out
to the respondent was substantially correct. This reply amounts to
\
admission of the allegations made in the plaint. Apart from this, the
accommodation. which had been let outto the respondent was specifically C
mentioned in the rent notes executed between the parties. The
accommodation shown in these documents is the same as had been
mentioned in the plaint. The portion shown as unauthorised construction
in the said documents had been scored-off and had been initialled by
both the parties. The respondent's contention that the unauthorisedly
constructed property was a part of the tenanted premises but the D
appellant did not want this clause to be retained in the said documents
because of some apprehensions of trouble from the Municipal
Corporation cannot be accepted. In fact, by deleting this line from the
agreement, the intention of the landlord becomes clear that the portion
which had been scored-off was not intended to be let out and form a E
part of the tenanted premises. In view of the written documents it is
not permissible for the respondent to urge or prove or attempt to prove
what had actually been scored-off in the said documents was also
intended to be a part of the tenanted premises. [925-E-H; 926-A-Dj

F
2. Even if it is assumed, though it is not held to be so, that the
portion shown as unauthorised construction was in existence at the
time of commencement of tenancy, it does not lead to the inference that
this portion was leased out but was not shown as part of the leased
premises apprehending proceedings being taken out for demolition at
the behest of the Municipal Corporation. (926-E-FJ G

3. The finding recorded by the High Court that on the expiry of
the period of licence the respondent was taken as a tenant of the entire
portion of the property is against the pleadings of the parties. This is
altogether a new case which has been made out by the High Court. The H
918 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A High Court has erred in holding that the suit was filed only with respect
to a portion of the suit property whereas the tenancy had been created
for both the portion shown in the plaint as well the unauthorisedly
constructed property there was a splitting of tenancy which is not
permissible in law. [926-G-H; 927-A)
B
Mohar Singh v. Devi Charan, (1988) 3 SCC 63, held inapplicable.

4. According to Section, 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
the landlord and the tenant can mutually agree to create a tenancy for
C manufacturing purposes for a period less than a year. Only in the
absence of this kind of contract the lease for manufacturing purposes
would be deemed to be a lease from year to year. The same can be
created by a registered document in view of the provision of Section
105 of the Act. In the present case, admittedly the lease was created
for a period of 11 months only and it was provided that the tenancy
D could be terminated by either of the parties by giving two months'
notice. There was a contract to the contrary between the parties
providing for termination of the lease between the parties by giving a
notice of less than six months and as such it was not necessary for the
appellant to terminate the tenancy by giving six months' notice. In view
E of the terms of the contract between the parties the tenancy could be
terminated by giving two months' notice. In the present case, the lease
in question was not from year to year or for a period exceeding one
year. Since the lease was not from year to year there was no
requirement of giving six months' notice. Manufacturing lease which
F is not from year to year does not require six months' notice for
termination. It will fall in the second half of Section 106 requiring
fifteen days' notice of termination. [928-B-F)

ShriJanki Devi Bhagat Trustv. Ram SwarupJain, (1995) 5 SCC 314,
relied on.
G
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 6405 of
2002.

From the Judgment and Order dated 16.3.2000 of the Delhi High
H Court in R.F.A. No. 507 of 1993. .·
LS. BEDI v. CHOPRA ELECTRICALS [BHAN, J.] 919

D.A. Dave, T.N. Singh and V.K.Singh for the Appellant. A

Parag Tripathi, Ms. Priya Kumar, Saket Sikri and Ms. Neeru Vaid foY
the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B
BHAN, J. : Aggrieved against the judgment and decree dated
16.3.2000 passed by the High Court of Delhi, in Regular First Appeal No.
\ 507 of J993 whereby the High Court has allowed the appeal by setting
aside the judgment and decree passed by the District Judge (hereinafter
referred to as "the Trial Court") and dismissing the suit filed by the C
plaintiff/appellant (hereinafter referred to as "the appellant) has come up
in this appeal.

Briefly stated the facts are:
D
Appellant filed a suit seeking a decree for possession by ejectment
of the defendant/respondent (hereinafter referred to as "the respondent")
and for mesne profit/damages from the date of institution of the suit with
respect to a portion of property No. B-5911, Naraina Industrial Area, Phase·
II, New Delhi, (hereinafter referred to as "the suit property") as shown in E .
red colour in the site plan Ex. P.2. It was averred in the plaint that the
Respondent had taken from the appellant one hall, three offices-cum-store
room and toilets for workmen in the ground floor and two mezzanine halls
on the mezzanine floor of the suit property shown in the red colour in the
plan attached with the plaint. That the suit property had been taken by the F
respondent as a licencee in 1981 for a period of 11 months at a monthly
licencee fee of Rs. 4500 and that respondent continued to remain in
possession even after the expiry of the period of licence and claimed
himself to be tenant of the suit property at a rent of Rs. 4,500 per month
and that appellant accepted the respondent as his tenant. It was also alleged
in the plaint that respondent had made several unauthorised Jdditions/ G
alterations etc. which had been shown in the green colour in the plan
attached with the plaint, Appellant did not claim possession in respect of
unauthorised additions/alterations made by the respondent in the suit. [We
were informed during the course of the arguments by the learned counsel
for the parties that the appellant filed Suit No. 519 of 1994 for possession H
920 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2004] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A of the portion shown in the green colour in the plan attached with the
plaint.] That the appellant served a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer
of Property Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") dated 6.3.1989
terminating the tenancy of the tenanted premises w.e.f. 31.5.1989. It was
mentioned in the notice that if according to the respondent the tenancy
B ended on any other date other than the last date of English calendar month
then the respondent should treat its tenancy as terminated from the close
of such a month of tenancy on the expiry of two months of the service of
the notice. By the said notice, respondent was also notified that in case
respondent does not comply with the said notice, respo:ident would be
(
C liable to pay damages/mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 1,000 per day which
claim was without prejudice to the rights of the appellant to claim
possession. That the contents of the reply to the notice were false and
baseless. That the respondent did not vacate the suit property hence the
suit was filed for possession. Appellant also prayed for a preliminary
decree directing enquiry about the amount of damages/mesne profits
D payable by the respondent in accordance with order 20 Rule 12 of Code
of Civil Procedure.

Respondent in his written statement took preiiminary objection that
the plaint was liable to be rejected as the appellant has not given any
E valuation in the plaint regarding relief of mesne profit. Another preliminary
objection taken was that notice to quit served upon the respondent was bad
in law as the date from which the tenancy was alleged to have been
terminated had not been specified and that premises let out had not been
duly identified. On merits, the respondent pleaded that the respondent was
F a tenant in respect of the suit property vide agreement dated 26.5.1980
which though described as a licence deed was in fact a rent note. Rate
of rent of Rs. 4,500 per month was not denied. In reply to para 2 of the
plaint wherein the appellant had described the extent of accommodation
let out to the respondent, respondent pleaded that the premises described
in para 2 of the plaint was substantially correct. Respondent denied having
G made any unauthorised additions/alterations and pleaded that the portion
shown in green colour in the plan attached with the plaint alleged to have
been unauthorisedly constructed by the respondent had in fact been let out
as it is from the commencement of the tenancy in May 1980. It was stated
that the shed in the rear and the mezzanine portion shown in the green
H colour in the plan attached with the plaint were in existence at the time
I.S. BED! v. CHOPRA ELECTRICALS [BHAN, J.] 921

) .. of letting out of the premises as was clear from the rent agreement A
originally executed although the said portion had been scored off since the
appellant did not want to mention the same as he was apprehensive of the
trouble from the Municipal Corporation of Delhi. Liability to pay damages
at the rate of Rs. I 000 per day was also denied.
B
Appellant filed replication to the written statement filed by the
respondent denying the averment in the written statement and reiterated
the averment set out in the plaint.

On the pleadings of the parties the following issues were framed by C
the Trial Court:

"i) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for possession?
OPD

ii) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to claim damages/mesne D
profits for use and occupation of the disputed property from ·
the defendants? OPP.

iii) Whether the tenancy of the defendant is terminated validly?
OPP E
iv) Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form?
OPD

v) Whether the suit has not been properly valued for the F
purposes of court fee and jurisdiction? OPD

vi) Whether the suit is not maintainable in view of provisions
of Delhi Rent Control Act? OPD

vii) Whether the premises were not let out for manufacturing G
purposes? OPD

viii) Relief?"

Issue No. (vii) was amended vide order dated 21.3. I 991: H
922 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2004] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A "Whether the premises are let out for manufacturing purposes?
OPD"

Issue Nos. 2 and 5 were taken up together. It was held that the
tenancy of the respond.en! had been validity terminated and respondent
B having failed to vacate the tenanted premises after termination of the
tenancy, the appellant is entitled to claim mesne profits/damages from the
respondent for use and occupation of the suit property. Issue No. 4 was
decided in favour of the appellant and against the respondent and it was
held that the suit was maintainable. Issue No. 5 was not pressed by the
C respondent, and therefore the same was decided in favour of the appellant.
Issue No. 6 was decided in favour of the appellant and against the
respondent and it was held that since property had been let out at a rent
of more than Rs. 3,500 the provisions of Delhi Rent Control Act were
not applicable. The only avenues open to the appellant to seek ejectment
of the respondent was to file a suit for possession. Issue No. 7 was decided
D against the appellant and in favour of the respondent and it was held that
the suit property had been let out for manufacturing purposes. Issue
Nos. I and 3 which are the crucial issues were taken up together. Both
these issues were decided in Favour of the appellant and against the
respondent.
E
Validity of the notice terminating of the tenancy as also the right of
the appellant to claim possession of the suit property was disputed by the
respondent on two grounds: (I) that the tenancy between the parties had
been created for manufacturing purposes and the same could be terminated
F in terms of section 106 of the Act by giving six months notice which was
not done; and (2) that the suit for possession of a part of tenanted premises
was not maintainable and relief of ejectment from a part of tenanted
premises could not be granted. Both the contentions were negatived by
the trial Court and the suit was decreed. It was held that tenancy had been
terminated validly by giving two months notice in terms of clause 15 of
G the lease/licence document. Since the lease/licence document was not
registered document and the tenancy was from month to month the
same could be terminated by giving 15 days notice under Section I 06
of the Act. Further, the Trial Court held that the suit had been filed
for the entire tenanted premises and not for a part of it as alleged by
H the respondent.
LS. BED! v. CHOPRA ELECTRIC{\LS [BHAN, J.] 923
Aggrieved against the judgment and decree of the trial Court the A
respondent filed the first appeal which has been disposed of by the
impugned order. The findings recorded on issue Nos. 2, 4, 5 to 7 were
not contested by either of the parties and accordingly they were confirmed.
Findings on issues No. I and 3 were contested. The High Court reversed
the findings of the trial Court and accepted the appeal. It set aside the order B
of the trial Court and held that the appellant had let out the entire premises
including the portions shown in green in plan Ex.P.2. That the appellant
had claimed eviction of the respondent only from a portion of the tenanted
premises which amounted to splitting of the tenancy which was not
permissible in law. The unity and integrity of the tenancy could not be
splitted by the landlord by claiming possession of a part of the demised C
premises from the tenant. For the same reason notice of termination of
tenancy was also held to be invalid.

Ex. DI is the licence deed dated 26.5. I 980. According to the
appellant on the basis of this licence deed, the respondent was permitted D
to use portion shown in red as a licencee for a period of I I months. Ex.
P. 3 is another licence agreement dated 1.5.1981 also for the same portion
shown in red but for the subsequent period of 11 months. While describing
the portion permitted to be used by the respondent on licence basis in both
the documents, one line has been scored off. It is not disputed that the E
line, which has been scored off in both the documents relate to the green
portion in plan Exp. P.2. Ex. DI describes the licensed premises as under:

"AND whereas the licencee has approached the licensor for the
use ofa part of the building which include main hall on the ground F
floor, 3 offices cum store rooms, 2 mezzanine halls, toilets for
workmen shed in the back portion of the premises and part of
open premises excluding one room with attached W.C."

Similarly in the document Ex P3 the licensed portion of the premises has
been described as: G

"AND whereas the licencee has approached the licensor for the
use of a part of the building which include main hall on the ground
floor, 3 offices cum store rooms, 2 mezzanine halls, toilets for
workmen shed in the back portion of the premises and part of H
924 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2004] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A open premises excluding one room with attached W.C."

Underlined portion in both the documents has been scored off.

Shri D.A. Dave, learned senior counsel appearing for appellant
B contended that the contents of documents Ex. D 1 and P3 will govern the
rights of the parties. Portion shown in green was not included in the two
documents and did not form part of tenancy and the same is unauthorisedly
occupied by the respondent. The suit has been filed for the portion shown
in red in the site plan Ex. P2 which had been let out to the respondent.
C In para 2 of the plaint the appellant has specifically pleaded that the
respondent had taken on rent from him a portion comprising of hall, 3
office cum store rooms, two mezzanine halls and toilet on the ground floor
of the demised premises. In reply to this averment, respondent in his
written statement pleaded that the premises described in para 2 in the plaint
as having been let out to the respondent was substantially correct. This
D reply clearly amounts to admission of the allegations made in the
corresponding paragraph of the plaint. That in view of this admission made
by the respondent the High Court has gravely erred in recording a finding
to the effect that the appellant had let out the portion shown in green as
well to the respondent. That the High Court has built a new case for the
E respondent, which was not even pleaded by him, in holding that on the
expiry of period oflicence the respondent was taken as a tenant of the entire
property of the appellant which was in occupation of the respondent. It
was also contended that there was no registered instrument executed
creating tenancy therefore tenancy will be deemed to be from month to
F month terminable with 15 days notice and the High Court has erred in
holding to the contrary.

As against this, Shri Parag Tripathi, learned senior counsel appearing
for the respondent contended that the green portion was also in existence
during the year 1980-81. It was not made part of the licence agreement
G because of some apprehension on the part of the appellant about the
Municipal Corporation of Delhi taking action for demolition of the said
portion, which appeared not to have been constructed on the basis of any
sanction obtained from the said authority. He made reference to the
original documents Ex. P3 and Ex. D 1 in support of his submission that
H the portion delineated in green in the plan Ex. P2 was in existence and
I.S. BED! v. CHOPRA ELECTRICALS [BHAN, J.) 925
._ . formed part of tenancy. Suit was filed only with respect to the portion A
shown in red. The suit was filed with respect to a portion of the tenanted
prt'mises which is not permissible in Jaw. As the premises were let out
for manufacturing purposes and the respondent was carrying on
manufacturing activities therein the tenancy will be deemed to be for
manufacturing purposes terminable by giving six months' notice as B
provided in Section 106 of the Act. The tenancy was not terminated in
accordance with law.

I. The High Court came to the conclusion that the portion shown in
green was in existence at the time of the creation of the lease in favour C
of the respondent. Otherwise there was no reason why in documents DI
and Ex.P.3 the same would find mention. That the appellant did not
want the green portion to be made a part of the licence/lease
apprehending proceedings to be taken for demolition of the same at the
behest of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi. From this the High Court D
inferred that the portion shown in green was in existence in 1980-81. After
coming to this conclusion the High Court proceeded to record the following
finding:

"In view of this, it has to be inferred that on expiry of the period
oflicence the defendant was taken as a tenant of the entire portion E
of property of the plaintiff, which was in occupation of the
defendant."

In para· 2 of the plaint the appellant had made a specific averment that
the respondent had taken from the appellant a portion comprising of hall, F
3 office cum store rooms and toilet on the ground floor and two mezzanine
halls in the mezzanine floor. In para 2 of the written statement filed by
the respondent it was pleaded that the premises described in para 2 of the
plaint as having been let out to the respondent was substantially correct.
This reply amounts to admission of the allegations made in the corresponding G
paragraph in the plaint. Apart from this accommodation which had been
let out to the respondent was specifically mentioned in the rent notes
executed between the parties, i.e., Exs. DI and P3. The accommodation
shown in these documents is the same as had been mentioned in para 2
· of the plaint and shown in red colour in the site plan Ex. P2. The line "shed H
926 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2004] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
,l I

A in the back portion of the premises and part of open premises" in the said
two documents had been scored off and had been initialed by both the
parties. The submission of the learned counsel for the respondent that
portion shown in green colour in the site plan Ex. P2 was a part of the
tenanted premises but the appellant did not want this clause to be retained
B in these two documents because of some apprehensions of trouble from
the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, which found favour with the High
Court cannot be accepted. In fact, by deleting this line from the agreemenJ,
the intention of the landlord becomes clear that the portion which had been
scored off was not intended to be let out and form a part of the tenanted I

C premises. In so far as the accommodation shown in these two documents,
i.e. one hall, 3 office cum store rooms and toilet on the ground floor and
two mezzanine halls on the mezzanine floor, there is no dispute that the
, portion shown in red colour in the site plan Ex. P2 was this portion and
for which a decree of possession was being claimed in the present suit. In
D view of the written documents Ex. DI and P3 it is not permissible to the
respondent to urge or prove or attempt to prove what had actually been
scored off in the said agreements was also intended to be a part of the
tenanted premises.

The appellant had a<lmittedly filed the suit in respect of the premises
E as described in the two written documents between the parties. The portion
shown in the green having been scored off and initialed by both the parties
goes to show that portion shown in the green had not been let out by the
appellant to the respondent. Even if it is assumed for the sake of
argument, though we are not holding to be so, that the po'rtion shown
F in green in the site plan Ex. P2 was in existence in the year 1980-81
it does not lead to the inference that this portion was leased out but was
not shown as part of the leased premises apprehending proceedings being
taken out for demolition at the behest of the Municipal Corporation of
Delhi.
G
The finding recorded by the High Court that on the expiry of period
of licence the respondent was taken as a tenant of the entire* portion of
the property is against the pleadings of the parties. This is altogether a
new case which has been made out by the High Court. The High Court
H has misconstrued and misinterpreted the two deeds of licence/lease as well
J.S. BED! v. CHOPRA ELECTRICALS [BHAN, J.) 927
as the plaint in observing that the suit was filed only with respect to the A
portion shown in red colour in the plan whereas the tenancy had been
created for both the portion shown in red colour as well as green and thus
there was a splitting of tenancy which was not permissible in Jaw.

Law laid down by this Court in Mohar Singh v. Devi Charan & Ors., B
[1988] 3 SCC 63 on which reliance has been placed by the High Court
would not be applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case,
inasmuch as it is clearly evident from the documents, i.e., Ext. D 1 and Ext
P3, that in fact there is no splitting off the tenancy and suit was filed for
recovery of possession of the suit property already found indicated in the C
said document as well as in Plan Ext. P2 in the red colour.

Validity of the notice as also the right of the appellant to claim
possession of the tenanted premises was questioned by the respondent on
the ground that as tenancy between the parties had been created for D
manufacturing purposes the same could be terminated only after giving six
months' notice to quit as provided under Section 106 of the Act, which
was not done. The trial Court has negatived this submission by holding
that according to the provision of Section 106 of the Act a lease for
manufacturing purpose is deemed to be a lease on year to year basis but E
the same was subject to the contract to the contrary if any between the
landlord and the tenant. The landlord and the tenant can agree to create
a tenancy even for manufacturing purpose for a period of less than one
year. That in Clause 15 ·of the lease document it is specifically mentioned
that the tenancy could be terminated by either of the parties by giving
notice of two months. That the tenancy of the respondent had been validly F
tenninated by serving a notice in terms of Clause 15 of the lease document.
The High Court has not given any reason for reversing this finding and
holding that the termination of the tenancy was invalid.

We agree with the view taken by the Trial Court that the tenancy has G
been validly terminated. Clause (1) of Section 106 reads thus:

"106. Duration of certain leases in absence of written contract
or local usage. - ( 1) In the absence of a contract or local law
or usage to the contrary, a lease of ir.1movable prop.:rty for H
928 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A agricultural or manufacturing purposes shr.ll be deemed to be a
lease from year to year, terminable, on the part of either lessor
or lessee, by six months' notice; and a lease from month to month,
terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by fifteen days'
notice."
B
According to the provisions of Section I 06 of the Act a lease for
the manufacturing purpose is deemed to be a lease from year to year but
the same is subject to the contract to the contrary between the parties. The
landlord and the tenant can mutually agree to create a tenancy for .;
C manufacturing purpose for a period less than a year. Only in the absence
of this kind of contract the lease for manufacturing purposes would be
deemed to be a lease from year to year. The same can be created by a
registered document in view of the provision of Section 11)5 of the act. In
the present case, admittedly the lease was created for a period of 11 months
D only and it was provided in clause 15 that tenancy could be terminated by
either of the parties by giving two months' notice. Then: was a contract
to the contrary between the parties providing for termination of the lease
between the parties by giving a notice of less than six months and as such
it was not necessary for the appellant to terminate the tenancy by giving
E six months' notice. In view of the terms of the contract between the parties
the tenancy could be terminated by giving two months' notice. In the
present case, the lease in question was not from year to year or for a period
exceeding one year. Since the lease was not from year to year there was
no requirement of giving six months' notice. Manufacturing lease which
is not from year to year does not require six months' notice for termination.
F It will fall in the second half of Section I 06 requiring fifteen days' notice
of termination.

This Court had the occasion to examine this point in Shri Janki Devi
Bhagat Trust, Agra v. Ram Swarup Jain (dead) by Lrs., [1995] 5 SCC
G 314, and it was held thus:

"Section I 06 provides, inter alia, that in the absence of a contract
between the parties, a lease of immovable property for
manufacturing purposes shall be deemed to be a lease. from year
H to year terminable by six months' notice. In the present case there
I.S. BED! v. CHOPRA ELECTRICALS [BHAN, J.] 929

is a clear finding to the effect that the lease in question was not A
from year to year or for a period exceeding one year. Therefore,
even though. the lease may be for a manufacturing purpose, since
the lease was not from year to year, six months' notice was not
required. A manufacturing lease which is not from year to year
does not n.·quire six months' notice of termination. It will fall in B
the second half of Section I 06, requiring fifteen days' notice of
termination. A lease from month to month or a lease other than
a lease from year to year is terminable by fifteen days' notice.
Hence the notice in the present case is a valid notice to quit. The
High Court, having come to the conclusion that the lease was not C
for a period exceeding one year, and was not a lease from year
to year erred in holding that six months' notice to quit was
required. Such a notice is required, provided there is no contract
to the contrary, only when a manufacturing lease is, or is deemed
to be, from year to year. This not being the case, the lease is D
terminable by fifteen days' notice even if the lease is a
manufacturing lease."

We respectfully agree with the view taken by this Court in the above
quoted case. Since the lease was for a period of less than one year notice E
of six months to quit was not required to be given In the present case
there was a contract to the contrary between the parties providing that the
tenancy could be terminated by giving two months notice. The tenancy
had been validly terminated.

We are of the considered view that the High Court has erred in F
.holding that the appellant had split the tenancy and had asked for
possession of a portion of the tenanted premises. The High Court has also
erred in holding that the tenancy had not been validly terminated by serving
a notice in accordance with law.
G
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the High Court is set
aside and the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court is restored.
The suit filed by the plaintiff/appellant stands decreed and the appellant
., would be entitled to take possession of the demised premises. Appeal is
allowed with no order as to costs. H
930 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A Keeping in view that the respondent is carrying on manufacturing
activities in the demised premises his dispossession is stayed till 31.5.2005
provided he files an undertaking within a period of three weeks from today
to vacate the premises and hand over possession of the same to the
appellant on or before 31.5.2005. Further he is required to deposit arrears
B •)f rent, if any, and undertake to pay the rent in future as well.
v.s.s. Appeal allowed.