Holding

The High Court’s revisional powers under Section 50 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act are wider than those under Section 115 CPC, and the landlord failed to prove a reasonable bonafide requirement and the amount of rent arrears, so eviction could not be ordered.

Summary

The landlord, Sri Kempaiah, filed an eviction petition under the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961, claiming a reasonable and bonafide requirement for the premises and alleging arrears of rent. The trial court allowed eviction on the basis of bonafide requirement but rejected the landlord’s claim of arrears because he could not produce evidence of the rent rate. The Karnataka High Court, exercising its revisional power under Section 50 of the Act, set aside the trial court’s order, holding that the landlord had not shown a genuine need and had failed to establish the quantum of rent due. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the High Court could review the findings of fact and affirmed that its revisional powers are broader than those under Section 115 of the CPC. The Court held that the landlord did not satisfy the statutory requirement of “reasonable and bonafide requirement” and could not prove the amount of arrears, so eviction could not be ordered. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, leaving the High Court’s decision intact.

Issues considered

Whether the High Court has revisional jurisdiction under Section 50 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 that exceeds the powers conferred by Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.
Whether the landlord satisfied the requirement of a reasonable and bonafide personal requirement under Section 21(1)(h) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 for eviction.
Whether the landlord proved the quantum of rent arrears, including the rate of rent, necessary to invoke eviction under Section 29(4) of the Act.
Whether the Supreme Court can disturb the High Court’s findings of fact in a revision proceeding.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 115
Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961s. 21(1)(h), s. 29(4), s. 50

Subjects

rent controlevictionbonafide requirementrevisional jurisdictionKarnataka Rent Control ActSection 50Section 21Section 29civil procedurelandlord-tenant

Judgment

A SRI KEMPAlAH.
v.
LINGAIAH AND ORS.

OCTOBER 31, 2001 .~· •·
.[RP. SETHI AND S.N. PHUKAN, JJ.]

'.'. ~:·
Rent Control and Eviction :

Kamataka Rent ControlAct, .1961 :

C Sections 21 ( 1)(h) and 29(4 )___:Eviction petition-On ground Qf bonafid~ :·
requirement-No evidence led to prove the same-G~und of default in p~y-
ment of rent-Failure to show rate of rent7'"Held, the grounds of eviction not ·t
proved.

D Section.50-'--Revisional power of High Court-Held, are wider than the
powers conferred under ;ection 115 CPC-Civil Procedu1-e Code, 1908~
&~oolli ·
·-
Words and Phrases: 'Require'-Meaning of-In the cont~xt of Section
21( l)(h) o.f Kamataka Rent Control Act, 1961.
E
Appellant-landlord filed evictiOn petition on the grm~nd of bonafide .
requirement and on the ground of arrears of payment of rent. During
trial, the appellant himself did not appear as a witness and tried.to prove
the averments in the petition by production of PW 1, his son, as a witness.
F Rent controller allowed the petition on the ground of bonafide requirement
but with regard to default in, payment of rent, it observed that in the
absence of any material regarding rate of rent self-testimony of PW 1
cannot be accepted.

High Court allowed the revision petition holding that there was no
G
bonafide requirement and the case was not a case where partial eviction
could have been ordered; and that the appellant was not able to show as to
what actual amount each terient was liable to.pay when he issued notice.

In appeal, this Court directed the respondents to pay arrears of rent.
H Respondents.paid the r~ilt as per their own calculatfon•.
644
SRI KEMPAIAH v. LINGAIAH 645
The appellant contended that findings of fact arrived at by'the trial A·
court could not be disturbed by the Higli Court in exercise of its revisional
jurisdiction; and that the appellant landlord required the entire premises
.bonajide; and that since the respondents had failed to pay full arrears as
pel," direction of this Court, they may be evicted in terms of Section 29(4) of I
the Karnataka.Rent Control Act, 1961. B
. .
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
.. \

HELD : 1. Revisional powe~ of the High Court, undedhe Karnataka
Rent Control Act, 1961 are wider than the powers conferreCI upon it under
Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The High Court is not pre- C
eluded to appreciate the evidence for arriving at the conclusion regarding
the alleged reasonable bonafide requirement. There is no fault in the judg-
ment of the High Court in so far as the scope of its powers under Section 50
of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 is concerned. [647-E-Fl

. Bhoolchand & Anr: v. Kay Pee Cee Investments & Anr:, [1991} 1 SCC D
343, relied on.

2. It may have been a wish 01:" desire of the appellant to occupy the
leased premises but he failed to prove the reasonable bonafide requirement
as contemplated under Section 21(1)(h) of the Act. The word "require" E
used in clause (h) of sub-clause (1) of Section 21 of the Act implies some-
thing more than a mere wish or impulse or desire on the part of the
landlord. Although the element of need is present in both the cases, the real ·
distinction between "desire" and "require" lies in the insistence of the need•
. There is an element of ''must have" in the case of"require" which is not
present in the case of mere "desfre". The ground mentioned in clause (h) F
of sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Act emphasizes the genuineness of
the requirement of the landlord. The terms "reasonable and bonafide
requirement'' are complementary and supplementary to each other in the
context. (648-C-E}
G
Dattatraya Laxman KamMe v. Abdul RasulMoulali Kotkunde & Am:,
(1999) 4 sec 1, referred to.
..
3.1. The trial court, rightly held that.''in the absence of any material
regarding the.rate of rent, the selHestimony of PW 1 cannot be accepted".
[647-H} H
.;

646 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] ~P. 4 S.C.R.
A 3.2. The Memo of Calculations filed by the appellant himself s~ows
that the respondents had made the payment of the rent as per their own
calculations and even according to the appellant a meagre amount is stated
to have not been paid. Without determining the quantum of rent, particu-
larly when the appellant himself was not sure about the monthly rate of rent,
the direction of the court stands substantially complied with not requiring
B
the invoking of powers under Section 29(4) of the Act. [649~B-C]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 15029-15033
of 1996.

From the Judgment and Order dated 9.8.96 of the Kamataka High Court
c in H.R.R.P. Nos. 121, 122, 123, 124, 125 of 199~.

S.N. Bhat for the Appellant.
. (
E.C. Vidya Sagar for tl1e Respondents.

D The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

SETHI, J. The appellant-landlord prayed for eviction of the respond-
ents-tenants on the ground of his bonafide personal requirement within the
meaning of Section 21(1)(h) of the Ka1'nataka Rent Control Act (hereinafter
referred to as "the Act''): He submitted th_at he had a large family and was
E residing in a rented premises. ·He intended to convert the entire premises, in
the occupation of the respondents-tenants and some other tenants, into one
· po1tion by making suitable alterati.ons. It was further contended that the
respondents were in atTears of payment of ren(

The Trial Court allowed the petition holding that the appellant required
F
the premises for his bona.fide use and occupation but in revision filed by the
respondents-tenants, the order of the Trial Court was set aside vide the common
order impugned in tl1ese appeals. The appeUant submits that the High Court
was not justified in allowing the revision petitions and setting aside the order
passed by the Trial Court al1egedly without looking into the fact that the entire
G premises in question was to be made as one unit as per plan Exhibit P-8. It
is further con.tended that the High Court was not justified in holding that there
existed discrepancies in the statements of the witnesses produced by the appel-
lant or that he had no reasonable bonafide requirement of the pr~mises in
occupation of tl1e respondent-tenants. The conclusions arrived at by the High
H Court are te1med to he not based upon the evidence led in the case and the
SRI KEMPAIAH v. LINGAIAH [SETHI, J.] 647
rejection of his prayer for eviction is causing great hardship to him. It is further A
submitted that the findings of fact arrived at by the Trial Court could not be
disturbed by the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction.

Section 50 of the Act provides:

"SO.Revision (1) The High Court may, at any time call for and examine B
any order passed or proceeding taken by the Court of Small Causes or
the Court of Civil Judge under this Act or any order pas~ed by the
'• Controllerunder Sections 14, 15, 16 or 17 for the purpose of satisfying
itself as to the legality or correctness of such order or proceeding and
may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit.
c
(2) The District Judge may; at any time call for and examine any order
passed or proceeding taken by the Court of Munsiff referred to in sub-
clause (iii) or clause (d) of Section 3 for the purpose of satisfying
himself as to the legality or correctness of such order or proceeding and

..
·may pass such order in reference thereto as he thinks fit. The order D
of the District Judge shall be final.

(3) The costs of and incidental to all proceedings before the High Court
or the District Court shall be in the discretion of the High Court or the
District Judge, as the case may be."
E
It has been held in Bhoolchand & Anr. v. Kay Pee Cee Investments &
I
Anr., [1991] 1 SCC 343 that the revisional powers of the High Court, under
the Act, are wider than the powers conferred upon it under Section 115 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. The High Court is not precluded to appreciate the
evidence for arriving at the conclusion regarding the alleged reasonable bonafide
requirement. F

We do not find any fault in the judgment of the High Court in so far as
the scope of its powers under Section 50 of the Act is concerned.

Regarding non payment of rent, the High Court has found that the
landlord had not been able to show as to what actual quantmn of amount each G
teriant wa:s liable to pay when he issued the notice. Despite showing the total
amount allegedly payable by the tenants, the landlord failed to show the rate
of rent of the leased premises in occupation of each of the respondents-tenants.
The Trial Court, therefore, rightly held that "in the absence of any material
regarding the rate of rent, the self-testimony of PW 1 cannot be accepted". It H
648 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A may be ~oticed that the appellant himself did not appear as a witness in the case
a~d trie1 to ~ro~e the averments m~de in ~e petition by prod~ction of PWl,
· his son, !lS his. witness. The aforesaid finding of fact was not disturbed by the
High Cowt.

Regarding the reasonable bonafide requirement of the appellant, the .I
B High Court, on appreciation of evidence, found that he had no bonafide rea-
sonable requirement, the case was not a case in which partial eviction could
have been ordered and if the eviction is ordered, greater hardships would be
caused. to the tenants who were all proved.to be poor people.

Though it was pleaded that the appellant was under compulsion to vacate
c the premises under his occupation as his l~ndlord was insisting to vacate the
same, yet no evidence was led in that behalf. It may have been a wish or desir~, - '
of the appellant to occupy the leased premises but he failed to prove 'the
reasonable bonafide requirement as contemplated under Section 21 (I )(h) of the
Act. The word "require" used in clause (h) of sub-section (1) of Section 21
D of the Ac~ implies something more than a mere wish or impulse or desire on
the part of the landlord. Although the element of need is present in both the
cases, the real distinction between "desire" and "require" lies in the insistence
of the need~ There is an element of "must have" in the case of "require" which
is not present in the case of mere "desire". The ground mentioned in clause
(h) of Sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Act emphasizes to the genuineness
E
of the requirement of the landlord. The tenn, "reasonable and bonafide require-
ment" are complementaiy and supplementary to each other in the context.
Dealing with a similar provision under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging
House Rates Control Act, 1947, this Court in Dattatraya Laxnian Kamble v.
Abdul Rasul Moulali Kotkunde & Am:, [1999]. 4 SCC 1 held that when the
F Legislature employed the two terms together the message to be gathered is that
requirement must be really ·genuine from any reasonable standard. Where
eviction is sought on the aforesaid grolind, a duty is cast upon the court to
satisfy itself with the alleged requirement of the landlord. Even in a case where
the ti;nant does not contest oi dispute the claim of the landlord and the tenancy
G is governed by the Rent Control legislation, the cowt is obliged to look into
the claim iridependently and give a specific finding in that .regard. ~

··. Learned corinsel for the appellant tooku.s through the evidence prOduced
in the case and· we have also perused the order of the Trial Cowt as well as
the High Court, We find no ground to interfere with the findings arrived at
H by the High C()urt vide the order impugned in these appeals.
SRI KEMPAIAH v. LINGAIAH [SETHI, J.] 649
Learned cowisel for the appellant also drew our attention to the orders · A
passed by this Court in IA Nos.6 to 10 on 30th April, 2001 and prayed that
as the respondents have failed to comply with the directions, eviction against
them be directed in terms of Section 29(4) of the Act. The submission has no
substance in view of the Memo of Calculations filed by the appellant himself
which shows that the respondents had made the payment of the rent as per their
B
own calculations and even according to the appellant a meagre amowit is stated
to have not been paid. Without determining the quantum of rent, particularly
when the appellant himself was not sure about the monthly rate of rent, we are
satisfied that the court order dated 30th April, 2001 stands substantially com-
plied with not req'9cing the invoking of powers wider Section 29(4) of the Act.
c
There is no merit in these .appeals which are accordingly dismissed
without any order as to costs.

K.K.T. Appeals dismissed.

- f.