Holding

A counsel’s statement is not an admission of the party and cannot be treated as a compromise; hence, there was no material to support the Controller’s satisfaction, rendering the eviction order without jurisdiction.

Summary

The appellant, a registered charitable society, sought eviction of the tenant under Section 22(d) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, claiming a bona‑fide need for the premises. The tenant denied that the appellant was a public institution and that it required the premises. During trial the tenant’s counsel conceded both points, and the Additional Rent Controller treated this concession as an admission, granting eviction. The Supreme Court held that a statement made by a party’s counsel across the bar is not an admission under Section 18 of the Evidence Act, 1972, nor can it be treated as a compromise; consequently, there was no material to support the Controller’s satisfaction of jurisdiction under Section 22(d). The eviction order was therefore without jurisdiction and the appeal was dismissed with costs.

Issues considered

Whether a statement made by a party’s counsel across the bar constitutes an admission of the party under Evidence Act, 1972, s.18.
Whether such a statement can be treated as a compromise.
Whether the Additional Rent Controller can record satisfaction of jurisdiction under Section 22(d) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 without material evidence.
Whether the appellant qualifies as an "institution" within the meaning of Section 22(d).
Whether the eviction order is vitiated for lack of jurisdiction.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedures. 47
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958s. 22(d), s. 40
Indian Evidence Act, 1972s. 18

Subjects

evictionrent controlbona fide requirementpublic institutionadmissionevidencecompromisejurisdictionSection 22(d)Delhi Rent Control ActEvidence Act 1972

Judgment

SRI SWAMI KRISHNANAND GOVINDANAND A
v.
MIS. M.D. OSWAL HOSIERY (REGD.)

FEBRUARY 20, 2002

[SYED SHAH MOHAMMED QUADRI AND B
DORAISWAMY RAW, JJ.J

Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958

S.22(d)-land/ord claiming itself to be a public institution-Seeking C
eviction of tenant on ground of bona fide requirement-<::laim that institute
needed premises for furtherance of its activities-Tenant denying in written
statement the status of landlord as a public institution as also that it needed
pre'fises bona fide for furtherance of its activities-But Advocate appearing
for ~nant conceded before Additional Rent Controller, both the facts disputed D
by tenant in his written statement-Additional Rent Controller recorded the
statement of the Advocate and allowed eviction petition-Rejecting the
contention of landlord that statement made by counsel for tenant across the
llar is an admission and the Rent Controller recorded his satisfaction on the
hasis thereof, the Court-Held, whether the appellant is an institution within
the meaning of Section 22 of the Act and whether it required bonafide the E
premises for fartherance of its activities, are questions touching the jurisdiction
of the Additional Rent Controller-He can record his satisfaction only when
he holds on these questions in favour of the appellant-For so holding there
must be material on record to support his satisfaction otherwise the satisfaction
not based on any material or based on irrelevant material, would be vitiated F
and any order passed on such a satisfaction will be without jurisdiction--
There can be no doubt that admission of a party is a relevant material-But
on the facts of this case, the statement of the counsel of the tenant can not be
accepted as an admission so as to bind the tenant-Excluding that statement
from consideration there was no material before the Additional Rent Controller
to record his satisfaction within the meaning of Clause (d) ofSection 22 of the G
Act--Order ofeviction was thus without jurisdiction-The statement ofcounsel
for tenant can also not be treated as a compromise-Compromise like a contract
postulates consensus between two parties-A statement ofa counsel conceding
the grounds of eviction and seeking some time for the respondent to vacate the
premises, can not be termed a compromise-Evidence Act, 1972-S. 18- H
2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 2 S.C.R.

A Compromise.
Evidence Act, 1972

S. 18-Admission by party's counsel-Counsel for the tenant conceding
before the Court duri~g arguments the facts denied by tenant in written
B statement-Held, in the facts of the case, statement of the counsel of tenant
cannot be accepted as an admission so as to bind the tenant.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 5062 of
1997.

C. From the Judgment and Order dated 2.12.81 of the Delhi High Court
in S.A. No. 275 of 1980;

Jaspal Singh and Shiv Prakash Pandey for the Appellant.

Rishi for the Respondent.
D
The following Order of the Court was delivered :

This is an appeal from the judgment and order of the High Court of
Delhi allowing the respondent's Second Appeal Order No. 275 of 1980 on
December 2, 1981.
E
The appellant-landlord of the sui~ premises is a registered sociecy under
the Societies Registration Act. It filed application against the respondent-
tenant for his eviction from the suit premises under Clause ( d) of Section 22
of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (for short "the Act") on the ground that
the premises are required bonafide for furtherance of its activities. The
F respondent filed written statement -denying both that the appellant is an
institution within the meaning of that provision and that it required the premises
bonafide for furtherance of its activities. It appears that when the case was
posted for trial, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent conceded
the facts disputed by the respondent in his written statement before the Court.
G That statement of the advocate was recorded by the Addi. Rent Controller
thus : "The respondent's learned counsel has admitted the ground of eviction
and also the fact that appellant is a public charitable institution and for that
-
purpose it required the premises". On that basis the eviction application filed
by the appellant was allowed on 24th March, 1973. Within a week thereafter
the respondent filed a review petition which was dismissed. He then filed a
H writ petition challenging the valid icy of the said order of eviction but that was
SRI SW AMI KRISHNAN AND GOVINDANAND v. M.D. OS WAL HOSIERY 3
dismissed as withdrawn on July 22, I 974. Thereafter, the respondent filed an A
l appeal against the said order of eviction before the Rent Control Tribunal but
it \\'.as also dismissed on September 5, 1977. Be that as it may, when the
appellant filed a petition for execution of order of eviction, the respondent
raised objections both under Section 40 of the Act as well as under Section
47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. By separate orders both the objection
petitions were dismissed on April 5, I 980. That order was challenged by the B
respondent unsuccessfully before the Rent Control Tribunal. Dis-satisfied
with order of the Tribunal dated May 16, I 980, dismissing the appeal, the
respondent filed the aforementioned second appeal which was allowed on
-( December 2, 1981. It is against that order of the High Court that the present
appeal is filed by special leave. c
Mr. Jaspal Singh, learned senior counsel, appearing for the appellant,
has vehemently contended that statement made by the learned counsel of the
respondent across the Bar is indeed an admission of the party and, therefore,
the Addi. Rent Controller recorded his satisfaction on the basis of the
admission; the order of the Addi. Rent Controller cannot there by be treated D
~
as being without jurisdiction. We are afraid we cannot accede to the contention
...) of the learned counsel. Whether the appellant is an institution within the
meaning of Section 22 of the Act and whether it required bonafide the premises
for furtherance of its activities, are questions touching the jurisdiction of the
Addi. Rent Controller. He can record his satisfaction only when he holds on E
these questions in favour of the appellant. For so holding there must be
material on record to support his ~atisfaction otherwise the satisfaction not
. based on any material or based on irrelevant material, would be vitiated and
_, . any order passed on such a satisfaction will be without jurisdiction. There
can be no doubt that admission of a party is a relevant material. But can the
statement made by the learned counsel of a party across the Bar be treated F
as admission of the party ? Having regard to the requirements of Section 18
of the Evidence Act, on the facts of this case, in our view, the aforementioned
statement of the counsel of the respondent can not be accepted as an admission
so as to bind the respondent. Excluding that statement from consideration
there was thus no material before the Addi. Rent Controller to record his
G
satisfaction within the meaning of Clause ( d) of Section 22 of the Act. It
follows that the order of eviction was without jurisdiction.

The learned counsel next contended that the statement of the learned
counsel for the respondent should be treated as a compromise as the Court
gr~nted five years' time to the respondent for vacating .the suit premises. In H
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 2 S.C.R.

.A our view, this contention has to be rejected. The compromise like a contract
postulates consensus between two parties. A statement of a counsel conceding
the grounds of eviction and seeking some time for the respondent to vacate
the premises, can not be termed a compromise.

In view of the above discussion, we do not find any reason to interfere
B with the order under challenge. The appeal is dismissed with costs.

R.P. Appeal dismissed.