Holding

The will was duly executed; the propounder satisfied the statutory burden and no suspicious circumstances were established to invalidate it.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined an appeal by the daughters and a granddaughter of Padmayya Kambali challenging a will dated 28‑03‑1976 that bequeathed certain properties to the testator's two sons. The appellants argued that the will was not duly executed, citing the testator's advanced age, his death within 15 days of execution, the presence of a son in the house, and a four‑year delay in registration as suspicious circumstances. The respondents proved the will's execution through the testimony of the scribe, two attesting witnesses, and a handwriting expert, all of whom affirmed the testator’s sound mind and free will. The Court held that under Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 the onus to prove due execution lies on the propounder, and once the basic requirements of signature, testamentary capacity, and proper attestation are satisfied, the burden is discharged unless genuine suspicious circumstances are shown. The Court found no such circumstances, rejected the claim that the son’s presence indicated undue influence, and concluded that the delay in registration did not affect the will’s validity. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

The validity and due execution of the will dated 28‑03‑1976 under Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925
Whether the burden of proving due execution of a will lies on the propounder and if it was discharged
Whether the testator's age, death shortly after execution, and delay in registration constitute suspicious circumstances requiring explanation
Whether the presence of a son in the house at the time of execution proves his prominent participation or undue influence
Whether the non‑disclosure of the will in earlier proceedings casts doubt on its authenticity

Legislation cited

Subjects

Will executionBurden of proofIndian Succession ActSection 63Testamentary capacityAttestationSuspicious circumstancesPartition of propertyInheritance

Judgment

A SRIDEVI AND ORS.
V.

JAYARAJA SH ETTY AND ORS.

JANUARY 28, 2005

B [ASHOK BHAN AND A.K. MATHUR, JJ.]

Succession Act, 1925-Section 63-Will-Execution of-Onus to prove
due execution lies on propounder-Once propounder shows that the testator
C in sound disposing mind signed the Will of his own free will, onus to prove
undue influence, fraud, coercion shifts to the person alleging it-On facts,
testator executed the Will bequeathing certain properties in favour of
respondents-Appellants claiming share in the property on the ground that
Will was not duly executed-Trial court and High Court dismissing the claim
upholding the validity of Will-On appeal, held, in the absence of suspicious
D circumstances surrounding the execution of Will, and the statement ofattesting
witnesses and scribe as to sound disposing mind oftestator while signing Will,
respondents are discharged from burden -of proving the due execution of
Will-Presence of son in the house at the time of execution of Will itself does
not prove that he took prominent part in execution of Will-Delay in registration
of Will explained-Thus, Will duly executed.
E
One 'P' father of 4 sons and 3 daughters executed a Will bequeathing
certain movable and immovable properties to his sons 'D' and 'R'.
Appellant l and 2, daughters of P and appellant 3, granddaughter from
his third daughter filed suit claiming I/7th share each in the propertie~i
F as natural heirs. Respondent nos.l-7 in their written statement admitted
the contents of plaint. The suit was contested by the grandchildren
(children of his 3 sons) and 'D' son of P. In the plaint, there was no mention
about the Will as according to the appellants, it was not brought to their
notice prior to filing of written statement. Trial court dismissed the su'it
holding that Will executed by 'P' was genuine and valid and the
G bequeathed properties were not amenable to partition. High Court upheld
the order of trial court. Hence the present appeal.

Appellants contended that the Will propounded by the respondents
was not a duly executed Will; that burden to prove due execution of the

H 862
SRIDEYI v. J. SHETTY 863
Will was on the propounders of the Will which they have failed to A
discharge; that the Will was surrounded by suspicious circumstances as
the testator died within 15 days of the execution of the Will and that he
did not have the testamentary capacity to execute the Will; that respondent
No. 13 (son of P) had taken a prominent part in the execution of the Will
as he was present in the house at the time of the alleged execution of the
Will; that the respondents had failed to disclose the execution of the Will B
in any of the earlier proceedings before the revenue authorities and the
• forest authorities which were contested between the appellants and
Respondent Nos. 8-13 and that 'the Will was got registered after a lapse
of 4 years and did not see the light of the day till it was produced in the
present proceedings after a lapse of more than 6 years. C
Respondent Nos. 8-13, the grand children contended that the due
execution of the Will had been proved by the testimony of the scribe and
the two attesting witnesses coupled with the testimony of the hand-writing
expert, who have categorically stated that the Will had been executed in
their presence and the.testator signed the same while in sound disposing D
mind and in possession of full physical and mental faculties; that need to
register the Will after a lapse of 4 years arose as per the legal advice given
to them; that the Will had been disclosed to the respondents at the time
of final obeisance ceremony of the testator in I 976, and then in 1978 in
the proceedings before the forest authorities and that the Will was E
disclosed to the entire world at the time of its registration in 1980.

Dismissing the appeal, the court

HELD: 1.1. The mode of proving the Will does not differ from that
of proving any other document except as to special requirement of F
attestation prescribed in case of a Will by Section 63 of Indian Succession
> Act, 1925. The onus to prove the Will is on the propounder and in the
absence of suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the Will,
proof of testamentary capacity and proof of the signature of the testator,
as required by law, need be sufficient to discharge the onus. Where there
are suspicious circumstances, the onus would again be on the propounder G
to explain them to the satisfaction of the court before the Will can be
~-
accepted as genuine. Proof in either case cannot be mathematically precise
and certain and should be one of satisfaction of a prudent mind in such
matters. In case the person contesting the Will alleges undue influence,
fraud or coercion, the onus will be on him to prove the same. The H
864 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] 1 S.C.R.

A propounder of the Will has to show that the. Will was signed by the
testator; that he was at the relevant time in sound disposing mind; that
he understood the nature and effect of dispositions and had put the
signatures to the testament of his own free will and that he had signed it
in the presence of each other. Once these elements are established, the onuS>
B which rests on the propounder is discharged. (869-E-G; 870-D)

H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B.N. Thimmajamma and Ors., (1959) Supp.
1 SCR 426; Ramachandra Ramabux. v. Champabaiand Ors., (1964) 6 SCR
814; Surendra Pal and Ors. v. Dr. (Mrs.) Saraswati Arora and Anr., (1974)
2 SCC 600; Smt. Jaswant Kaur v. Smt. Amrit Kaur and Ors., (1977) 1 SCC
C 369 and Meenakshiammal (Dead) thr. LRs and Ors. v. Chandrasekaran and
Anr., (2005) 1 SCC 280, relied on.

1.2. The two attesting witnesses and the scribe have categorically
stated that testator 'P' was in sound state of health and possessed his full
physical and mental faculties. Except that P was 80 years of age and dlied
D within 15 days of the execution of the Will, nothing has been brought on
record to show that he was not in good health or possessed of his physical
or mental faculties. From the cross-examination of the scribe and the two
attesting witnesses, the appellants have failed to bring "ut anything which
could have put a doubt regarding his physical or mental incapacity to
execute the Will. The family properties had been partitioned in the year
E 1961. The shares which were given to sons D and R were in possession of
tenants and vested in the State Government whereas the properties which
had been given io the daughters were in the personal cultivation o1r the
family. The testator while executing the Will bequeathed the properties
which had fallen to his share in the partition and which he had inhe~rited
F from his brother which were in his personal cultivation in favour of his
two sons D and Rand gave the right to receive compensation to other heirs
of the properties which were under the tenants and had vested in the State
Government. It is not a case where the father had deprived his other
children totally from inheritance. Reasons for unequal distribution have
been given in the Will itself. This had been done by him to balance the
G equitable distribution of the properties in favour of all his children.
(871-A-B, C-E)

2. Mere presence of Jlespondent 13 in the house would not prove that
he had taken prominent part in the execution of the Will. Moreover, both
H the attesting witnesses have also stated that the daughters were also present
SRIDEVI v. J. SHETTY 865
in the house at the time of execution of the Will. The presence of the A
daughters in the house at the time of execution of the Will itself dispels
any doubt about the so-called role, which Respondent No. 13 had played
in the execution of the Will. (871-GI

3. The case of the respondents is that the Will was disclosed in the
year 1978 as well during the proceedings pending before the forest B
authorities. Respondent No. 13 had moved an application before the forest
authorities for permission to cut the trees standing on the land which had .
come to his share under the Will. It was contested by the appellants. A
settlement was arrived at wherein three daughters had stated that after
the death of their father, they did not have any objection for the grant of C
general certificate authorizing Respondent No. 13 to cut the trees. From
this it can be safely presumed that the statement that they did not have
any right in the land was made by them only after knowing the contents
of the Will. Both the attesting witnesses have stated that the daughters
were present at the time of the execution of the Will. This assertion of the
two attesting witnesses has not been controverted by either of the D
daughters by appearing in the witness box. From their presence in the
house at the time of the execution of the Will, it can reasonably be inferred
.I that they had knowledge about the execution of the Will. [872-E, F, G-Hl

4. At the time ofregistration of the Will in 1980, the scribe and the
two attesting witnesses had been produced before the Registrar. Their E
statements were recorded and only after satisfying himself, the Registrar
registered the Will. The statements of the scribe and the two attesting
witnesses before the Registrar are in harmony with the statements made
by them in the court. Since the daughters were .present at the time of
execution of the Will by the testator and the execution of the same was p
disclosed at the time of final obeisance ceremony of the testator and that
)
the Will had also been brought to the notice of the appellants in the year
1978 during the proceedings before the forest authorities, the registration
of the Will in the year 1980 by itself does not cast a doubt regarding the
execution of the Will in the year 1976. [873-8, DI
G
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 3749of1999.

~- From the Judgment and Order dated 9.1.98 of the Kamataka High
Court in R.F.A. No. 715 of 1988.

Sanjay Parikh, Naveen R. Nath, Mrs. Lalit Mohini Bhat, Ms.Anitha H
866 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] 1 S.C.R.

A Shenoy and Ms. Hetu Arora for the Appellant.
Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, S.N. Bhat, N.P.S. Panwar and D.P. Chaturvedi for
the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered :
B
Plaintiffs who are the appellants have filed this appeal assailing the
judgment and decree passed by the High Court of Karnataka in Regular First
Appeal No. 715 of 1988 to the extent it has gone against them. By the
impugned judgment, the High Court has affirmed the judgment and decn!e
passed by the Trial Court.
c
Facts :

One Padmayya Kambali was the owner of the disputed suit propertic:s.
He had four sons and three daughters. Appellant Nos. 1 & 2 are the daughtt:rs
and appellant No. 3 is the granddaughter through the third daughter who has
D died. Defendant-respondent Nos. 1 to 12 are the grandchildren of Padmayya
Kambali through his three sons and 13th Respondent is his 4th son. Padmayya
Kambali died on 13.4.1976. At the time of his death he left behind -vast
properties some of which he had inherited from his brother and includes
properties which vested in the State of Karnataka in respect of whi1ch
E compensation was paid. He executed a will dated 28.3.1976 (Exhibit D-1)
which was got registered on 11.9.1980

Appellants filed the suit being Original Suit No. 5 of 1981 for partition
and separate possession of 1/7th share for each of the appellants of the
properties described in the Schedules 'A', 'B', 'C' and 'D' attached to the
F plaint. Schedule properties 'A', 'B' and 'C' are immovable properties whereas
'D' schedule properties are movable properties. It was alleged in the plaint
that the suit properties are the Joint Hindu Family properties and the appellants
being the natural heirs are entitled to 1/7th share each in the suit properties.
It was also averred that respondents were enjoying the properties to the
exclusion of the appellants and were not willing to partition the properties or
G come to a reasonable or amicable settlement. Nothing has been stated about
the will in the plaint as according to them it had not been brought to their
notice prior to the filing of the written statement. Respondent Nos. 1-7 in
their written statement admitted the contents of the plaint. Respondent Nos.
8-12, wife and children of Darmaraja Kadamba (a pre-deceased son of the
H testator), and Respondent No. 13 - Raviraja Kadamba contested the suit.
SRIDEVI v. 1. SHETTY 867
~ According to them, there was a partition in the family under a Registered A
Partition Deed (Exhibit D-4) dated 4.1.1961. Under the said partition, the
female members were allotted major shares in the properties which were in
personal cultivation and enjoyment of the family whereas Dharmaraja
Kadamba (deceased) - husband & father of Respondent Nos. 8 to 12 and
Raviraja Kadamba - Respondent No. 13, were allotted properties which were
in possession of the tenants. After the coming into hire<' of the Karnataka B
Land Refonns (Amendment) Act, 1973, Act 1 of 974, all tenanted lands
vested in the Government and the two sons were left witi1 no properties. In
order to correct the injustice done to these two sons, Padmayya Kambali
bequeathed schedule properties 'A' and 'B' (which were not under the tenants)
in their favour and the daughters i.e. the appellants were given the right to c
receive compensation in lieu of the lands which were with the tenants and
had vested in the Government under the Land Refonns Act. It was averred
that Padmayya Kambali executed the will of his own while in sound disposing
mind. At the time of execution of the will, he was in possession of his
physical and mental faculties. It was averred that except the properties which
are the subject matter of this appeal and are shown in schedule 'A' and 'B' D
'

~ to the will, other properties were amenable to partition. Insofar as immovable
properties are concerned, they were divided amongst the heirs soonafter the
_,, death of Padmayya Kambali. It was also averred that the contents of the will
executed by the testator were disclosed at the time of final obeisance ceremony
of Padmayya Kambali in the year 1976. E
The Trial Court framed relevant issues. Appellants examined PWs. 1 to
4 and got marked Exhibits P-1 to P-15. The respondents examined 5 witnesses
which included Respondent No. 13 - himself, Scribe and two attesting
witnesses of the will, hand-writing expert and got marked documents Exhibits
D-1 to D-5. F
The Trial Court after considering the entire material and evidence on
)
record found that the will executed by Padmayya Kambali was genuine and
.. valid. It was held that the schedule properties Schedule 'A' and 'B' bequeathed
in favour of his two sons viz. Dhannaraja Kadamba and Raviraja Kadamba
under the will are not amenable to partition. Regarding the other properties G
the suit was decreed. There is no dispute regarding the properties in respect
of which the suit has been decreed.

Assailing the findings of the Trial Court that the will is genuine and
valid, the appellants filed First Appeal in the High Court. It was alleged in H
868 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005] I S.C.R.
,...
A the memo of appeal that the execution of the will has not been proved in
accordance with law and that there were suspicious circumstances surrounding
the will which the propounder of the will failed to dispel by leading cogent
and acceptable evidence.

The High Court after re-examining the entire evidence present on the
B record held that the scribe in his testimony had vividly stated that the will
was drafted on the dictation of the testator as per his desire. The two attesting
witnesses had stated that the will was read to the testator and the testator,
after understanding the contents thereof, signed the same. The testator signed .
the will in their presence and they had signed the will as attesting witnesses
in his presence. Hand-writing expert produced by Respondent Nos. 8-13
c corroborated the testimony of the scribe and the two attesting witnesses. He
compared the signatures of the testator on the will (at 6 places) with his
admitted signatures and in his opinion the signatures appending to the will
were that of the testator.

'D Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed aggrieved against which the
present appeal has been filed. ..
Counsel for the parties addressed arguments on Issue No. 4 only, which
~
is to the following effect :

E "Whether the Will dated 28.3.1976 executed by Late Padmaraja
Kamba/i set up by the defendants 8 to 13 is true and valid and
executed by late Padmaraja Kamba/i in sound and disposing state of
mind?"

Shri Sanjay Parikh, learned advocate appearing for the appellants
F strenuously contended that the will propounded by the respondents was not
a duly executed will. According to him, the burden to prove due execution
of the will was on the propounders of the will which they have failed to ;

discharge. That the will was surrounded by suspicious circumstances. The
burden to remove the suspicion on the due execution of the will was also on
the propounders which they have failed to discharge. According to him, the
G testator died within 15 days of the execution of the will and that he did not
have the testamentary capacity to execute the will. Respondent No. 13 had
taken a prominent part in the execution of the will as he was present in the
house at the time of the alleged execution of the will. That natural heirs had
been excluded from the properties bequeathed in favour of Dharmaraja
·-r -
H Kadamba and Raviraja Kadamba without any valid reasons. That the
SRIDEVI v. J. SHETTY 869
respondents had failed to disclose the execution of the will in any of the A
earlier proceedings before the revenue authorities and the forest authorities
which were contested between the appellants and Respondent Nos. 8-13 which
throws a grave and serious doubt about the due execution of the will. That
the will was got registered after a lapse of 4 years and did not see the light
of the day till it was produced in the present proceedings after a lapse of B
more than 6 years. That the burden to dispel the suspicious circumstance
enumerated above was on the propounders of the will which they had failed
to discharge by leading cogent and acceptable evidence. As against this, Dr.
Rajeev Dhavan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Respondent Nos.
8-13 contended that the due execution of the will had been proved by the
testimony of the scribe and the two attesting witnesses coupled with the C
testimony of the hand-writing expert. That the attesting witnesses have
categorically stated that the will had been executed in their presence and the
testator signed the same while in sound disposing mind and in possession of
full physical and mental faculties. The need to register the will after a lapse
of 4 years arose as per the legal advice given to them. That the will had been
disclosed to the respondents at the time of final obeisance ceremony of the D
deceased in the year 1976, and then in the year I 978 in the proceedings
before the forest authorities. That the will was disclosed to the entire world
at the time of its registration on 11.9.1980. According to him, there were no
suspicious circumstances attending the due execution of the will and even if
there were any such circumstances, the same had been dispelled by the E
respondents by leading cogent evidence.

It is well settled proposition of law that mode of proving the will does
not differ from that of proving any other document except as to the special
requirement of attestation prescribed in the case of a will by Section 63 of
the Indian Succession Act, 1925. The onus to prove the will is on the F
propounder and in the absence of suspicious circumstances surrounding the
execution of the will, proof of testamentary capacity and proof of the signature
of the testator, as required by law, need be sufficient to discharge the onus.
Where there are suspicious circumstances, the onus would again be on the
propounder to explain them to the satisfaction of the court before the will can
be accepted as genuine. Proof in either case cannot be mathematically precise G
and certain and should be one of satisfaction of a prudent mind in such
matters. In case the person contesting the will alleges undue influence, fraud
or coercion, the onus will be on him to prove the same. As to what are
suspicious circumstances have to be judged in the facts and circumstances of
each particular case. [For this see H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B.N. H
870 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005] 1 S.C.R.

A Thimmajamma and Ors., (1959] Supp. 1 SCR 426 and the subsequent
judgments Ramachandra Rambux v. Champabai and Ors., (1964] 6 SCR
814; Surendra Pal and Ors. v. Dr. (Mrs.) Saraswati Arora and Anr., (1974]
2 SCC 600; Smt. Jaswant Kaur v. Smt. Amrit Kaur and Ors., (1977] l SCC
369 and Meenakshiammal (Dead) thr. LRs. and Ors. v. Chandrasekaran and
B Anr., (2005] 1 sec 280.J
In the light of this settled position of the law, we have to examine as
to whether the will under consideration had been duly executed and the
propounders of the will had dispelled the suspicious circumstances surrounding •
the will.
c Although the Trial Court as well as the High Court recorded a finding
of fact that the will had been duly executed, but on the insistence of the
counsel for the parties we have gone through the evidence of the scribe, two
attesting witnesses and hand-writing expert at length.

D The propounder of the will has to show that the will was signed by the
testator; that he was at the relevant time in sound disposing state of mind;
that he understood the nature and effect of dispositions and had put his
signatures to the testament of his own free will and that he had signed it in
the presence of the two witnesses who attested in his presence and in the
presence of each other. Once these elements are established, the onus which
E rests on the propounder is discharged. DW-2, the scribe, in his testimony has
categorically stated that the will was scribed by him at the dictation of the
testator. The two attesting witnesses have deposed that the testator had signed
the will in their presence while in sound disposing state of mind after
understanding the nature and effect of dispositions made by him. That he
F signed the will in their presence and they had signed the will in his presence
and in the presence of each other. In cross-examination, the appellants failed
to elicit anything which could persuade us to disbelieve their testimony. It
has not been show that they were in any way interested in the propounders
of the will or that on their asking they could have deposed falsely in court.
Their testimony inspires confidence. The testimony of the Scribe (DW-2) and
G the two attesting witnesses (DWs. 3 and 4) is fully corroborated by the
statement of hand-writing expert (DW-5). The will runs into 6 pages. The
testator had signed each of the 6 pages. Hand-writing expert compared the
signatures of the testator with his admitted signatures. He has opined that the
signatures on the will are that of the testator. In our view, the will had been
H duly executed.
SR!DEYI v. J. SHETTY 871
Coming to the suspicious circumstances surrounding the will, it may be A
stated that although the testator was 80 years of age at the time of the
execution of the will and he died after 15 days of the execution of the will,
the two attesting witnesses and the scribe have categorically stated that the
testator was in sound state of health and possessed his full physical and
mental faculties. Except that the deceased is 80 years of ~ge and that he died
within 15 days of the execution of the will, nothing has been brought on B
record to show that the testator was not in good health Jr possessed of his
physical or mental faculties. From the cross-examination of the scribe and the
two attesting witnesses, the appellants have failed to bring out anything which
could have put a doubt regarding the physical or mental incapacity of the
testator to execute the will. Submission of the learned counsel for the appellants C
that the testator had deprived the other heirs of his property is not true. The
family properties had been partitioned in the year 1961. The shares which
were given to Dharrnaraja Kadamba and Raviraja Kadamba were in possession
of tenants and vested in the State Government after coming into force of
Karnataka Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1973 whereas the properties
which had been given to the daughters were in the personal cultivation of the D
family. The testator while executing the will bequeathed the properties which
had fallen to his share in the partition and which he had inherited from his
brother which were in his personal cultivation in favour of his two sons
Dharrnaraja Kadamba and Raviraja Kadamba and gave the right to receive
compensation to other heirs of the properties which were under the tenants E
and had vested in the State Government. It is not a case where the father had
deprived his other children totally from inheritance. Reasons for unequal
distribution have been given in the will itself. This had been done by him to
balance the equitable distribution of the properties in favour of all his children.

Counsel for the appellants argued that Respondent No. 13 had taken F
prominent part in the execution of the will as he was present in the house at
the time of the alleged execution of the will. We do not find any merit in this
submission. Apart from establishing his presence in the house, no other part
is attributed to Respondent No. 13 regarding the execution of the will. Mere
presence in the house would not prove that he had taken prominent part in
the execution of the will. Moreover, both the attesting witnesses have also G
stated that the daughters were also present in the house at the time of execution
of the will. The attesting witnesses were not questioned regarding the presence
of the daughters at the time of the execution of the will in the cross-
examination. The presence of the daughters in the house at the time of
execution of the will itself dispels any doubt about the so-called role which H
872 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005) l S.C.R.

A Respondent No. 13 had played in the execution of the will. They have not
even stepped into the witness box to say as to what sort of rote was played
by Respondent No. 13 in the execution of the will.

Another suspicious circumstance which was highlighted at great length
B by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the Respondent Nos. 8-13 had
failed to disclose the will for a period of 4 years in any of the earlier
proceedings before the revenue authorities and the forest authorities. That the
will was got registered after a lapse of 4 years and did not see the light of
the day till the initiation of proceedings in the present suit. We do not find
any substance in this submission as well. Respondent No. 13 in his testimony
C has stated that the contents of the will were disclosed in the year 1976 at the
time of final obeisance ceremony of the testator. There is not much of cross-
examination of this witness on this point. None of the appellants have stepped
in the witness box. Sukirthi Hegde (PW-1), husband of Appellant No. 3 i.e.
grand-daughter of the testator, denies knowledge about the disclosure of the
contents of the will at the time of final obeisance ceremony of the testator.
D He has not even stated in his testimony as to whether he was married to
Appellant No. 3 at the time of the death of the testator or that he was present
at the time of final obeisance ceremony of the testator. There is nothing on
the record which could persuade us to disbelieve the testimony of Raviraja
Kadamba (OW-1). The case of the respondents is that the will was disclosed
E in the year 1978 as well during the proceedings pending before the forest
authorities. Respondent No. 13 had moved an application before the forest
authorities for permission to cut the trees standing on the land which had
come to his share under the will. It was contested by the appellants. A
settlement was arrived at and the three daughters viz. Padmaraja Kadamba,
Sridevi and Muttu@ Dejamma (out of whom two are the appellants and 3rd
F died and is now represented through her daughter) in a joint statement filed
before the authorities, categorically stated that "we do not have any right
over the said Janel'. It was also stated that after the death of their father, they
did not have any objection for the grant of general certificate authorizing
Respondent No. 13 to cut the trees in Survey No. 189. In view of this
G statement, it does not lie in the mouth of the appellants to contend that they
had any right over the property. From this it can be safely presumed that the
statement that they did not have any right in the land was made by them only
after knowing the contents of the will. Both the attesting witnesses have
stated that the daughters were present at the time of the execution of the will.
This assertion of the two attesting witnesses has not been controverted by
H either of the daughters by appearing in the witness box. From their presence
SRIDEVI v. J. SHETTY 873
in the house at the time of the execution of the will, it can reasonably be A
inferred that they had knowledge about the execution of the will. Under these
circumstances, it cannot be held that the execution of the will had not been
brought to the notice of the appellants.

At the time of registration of the will on 1'1.9.1980, the scribe and the
two attesting witnesses had been produced before the Registrar. Their B
statements were recorded and only after satisfying himself, the Registrar
registered the will. The statements of the scribe and the two attesting witnesses
before the Registrar are in harmony with the statements made by them in the
court. Another circumstances which was stressed during the course of the
arguments by the counsel for the appellants was that although it was not C
necessary to get the will registered, but still the respondents got it registered
after a period of 4 years only to lend authenticity to the will. According. to
Respondent No. 13, the will was got registered on the advice of a lawyer to
enable them to produce it before various authorities. Since we have come to
the conclusion that the daughters were present at the time of execution of the
will by the testator and the execution of the same was disclosed at the time D
of final obeisance ceremony of the testator and that the will had also been
brought to the notice of the appellants in the year 1978 during the proceedings
before the forest authorities, the registration of the will in the year 1980 by
itself does not cast a doubt regarding the execution of the will in the year
1976.
E
For the reasons stated above, we do not find any merit in this appeal
and the same is dismissed with no order as to costs.

D.G. Appeal dismissed.