Holding

A sales manager who sells adulterated food is directly liable under s.7(1) read with s.16(1)(a) irrespective of any nomination under s.17(2), and other officers may be prosecuted if consent, connivance or neglect is established.

Summary

The State of Delhi filed a complaint under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 alleging that groundnut oil sold by Ahmed Oomer Bhoy's Delhi branch was adulterated. The complaint named the manufacturers, distributors, retailer, the person nominated under s.17(2) as responsible, and the two sales managers of the Delhi branch, I.K. Nangia and Y.P. Bhasin. The Metropolitan Magistrate dismissed the complaint against the sales managers, holding they were only involved in sale and not manufacture. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that anyone who actually sells an adulterated article is directly liable under s.7(1) read with s.16(1)(a), and that the nomination under s.17(2) does not shield other officers unless consent, connivance or neglect is proved. The Court interpreted the amended s.17 to impose liability on all persons in charge of the business of a branch when no specific nomination is made, and affirmed that the Explanation to s.17(2) imposes a duty to nominate for each establishment. Consequently, the magistrate’s order was set aside and summons were directed against the sales managers.

Issues considered

Whether a sales manager of a company’s branch can be prosecuted under s.7(1) read with s.16(1)(a) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act when the company has nominated another person as responsible under s.17(2).
Whether, after the amendment by Act 34 of 1976, other officers of a company not nominated under s.17(2) can be prosecuted only if the offence is shown to be committed with their consent, connivance or attributable neglect.
Interpretation of the scope and mandatory nature of the Explanation to s.17(2) regarding nomination for different establishments or branches.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 204
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954s. 16(1)(a), s. 17(1)(a)(i), s. 17(1)(a)(ii), s. 17(2), s. 17(4), s. 7(1)

Subjects

Food adulterationCorporate criminal liabilitySection 17 nominationSales manager liabilityVicarious liabilityStatutory interpretationCriminal procedure

Judgment

1016

STATE (DELHI ADMINISTRATION)
v.
I. K. NANGIA AND ANR.
•• •
October 23, 1979

B [S. MVRTAZA FAZAL ALI AND A. P. SEN, JJ.]

Process, issue of-Test for issue of process-Criminal Procedure Code, 197~,
Section. 204 Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, Section 17(2), scope
of-In a case where the manufacturer of an article of food is a company, which
has no1ninated a person under sub·section (2) of section 17 of the Act, as the
person responsible, whellier sales 1nanager of· one of its branches can be' pid·
c secured for a11 offence punishable under section !6(1)(a) read with section 7(1~ "'
of the Act, when the article of food sold at the branch is found to be adulterate«
within the meaninR of section 2(ia) of the Act.
Pre11ention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, section 17(2)-JVhether, afta-
the int1·oduction of the new section 17 by Act No. 34 of 1976, when an offenR
is comniitted by. a company, which has nominated a person responsible under
D Seciiov 17(2), it i's not permissible to prosecute any other officer of the CO'f1!.~
panv not ,being nominated under sub-section (2), unless there i's allegation that
th; off~11ce had been committed with the consent or connivance of or was attTi-
bntablf1 to any neglect on the part of such officer.
On August 31, 1976, the Food Inspector lifted a sample of 'Pootman' bran4
:: ref\ned ground nut oil from M/s. Amar Provision & General Storei!, whiclt
E wa' sold/supplied to it by' M/s. Gainda Mull Hem Raj on August 20, 197~
aod tho same was found, as per the Public Analyst's report dated Septetllber
9, 1976, to be adulterated due to the presence of Castoroil (not an edible oil).
This adulterated article of food was supplied/sold to Gainda Mull Hemraj by
Mis. Ahmad Comer Bhoy through its sales managers at Delhi, J. K. Ningia
and Y. P. Bhasin.
•
• On June 23, 1977, the Delhi Administration filed a complaint under sectio11
7(1) read with Section 16(1)(a) and Section 17 against (i) M/s. Ahmei
Oomer Bhoy Ahmed Mills, Bombay manufacturers of well known brand
Postman groundnut oil (ii) their distributors M/s. Gainda Mull Hemraj, New
Delhi, a partnership firm, and its managing Partner Meller Chand Jain (iii)
M/s. Amar Provision and General Stores, Netajinagar Market, New Delhi and
its owner Amrik Lal, the retailer (iv) Y. A. Khan, Manager, Quality Control,
Ahmed Mills appointed by the manufacturers as the person respOnsihle under
section 17 (2) of the Act, and (v) The two sales managers, Delhi Branch of
Mis. Ahmed Comer Bhoy, manufacturers, I. K. Nangia and Y. P. Bhasin.
f
The MetrOjloiitan Magistrate, Delhi by his order dated April l, 1978 found
that there \Vas a prima facie case against all except the two sales managers
and issued process accordingly. He dismissed the complaint against the res~
pondents on the ground "that they were not concerned with the manufacturer
H of the article in question, but had only effected the sale thereof". The Delhi
Administration 1n0Yed the High Court in revision against dismissa1, but it de-
clined to interfere.
STATE v. I. K. NANGIA (Sen, !.) 1017

Allowing the appeal by special leave the Court, A
HELD : 1. At the initial stage, if there is strong ~uspicion whieh leads the
Court to think that there is a ground for presuming that the accused had
.. comnlitted an offence, then it is not open to the Court to say that there was
no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. [1020 C-D]
In the instant case, the allegations in the complaint constitut~ a prima facie~
oase against the res~ndents of having committed an offence under section 7(1) B
read witi1 section 16(l)(a) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.
The words "were in charge· of" and "responsible to it for the conduct of its
business" are wide enough to include all the business activities of M/s. Ahmed
Oomer Bhoy at Delhi who have· their office at De1hi ai.Ld the hvo respondents
.are the sales Managers. [1020 E, G-H, 1021 A]

State of Bi/iar v. Ramesh Singh, [1978] 1 SCR 257; applied. c
2. The person actually effecting the sale of an adulterated article of food is
·directly liable under section 7 (i) of the Act. The manufacturers M/s. Ahmed
Oomer Bhoy, Bombay became liable because they were directly selling the
adulterated article through their branch office at Delhi. The respondents I. K.
Nangia and Y. P. Bbasip. also became liable because of the wordSI ''by any
person on his behalf'' in S~ction 7 which includes their agents and servants~ D
In view of this, the learned Metropolitan Magistrate should not have dismissed
1be complaint against the respondents. [1021 C.E]

3. On the plain meaning of the new section 17, introduced by Act 34 of
1976, when an offence has been committed by a company, where tbere is no
nomination under s. 17(2), every person \vho at the time the offence was com-.
mitted '\\:as in charge of and \vas responsible to the company for the conduct E
of the' business, is deemed to be guilty of the offence and is liable to be pro-
ceeded against and punished. Notwithstanding the nomination of a person
under s. 17(2), any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the com-
pany [not being a person nominated under sub-s. (2)] can also be vicarioiisly
made liabJe if it is proverl that the offence has been committed ",vith the con-
sent or connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of such
person". (1023 B·DJ I!'
4. To construe section 17(2) of the Act to mean that the only person liable
to be proceeded is the named /nominated person under section 17 (2) would
i,. render the &planation to Section '17(2) wholly illusory. [1023 E-F]

-j 5. Where there is a large business organisation, "':ith a widespread network
of sales organisation throughout the country, it ought to nominate different per- G
•ons for different places or face the <eonsequenyes set forth ins. 17(1)(a)(ii).
"The Explanation appended to s. 17(2) does, in terms, contemplate that where
a company has different establishments or branches or different units in any
-establishment or branch, it may nominate different persons in relation to diffe-
rent establishments or branches or units and the person so nominated in relation:
10 any establishment or branch or unit shall be· deemed to be the person
r~sponsible in respect of such establishment or branch or unit. The language of
the Explanation shows a purpose and, therefore, a construction· consistent with
:tltat purpa<e must reasonably be placed upori, it. [1024 F-H, 1025 Al
1018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 1 S.CAt.

A The Explanation to s. 17(2), although in terms permissive impqses a duty
upon such a company to nominate a person in relation to diffelfent establish-
ments or branches or units. There can be no doubt that this implies the perform-
ance of a public duty, as otherwise, the scheme underlying the section would be
unworkable. [1024 A-DJ
•
The Explanation lays down the mode in which the requirements of '· 17(2)
B should be complied with. Normally, the word 'may implies what is optional,
but for the re<k)ons stated, it should in the context in which it appears, mea~.
~must'. There is an element of compulsion. It is a power coupled with a duty.
Though the company is not a body or authority, there is no reason why the

c
same principle shonid not apply. It is thUs wrong to suggest that the Explana-
tion is only ari enabling provision, \Vhen its breach entails in the consequences-
indicated above. It is nof left to one's choice, but the Jaw makes it imperative.
.
Admittedly, M/s. l\nand Oomer Bhoy had not at the material time nominated'
any person, in relation to their Delhi branch. The matter is, therefore, sqililrely
conversed bys. 17(1)(a)(ii). [1024D-E, H, 1025 A]
,
Julias v. ford Bishop of Oxford, [1875-85] A.C. 214; quoted with approval.

6. The individual liability of the sales manager is distinct and separate f~
D the corporate liability of the manufacturer. In case of a 'company p('Osecution•;
the company alongwith its agent, that is, the person nominated under s. 17(2)
as \.Vell as the sales manager can both be prosecuted under s. 7(i) read with
s. 16 (I) (a). Notwithstanding the nomination of a person responsible under
s. 17(2), there can also be prosecution of any director, manager, secretary, or
other officer of the company under s. 17(4). But in such a case it is necessary
for the prosecution to prove that the offence has been committed 'with the
E consent or connivance of, or is attributable to,. any neglect on the part of such
peri;on'. [1025 B-Dl

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 243
of 1979.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Jndgment and Order
E
dated 13-9-1978 of the Delhi High Court in Criminal Revision No.
271/78.
U. R. Laliz, R. Bana, M. N. Shroff and Miss A. Subhashini for the
Appellant.
G K. L. Arora, R. S. Sodhi and H. C. Gulati for Respondent No. 1.
V. B. Ga11atra, I. N. Shroff and H. S. Parihar for Respondent
'No. 3.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SEN J.-In this appeal, by special leave, from the judgment of the·
H Delhi High Court, two questions arise which are one of very general
importance. The first is, in a case where the manufacturer of an arti-
cle of food is a company, which has nominated a person under sub-s.
STATE V, I. K. NANGIA (Sen, J.) 1019

-(2) of s. 17 of th~ Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, as the
. person responsible, whether the sales manager at one of its branches
· can be prosecuted for an offence punishable under s.16 (1) (a) read
with s.7 (i) of the Act, when the article of food sold at the branch is
found to be adultera_ted within the meaning of s.2 (ia) of the Act. The

- ,i1
(
second is, whether after the introduction of the new s.17 by Act 34 of
1976, when an offence is committed by a company, which has nomi-
nated a person responsible under s.17 (2), it is not permissible !o pro-
•·
secute any other officer of the company not being nominated under sub-
s. (2), unless there is allegation th_at the offence had been committed
'with the coru;ent or connivance of, or was attributable to, any neglect
-0n the part al such officer. c·
Upon the first question the facts lie within the smallest possible
compass. On June 23, 1977 the Delhi Administration filed a com-
plaint under s.7 (i) read with s.16 (1) (a) and s.17 against (1) M/s.
Alnned Oomar Bhoy, Ahmed Mills, Bombay, manufacturers of the
well-known 'postman' brand or refined groundnut oil, (2) their distri-
butors M/s. Gainda Mull Hem Raj, New Delhi, a partnership firm, and
its managing Partner Mehar Chand Jain, (3) M/s. Amar Provision &
General Store, Netaji Nagar Market, New Delhi and its owner Amrik
Lal, the retailer, ( 4) Y. A. Khan, Manager Quality Contr,ol, Ahmed
Mills appointed by the manufacturers as the person responsible under
s. 17 (2) of the Act, and (5) the two Sales Managers, Delhi Branch E.
of M/s. Ahmed Oomer Bhoy, manufacturers, I. K.. Nangia and Y. P.
.
\. ,.......J.,
Bhasin.
It was alleged that on August 31, 19.76, S. D. Sharma, Food
Inspector, New Delhi Municipal Committee lifted a sample of 'Post-
man' brand refined groundnut oil from ~/s. Amar Provision & General F·
Store, which was sold/supplied to it by M/s. Gainda Mull Hem Raj
.L
on August 20, 1976, and the same by the Public Analyst by his report
dated September 9, 1976 was found to be adulterated due to the pre-
sence of 'castor oil' (Not an edible oil). It was further alleged that
tl1is adulterated article of food was supplied/sold to M/s. Gainda Mull
Hem Raj by M/s. Ahmed Oomer Bhoy on August 20, 1976 through
its Sales Managers at Delhi, I. K. Nangia and Y. P. Bhasin.
The Metropalitan Magistrate, Delhi by his order dated April 1,
1978 found that there was a prima facie case against M/s. Ahmed
Comer Bhoy, the manufacturers of the 'Postman' brand refined ground-
nut oil, their distributors at Delhi M/s. Gainda Mull Hem Raj and Hi
M/s. Amar Provision Store, the retailer, as well as against Y. A. Khan,
the Quality Contra! Manager, Ahmed Mills, but declined to issue any

I
1020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 1 S.C.R,
\
.~
..A process against thei respondents I. K. Nangia and Y. P. Bhasin, &ie
two Sales Managers of M/s. Ahmed Oomer Bhoy at Delhi observiqg
that though they had effected the sale of the adulterated article of food •
'they were not concerned with the manufacture of the article in question
but had only effected the sale thereof. He accordingly, dismissed the
complaint against them holding that their prosecution was miscon-
ceived.
The Delhi Administration moved the High Court in revision but it
declined to interfere.

There can be no doubt that the order made by the learned M~tro-
' ·· ~ politan Magistrate refusing to issue any process against the respon,.
dents is wholly unwarranted. It cannot be said that there is no mate-
rial for. presuming that these respondents had not committed an offence
and, therefore, it was not open to the learned Metropolitan Magistrate
·to come to the conclusion that there was no basis for proceeding against
·them. The test as laid down by this Court in the State of Bihar '\'.
,D Ramesh Singh(') is that at the initial stage, if there is a strong suspicion
which leads the Court to think that there is a ground for presuming that
the accused has committed an offence, then it is not open to the Court
to say that there was no sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused. ·
in the instant c_ase, the allegations in the complaint constitute a
prima.jacie case against the respondents of having committed an offence
under s.7 (i) read with s.16 (1) (a) of the Act. In the complaint, L
the material allegations are as follows:
"6. That the adulterated article of food was supplied/
... sold to M/s. Gainda Mull Hem Raj on 20-8-76 by M/s .
Ahmed Oomer Bhoy through its sales managers at Delhi
I. K. Nangia and Y. P. B]jasin.
7. That accused Y. A. Khan is the Quality Control
Manager of accused No. S and accused I. K. Nangia and
Y. P. Bhasin are the Sales Managers (Local Branch) of
accused No. S and were incharge of and responsible to it for
the conduct of its business at the time of commission of
offences by accused No. S."
The words "were incharge of' and "responsible to it for the con-
duct of its busiriess" are wide enough to include all the business acti- .'II
vities of M/s. Ahmed Comer Bhoy at Delhi. It is a common !JTOund
tliat they have a Delhi Office at 2-A/3., Asaf Ali Road, New Delhi, amj

(1) (1978] l S.C.R. 257.
STATE v. I. K, NANGIA (Sen, J.) 1021

that the two respondents I. K. Nangia and Y. P. Bhasin are the Sales
Managers.
)
The complaint makes a specific allegation that the respondents were
incharge of and were responsible to their employers for the conduct of
their business at Delhi. S. D. Sharma, Food Inspector, PW 1 has
stated during the enquiry under s. 202 of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure that the adulterated article of food in question was sold by them
• to the distributors M/s. Gainda Mull Hem Raj vide bill No. 62 dated
August 20, 1976. Further, he goes on to say, that they were incharge
of and responsible to M/s. Ahmed Oomer Bhoy for the conduct of
their business in Delhi at that time.
Now, the person actually effecting the sale of an adulterated articfei
of food is directly liable under s.7 (i) of the Act, which reads:
"7. No person shall himself or by any person on bis
behalf manufacture for sale, or store, sell or distribute.
(i) any adulterated food;"
The manufacturers,, M/t. Ahmed Oomer Bhoy, Bombay became
liable because they wete diLectly selling the adulterated article through
their branch office at Deihl. The respondents I. K. Nangia and Y. P.
Bhasin also became liable because of the words "by any person on bis
behalf" which includ~ their agents and servants. That appears to be
the true construction of the section. In view of this, the learned
Metropolitan Magistrate could not have dismissed the complaint against
the respondents.
It appears that M/s. Ahmed Oomer Bhoy, Bombay had appointed
the accused Y. A. Khan, Manager Quality Control, Ahmed Mills to be
the person responsible for the company under s.17 (2) on July 31,
1916. It is argued on the strength of s. 17 (1) (a) (i) that the reil-
pondents could not, therefore, be prosecuted for the offence committed
by M/s. Ahmed Oomer Bhoy. This contention, in our opinion, needs
only to be stated to be rejected. Not only doeS it involve attributing
to the Legislature something which was never intended, but it conflicts
with the ordinary canons of constructions.
The question turns upon a proper construction of the hew s. 17,
introduced by Act 34 of 1976, which iu so far as material reads : -
"17. (i) Where an offence under this Act has been com-
mitted by a company-
H'
( a) (i) the person, if any, who has been nominated under
sub-section (2) to be in charge of, and responsible to, the
1022 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 1 S.C.L

company for the conduct of the business of the company
(hereafter in this section referred to as the person reopon-
sib!e), or
(ii) where no person has been so nominated, every per-
son who at the time the offence was committed was incharg~
of and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of the •
business of the company; and

(b) the company,
shall be deemed to be guilty of .the offence and shall be liable
to be proceeded against and punished accordingly :

Provided tl13t nothing contained in this sub-section shall
render any sucli person liable to any punishment provided in
.. '

this Act if he proves that the offence was committed without
his knowledge. and. that he exercised all due diligence to pre-
vent the commission of such' offence.
,
(2) Any company may, by order in writing, authorise
any of its directors or managers {Such manager being em-
ployed mainly in a managerial or supervisory capacity) to
exercise all such powers and take all such steps as may be
necessary or expedient to prevent the commission by the
company of any offence under this Act and may give notice
to the Local (Health) Authority, in such form and in such
manner as may be prescribed, that it has nominated such
director or manager as the person responsible, along with the
written consent of such director or manager for being so
nominated.

Explanatio11.-Where a company has different establish-
ments, or branches or different units in any establishment or
branch, different persons may be nominated nnder this sub-
section in relation to different establishments or branches or
units and the person nominateid in relation to any establish-
·G ment, branch or unit shall be deemed to be the person res-
ponsible in respect of such establishment, branch or unit.

(3) x x x x x
J
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing
R sub-sections, where an offence under this Act has been com-
mitted by a company and it is proved that the offence has
been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is
STATE V. I. K. NANGIA (Sen, J.) 1023

attributable to, any neglect on the part of, any director, A'
manager, secretary or other officer of the company, [not
being a person nominated under sub-section (2)] such direc-
tor, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed
to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded
against and punished accordingly."

On the plain meaning of the section, when an offence has been
•
commitled by a compaiiy, where there is no nomination under s. 17 (2),
-every person who at the time the offence was committed was in
charge of and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the
business, is deemed tobe guilty of the offence and is liable to be pro- c
ceeded against and punished. Notwithstanding the nomination .of
a person under s.17 (2), any i:lirector, manager, secretary or other
officer of the company [not being a person. nominated under sub-s. (2)]
can also be vicariously made liable if it is proved that the offence has
'been committed "with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable
·to any neglect on the part of such person'. D

It is, however, strenuously urged that the company !1avin!1'nominat-
·ed the accused Y. A. Khan, Quality Control Manager, Ahmed Mills to
be the person responsible under s.17 (2), he is the only person liable
to be proceeded against throughout the country and the prosecution of
ihe respondents is wholly misconceived. Our attention has been E
drawn to the nomination form, and it says that h<i shall be responsible
for the company. We are afraid, there is no substance in this con-
iention. There is nothing in the document to show that the nomination
is effective not only for the registered office of the company at Bombay
but also for all its branches in diffe<ent States. Such a construction
I'
would, in our opinion, render tl1e Explanation to s. 17 (2) wholly
illusory.

Where there is a large business organization with a widespread
network of sales organi5ations throughout the country, ·it. ought to
nominate different persons for different places or face the consequences
G
set forth in s.17 (1) (a) (ii). The Explanation appended to s.17 (2)
does, in tem1s, contemplate that where a company has different estab-
lishments or branches or different units in any establishment or branch,
it may nominate different persons in relation to different establisliments
or branches or units and the person so· nominated in relation to any
establishment or branch or unit shall be deemed to be the person res- H
ponsible in respect of such cstablisl1ment or branch or unit. The
la.guage of the Explanation shows a purpose a®, therefore, a cons-
1024 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 1 S.c.Jt,

A traction consistent with that purpose must reasonably be placed upon·
it .

We are clear that the Explanation to s. 17(2), although in terms.
permissive, imposes a duty upon such a; company to nominate a person
in relation to different establishments or branches or units. There can
B' be no doubt that this implies the performance of a public duty, as
otherwise, the scheme underlying the section would be unworkable.
The case, in our opinion, comes with in the dictum of Lord Cairiis in·
Julius v. Lord Bishop of Oxford(') :

"There may be something in tbe nature of the thing em-
c powered to be done, something in the objec\ for which it is
to be done, something in the conditions unC!er which it is
to be pone, something in the title of .the persons for whose
benefit the power is to be exercised, which may couple the
power with a duty, and make it the duty of the person in• I
whom the power is reposed· to exercise that power when
D
called upon to do so."

The Explanation lays down the mode in which the r.equirements of
s. 17 (2) should be complied with. Normally, the word 'may' implies
what is optional, but for thd reasons stated, it should in the context in
E which it appears, mean 'must'. There is an element of compulsion.
It is power coupled with a duty. In Maxwell on Interpretation of
Statutes, 11th Edn. at p. 231, the principle is stated thus:

"Statutes which authorise persons to do acts For the
be1Tefit of others, or, as it is sometimes said, for the public
good or the advancement of justice, have ofteni given rise to
controversy when conferring the authority in terms simply
enabling and not mandatory. In enacting that they "may"
or "shall, if ihey think fit", or, "shall have power", or that
"it shall be laWful" for them to do such acts, a statute appears
to use the language of mere permission, but it has been so
G often decided as to have become an axiom that in such cases
sncb expressions may have-to say the least-a compulsory
force, and so could seem to be modified by judicial exposi-
tion." (Emphasis supplietf).

Though the company is not a body or authority, there is no reason·
-· B why the same principle should not apply. It is thus wrong to suggest

tl) (1875-85] A.C. 214 ..
STATE v. I. K. NANGii\ (Sen, J.) 1025

that the Explanation is only an enabling provision, when its breach
entails in the consequences indicated above: It is not left to one's
choice, but the law makes it imperative. Admittedly, M/s. Ahmed
Oomer Bhoy had not at the material tim~ nominated any person, in
relation to their Delhi branch. The matter is, therefore, squarely
covered bys. 17 (1) (a) (ii).
On the two questions formulated, the answer is scU-evident. The
••
individual liability of the sales manager is distinct and separate from
the corporate liability of the manufacturer. In case of a 'company
prosecution', the company along with its agent, that is, the' person
nominated under s.l 7 (2) as well as the sales manager can both be
prosecuted under s.7 (i) read with 's.16 (1) (a). Notwithstanding c
the nomination of a person responsible under s. 17(2), there can also
be prosecution of any director, manager, secretary or other officer of
the company under s. 17 ( 4). But in such a case it is necessary for
the prosecution to prove that the offence has been committed 'with
the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to, any neglect on the
part of such person'. 0

The result, therefore, is that the order of the Metropolitan Magis-
trate is set aside and he is directed to issue summons to the respondents
and proceed with the trial according to law.

E
V. D. K. Appeal allowed.

11-743 SCl/79