Holding

The acquisition was not mala fide; it was a bona‑fide exercise of the State’s eminent‑domain power to serve a genuine public purpose of education.

Summary

The State of Andhra Pradesh was occupying a century‑old school building owned by GoverdhAnlal Pitti under a tenancy. The landlord obtained an eviction order from the High Court, which also directed the State to vacate the premises. While the eviction was pending, the State initiated acquisition proceedings under Sections 4(1) and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The landlord challenged the acquisition as being malicious in law, alleging that the State acted solely to frustrate the court’s eviction order. The Supreme Court held that the State’s acquisition was a bona‑fide exercise of its eminent‑domain power to meet a genuine public purpose of providing education, and that the timing of the acquisition did not render it mala fide. Consequently, the High Court’s order quashing the acquisition was set aside and the appeal was allowed.

Issues considered

The acquisition of the school building was mala fide or malicious in law.
Whether the State’s right of eminent domain survives despite an undertaking to vacate under rent‑control eviction proceedings.
Whether the eviction order and High Court direction constitute a valid ground for initiating acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act.
Whether the public purpose of education justifies acquisition of a dilapidated building that does not meet current school‑building norms.
Whether the acquisition proceedings were initiated in good faith or to frustrate the court’s order.

Legislation cited

Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 17(4), s. 4(1), s. 6

Subjects

land acquisitioneminent domainmalice in lawpublic purposeevictionrent controlstatutory powerbona fidedilapidated buildingeducation

Judgment

A ST ATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND ORS.
v.
GOVERDHANLAL PITTI

MARCH 11, 2003

B [DORAISWAMY RAJU AND D.M. DHARMADHIKARI, JJ.)

Land Acquisition Act, 1894; Sections 4(1) and 6:

C Sch.ool building in dilapidated condition-~viction of State as tenant
therefrom-During pendency of appeal, High Court allowed the Writ Petition
of the landlord directing State Government to evict and hand over possession
of School building to landlord-State initiating acquisition proceedings-
challenge to-Writ Petition allowed by the Single Judge and affirmed by the
Division Bench of the High Court holding acquisition proceedings to be
D malacious in law-On appeal, Held: when eviction order as we/las direction
to hand over possession of the School pr2mises to its owner was passed by
the High Court, State was having no other alternative except to initiate
acquisition proceedings in public interest to serve educational needs of
children-Hence, State acted reasonably by just exercise of its statutory
power, can not be condemned for ma la fide exercise of it.
E
Words and Phrases:

"Malacious in fact", "malacious in law" and "right of eminent
domain "-Meaning in the context of acquisition proceedings -Discussed.

F A school was run by the State in a building owned by the respondent-
landlord, who filed an eviction petition on ground of dilapidated condition of
the building. Later, Additional Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court granted
eviction of the State from the School building. During pendency of the appeal,
writ petition of the landlord seeking early eviction of the State was allowed by
G the High Court directing the State to vacate and hand over possession of the
premises within a specified time period. In the meanwhile, State initiated
acquisition proceedings for acquisition of School building under the provisions
of Land Acquisition Act. Writ Petition filed by the landlord challenging the
acquisition proceedings was allowed by the Single Judge of the High Court
and affirmed by the Division Bench holding the acquisition proceedings to be
H 908
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESHv. GOVERDHANLAL Pim 909
malacious in law. Hence the present appeal. A
It was contended for the State that acquisition of the .building was
necessary to cater to the educational needs of the children; and that right of
eminent domain of the State to acquire school building for urgent purpose
was not lost merely on the ground that it could not successfully oppose the
eviction proceedings under the Rent Control and Eviction Act. B
On behalf of the landlord, it was submitted that State by initiating
acquisition proceedings to acquire school building, after it had undertaken
before the High Court to deliver possession of the premises, lacked bonafide
and attempted to frustrate the decision of the Court; and that the School C
building did not conform to the norms fixed by the Government itself.
Therefore, it could not be permitted to acquire ~uch building for the purpose
of running a school.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.1. The legal meaning of malice is "ill-will or spite towards a
D
party and any indirect or improper motive in taking an action". This is
sometimes described as "malice in fact". "Legal malice" or "malice in law"
means 'something done without lawful excuse'. In other words, 'it is an act
done wrongfully and wilfully without reasonable or probable cause, and not
-.4
\ necessarily an act done from ill feeling and spite. Where malice is attributed E
to the State, it can never be a case of personal ill-will or spite on the part of
the State. If at all, it is malice in legal sense, it can be described as an act
which is taken with an oblique or indirect object. The legal malice on the
part of the State as attributed to it should be understood to mean that ·the action
of the State is not taken bonafide for the purpose of the Land Acquisition Act F
and it has been taken only to frustrate the favourable decisions obtained by
the owner of the property against the State in the eviction and writ
proceedings. (914-F, G; 915-A-B]

Administrative Law by Prof Wade (Eighth Edition, P. 414), referred
to. G
Words & Phrases Legally defined (Third Edition, Butterworths 1989),
referred to.

1.2. The school building is hundred years old. It is in dilapidated
H
- condition and at the time, the High Court, in earlier Writ Petition directed
9i0 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] 2 S.C.R.

A the State to deliver the possession of the building, it was found to be in .... ~.

dangerous condition, Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that the State was
running a school in the building since the year 1954. The High Court held
acquisition proceedings to be malicious only because the State lost in eviction
proceedings and had given an undertaking to vacate the school building.
(915-C-D)
B
1.3. Relationship inter se of the State as tenant with the respondent as
the owner-cum-landlord of the building is regulated by Rent Control
Legislation. Tiiie rights and liabilities of State as tenant are distinct from its
'right of eminent domain' of allproperties. The school was catering to the
C educational needs of the children residing in the heart of the city. It cannot
be seriously disputed that the continuance of the school at the same location
would serve public purpose of fulfilling educational needs of children in the
old city. (915-D, E)

.1.4. Though the State as tenant of the school building took no step to
D acquire the land before order of eviction and direction of the High Court, it
cannot be held that when it decided to acquire the building, there existed no
genuine public purpose. If only the possession of the property could be retained
as a tenant, it was unnecessary to acquire the property. The order of eviction
'·
as well as the direction to vacate issued by the High Court only provide just,
E reasonable and proximate cause for resorting to acquisition under the Land
Acquisition Act. Resort, therefore, to acquisition at a stage when there was
no other alternative but to do so to serve a genuine public purpose which was
being fulfilled from 1954 signify more a reasonable and just exercise of
statutory power. Such exercise of power cannot be condemned as one made in
colourable or ma/a fide exercise of it. (915-G-H; 916-A)
F ''
1.5. From the circumstances in the instant case, it cannot be concluded
that public purpose does not exist for the State to acquire the school premises.
The position of the State as a landlord is different from its position as a
sovereign State with 'right of eminent domain' over all landed properties. It
is obvious that as a tenant the State had several inhibitions in law in effecting
G substantial repairs to the building or reconstructing it. The landlord in that
regard had superior rights in rent legislation. But once the State acquires
the school building, it had many options. It can demolish the whole building
and reconstruct it. It may effect substantial repairs and alterations to it for
making it suitable for continuing the school at the same premises and thus
H meet the educational needs of the children. [916-C-D-Ej
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH v. GOVERDHANLAL PITT! [D.M. DHARMADIIlKARI, J.) 911

State of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga A
and Ors., 11952) SCR 889; State of U.P. and Anr. v. Keshav Prasad Singh,
11995) 5 SCC 587 and First Land Acquisition Collector and Ors. v. Nirodhi
Prakash Gangoli and Anr., 12002] 4 SCC 160, relied on.

State of U.P. and Ors. v. Hindustan Aluminium Corpn. Ltd. and Ors.,
[1979) 3 SCR 709, distinguished. B
1.6. The new norms fixed for setting up of a school building may not be
necessarily applicable to the existing buildings. Norms, if any, fixed by the
Urban Development Authorities can be insisted upon for proposed new school
buildings in the newly developed areas. 1916-G]
c
1.7. Merely because as a temporary arrangement the school building
has been shifted to an alternative place apparently to avoid the unpleasantness
of facing any contempt proceedings, the order of the High Court can not be
upheld. The school building was hundred years old, dilapidated and in
dangerous condition. Shifting school building to the alternative site had, D
therefore, become necessary to avoid any possible catastrophe by collapse of
the building. On this ground, it cannot be held that the public purpose for
acquiring the building no longer exists. (918-F, G]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 6969of1999.
E
From the Judgment and Order dated 22.7.1999 of the Andhra Pradesh
High Court in W.A. No. 652of1999.

T.V. Ratnam, and G. Prabhakar for the Appellants.

V.R. Reddy, D. Bharathi Reddy for the Respondent.
F
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

DHARMADHIKARI J. This appeal has been preferred by the State of
Andhra Pradesh and its Authorities against the Division Bench judgment
dated 22.7.1999 passed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Writ Appeal G
No. 652 of 1999. The Division Bench upheld the order dated 29.12.1998 of the
learned Single Judge of the High Court.

On the basis of the facts and circumstances the High Court came to the
conclusion that the acquisition of the school building with its appurtenant
land by the State was an action liable to be quashed being 'malicious in law.' H

----~----~--
912 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003) 2 S.C.R.

A The school building which is in the heart cf old city of Hyderabad was
in possession of the State as tenant of the resp Jndent from the year 1954.
In the year 1977, respondent/landlord appro1.ched the Rent Controller,
Hyderabad fo~ eviction of the State from school building on the ground that
it had become dilapidated and required reconstruction. By order dated
B 15.12.1979, the Rent Controller, Hyderabad dismissed the eviction petition.
The Additional Chief Judge, City Small Causes, Hyderabad by its order made
on 15.3.1989 in the appeal of the tenant granted eviction of the State from the
school building. During pendency of appeal, the respondent/owner approached
the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Writ Petition No. 6487 of 1988 seeking
early eviction of the State on the ground that the condition of the building
C was dangerous for the school. The High Court on 12.8.1988 allowed the Writ
Petition and directed the State Government to vacate and hand over the
possession of the school building to the owner within a specified period. The
period of vacating the building by the State \\as later on extended upto
30.4.1989 on an alleged undertaking given by the State authorities to deliver
D the possession before the expiry of the extended period.
It is the case of the respondent that only in order to frustrate the decree
of eviction and to avoid the delivery of possess .on of the land and school
building to the owner in compliance with the directions made by the High
Court in Writ Petition No. 6487 of 1988 and in breach of undertaking given
E by the State to vacate, the State hurriedly issued on 26.4.1989 notifications
under Section 4(1) and Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act for acquisition
of the building and premises of the school. L<ter in the proceedings of
acquisition, an Award was passed on 08.5.1992 granting compensation in the
sum of Rs.2,60,968.68/- to the respondent.

F The respondent/owner assailed the acquisition proceedings by Writ
Petition No. 6876 of 1989 which was allowed by tt e learned Single Judge and
upheld in appeal by the Division Bench of High Court of Andhra Pradesh.
Aggrieved by the impugned order of the High Court quashing the acquisition
proceedings, the State of Andhra Pradesh is in appeal to this Court.

G The learned Single Judge, on taking into consideration the time and
manner of the acquisition proceedings, came to the following conclusion:-

"In my view, the said exercise of power un for Section 4( I) of the Act
is to circumvent the Civil Court decree and :he High Court order under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India. n e exercise of power under
H
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH v. GOVERDHANLAL PITTI (D.M. DHARMADHIKARI, l .] 913
Section 4(1) of the Act is not fair and it is only to scuttle a valid A
~
\ decree passed by the Civil Court which amounts to 'malice in law'.
The power under Section 4(1) of the Act cannot be exercised to thwart
a valid decree passed by the Civil Court" .
•
By the impugned order, the Division Bench also in Writ Appeal came
to the same conclusion which in its language is :- B
"Acquisition suffers from lack of bona jir:les and is only an arbitrary
act and an attempt to undo the consequences of the judicial decision".

The Division Bench in coming to the conclusion that the proceedings
for acquisition initiated by the State were not fair and bona fide also took into C
consideration the fact that minimum norms fixed by State itself for setting up
a school with facilities like play grounds, lecture hall and open space were
not fulfilled in the case of school building in dispute. It also observed that
school building was hundred years old and was declared unfit for human
habitation as back as in the year 1990. The State Government took no action D
for past several years to acquire the building. The proceedings for acquisition
were commenced only when it ;uffered an order of eviction under the Rent
Control Act and obtained extended period from the High Court to vacate the
premises of the School.

We have heard the learned counsel Shri T.V. Ratnam appearing for the E
State. He submits that acquisition of the school building was necessary to
cater to the educational needs of the children living nearby the old city of
Hyderabad. It is argued that merely because the State failed in its attempt to
successfully oppose the eviction proceedings under the Rent Control and
Eviction Act, its independent 'right of eminent domain' was not lost to
r acquire under due process of law the building for urgent public purpose. F
Reliance is placed on the decisions of this Court in State of Bihar v.
Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga and Ors., [ 1952) SCR
889; Prabodh Sagar v. Punjab State Electricity Board and Ors., [2000) 5 SCC
630 and First Land Acquisition Collector and Ors. v. Nirodhi Prakash
Gangoli and Anr., [2002) 4 sec 160. G
We have heard reply ofleamed senior counsel Shri V.R. Reddy appearing
for the owner (respondent) of the school building. Strenuous effort is made
to support the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. It is contended
that the most important fact cannot be lost sight of that the school building
was not only dilapidated but was found to be in dangerous condition which H
914 SUPREME COURT REF ORTS [2003] 2 S.C.R.

A prompted the High Court, in earlier writ petition to direct the State, to hand
over the vacant possession of the building to t~ e owner without waiting for
culmination of the proceedings of eviction pe 1ding in appeal before City
Small Causes Court. It is pointed out that at the stage when the State
Government had undertaken to the High Court to deliver possession of the
B school building, the proceedings for acquisition under Land Acquisition Act
were initiated. The High Court, therefore, was right in coming to the conclusion
that the action of the State lacked bona tides and was clearly an attempt to
frustrate the decisions of the court. The learned counsel also produced before
us the norms fixed by the Urban Development Authorities for setting up of
a school. It is submitted that as per the norms fixed for setting up of a school,
C the school building in question does not at all conform to those norms. The
State Government, therefore, cannot be permitted to acquire school building
with its premises which does not satisfy the norms fixed by the State itself
for setting up of a school.

The last submission made is that since the school building was in
D dangerous condition and the school having Jeen already shifted at an
alternative site, this Court in exercise of its power under Article 136 of the
Constitution oflndia should refuse to interfere in the order of the High Court.
In ·the alternative, it is prayed that the State Government be directed to
reconsider its decision for retaining the school t uilding as the school stands
E shifted to a new location.

The legal meaning of malice is "ill-will or~ pite towards a party and any
indirect or improper motive in taking an action". This is sometimes described
as "malice in fact". "Legal malice" or "malice in :aw" means 'something done
without lawful excuse'. In other words, 'it is ~in act done wrongfully and
F wilfully without reasonable or probable cause, and not necessarily an act
done from ill feeling and spite. It is a deliberate 1ct in disregard of the rights
of others'. [See Words and Phrases legally defimd in Third Edition, London
Butterworths 1989}.

Where malice is attributed to the State, it can never be a case of
--
G personal ill-will or spite on the part of the Stdte. If at all, it is malice in legal
sense, it can be described as an act which is taken with an oblique or indirect
object. Prof. Wade in its authoritative work on Administrative Law [Eighth
Edition at pg. 414] based on English decisions and in the context of alleged
illegal acquisition proceedings, explains that an action by the State can be
H described mala fide if it seek to 'acquire land' 'for a purpose not authorised
STATEOF ANDHRA PRADESH v. GOVERDHANLAL PITTI [D.M. DHARMADHIKARI, J.] 9 J5

by the Act'. The State, if it wishes to acquire land, should exercise its power
A
bona fide for the statutory purpose and for none other'.

The legal malice, therefore, on the part of the State as attributed to it
should be understood to mean that the action of the State is not taken bona
fide for the purpose of the Land Acquisition Act and it has been taken only B
to frustrate the favourable decisions obtained by the owner of the property
against the State in the eviction and writ proceedings.

It is true that the school building is hundred years old. It is in dilapidated
condition and at the time, the High Court, in earlier Writ Petition directed the
State to deliver the possession of the building, it was found to be in dangerous C
condition. Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that the State was running a
school in the building since the year 1954. The school is in the heart of the
city of Hyderabad. The Hlgh Court held acquisition proceedings to be malicious
only because the State lost in eviction proceedings and had given an
undertaking to vacate the school building.
D
Relationship inter se of the State as tenant with the respondent as the
owner-cum-landlord of the building is regulated by Rent Control Legislation.
The rights and liabilities of State as tenant are distinct from its 'right of
eminent domain' of all properties. The school was catering to the educational.
needs of the children residing in the heart of the city. It cannot be seriously E
disputed that the continuance of the school at the same location would serve
public purpose of fulfilling educational needs of children in the old city.

'· The High Court of Andhra Pradesh held the action of acquisition of
the property by the State as malicious in law only because before passing of
'"'\ the adverse orders by the court against it, no action for acquisition of the F
building which was in its occupation since 1954, was initiated. In our opinion,
even if that be the situation that the State as tenant of the school building

- took no step to acquire the land before order of eviction and direction of the
High Court, it cannot be held that when it decided to acquire the building,
there existed no genuine public purpose. If only the possession of the property
could be retained as a tenant, it was unnecessary to acquire the property. The G
order of eviction as well as the direction to vacate issued by the High Cou1t
only provide just, reasonable and proximate cause for resorting to acquisition
under the Land Acquisition Act Resort, therefore, to acquisition at a stage
when there was no other alternative but to do so to serve a genuine public
.....,f which was being fulfilled from 1954 signify more a reasonable and just exercise H
916 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] 2 S.C.R.

A of statutory power. Such exercise of power cannot be condemned as one
made in colourable or mala fide exercise of it.

Reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of State of UP and
Ors v. Hindustan Aluminium Corpn. Ltd and Ors., (1979] 3 SCR 709 does not
help the case of the respondent/owner. We do not find that the State in
B initiating acquisition proceedings, at a time when there were adverse orders
against it by the courts to vacate the premises, acted for a reason and
purpose knowingly foreign to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act.
The real issue before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh and before this Court
is whether the land acquisition proceedings can be held to be actuated by
C any purpose other than public purpose. From the circumstances placed before
us, we do not find that public purpose does not exist for the State to acquire
the school premises. The position of the State as a landlord is different from
its position as a sovereign State with 'right of eminent domain' over all landed
properties. It is obvious that as a tenant the State had several inhibitions in
law in effecting substantial repairs to the building or reconstructing it. The
D landlord in that regard had superior rights in rent legislation. But once the
State acquires the school building, it had many options. It can demolish the
whole building and reconstruct it. It may effect substantial repairs and
alterations to it for making it suitable for continuing the school at the same
premises and thus meet the educational needs of the children living in the
E heart of the city in Hyderabad.
We are not at all impressed by the argument advanced on behalf of the
.respondent/owner that as the school building in question does not conform
to norms fixed, the State cannot be allowed to act against its own norms fixed
for setting up of a school. It is futile to apply an order of the government
F dated 31. 7.98 made w.e.f. 01.8.1998 in testing the reasonableness of the
acquisition or its desirability as also the utility of the same to a public
purpose. Public interest undoubtedly in such building was being served from
1954 onwards at the same location.

This Court cannot overlook the fact that the new norms whatsoever
G fixed for setting up of a school building may not be necessarily applicable to
-
the existing buildings. Norms, if any. fixed by the Urban Development
Authorities can be insisted upon for proposed new school buildings in the
newly developed areas. It is not necessary to go further into that subject.

In the State of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of
H
j
STA TE OF ANDHRA PRADESH v. GOVERDHANLAL PITT! [D.M. DHARMADHIKARI,J.] 9 J7
Darbhanga and Ors., (1952] SCR 889, this Court has recognised the right of A
State of 'eminent domain' that is 'ihe right of compulsory acquisition of any
private property'. This power of eminent domain of the State is sovereign
power over powers and rights of private persons to properties. The High
Court of Andhra Pradesh has referred and distinguished Division Bench
decision of its own court. We find that challenge in similar circumstances by B
private owners to the action of acquisition taken by the State and the
contention based on malice in law was negatived by this Court in case of
State of UP and Anr. v. Keshav Prasad Singh, (1995] 5 SCC 587. The relevant
part of it reads thus :-

"4. Having c<.insidered the respective contentions, we are of the C
considered view that the conclusion of the High Court was clearly
illegal. It is seen that the land acquired was for a public purpose.
Admittedly, the same land was acquired in the year 1963 for building
a PWD office and after construction a compound wall was also
constructed to protect the building. As found by the civil court, on
adducing evidence in a suit that the Department had encroached upon D
the respondent's land which was directed to be demolished and
delivery of possession to be given. It is seen that when that land was
needed for a public purpose, i.e. as part of public office, the State is
entitled to exercise its power of eminent domain and would be justified
to acquire the land according to law. Section 4(1) was, therefore, E
correctly invoked to acquire the land in dispute. It is true that the
State had not admitted that its officers had encroached upon the
respondents" land and had carried the matter in appeal. The finding
of the civil court was that the property belongs to the respondent.
The factum of the action under the Act implies admission of the title
of the respondent to the extent of land found by the civil court to be F
an encroachment. Though the State chose to file the appeal which
was pending, better judgment appears to have prevailed on the state
to resort to the power of eminent domain instead of taking a decision
on merits from a Court of Law. In view of the fact that the f'WD office
building was already constructed and a compound wall was needed G
to make the building safe and secure and construction was already
made, which is a public purpose, the exercise of power of eminent
domain is perfectly warranted under law. It can neither be said to be
colourable exercise of power nor an arbitrary exercise of power.

See also the decision in the case of First land Acquisition Collector H

I_
918 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] 2 S.C.R.

A and Ors. "· Nirodhi Prakash Gangoli and Anr., [2002] 4 SCC 160. The
relevant part of argument at page 166 para 6 reads thus :-

"6. It is indeed difficult for us to uphold the conclusion of the Division
Bench that acquisition is mala fide on the mere fact that physical
possession had not been delivered pursuant to the earlier directions
B ofa learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court dated 25.8.1994.
When the Court is called upon to examine the question as to whether
the acquisition is mala fide or not, what is necessary to be inquired
into and found out is, whetner the purpose for which the acquisition
is going to be made, is a real purpose or a camouflage. By no stretch
c of imagination, exercise of power for acquisition can be held to be
mala fide, so long as the purpose of acquisition continues and as has
already been stated, there existed emergency to acquire the premises
in question. The premises which were under occupation of the students
of National Medical College, Calcutta, were obviously badly needed •
I
for the College and the appropriate authority having failed in their r-
D attempt earlier twice, the orders having been quashed by the High
Court, had taken the third attempt of issuing notification under Section
4(1) and 17(4) of the Act, such acquisition cannot be held to be mala
fide and, therefore, the conclusion of the Division Bench in the
impugned judgment that the acquisition is mala fide, must be set aside
E and we accordingly set aside the same' .

The last submission made on behalf of the respondent/owner also does
not commend to us. Merely because as a temporary arrangement the school
building has been shifted to an alternative place apparently to avoid the
unpleasantness of facing any contempt proceedings, this Court cannot uphold
F the order of the High Court and leave the matter to the State Government to
reconsider the question whether the school building is still required for its "
purposes.
--:

G
Admittedly, the school building was hundred years old, dilapidated and
in dangerous condition. Shifting school building to the alternative site had,
·-
therefore, become necessary to avoid any possible catastrophe by collapse
of the building. On this ground, however, it cannot be held that the public
purpose for acquiring the building no longer exists. The last prayer made on
behalf of the respondent/owner also, therefore, cannot be accepted.

H As a result of the aforesaid discussion, the appeal succeeds and is
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH l'. GOVERDHANLAL PITTI [D.M. DHARMADHIKARl..I] 919

-
\ hereby allowed. The impugned orders of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh A
are set aside.

In the circumstances aforesaid, we would leave the parties to bear their
own costs in this appeal.

S.K.S. Appeal allowed, B