Holding

A High Court cannot set aside a Special Court's findings of fact that are based on evidence and not perverse; the Special Court's order stands.

Summary

The State of Andhra Pradesh filed an application under the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 alleging illegal occupation of certain parcels of land (the Schedule Land) by Abdul Khuddus and others. The Special Court examined oral and documentary evidence and held that the respondents were land grabbers, could not prove title by adverse possession, and ordered them to pay compensation to perfect their title. The respondents challenged this order by a writ petition under Article 226, and the High Court set aside the Special Court's findings. The Supreme Court examined whether a High Court may interfere with a Special Court's factual findings and held that interference is permissible only when findings are unsupported by evidence or are based on conjecture, which was not the case here. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court judgment, restored the Special Court's order, and directed that the respondents either pay the compensation within four months or face recovery of the land by the State.

Issues considered

Whether the High Court, exercising jurisdiction under Article 226, can set aside findings of fact made by a Special Court under the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 when those findings are based on evidence and are not perverse.
Whether the Special Court's order directing payment of compensation to perfect the respondents' title is valid.

Legislation cited

Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982

Subjects

Article 226Writ jurisdictionSpecial CourtFindings of factLand grabbingAdverse possessionCompensationTitle perfectionHigh Court interference

Judgment

f
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH A
v.
ABDUL KHUDDUS (DEAD) BY LRS. & ORS.

NOVEMBER 29, 2007
B
f > [TARUNCHATTERJEEANDDALVEERBHANDARI,JJ.]

Constitution of India, 1950:
Article 226-Writ petition-Jurisdiction ofHigh Court to interfere C
with findings offact arrived at by Special Court under A.P. Land
Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982-HELD: High Court, in its writ
jurisdiction under Article 226 may interfere with findings offact arrived
at by Special Court only iffindings are based on no evidence or based
on conjectures or surmises and ifno reasonable man would, on given D
facts and circumstances, come to the conclusion reached by the Special
Court-On facts, findings arrived at by Special Court cannot, by any
stretch of imagination, be said to be based on no evidence or beset
with surmises or conjectures and that finding ofSpecial Court on the
question oftitle ofrespondents by way ofadverse possession was based
on consideration ofrelevant evidence-both oral or documentary-That E
apart, neither any relevant material was excludedfrom consideration
by it nor was any irrelevant material relied upon in recording its
findings-Besides, since it has been found on facts that respondents
could neither prove that they acquired title by way of adverse
possession in respect of Schedule Land nor could it be proved that F
Schedule Land belonged to Gandhi Hill Society, it cannot be ruled out
that land would only belong to State which was grabbed by
respondents-It may also be placed on record that High Court, while
reversing the findings of Special Court could also not come to a
conclusion offact that respondents perfected their title in respect of G
Schedule Land by adverse possession or that Schedule Land belonged
to Gandhi Hill Society-It was not open to High Court, in exercise of
its writ jurisdiction, to set aside findings offact arrived at by Special
Court which were based on sound consideration of materials on
709 H
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710 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 12 S.C.R.

A record-Order ofHigh Court is set aside-However, since respondents
have raised construction on Schedule Land and Special Courl has
directed payment ofcompensation so that title ofrespondents in respect
of Schedule Land is perfected, respondents would pay the amount as
directed by Special Court and in the event, respondents/ailed to deposit
B the said amount, application filed by appellant before Special Court (
shall stand allowed and it would be open to appellant to recover ·
Schedule Land in accordance with law.
Kanda Lashmana Bapuji v. Govt. ofAndhra Pradesh and Ors.,
[2002) 3 sec 258, relied on.
c
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 7360 of
2000.
From the final Judgment and Order dated 13.10.1998 of the High
Court of Judicature, Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in W.P. No. 6452/
D 1995.
H.S. Gururaja Rao, Manoj Saxena, Rajnish Kr. Singh, Rahul Shukla
and T.V. George for the Appellant.
B. Sunita Rao for the Respondents.
E
The following Order of the Court was delivered
ORDER
'
1. This appeal is preferred against a judgment and order dated 13th
F of October, 1998 of the High Court of Judicature for Andhra Pradesh at
Hyderabad in W.P. No. 6452of1995, whereby the Division Bench of
the High Court had allowed the Writ Petition filed by the respondents and
set aside the order dated 9th of June, 1994 passed by the Special Court
under the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 at
G Hyderabad (for short "the Special Court").
2. The only question that needs to be decided in this appeal is, "Can ,_·
the High Court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution, set aside a finding of fact arrived at by the Special Court,
under the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 (for
H
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STATEv.ABDULKHUDDUS(DEAD)BYLRS. 711

short "the Act'') when such finding of fact of the Special Court was made A
on consideration of the evidence on record and could not be said to be
perverse or arbitrary.?"
3. Briefly stated, the facts leading to the filing of this appeal are that
the appellant, the State of Andhra Pradesh, filed an application under the B
J )
Act against the respondents in the Special Court alleging, inter alia, that
the 1st respondent was in occupation of 470 sq. yards ofland in Ward
No. 5, Block No. 1, Vijaywada out of which 220 sq. yards situated in
N.T.S. No. 26 correlated to old N.T.S. No. 17/1-A/1-A ofVijaywada
town (for short the "Schedule Land") was by way of illegal encroachment.
The appellant further complained that the 2nd and 3rd respondents, being C
the heirs and legal representatives of the original respondent No. 2, were
in occupation of 540 sq. yards of land, out of which 190 sq. yards also
situated in N.T.S. No. 26 correlated to old N.T.S. No. 17/1-A/l-A of
Vijaywada town (for short "the schedule land") was by way of illegal
encroachment. Accordingly, the State of Andhra Pradesh, the appellant, D
had prayed for a declaration that the respondents were land grabbers within
the meaning of the Act and that the appellant was the owner of the
Schedule Land.
4. The respondents, in their objection, denied that they were land E
grabbers in respect of the Schedule Land and pleaded that their
predecessors-in-interest had perfected title of the land by way of adverse
possession and alternatively, according to them, the Schedule Land
belonged to Gandhi Hill Society and therefore, the question of grabbing
the land of the appellant by the respondents did not arise at all. Accordingly, F
they pleaded that the application under the Act filed by the State of AP.
must be rejected.
5. The parties went into trial and they were permitted to adduce
evidence in support of their respective cases.
G
6. The Special Court before which the application for land grabbing
was filed by the appellant, after considering the oral and documentary
evidence on record, held that the respondents were land grabbers within
the meaning of the Act. The Special Court also held, on consideration of
the materials on record and evidence adduced by the parties, that the H
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712 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 12 S.C.R.

A respondents had failed to prove that they had perfected the title in respect
of the Schedule Land by way of adverse possession. It was also held
on consideration of the evidence on record that the respondents had failed
to prove that the Schedule Land belonged to Gandhi Hill Society.
However, the Special Court, after finding that the respondents had done
B construction on the Schedule Land, granted liberty to the respondents
to pay the market value of the Schedule Land grabbed by them so that
the title of the same could be perfected by them. Accordingly, the Special
Court directed the 1st respondent to pay Rs. 4,40,000/- and the 2nd
and 3rd respondents to pay Rs. 3,80,000/- by 12 monthly installments
c to the appellant.
7. Feeling aggrieved by the order of the Special Court, the
respondents filed a Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution,
which was allowed, as noted herein earlier, and the order of the Special
Court was set aside.
D
8. For proper disposal of this appeal, therefore, it would be
necessary for us to consider the findings of fact arrived at by the Special
Court at this stage. The Special Court had reached the following findings
of fact after analyzing the evidence - oral and documentary on record: -
E (i) Exhibit A1 was the extract of Town Survey Land Register in
respect of the land in Old T.S. No. 17/lA/lA and its
classification was shown as 'poramboke'. Exhibit A2 was the
extract of the Adangal in respect of the said land for Fa5lies
of 1399-1400, in which the Schedule Land was described
F as 'Konda Poramboke' in Column No. 6.
(ii) The name of the 1st Respondent was shown as an encroacher
into an extent of220 sq. yards in Exhibit A2. In Exhibit A3,
Adangal extract the name of 2nd Respondent was shown as
an encroacher into an extent of 190 sq. yards and that
G Respondent Nos. 3 & 4, who were the legal representatives
of the 2nd Respondent were continuing in possession of that
190 sq. yards after the death of Respondent No. 2.
(iii) Exhibit A4 was the sketch showing the extents encroached
by Respondent Nos. 1, 3 & 4.
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STATEv. ABDULKHUDDUS(DEAD)BYLRS. 713

(iv) Exhibit AS was another sketch showing the encroached A
extents.
(v) After considering the evidence of PW3, it was found that
Exhibit Al3 was a true extract of 1965 survey plan showing
the extents grabbed by Respondent Nos. 1, 3 & 4, which were
in N.T.S. No. 26 marked in red colour belonging to the B
Government.
(vi) Relying on the evidence of PW3, it was further found that the
land of Gandhi Hill Society was in N.T.S. No. 52 as per the
1965 survey, which was correlated to Old N.T.S. No.15-Al
Part.
c
(vii) Relying on the cross-examination of PW-3, it was also held
that only an extent of 7 acres and odd in N.T.S. No. 52
belonged to Gandhi Hill Society and the Society had no title
-I
ever in extent ofN.T.S. No. 26. D
.oi
(viii) No documents were filed to prove since how long the
respondent Nos. 1, 3 & 4 were in possession of the extents
that were shown to have been grabbed by them.
(ix) Relying on Exhibit Al2, it was also held that N.T.S. No. 52
E
was correlated to Old N.T.S. No. 15-Al Part ofVijaywada
and N.T.S. No. 26 was correlated to Old N.T.S. No. 17/lA-
Part. Accordingly, the Special Court held that the entries in
Exhibit Al 2 would clearly go to show that Gandhi Hill Society
had nothing to do with N.T.S. No. 26 formed in pursuance
of the survey in the year 1965 and, therefore, it was clearly F
proved from the evidence of PWl & 2 that the Schedule Land,
which was an extent of 410 sq. yards lying to the East of the
sites covered by Exhibits AS and All was in N.T.S. No. 26
belonging to the Government and not in N.T.S. No. 52
belonging to Gandhi Hill Society. G
'- ~
(x) An adverse inference was drawn against the respondents for
non-production of the title deeds who had placed reliance only
on Exhibit A-8, which was in favour of Respondent No. 1 and
Exhibit Al 1 which was in favour oflate Respondent No. 2.
H
714 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 12 S.C.R.

A (xi) The respondent No. 1 admittedly had purchased only an extent
of 250 sq. yards adjoining East of 220 sq. yards shown to
have been grabbed by him as per Exhibit A4 and it was also
admitted by Respondent No. 3 that his mother Respondent
No. 2 had purchased only an extent of 350 sq. yards under
B the original of Exhibit All and the site of an extent of 190 sq.
yards shown to have been grabbed by him and Respondent
No. 4 was not covered by that Sale Deed.
(xii) So far as the case of adverse possession of the respondents
was concerned, it was found that the respondents had failed
C to prove that they had acquired title by adverse possession.
Accordingly, the Special Court, after considering the findings arrived at
by it allowed the application holding that the land belonged to the State
and directed the 1st respondent to pay Rs. 4,40,000/- and the 2nd and
D 3rd respondents to pay Rs. 3,80,000/- by 12 monthly installments to the
appellant.
9. It is this order of the Special Court, which was challenged by the
respondents by way of a Writ Petition. At this juncture, we may now
consider as to when the High Court could interfere, with a finding of fact
E arrived at by the Special Court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution. It is now well settled that the High Court,
in its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, may interfere
with the findings offact arrived at by the Special Court only if the findings
are based on no evidence or based on conjectures or surmises and if no
F reasonable man would on given facts and circumstances come to the
conclusion reached by the Special Court. Therefore, it is pellucid that it
is only in these special circumstances that it would be open to the High
Court to interfere with the findings of fact arrived at by the Special Court.
In Kanda Lakshmana Bapuji v. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh and Ors.,
G [2002] 3 SCC 258, this court while dealing with the provisions of the
Act decided the question as to when could the High Court, in the exercise
of its writ jurisdiction, interfere with the findings of fact arrived at by the
Special Court and observed in para 49 as under :-
"On a careful pemsal of the judgment of the Special Court on
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STATEv. ABDULKHUDDUS(DEAD)BYLRS. 715

the question of title of the first respondent and that of the appellant A
and his lessor Inamdar we are satisfied that neither was any
relevant material excluded from consideration nor was any
irrelevant material relied upon by the Special Court in recording
its finding. There was, therefore, no scope for the High Court to
) ) interfere with those findings. In our view, the High Court committed B
no error of law in not interfering with the findings of the Special
Court in regard to the title of the first respondent and absence of
title in the appellant to the land in dispute (see : Omar Salay
Mohamed Sait v. CIT) .......... "
10. We have already discussed the findings of the Special Court and
c
we find from the same that the findings arrived at by the Special Court
cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be said to be based on no evidence
~
or beset with surmises or conjectures and that the finding of the Special
-f, Court on the question of title of the respondents by way of adverse
. possession was based on consideration of the relevant evidence - both D
oral or documentary. That apart, we also find from the order of the Special
Court that neither any relevant material was excluded from consideration
by it nor was any irrelevant material relied upon by it in recording its
findings. At the risk of repetition, we may say that the Special Court had
gone into the evidence, considered the evidence adduced by both the E
parties including the documentary evidence on record and came to a
finding that the Schedule Land did not belong to Gandhi Hill Society and
that the respondents could not prove that they had perfected title in respect
of the Schedule Land by way of adverse possession. That apart, we are
of the view that since it has been found on facts that the respondents could F
neither prove that they had acquired the title by way of adverse possession
in respect of the Schedule Land nor could it be proved that the Schedule
Land belonged to Gandhi Hill Society, it cannot be ruled out that the land
would only belong to the State which was grabbed by the respondents.
It may also be placed on record that the High Court, while reversing the G
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i findings of the Special Court could also not come to a conclusion of fact
that the respondents had perfected their title in respect of the Schedule
Land by adverse possession or that the Schedule Land belonged to
Gandhi Hill Society. Such being the position, we are unable to sustain the
order of the High Court, which had set aside the findings of fact arrived H
716 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 12 S.C.R.

A at by the Special Court, which, in our view, were arrived at on
consideration of the materials on record and which, by any stretch of
imagination, cannot be said to be based on no evidence or surmises or
conjectures and therefore, it was not open to the High Court, in the
exercise of its writ jurisdiction, to set aside the findings of fact airived at
B by the Special Court which were based on sound consideration of the
materials on record.
11. Accordingly, the impugned judgment of the High Court is set
aside. Before parting with this order, we may keep it on record that the
Special Court had taken into consideration the fact that the respondents
C have constructed on the Schedule Land and therefore, had directed
payment of compensation so that title of the respondents in respect of
the Schedule Land is perfected. That being the position, it would be open
to the respondents to pay the amount as directed by the Special Court
and in the event, the said amount as directed by the Special Court is paid
D within four months from this date, the application filed by the appellant •
shall be disposed of with that direction and in the event, the respondents
fail to deposit the said amount, the application filed by the appellant before
the Special Court shall stand allowed and it would be open to the appellant
to recover the Schedule Land in accordance with law.
E
12. For the reasons aforesaid, the impugned judgment of the High
Court is set aside and that of the Special Court is restored.
13. The Civil Appeal is accordingly disposed of with no order as to
costs.
F
RP. Appeal disposed of.