Holding

The High Court did not exceed its jurisdiction; its interference was justified because the Special Court ignored material evidence and misapplied the Act, and the respondents are not land grabbers.

Summary

The State of Andhra Pradesh sued respondents to declare land occupied by them as government land, which was transferred to a Special Court under the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982. The respondents claimed title based on a historic Muntakhab and subsequent occupancy rights, but the Special Court declared them land grabbers, relying on the absence of revenue entries. The State appealed to the High Court, which, in a writ petition, re‑examined the evidence, found that the title documents and revenue records supported the respondents' claim, and set aside the Special Court's order. The State then appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the High Court had exceeded its writ jurisdiction by re‑appreciating evidence. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was within its jurisdiction because the Special Court had ignored vital evidence and misapplied the Act, and that the respondents were not land grabbers under Section 2(d). Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the High Court's decision upheld.

Issues considered

Whether a High Court, exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226/227, can re‑examine evidence and set aside a Special Court's finding in a land‑grabbing case.
Whether the respondents fall within the definition of 'land grabber' under Section 2(d) of the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982.
Scope of exclusive jurisdiction conferred on Special Courts and the availability of any appeal against their orders.

Legislation cited

Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982s. 2(c), s. 2(d), s. 7, s. 8(1), s. 8(6), s. 9

Subjects

Land grabbingSpecial CourtWrit jurisdictionArticles 226 and 227Title proofEvidence appraisalExclusive jurisdictionAndhra Pradesh

Judgment

A STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH
v.
P.V. HANUMANTHA RAO (D) THR. LRS. AND ANR.

OCTOBER 14, 2003

B [SHIVARAJ V. PATIL AND D.M. DHARMADHIKARI, JJ.]
. -
Constitution of India-Articles 226 and 227-Judicial review-
Jurisdiction of High Court-Scope of-Case of land grabbing-Lower
court overlooking material evidence and circumstances-No appeal provided
C for against order of the lower court-Held, High Court can look into
evidence to see if the court below has ignored vital evidence-Andhra
Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982-Section 2(d).

Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982-Section
D 2(d)-Land grabbing-Proof of-Mere bona fide claim to land accupied
not sufficient-Burden on the occupant to prove lawful title.

Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982-Sections 7
and 8-Setting up ofSpecial Court and exclusion ofjurisdiction ofregular
civil courts-Effect of-Held, provisions should be construed strict!y- .
E Interpretation of Statutes.

The appellant filed a suit against the respondents for a declaration
that certain land occupied by the respondents was government land.
After coming into force of the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing
F (Prohibition) Act, 1982 and constitution of Special Court under the
said Act, the suit was transferred to the Special Court.

The case of the respondents was that the land belonged to the
erstwhile ruler ofNizam State and had been granted to their predecessor-
in-title as 'Muntakhab' or 'loam'. After passing of the loam Abolition
G Act, the predecessor-in-title had filed a petition before the Revenue
Officer for grant of occupancy rights under the Act, which was allowed
in his favour. The Collector reversed the order in appeal. The Board
of Revenue allowed the review petition filed against the order of the
Collector, holding that the land was granted as 'mafi-inam' to t!he
H predecessor-in-title of the respondents. The order of the Board of
736
STATE v. P.V. HANUMANTHA RAO 737

Revenue was not challenged by the appellant. The respondents also A
filed a writ petition for directing the authorities to implement the order
of the Board of Revenue, which was allowed by the High Court.

The Special Court declared the respondents as land grabbers
holding, inter alia that (a) the land in occupation of the respondents B
was not shown as a separate survey number in the revenue records;
(b) 'lnam' was not entered in any revenue records; (c) the 'muntakhab'
was not genuine and valid and the Collector had found it to be not
proved.

The respondents filed a writ petition against the order of the C
Special Court. The High Court summoned the original file and after
considering it, held that there was evidence of existence of grant by
'Muntakhab' and reliance placed by the Special Court on the order
of the Collector was erroneous as the order had been set aside by the
Board of Revenue. The High Court also held that in holding that the D
revenue records did not show entries in favour of the grantee, the
Special Court erred and overlooked the entries in pahani patrikas,
which showed that the land was granted as 'loam' to the predecessor-
in-title of the respondents. The predecessor-in-title of the respondents
had been litigating to get his name mutated in the revenue record. The E
High Court allowed the writ petition in favour of the respondents.

In appeal before the Court, the appellant contended that the High
Court had exceeded its writ jurisdiction by re-appreciating the evidence.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court F
HELD : 1. The High Court did not exceed its jurisdiction in
upsetting the judgment of the Special Court. (755-A]

2.1. The remedy of writ petition available in the High Court is not
against the 'decision' of the subordinate court, tribunal or authority G
but it is against the 'decision making process'. In the 'decision making
process', if the court, tribunal or authority deciding the case, has
ignored vital evidence and thereby arrived at erroneous conclusion or
has misconstrued the provisions of the relevant Act or misunderstood
the scope of its jurisdiction, the constitutional power of the High Court H
738 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India can be invoked
to set right such error and prevent gross injustice to the party
complaining. This Court has recognised the right of the Hi~:h Court
to interfere in orders of subordinate courts and tribunals where (1)
there is an error manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings
B such as when it is based on clear misreading or utter disregard of the
provisions of law and (2) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice
has occasioned thereby. [751-G-H, 752-A, 752-E-F]

2.2. No doubt, neither in exercise of power of writ under Article
226 nor in supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution
of India, the High Court will not convert itself into a court of appeal
and indulge in re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence but tht~ power
of the High Court in writ jurisdiction to interfere where important
evidence has been overlooked and the legal provisions invoh·ed are
misinterpreted or misapplied has been recognised. [752-F-G]

Surya Devi Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and Ors., (2003] 6 SCC675;
Swarn Singh & Anr. v. State of Punjab & Ors., AIR (1976) SC 232,
referred to.

JMD. Alloys Ltd v. Bihar State Electricity Board & Ors., [2003) 5
sec 226, cited.
3.1. With the growing menace ofland grabbing, the Andhra Pradesh
Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 constitutes Special Courts and
ousts jurisdiction of regular civil courts in respect ofland alleged to have
been grabbed. The Special Court has been conferred powers of civil
court to examine all questions of title and possession with respect to the
land alleged to have been grabbed. The findings of the Special Court are
binding and conclusive.on the parties and all others intilrest in the land
which is alleged to have been grabbed. Against the decision of the Special
Court, no appeal is provided. Where the regular remedy provided by
general law is ousted by special law, the provisions of the latter deserve
to be construed strictly. [754-D-E, 750-F-G, 754-E].

3.2. When an occupant of the land is alleged to be a 'land
grabiber', he has to justify his possession and prove his source of the
title. Where source of title by an occupant is produced, the Special
STATE v. P.V. HANUMANTHA RAO 739

Court is required to examine it to consider whether on the basis of A
evidence of the title produced by him, he can be held to be not falling
in the definition of 'land grabber' under sub-clause (d) of Section 2 of
the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982. A mere
doubt raised by the State on the title and possession of the occupant
of a land does not make him a land grabber. Whenever the right of B
the occupant is questioned by the State, it is not enough for the
occupant to show that he has a prima facie bona fide claim to the land
occupied but a burden is cast on him to prove that he is in occupation
and possession of the land under a lawful title. [754-E-F, 751-E-G]

Kanda Lakshmana Bapuji v. Government ofA.P. and Others, [2002) C
3 sec 258, referred to.

3.3. In the present case, the occupants had produced documents to
prove their source of title and long possession of their predecessor-in-
title. This title deed with revenue entries based on them produced by the D
occupants should have been treated sufficient for the purpose of the
Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 to treat the
occupants of the land to be falling outside the definition of' land grabber'.
It is not a case where the ottupants have tried to justify their position on
the basis of a mere bonafide claim to the land. They have produced oral E
and documentary evidence on the 'Muntakhab' and justified their
position as alienees from the heirs of original grantees. (754-F-H, 755-A]

3.4. The Special Court declared the occupants as 'land grabbers'
holding that the Muntakhab contained in the file is not reliable and
supported by any corresponding revenue entries in favour of the F
occupants. The High Court, which alone could have examined the
correctness of the decision of the Special Court, in the absen~e of any
remedy of appeal, rightly observed that it was within its power to re-
examine the evidence to ascertain the correctness of the findings of the
Special Court. The High Court interfered with the judgment of the G
Special Court not merely because it found its reasoning or conclusions
erroneous but it found that important evidence corroborating the
grant was not properly scrutinised by the Special Court and important
revenue records availabe were disregarded. According to the High
Court, the Special Court was clearly wrong in holding the occupants H
740 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A of the land as 'land grabbers' when they had produced documents of
title and others of the Revenue Board and the High Court. The! High
Court in its writ jurisdiction was, therefore, fully justified in examining
those documents of title and upsetting the judgment of the Special
Court on the ground that material evidence and circumstances proved
B by the occupants were overlooked in holding the occupants as land
grabbers. (753-B-D, 753-F-H, 754-A-C]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 8601-
8605 of 1997.

C From the Judgment and Order dated 18.9.96 of the Andhra Pradesh
High Court in W.P. Nos. 10074, 10075, 10076, 17015 and W.A. No. 284
of 1992.

WITH
D
S.L.P. No. CC No. 4870 of 2000.

Ms. K. Amareshwari, Ms. T. Anamika for G. Prabhakar and Ambhoj
Kumar Sinha for the Appellant.

E K. Ramamoorthi, Krishnamurthi Swami, P. Niroop, R. Chandra
Shekhar Reddy and Ms. D. Bharthi Reddy for t!te Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court wad delivered by

F DHARMADHIKARI, J.: The State of Andhra Pradesh is in appeal
agairist the common judgment dated 18.9.1996 passed by the High Court
of A.P. in W.P. No. 10074of1992 and batch of writ appeals whereby the
judgment dated 30. 7.1992 of the Special Court, Hyderabad under the
Andhra Pradesh Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 (for short: 'the Act of
1982') has been reversed with declaration that the respondents are not 'lan9
G grabbers' within the meaning of definition clause contained in Section 2(d)
of the Act of 1982.

The principle submission made before us by the learned senior
counsel appearing for the State of Andhra Pradesh is that the High Court
H in exercise of its writ jurisdiction had no justification, as in appeal, to re-
STATE v. P.V. HANUMANTHA RAO [DHARMADHIKARl,J.] 741

appreciate the whole evidence led by the parties before the Special Court A
and record contrary conclusions. Reliance is placed on Swarn Singh & Anr.
v. State of Punjab & Ors., AIR (1976) SC 232 and J.MD. Alloys Ltd v.
Bihar State Electricity Board & Ors., [2003] 5 SCC 226, paras 14 & 15
at pages 237-238.
B
The learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents supported
the judgment of the High Court contending that the Special Court,
established under the Act of 1982, overlooked vital documents of title
produced by the occupants of the disputed land and gave undue importance
to the fact that in revenue papers, the names of the occupants are not
recorded as being in lawful possession of the lands in question. The C
submission made is that where a Special Court exercising exclusive
jurisdiction conferred on it to determine whether the occupant of a land
is a 'land grabber' or not, ignores vital piece of evidence and takes decision
by giving importance to unimportant facts and circumstances, the power
of the High Court under Article 226 & 227 is wide enough to correct such D
gross errors of the Special Court. Reliance is placed on Surya Dev Rai v.
Ram Chander Rai & Ors., [2003] 6 SCC 675.

According to the case of the State, total land in Survey No. 9 of
Saroomagar Village in Rangareddy District of Andhra Pradesh measures E
Acres 540.32 guntas. Out of the said area, acres 295.18 guntas were set
apart in favour of the ex ruler of erstwhile Nizam State as Sarfekhas lands
(personal property of the Nizam). The balance of acres 245.14 guntas,
according to the State, was entered in revenue records as 'Kancha' lat>'.is.

On the other side, the case of the occupants of the land is that the F
erstwhile ruler in the Nizam State had granted as 'Muntakhab' or 'Inam',
sixty acres of land out of the above Survey No. 9 to his Horseman - Syed
Khasim Silhedar. After the death of Syed Khasim, his son Gulam Ahmed
sold 45 acres of land to respondent- P. V. Hanumantha Rao. The remaining
15 acres of land is claimed to be in possession of heirs of Gulam Ahmed G
who are respondents to these appeals and were parties before the High
Court. A petition for grant of occupancy rights under Inams Abolition Act
was filed before the Revenue Divisional Officer which was allowed in
favour of Gularri Ahmed. The Collector, in appeal, reversed that order. In
Writ Petition Nos. 2449/1988 & 7520/1988 filed against the said order, the H
742 SUPREME COURT REPORTS {2003] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A High Court in its order dated 31.12.1991 did not go into the merits of
the contentions of the parties because by that time the State of A.P. had
filed a suit for declaration of the land in dispute as the government land
and on constitution of Special Court under the Act of 1982, the suit was
transferred for tial to Special Court in accordance with Section 8(8) of the
B Act of 1982.

The occupants of the land continued to assert their rights and
approached the Board of Revenue for mutation of their names on sixty
acres of land in Survey No. 9 which they claimed to be in their actual
possession. In the review petition filed by the occupants-of the land the
C Board examined the documents of the produced by the occupants and by
order dated 06.8.1974 (Ex. A-15) came to the conclusion that sixty acres
of land from Survey No. 9 in Saroornagar Village was granted as
mafi-inam to Syed Khasim. The review petition was allowed by order dated
06.8.1974 of Board of Revenue but option was given to the government
D to take over the said Inam land, if they so desire, on payment of
compensation. The said order of the Board of Revenu.:_ remained
unchallenged by the State. The respondents - occupants then filed a writ ·
petition seeking implementation of the order of the Board of Revenue
mentioned above. The writ petition No. 1683 of 1977 filed by the
E occupants was allowed by order dated 01.3 .1978 of the High Court with
issuance of directions to the authorities to implement the order of Board
of Revenue dated 06.8.1974 whereunder the rights of the occupants to the
land in question were recognised. An option ·was left to the government
to invoke its revisional powers, if available, in accordance with law.

F After examining the documents of the title and other revenue records
produced by the occupants of the land, the Special Court decided against
the occupants of the land and held them to be 'land grabbers'.

In paragraph 44 of its order, the Special Court records· thus :
G "In none of these surverys, this sixty acres of land said_to be
belonging to Syed Khasiin Silhedar was sub-divided nor s~parately
shown ............................ ..

It does not show separate survey number of this sixty acres of
H. land."
STATE v. P.V. HANUMANTHA RAO [DHARMADHIKARI,J.] 743

Relying on the letter of the Collector (Ex. A-19) sent on a query made A
regarding existence of records with regard to the claim to ownership of the
occupants of the land, the Special Court made following observations :

"Ex. C-9 is the letter addressed by the Administrator, H.E.H., the
Nizam's Private Estate, to the Collector, while making inquiry B
under Ex. A-19. It was referred by the Collector also under Ex.
A-19. In this, he stated that even after thorough search the
existence of the file at any time has not been established, that Syed
Khasim might have been an employee of the Sarfekhas but he was
never given any land as Inam in Saroomagar village in Survey
No. 911 to the extent of 60 acres or even less, and that the whole C
record submitted to this office by the said GPA of Gulam
Mohammed appears to be a fictitious one. This assertion of this
office cannot be empty as such a huge Inam granted will not be
left without any record all these years, let alone entering in the
revenue records." D
The Special Tribunal thus proceeded and recorded one of its
conclusions thus :

"Thus it is seen since the date of grant in 1313-F (1903) the Inam
was not entered in the. revenue records and it was never given E
effect to by the Sarfekhas authorities."

The Special Court considered various documents and orders produced
by the parties befor it and recorded its final conclusion thus :
F
"The result of discussion of these issues 2 and 3 is that the grant
is not available, Muntakhab is not true and the Inam is not entered
in any of the revenue records, and consequently, we hold that the
respondents have failed to prove that the suit land is inam land,
and accordingly, we record our finding on issues 2 and 3 in the
negative." G
The High Court in writ petition preferred by the respondents
reexamined the documents of title and other revenue papers produced
before it including the various orders of revenue authorities and earlier
orders of the High Court passed from time to time. It then recorded contrary H
744 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A conclusions and set aside the order of the Special Court.

The main controversy is with regard to the acceptance of the claim
of title on the basis of muntakhab (Ex. B-9) granted to Syed Khasim -
predecessor-in-title of the present respondents. The High Court examined
B muntakhab (Ex. B-9) and the other connected documents to consider
whether the finding of Special Court to reject that document of title as
unreliable was justified in law. On the question of validity and reliability
of ~untakhab (Ex. B-9), the High Court held thus :

"Ex. B-9, the Xerox copy,ofMuntakhab (title-deed) dated 1st Dai
c 1313 Fasli ( 5 .11.1903) shows grant of sixty acres of land to Syed
khasim. Ex. B-10 is the note file signed by Sikandar Yar Jung.
Exs. B-9 and BIO are sent to Khurshid Jahi Paigah Authorities by
the Secretary of Sarefkhas. By letter dated 29.4.1917 (Ex.B-11),
the Secretary of Sarfekhas Mubarak to the Tahsildar East,
D Atratbalda District, stated that sixty acres of land is part of
Sarfekhas land ofNizam and since Sayed Khasim's right has been
established over that land, arrangement may be made that rio one
- - should enter into the possession of Syed Khasim and make entries
in revenue records."
E
The High Court summoned the original file (Ex. C-4) of the Sarfekhas
property as the Special Court had seen the original record translated in
English from Urdu. According to the High Court, the contents of file in
Ex. C-4 as to the existence of grant under 'muntakhab' in favol!r of Syed
F Khasim could not have been questioned by the Special Court. On the issue
of reliability of the contents of file (Ex.C-4) and the document of
muntakhab (Ex.B-9), the High Court found apparent mistake committed
by the Special Court in holding the document of title as unreliable for want
of seal, boundaries and plan with the grant. The High Court observes in
above respect thus :-
G
"The observation of the Special Court that there is in seal on Ex.
B-9 and no boundaries and plan .are appended is not correct
because we have perused Ex.C-4 file wherein a copy of Ex.B-9
is there, which bears a seal and an endorsement of its issuance.
H As regards the boundaries, it is to be noticed that when a part of
,...

STATE v. P.V. HANUMANTHA RAO [DHARMADHIKARI, J.] 745
land is bifurcated from vast extent of land, mentioning of A
boundaries i.n grant of certificate does not arise unless survey is
conducted and separate area is earmarked. The reliance placed by
the Special Court on the fact -that Assistant Collector held the
muntakhab as not proved, is not proper since the Board of
Revenue on verification of Exs. C-4, B-9 and B-10 accepted the B
grant and directed to implement the same in revenue records. The
effect of the order of the Assistant Collector is deemed to be set
aside and no more in existence. It cannot. therefore, be said that
Ex. B-9 is not genuine and valid. Ex.B-10 contains the signature
of Sikandar Yar Jung, which is found to be similar as that of him. C
So, it is not possible to come to conclusion that Exs. B-9 and
B-10 have been inserted into the file. We, therefore, hold that Exs.
B-9 and B-10 are genuine documents and are proved.

The High Court then referred to Ex. B-12, a certified copy of the
judgment in case No. 270 of 1902 on the file of the Second Judge, City D
Civil Court, Hyderabad in which the claim of Syed Khasim as lnamdar was
upheld by the civil court. According to the High Court, this judgment
corroborates the contents of the file (Ex. C-4) in which are contained the
muntakhab (Ex. B-9) and grant (Ex. B-10).
E

-
In negativing the claim of the occupants, the Special Court had
attached great importance to the fact that pursuant to the grant under
Muntakhab, revenue records do not show entries in favour of the grantee
and his legal representatives. The High Court has found that the Special
Court has grossly erred 'in that regard and overlooked entries in pahani F
patrikas (Ex. A-2 to A-13 and A-2 to A-28) covering period from 1962-
63 to 1986-87. The relevant part of the decision of the High Court contrary
to the finding of the Special Court on non-existence of entries in the
revenue records in favour of the occupants of land, reads as under :

"All the above documents show that sixty acres of land in survey G.
no. 9/1 of Saroomagar village was granted as inam to Syed
Khasim. He was in possession of that land during his life time.
He has taken up proceedings for getting his name mutated in
revenue records and the litigation continued. Irrespective of
litigation, the documents clearly show that inam was granted to H

.....
•

746 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A Syed Khasim and he was trying to get his name mutated in
revenue records.

The petitioner relied on pahani patrikas (Exs. A-2 to A-13 and
A-2 to A-28) for the period from 1962-63 to 1986-87, which are
for the continuous periods. It is a fact that the name of the son
B
of lnamdar of fifth respondent. It is a fact that the name of the
son of Inamdar of fifth respondent has not been mentioned
· therein. It is to be noticed that since the inception the inamdar,
his son and thereafter the fifth respondent were agitating to get
the names recorded in revenue records before the Collector. In
c those circumstances, possibly their names do not find place in the
revenue records. Unless the names are mutated in Jamabandi, they -·
cannot be carried over each year. Non-mention of names of the
inamdar or his son in revenue records is not fatal to the case of
fifth respondent. Exs. A-29 to A-35 are faisal pattis from 1968-
D 69 to 1977~78. In documents, the name of fifth respondent is
recorded as a person in possession and he was directed to pay
revenue and penalty as trespasser. Thus, the name of fifth
respondent does find place in revenue records."

E Thus finding various errors in the order of the Special Court due to
misreading of certain documents and overlooking relevant records, the
High Court recorded the following conclusions :

According to the definition of 'inam' under Section 2(c) of the
Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Abolition Inams Act, the land
F held under a gift or grant made by the Nizam or other competent
grantor and continued by virtue of Muntakhab or title deed is said
to be inam land. The evidence of fifth respondent and eighth
respondent coupled with the documentary evidence n~ferred to
above clearly show that inam was granted go Syed Khasim and
G there.after his Gulam Ahmed succeeded and they were agitating
their claim before the revenue authorities for getting their names
., ,, entered in revenue records. Fifth respondent, who was a tenant
first and then a purchaser; has been in possession of the land and
the same has been proved by the decrees of the civil court and
H· the judgments· of the criminal court in the proceedings under
STATE v. P.V. HANUMANTHA RAO [DHARMADHIKARI, J.J 747

Section 145 Cr.P.C. Merely because their names are not entered A
',, in revenue records, it cannot be said that there was no inam. Once
they are in physical possession of the land, non-entry of their
names in revenue records, will not vitiate the inam validly granted
to the inamdar.
B
Before the High Court, it was urged on behalf of the State, as has been
urged before us, that scope of interference under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India by the High Court, is limited and it cannot act like
an appellate court.

In. the present appeals, in the light of the findings and conclusions C
recorded by the Special Court and the High Court, two questions arise for
decision. The first is with regard to the scope of jurisdiction of High Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution in petition against the judgment of
the Special Court and the second is whether on the basis of the documents
on record the High Court was justified in holding that the occupants of the D
. land cannot be tenned as 'land grabbers' under the provisions of the Act
of 1982.

Taking up first the second question relating to the provisions of the
Act of 1982, we find that the object and scheme of the Act has to be E
examined. The Statement of Objects and Reasons for bringing into effect
the Act of 1982 is a key to understanding the various provisions of the Act
and the tenns defined therein. They read thus :

"Statement of Object and Reasons :- It has come to the notice of F
the government that there are organised attempts on the part of
certain lawless persons operating individually and in groups to
grab either by force, or by deceit or otherwise lands belonging to
the government, a local authority, a religious or charitable institution
or endowment, including a wakf or any other private person. The
land grabbers are forming bogus cooperative housing societies or G
setting up fictitious claims and including in large scale and
unprecedented and fraudulent sales of land through unscrupulous
real estate dealers or otherwise in favour of certain section of
people, resulting in large scale accumulation of the unaccounted
wealth. As public order is also adversely affected thereby now and H
748 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A then by such unlawful activities of land grabbers in the State,
particularly in respect of urban and urbanisable land, it was felt
necessary to arrest and curb such unlawful activities immediately
by enacting a special law in that regard."

To fulfil the above object, the Act defines 'Land Grabber' and 'Land
B
Grabbing' in Section 2(d) & 2(e) as under :

"2(d). 'Land Grabber' means a person or a group of persons who
commits land grabbing and includes any person who gives
financial aid to any person for taking illegal possession of lands
c· or for construction of unauthorised structures thereon, or who
collects or atterripts to collect from any occupiers of such lands
rent, compensation and other charges by criminal intimidation, or
who abets the doing of any of the above mentioned acts; and also
includes the successors in interest:
D
2(e) 'Land. Grabbing' means every activity of grabbing of any
land (whether belonging to the Government, a local authority, a
religious or charitable institution or endowment, including a wakf,
or any other private person) by a person or group of persons,
E without any lawful entitlement and with a view to ilk:gally taking
possession of such land, or enter into or create illegal tenancies
or lease and licences agreements or any other illegal agreements
in respect of such lands or to construct unauthorised structures
thereon for sale or hire, or give such lands to any person on rental
or lease and licence basis for construction, or use and occupation,
F of unauthorised structures; and the term 'to grab land' shall be
construed accordingly."

Under section 7, the Special Courts are constituted with extraordinary
powers. They can evolve their own procedure not 'inconsistent with the
G natural justice and fair play' and notwithstanding the provisions contained
in the Code of Civil Procedure. The relevant provision in sub-section (SD)
(i) of section 7 reads as under :

"7(5D)(i). Notwithstanding anything in the Code of Civil Procedure,
H 1908, the Special Court may follow its own procedure which shall
STATE v. P.V. HANUMANTHA RAO [DHARMADHIKARI, J.] 749

not be inconsistent with the principles of natural justice and fair A
play and subject to the other provisions of this Act and of any rules
made thereunder while deciding the civil liability."

Section 8(1) regulates powers and procedures of the Special Court
and reads thus :
B
"8(1). Procedure and powers of the Special Court. -The Special
Court may, either sou motu, or on application made by any person,
officer or authority take cognizance of any try every case arising
out of any alleged act of land grabbing or with respect to the
ownership and title to, or lawful possession of, the land grabbed, C
whether before or after the commencement of this Act, and pass
such orders (including orders by way of interim directions) as it
deems fit.

Sub-section (6) of section 8 makes the finding of the Special Court D
on the question of title and ownership of the land alleged to have been
grabbed as final and binding on all persons having interest in such land.
Sub-section (6) of section 8 reads thus :

"Section 8(6). - Every finding of the Special Court with regard
to any alleged act of land grabbing shall be conclusive proof of E
the fact of land grabbing and of the persons who committed such
land grabbing, and every judgment of the Special Court with
regard to the detennination of title and ownership to, or lawful
possession of, any land grabbed shall be binding on all persons
having interest in such land. F
Under Section 9, powers of civil court have been conferred on Special
Court and it is deemed to be a civil court for the purposes mentioned
therein:

"9. Special Court to have the powers of the Civil Court of and G
the Court of Session:- Save as expressly povided in this Act, the
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the Andhra
Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 1972 and the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973, in so far as they are not inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act, shall apply to the proceedings before the H
750 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A Special .Court and for the purposes of the provisions of the said
enactments, Special Court shall be deemed to be a Civil Court,
or as the case may be, a Court of Session and shall have all the
powers of a Civil Court and a Court of session and the person
conducting a prosecuting a prosecution before the Special Court
shall be deemed to be a -Public Prosecutor."
B
In accordance with sub-section (8) of section 8, any case pending
before any court or oti)er authority which would have been within
jurisdiction- of the Speeial Court shall stand transferred to the Special
Court.
·c
"Section 8(8). - Any case, pending before !iny court or other
authority immediately before the constitution of a Special Court,
as would have been within the jurisdiction of such Special Court,
shall stand transferred to the Special Court as if the cause of action
'D on which such suit or proceeding is based had arisen after the
constitution of the Spe~ial Court."

It is in accordance with sub-section (8) of section 8 that the suit for
declaration of title filed by the State of A.P. in the civil .court, stood -
-E transferred to the Special Court for trial and decision.

On examination of the relevant provisions of the Act of 1982 and in
the light of its objects and reasons, it is apparent that in cases of alleged
land grabbing, exclusive jurisdiction is conferred on the Special Court.
.F Jurisdiction of civil court on such subject matter stands ousted. The Special
Court has been conferred powers of civil court to examine all questions
of title and possession with respect to the land alleged to have been
grabbed. The findings of the Special Court are binding and conclusive on
the parties and all others having interets in the land which is alleged to have
been grabbed. Against the decision of the Special Court, no appeal is
:-o provided. Only remedy of aggrieved party is to approach the High Court
under Articles 226 or '227 of the Constitution of India. It is on the basis
- of ·the aforesaid provisions that we have to determine the scope of
·interference of the High Court in writ petition in the judgment and decision
of the Special Court. In the case of Konda Lakshmana Bapuji (supra), this
.H 'Court,· ~fter-examining the scheme of the Act, held :
STATE v. P.V. HANUMANTHA RAO [DHARMADHIKARI, J.] 751

"To make out a case in a civil case that the appellant is a land A
grabber the first respondent must aver and prove both the
ingredients - the factum as well as the intention - that the
appellant falls in the categories of the persons, mentioned above
[clause (d) of section 2 of the Act], has occupied the land in
dispute, which belonged to the first respondent, without any B
lawful entitlement and with a view to or with the intention bf
illegally taking possession of such land or entering into land for
any of the purposes mentioned in clause (e) of Section 2 of the
Act, summarised above.

What needs to be looked in the present controversy is : whether C
the appellant has any lawful entitlement (proprietary or possessory)
to the land in dispute and had come into possession of the land
in dispute unauthorisedly".

The Division Bench in that case further observed : D

"A mere prima facie bona fide claim to the land alleged to be
grabbed by such a person, cannot avert being roped in within the
ambit of the expression "land grabber". What is germane is lawful
entitlement to and not a mere prima facie Bona fide claim to the E
land alleged to be grabbed."

The provisions of the Act of 1982, which are to be understood in the
light of Statement of Objects and Reasons for the Act and the decision of
this Court in case of Konda Lakshmana Bapuji (supra), indicate that a mere F
doubt raised by the State on the title and possession of the occupant of a
land does not make him 'a land grabber'. Whenever the right of the
occupant is questioned by the State, it is not enough for the occupant to
show that he has a prima facie bona fide claim to the land occuplied but
a burden is cast on him to prove that he is in occupation or possession of
the land under a lawful title. G

True it is that remedy of writ petition available in the High Court is
not against the 'decision' of the subordinate court, tribunal or authority but
it is against the 'decision making process'. In the 'decision making
process', if the court tribunal or authority deciding the case, has ignored H
752 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A vital evidence and thereby arrived at erroneous conclusion or has
misconstrued the provisions of the relevant Act or misunderstood the scope
of its jurisdiction'', the constitutional power of the High Court under
Articles 26 and 227 can be invoked to set right such errors and prevent
gross injustice to the party complaining.
B
In the case of Surya Devi (supra) while examining the· nature and
ambit of power of the High Court to issue writs under Articles 226 or 227
of the Constitution, the above stated legal.position has been recognised by
observing thus :

c "Though we have tried to lay down broad principles and working
rules, the fact remains that the parameters for exercise ofjurisdiction
under Articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution cannot be tied down
-
in a strait-jacket formula or rigid rules.

D
At the end, we may sum up by saying that the power is there but
the exercise is discretionary which will be governed solely by the
dictates of judicial conscience enriched by judicial experience and
E practical wisdom of the Judge."

This Court has recognised the right of the High Court to interfere in
orders of sub-ordinate courts and tribunals where (1) there is an error
manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is
F based on clear misreading or utter disregard of the provisions of law and
(2) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.

No doubt, it was held that neither in exercise of power of writ under
Article 226 nor in supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227, the High
Court will convert itself into a court of appeal and indulge in the re-
G appreciation or evaluation of evidence. The power of the High Court iii
writ jurisdiction to interfere where important evidence has been overlooked
and the legal provisions involved are misinterpreted or misapplied has
been recognised even in the case of Swarn Singh & Anr. (supra) on which
strong reliance was placed on behalf of the State. The relevant observations
H are:
STATE v. P.V. HANUMANTHA RAO [DHARMADHIKARI, J.] 753
In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior tribunal, a A .
writ of Certiorari can be issued only if in recording such a finding,
the tribunal has acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible,
or has refused to admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is
not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases the
error amounts to an error of law. B
After detailed examination of the findings of the Special Court and
the contrary findings recorded by the High Court, we do not find that the
High Court has in any manner exceeded its writ jurisdiction. The Spe"Cial
Court declared the occupants as 'land grabbers' holding that the Muntakhab C

-
contained in the file (Ex. C-4) is not reliable and supported by any
corresponding revenue entries in favour of the occupants. The High Court,
which alone could have examined the correctness of the decision of the
Special Court, in the absence of any remedy of appeal, rightly observed
that it was within its power to re-examine the evidence to ascertain the
correctness of the findings of the Special Court In doing so, the High Court D
found that the documents of title Muntakhab (Ex. B-9) contained seal of
the Ex Ruler. The boundaries and plan were appended to it. It found that
the Special Court wrongly held that since the Muntakhab did not earmark
area of grant in the survey No. 9, the grant was insufficient to prove title
to the land in actual occupation of the respondents. The High Court also E
found that order of the Board of Revenue directing mutation in favour of
the occupants remained unchallenged and was not implemented despite
directions of the High Court in the earlier writ petition. The High Court
also found that the rejection of the title of the occupants on the ground that
there were no mutation entires made pursuant to the muntakhab was an
error caused by overlooking important revenue entries in favour of the F
occupants which are contained in pahani patrikas (Exs. A-2 to A-13 and
A-2 to A-28) for the period from 1962-63 to 1986-87. We have extracted
above the findings of the Special Court and the contrary findings recorded
by the High Court to show that the High Court interferred with the
judgment of the Special Court not merely because it found its reasoning G
or conclusions erroneous but it found that important evidence corroborating
the grant i.e. muntakhab (Ex. B-9). contained in the file (Ex. C-4), which
was summoned from the office of the Erstwhile Ruler, was not properly
scrutinised by the Special Court and Important revenue records available
were disregarded. According to the High Court, the Special Court was H
754 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A clearly wrong in holding the occupants of the land as 'land grabbers' when
they had produced documents of title and orders of Revenue Board and
the High Court. The legal representatives of the original grantee Syed
Khasim had been throughout litigating in the revenue courts and the High
Court for obtaining mutation in their names in the revenue records and for
B recognition of their rights as inamdars by virtue of the grant of the Ex Ruler
in their favour. The Special Court on unsubsta11tial grounds had rejected
their claims to title and possession of the land. The High Courts in its writ
jurisdiction was, therefore, ful;y justified in examining those documents of
title and upsetting the judgment of the ~pecial Court on the ground that
material evidence and circumstances proved by the occupants were
C overlooked in holding the occupants as land grabbers. In the course of
hearing of these appeals, the relevant documents of title were placed before
us for perusal and translated copies of the same have been supplied to us
in the form of an additional paper-book. W~ have heard the-parties and
ourselves looked into the papers to find that there exists overwhelming
D record of title and possession of the land in favour of the occupants and
they could not have been termed as 'land grabbers'.

With the growing menace of land grabbing, the Act, of 1982
constitutes Special Courts and ousts jurisdiction of the regular civil courts
E in respect of land alleged to have been grabbed. Where the regular retpedy
povided by general law is ousted by special law, the provisions of the latter
deserve to be construed strictly. We have examined the scheme and object
of the Act and examined its relevant provisions. When an occupant of the
land is alleged to be a 'land grabber', he has to justify his possession and
F prove his source oftitle. Where source oftitle by an occupant is produced,
the Special Court is required to examine it to consider whether on the basis
of evidence of title produced by him, he can be held to be not falling in
the definition of 'laud grabber' under sub-clause (d) of Section 2 of the
Act. In the present case, the occupants had produced documents to prove
their source of title and long possession of their predecessor-in-title being
G the original grantee under a Munthakhab issued by the Ruler of erstwhile
Nizam State. This title-deed with revenue entries based on them produced
by the occupants should have been treated sufficient for the purpose of the
Act to treat the occupants of the land to be falling outside the definition
of' land grabber'. It is not a case where the occupants have tried to justify
H their possession on the basis of a mere bona fide claim to the land. They
STATE v. P.V. HANUMANTHA RAO [DHARMADHIKARI, J.] 755

have produced oral and documentary evidence on the Munthakhab and A·
justified their possession as alinees from the heirs of the original grantees.

For the aforesaid reasons, in our view, the High Court did not exceed
its jurisdiction in upsetting the judgment of the Special Court.

SLP................ CC 4870 OF 2000 B.

Leave to file appeal against the impugned judgment of the High Court
has been sought by Urban Huts & Slum Dwellers Association through its
Secretary. The submission made is that on the land alleged to have been
grabbed by the respondents, several hutsment dwellers are in occupation C
and since the judgment binds them, they were necessary parties to be heard
by the Special Court and the High Court.

Since the hutsment dwellers individually or through their association
were not parties in the civil suit filed by the State which stood transferred D
to Special Court, we find no ground to grant leave to the Association of
the huts and slum dwellers to file an appeal. In view of the judgment
rendered by us in the main Civil Appeal Nos. 8601-8605of1997 preferred
by the State of A.P., the slum dwellers will have to work out their rights
independently. Their right and soqrce of occupation, if any, is different in
each case and it is not possibile to decide their rights in these appeals which E
arise out of the common judgment of the Special Court rendered between
parties impleaded in the cases before it. The leave to file appeal is,
therefore, refused. ·

In the result Civil Appeal Nos. 8601-8605of1997 are dismissed but F
in the circumstances without any order as to costs.

Permission to file Special Leave Petition (CC 4870 of 2000) is
refused.

B.K.M. Appeal dismissed. G