Holding

There must be a limit to the period for which criminal litigation is allowed to continue at the trial stage; excessive delay justifies quashing the proceedings.

Summary

The State of Bihar charged seven respondents under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act for alleged misappropriation of G.C. sheets. The case, initiated in 1963, suffered extreme delays with the charge framed only in 1967 and the trial dragging on for over 20 years. The Patna High Court quashed the proceedings in 1979, holding that the police report did not disclose an offence and that the prolonged trial amounted to an abuse of process. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed that criminal litigation must have a reasonable time limit at the trial stage and that such protracted delay, even in a serious offence, justifies quashing the case. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, leaving the high court's order intact.

Issues considered

Whether a delay of about twenty years in a criminal trial constitutes an abuse of the process of the court warranting quashing of the proceedings.
Whether the absence of a clear offence in the police report is sufficient to quash the case.
Whether there is a statutory or inherent limit on the period for which criminal litigation may continue at the trial stage.

Legislation cited

Essential Commodities Act, 1955s. 7

Subjects

criminal lawspeedy trialabuse of processessential commodities acttrial delayquashing of proceedingsprotracted litigation

Judgment

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402

A STATE OF BIHAR
v.
UMA SHANKAR KETRIW AL & OTHERS
December 18, 1980
B [S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND A. D. KOSHAL, JJ.]
Criminal trial-Prosecuti'on commenced in the year 1963--Continuing in
1979-High Court quashing proceedings as an abuse of the process of court-.
Order whether valid-Limit to period for criminal litigation to continue at 1rlal
stage-Necessity of.
•
c A case was initiated through a report lodged with the police on the 9th
April, 1960 that the respondent's firm had misappropriated a large quantity of
G. C. Sheets meant for distribution to quota and sub·quota holders. After
investigation, a police report was submitted on the 23rd December 1962 to the •
Magstrate, who took cognizance of the case on the 25th January, 1963. Cherges
were framed against the respondents under section 7 of the Essential Com.
modities Act on 15th September, 1967. The progress of the case thereafter
was very tardy.
D
In 1979, the respondents made two applications to the High Court f~r
quashing the proceedings initiated against them. The High Court allowed them
on the ground that the police report did not disclose any offence against any
of the respondent,, and that as the prosecution commenced in the year 1963
was still going on in 1979, it would be an abuse of the process of the Conrt
to allow the prosecution to continue any further.
E
In the appeal by the State to this Court, it was contended that the finding
about the police report not disclosing any offence was erroneous and that the
delay in the conclusion of the trial was not a justification for quashing the
proceedings.
Dismissing the appeal
:F HELD : 1. There has to be a limit to the period for which criminal litiga.
tion is allowed to go on at the trial stage. [4040] ~
2. The present case is not a proper one for interference inspite of the fact
that the allegations disclose the commission of an offence which is quite
serious. [404EJ •
In the instant case the trial has not made much headway even though no
G less than 20 years have gone by. Such protraction itself means considerable
harassment to the accused not only monetarily but also by way of constant
attention to the case and repeated appearances in court, apart from anxiety,
[404C.DJ
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 699
of 1980. •
H Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated
6-11-1979 of Patna High Court in Criminal Misc. Nos. 3679 and
3913/79. '

\
• BIHAR v. UMA SHANKAR (Kasha/, J.) 403

K. G. Bhagat and D. Goburdhon for the Appellant. A
S. C. Misra, M. P. Jha and A. K. Jho for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Conrt was delivered by
KosHAL, J. This is an appeal by special leave against an order
dated the 6th November, 1979 of a learned Single Jndge of the Patna B
High Court quashing the entire proceedings in a criminal case against
the 7 respondents who were facing a charge under section 7 of the
Essential Commodities Act in the Court of a Magistrate at Bhagaipi;r.
2. The case was initiated through a report lodged with the poiice
on the 9th of April 1960 with the allegation that the respondents' firm C
which held a licence for dealing in iron and steel had misappropriated
a large quantity of G.C. sheets meant for distribution to quota and
• sub-quota holders. After investigation a police report was submitted
on the 23rd December 1962 to a Bhagalpur Magistrate who took
congnizance of the case on the 25th January 1963. However, the
charge against the respondents was framed as late as 15th September D
1967 and since then the progress of th" case was very tardy as the
orders passed therein were challenged in appeals or on the revisio'nal
side from time to time. Ultimately in 1979 th" respondents made
two applications to the High Court praying that the proceedings against
them be quashed and the same were accepted through the impugned
order. The High Court held for various reasons that the police report E
did not disclose an,y offence against any of the respondent.. Another
reason for accepting the two applications may be stated in the words
of the learned Single Judge :
"Another important aspect of the matter is that the pro·
secution commenced in' the year 1963 and it is still going on F
in 1979. It is true that the accused persons themselves are
partly blamed for this delay because several revision appli·
cations have been filed at \heir instance in the High Court
• and in the district court. The situation, however, continues
to be unjustified because the last revision application was
some time disposed in 1973 and the record was returned in G
1974. This fact has been stated by the learned counsel for
the petitioners and five years have elapsed since then. I am
told that four witnesses have been examined and !he last
witness was examined in April, 1979 and after that no wit-
• ness has been examined. It has been stated in the order
sheet that prosecution is not in a position to know the H
address of the witnesses who are mostly Government Ofli.
T cials. Luxury of protracted trial cannot be allowed to the
404 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 2 s.c.R.
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A
prosecution. If they did not know the address of their own
witnesses and if the prosecution was not in a position to
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conclude its evidence by now it will be an abuse of the
process of the court to allow the prosecution go on any
further."
B 3. Le.arned counsel for the appellant State has challenged the
impug'ned order not only on the ground that its finding about the
police report not disclosing any offence against the respondents was
erroneous but also with the argument that the delay in the conclusion
of the trial was not a justification for quashing the proceedings. We •
have heard him at length and although there is much to be said against
c the impugned order i'n so far as the finding about the police report is
concerned, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the trial has not made
much headway even though no less than 20 years have gone by. Such
protraction itself means considerable harassment to the accused not
only monetarily but also by way of constant atte'ntioa to the case and
repeated appearances in court, apart from anxiety. It may well be
D that the respondents themselves were responsible in a large measure
for the slow pace of the case inasmuch as quite a few orders made
by the trial magistrate were challenged in higher courts, but then there
has to be a limit to the period for which criminal litigation is allowed
to go on at the trial stage. In this view of the matter we do not consi-
der the present case a proper one for our interference in spite of the
E fact that we feel that the all'¢gations disclosed the conunission of an
offence which we regard as quite serious.
4. For the reasons stated we dismiss the appeal.

N.V.K. Appeal dismissed. ~

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