Holding

The lands are "vacant land" under Section 2(q) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 and the Act applies, precluding acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act for the surplus portion.

Summary

The Gujarat government issued a notification under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to acquire lands for municipal employee housing. After the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (ULCRA) came into force, the landowners filed statements under ULCRA claiming the lands were in excess of the ceiling limit and sought to have the surplus land excluded from acquisition. They also challenged the applicability of ULCRA, arguing the lands were not "vacant land" and that the Act was beyond Parliament's competence. The Gujarat High Court quashed the ULCRA proceedings but allowed the acquisition to continue. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, held that the lands are "vacant land" within the meaning of Section 2(q) of ULCRA, that the Act applies notwithstanding the pending acquisition, and set aside the High Court judgment, dismissing the writ petitions.

Issues considered

Whether the lands in question fall within the definition of "vacant land" under Section 2(q) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976.
Whether the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 is applicable to lands that are subject to acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
Whether the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 is beyond the legislative competence of Parliament with respect to the State of Gujarat.
Whether acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 can continue for lands that are surplus to the ceiling limit under ULCRA.

Legislation cited

Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954s. 29(1)(a)
Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 24, s. 4(1), s. 5-A, s. 6
Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976s. 11, s. 1(2), s. 15, s. 19, s. 2(q), s. 3, s. 4, s. 42, s. 6, s. 7, s. 8, s. 9

Subjects

Urban land ceilingVacant landLand acquisitionLegislative competenceBuilding regulationsCeiling limitGujaratSupreme CourtStatutory interpretation

Judgment

STATE OF GUJARAT AND ORS. ETC.
A
v.
PARSHOTTAMDAS RAMDAS PATEL & ORS.

NOVEMBER 12, 1987

[E.S. VENKATARAMIAH AND K.N. SINGH, JJ.] B

Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 Section 2(q)(i)-
'Vacant land'-What is-Applicability of Act to 'land' which is subject
matter of land Acquisition proceedings.

The State Government of Gujarat-Appellant, issued a Notifica-
tion dated March 31, 1976 published in the Government Gazette dated
c
April 8, 1976 under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
stating that the Lands of the respondents were likely to be needed for
the public purpose of providing housing accommodation for the emp-
loyees of the Municipal Corporation, and that after making an enquiry
under section S·A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 the State Govern- D
ment had issued a declaration under section 6 of the said Act declaring
that the aforesaid lands along with other lands were needed for the said
public purpose.

In the meanwhile the Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act,
1976 came into force with effect from 17.2.1976. E

-- The respondents filed statements before the Competent Authority
under section 6 of the 1976 Act including the lands to be acquired which
were in excess of the ceiling limit which each of the respondents could
retain after the coming into force of the 1976 Act.
F
Thereafter, the respondents filed writ petitions contending that
the acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
should be proceeded with and the acquisition proceedings to the extent
it related to the surplus land under the ceiling law should be dropped.
The applicability of the provisions of the Urban Land (Ceiling and
Regulation) Act, 1976 insofar as they were applicable within the limits G
\ of the Municipal Corporation were questioned contending that: (i) the
-~ Act was beyond the legislative competence of Parliament insofar as tht
State Government of Gujarat was concerned; (ii) that the lands in ques-
tion were not 'vacant lands' as defined in the Act and, therefore the
proceedings instituted in respect of them under the Act were liable to be
quashed, and (iii) that the land acquisition proceedings under the Land H
997
998 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1988] I S.C.R.

Acquisition Act 1894 which were initiated should be completed, and the
A
Land Acquisition Officer should be directed to pass awards in favour of
the respondents. These writ petitions were contested by the appel-
lants-State.

The High Court though negativing the contentions of the respon-
B dents regarding the legislative competence of Parliament to pass the
Urban Land Act, quashed the proceedings instituted under the Act. It,
however, declined to issue a writ in the nature of mandamus directing
the Land Acquisition Officer before whom the proceedings were com-
menced under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as he was not made a
party to the writ proceedings, but made a declaration that the land
-~·
acquisition proceedings did not suffer from any infirmity. ! ·--.;...
c
The State Government aggrieved by the judgment of the High
Court filed Special Leave Petitions to this Court.

D On the question whether; the lands of the respondents are lands to
which the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 would apply.

Allowing the Appeals,

HELD: 1. The finding of the High Court that by virtue of sectkm
E 29(l)(a) of the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954 the lands fell outside the
definition of 'vacant land' in the Urban Land Act, 1976 is unsustain-
able. The High Court omitted to notice that the owners were entitled to
construct buildings on the lands after the permission was accorded by
the local authority. [lOOSC]
I
F 2. The object of the Urban Land Act, 1976 is to provide for the
imposition of a ceiling on 'vacant land' in urban agglomerations for the 1"'
acquisition. of such land in excess of the ceiling limit and to regulate the
construction of buildings on such land and to bring about an equitable
distribution of land iu urban agglomerations to subserve the common
good. [lOOOG] '
G
3. The question whether a piece of land is a 'vacant land' or not
does not depend upon the fact whether a prudent man would put up a
building on that land or not after the issue of a notification under
section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Nor a land will cease to
be a 'vacant land' merely because the permission of certain authorities
H is to be taken to put up a building thereon. [l006G-JJ]
STATEOFGUJARATv. PARSHOTTAMDAS [VENKATARAMIAH,J.] 999

4. The proceedings under the land Acquisition Act, 1894 cannot
A
have any bearing on the question whether the lands in question are
'vacant lands' or not for the purposes of the ceiling Jaw contained in the
Urban Land Act, 1976. When the lands in question or bulk of them are
likely to be acquired under the ceiling law by paying a compensation as
provided therein, it would not be proper to compel the Government to
acquire them under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. [1007Dl B

5. Sub-clause (i) of clause (q) of section 2 of the Urban Land
Act 1976 does not provide that a land on which the owner cannot
construct a building will cease to be 'vacant laud' for the purposes
of the Act. [l007F]

6. As long as construction of a building can be done on a land by C
some person or authority, the land does not get excluded from the
definition of the expression 'vacant land' under the Act. The lands in
the instant case, therefore, are 'vacant lands.' [1007G]

Smt. Shanti Devi v. The Competent Authority under U.L. (C.R.) D
Act, 1976 Delhi and others, AIR 1980 Delhi 106, overruled.

Prabhakar Narhar Pawar v. State of Maharashtra and Another,
AIR 1984 Bombay 122 and The State of U. P. and another v. Radha
Raman Agarwal and anothtr, AIR 1987 Allahabad 272, approved.
E
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 635-
642 of 1981.

From the Judgment and Order dated 19/22.9.1980 of the Gujarat
High Court in S.C.A. Nos. 3295, 3480, 3481, 3648, of 1979, 668, 669,
889 and 1205 of 1980. F

G. Ramaswamy, Additional Solicitor General, G.A. Shah,
Hameed Qureshi and M.N. Shroff for the Appellants.

B.K. Mehta, M.N. Goswami, P.V. Nanavathy and H.S. Parihar,
for the Respondents. G

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

VENKATARAMIAH, J. These appeals by special leave are filed
against the common judgment in eight writ ~etitions on the file of the
High Court of Gujarat. The respondents m these appeals 1.e. the H
1000 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1988) I S.C.R.

petitioners in the said writ petitions questioned the applicability of the
A
provisions of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (Act
33 of 1976) (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') to several pieces of
land belonging to them situated within the limits of the Ahmedabad
Municipal Corporation. They raised three contentions before the High
Cmut-(i) that the Act was beyond the legislative competence of
B Parliament insofar as the State of Gujarat was concerned; (ii) that the
lands in question were not vacant lands as defined in the Act and,
therefore, the proceedings instituted in respect of them under the Act
were liable to be quashed; and (iii) that the land acquisition proceed-
ings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 which had been initiated in
respect of the lands in question should be completed and the Land
Acquisition Officer should be directed to pass awards in favour of the
C respondents. The writ petitions were resisted by the State of Gujarat
and despite such opposition the High Court allowed the writ petitions.
The High Court negatived the contention of the respondents regarding
the legislative competence of Parliament to pass the Act in view of the
decision in Union of India etc. v. Valluri Basavaiah Chaudhary etc etc.
D [1979) 3 S.C.R. 802. The High Court, however, quashed the proceed-
ings instituted under the Act in respect of the aforesaid lands which
were pending before the Additional Collector and the Competent Au-
thority, Ahmedabad. While the High Court declined to issue a writ in
the nature of mandamus directing the Land Acquisition Officer, be-
fore whom the proceedings commenced under the Land Acquisition
E Act, 1894 were pending as he had not been made a party to the writ
petitions, it, however, made a declaration that the land acquisition
proceedings did not suffer from any infirmity. Indirectly the High
Court indicated that the land acquisition proceedings should be pro-
ceeded with. Aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court the appel-
lants have filed these appeals by special leave.
F
The principal question which arises for consideration in this case
is whether the lands in question are the lands to which the Act would
apply. The Act came into force with effect from 17.2.1976. The object
of the Act, as can be seen from its preamble, is to provide for the
imposition of a ceiling on vacant land in urban agglomerations, for the
G acquisition of such land in excess of the ceiling limit, to regulate the
constructions of buildings on such land and for matters connected
therewith, with a view to preventing the concentration of urban land in
the hands of a few persons and speculation and profiteering therein
and with a view to bringing about an equitable distribution of land in
urban agglomerations to subserve the common good. Section 3 of the
H Act, which may be considered to be the key section of the Act, pro-
STAIBOFGUJARATv. PARSHOTTAMDAS [VENKATARAMIAH,J.] 1001

vides that except as otherwise provided in the Act, on and from the A
commencement of the Act, no person shall be entitled to hold any
vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit in the territories to which the
Act applies under sub-section (2) of section 1. The State of Gujarat is
one of the States to which the Act has been made applicable by virtue
of the provisions in sub-section (2) of section 1 of the Act. The ceiling
limit is prescribed by section 4 of the Act. The expression 'vacant land' B
is defined in section 2(q) of the Act thus:

"2(q) 'Vacant land' means land, not being land mainly
used for the purpose of agriculture, in an urban agglomera-
tion, but does not include- · •

(i) land on which construction of a building is not c
permissible under the building regulations in force in the
area in which such land is situated;

(ii) in an area where there are building regulations,
the land occupied by any building which has been cons- D
tructed before, or is being constructed 011, the appointed
day with the approval of the appropriate authority and the
land appurtenant to such building; and

(iii) in an area where there are no building regula-
tions, the land occupied by any building which has been E
constructed before, or is being constructed on, the appoin-
ted day and the land appurtenant to such building:

Provided that where any person ordinarily keeps his
cattle, other than for the purpose of dairy farming or for
the purpose of breeding of live-stock, on any land situated F
in a village within an urban agglomeration (described as a
village in the revenue records), then, so much extent of the
land as has been ordinarily used for the keeping of such
cattle immediately before the appointed day shall not be
deemed to be vacant land for the purposes of this clause."
G
Section 6 of the Act requires every person holding vacant land in
excess of the ceiling limit at the commencement of the Act to file a
statement before the competent authority having jurisdiction_ on the
area in which the land is situated. Section 7 of the Act 1s ancillary_ to
t" 6 of the Act. Section 8 of the Act provides for the preparatt~n
~~ct~~ndraft statement as regards the vacant land held by any person m H
1002 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1988] I S.C.R.

A excess of the ceiling limit and for calling for objections from the owner
to the said statement. It also empowers the competent authority to
consider the objections raised by the owner of the land and to pass
such order as it deems fit. After the disposal of the objections the
competent authority is required by section 9 of the Act to make the
necessary alterations in the draft statement in accordance with the
B orders passed on the objections aforesaid and to determine the vacant
land held by the person concerned in excess of the ceiling limit. A copy
of the draft statement as so altered as the final statement under section
9 of the Act. After the service of the final statement prepared under
section 9 of the Act on the person concerned the competent authority
is required to acquire the land held by the person concerned in excess
of the ceiling limit in accordance with the procedure prescribed
C therein. Section 11 of the Act provides for payment of compensation in
accordance with the principles contained therein. The Act contains
provisions regarding the constitution of the Urban Land Tribunal and
makes provisions for appeal to the Urban Land Tribunal and also a
second appeal to the High Court. Section 19 of the Act provides that
D subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) thereof nothing in Chapter
III of the Act would apply to vacant lands held by the Central Govern-
ment or any State Government or any local authority or corporation or
other institution specified therein. Section 15 of the ~ct imposes ceil-
ing limit on future acquisition of vacant lands also. It is not necessary
to refer to the several other provisions in the Act except section 42
E thereof. Section 42 of the Act provides that the provisions of the Act
shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith in
any other law for the time being in force or any custom, usage or
agreement or decree or order of a court, tribunal or other authority.
Thus the Act is given an overriding effect.

F We have already given the definition of the expression 'vacant
land' found in section 2(q) of the Act. 'Vacant land' means any land
which is not being used mainly for the purpose of agriculture. But it
does not include (i) land on which construction of a building is not
permissible under the building regulations in force in the area in which
such land is situated; (ii) in an area where there are building regula-
G lions, the land occupied by any building which has been constructed
before, or is being constructed on, the appointed day with the
approval of the appropriate authority and the land appurtenant to such
building; and (iii) in an area where there are no building regulations
the land occupied by any building which has been constructed before,
or is being constructed on, the appointed day and the land appurtenant
H to such building. The proviso to the definition in section 2(q) of the Act
STATE OFGUJARATv. PARSHOTTAMDAS IVENKATARAMIAH, J.] 1003

?I provides that where any person ordinarily keeps his cattle, other than A
for the purpose of dairy farming or for the purpose of breeding of
live-stock, on any land situated in a village within an urban agglomera-
tion (described as a village in the revenue records), then, so much
extent of the land as has been ordinarily used for the keeping of such
cattle immediately before the appointed day shall not be deemed to be
vacant land for the purposes of this clause. The expression 'appointed B
day' is defined in section 2(a) of the Act. Under that clause 'appointed
day' means in relation to any State to which the Act applied in the first
instance, the date of introduction of the Urban Land (Ceiling and
Regulation) Bill, 1976 in Parliament, and in relation to any State
_ which adopts the act under clause (1) of Article 252 of the Constitu-
' lion, the date of such adoption. So far as the State of Gujarat is
concerned, the appointed date is the date of introduction of the Urban
c
Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Bill, 1976 in Parliament since the Act
became applicable to the State of Gujarat at the first instance by virtue
of section 1(2) of the Act.

The first contention raised by the respondents, namely, that the D
lands in question were agricultural lands under the Bombay Land
Revenue Code, 1879, and, therefore, they were not vacant lands under
the Act was rejected by the High Court itself and we need not dwell on
'../ it in these appeals since the said contention has not been raised before
us.
E
The second contention raised by the respondents who were
r petitioners before the High Court was that theiands in question were
lands on which the construction of buildings was not permissible under
the building regulations in force in the..area in which the lands were
situated and, therefore, they were outside the scope of the expression
Y- 'vacant land'. In other words the contention was that as the lands in F
( question were lands which came within the scope of sub-clause (i) of
clause (q) of section 2 of the Act, they could not be treated as vacant
lands. Three grounds were urged in support of the above contention
and they were based on the existence of a town planning scheme,
namely, the Town Planning Scheme No. 29 framed by the Ahmedabad
Municipal Corporation under the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954 G
which was in force at the relevant time. The first ground urged in this
behalf by the respondents before the High Court was that permission
to build on the lands in question could not be granted by the
authorities concerned as they had been included within the 'green belt'
around the city of Ahmedabad under the Town Planning Scheme and
hence they were not vacant lands. This plea was not accepted by the H
1004 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [!988] I S.C.R.

High Court because the proposal to retain the 'green belt' had been I(
A
abolished in the year 1975 and the restrictions on building, if any, on
those lands on that account were no longer in existence. The second
ground urged before the High Court was that on the coming into force
of the Town Planning Scheme No. 29 framed under the Bombay Town
Planning Act, 1954 no building activity was permissible on the afore-
B said lands because the said lands had been reserved for a public ~
purpose, namely, construction of Government staff quarters. In
support of this submission reliance was placed on section 29 of the
Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954. The relevant part of section 29 of
the Bombay Town Planning Act, -1954 reads as follows: j
"Restriction after declaration for town planning \
c scheme.

29(1). On or after the date on which the local autho-
rity's declaration of intention to make a scheme under
section 22 or the notification issued by the State Govern-
D ment under section 24 is published in the Official
Gazette,-

(a) no person shall within the area included in the
scheme erect or proceed with any building or work or y
remove, pull down, alter, make additions to or make any
E substantial repair to any building, part of a building, a
compound wall or any drainage work or remove any earth,
stone or material, or sub-divide any land, or change the
user of any land or building unless such person has applied
for and obtained the necessary permission which shall be
contained in a commencement certificate granted by the
F local a~thority in the form prescribed ................. " ~

The High Court treating section 29(1)(a) of the Bombay Town
Planning Act, 1954 as a building regulation within the meaning of that
expression used in sub-clause (i) of clause (q) of section 2 of the Act
was of the view that the ban contained in clause (a) of section 29( 1) of
G the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954 brought the lands in question
within sub-clause (i) of clause (q).of section 2 of the Act. Assuming for
purposes of argument that section 29( l)(a) of the Bombay Town Plan- >"-
ning Act, 1954 amounted to a building regulation it cannot be saici that
the construction of buildings on the land in question was not permissi-
ble at all. Section 29(1)(a) of the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954
H only required a person who owned a piece of land situated within an
STATEOFGUJARATv. PARSHOTTAMDAS [VENKATARAMIAH,J.l 1005
.... area included in the scheme to obtain the permission from the local
'i A
authority before erecting or constructing any building or pulling down
or altering any building as provided therein. Merely because section
29(1)(a) of the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954 requires a person
owning the land to which a scheme applied to obtain permission of the
local authority to construct a building on it, it cannot be said that the
land was one on which construction of building was not permissible. B
_.., The embargo in question was not total. It was only where the ban was
complete it could be said that no construction was permissible on the
land. The High Court omitted to notice that the owners were entitled
-ce:'
to construct buildings on the lands after the permission was accorded

,-t by the local authority. The finding of the High Court that by virtue of
section 29( l)(a) of the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954 the lands fell
outside the definition of 'vacant land' in the Act is, therefore, unsus-
tainable.
c

It was no doubt true that the State Government had issued a
notification dated March 31, 1976 published in the Gujarat Govern-
ment Gazette dated April 8, 1976 under section 4( 1) of the Land D
Acquisition Act, 1894 stating that the lands in question were likely to
be needed for a public purpose, namely, for providing housing accom-
modation for the employees of the Ahmedabad Municipal Corpora-
tion and that after making an enquiry under Section 5-A of the Land
....; Acquisition Act, 1894 the State Government had issued declaration
•
under section 6 of that Act declaring that the aforesaid lands along E
with other lands were needed for the public purpose referred to above.
In the meanwhile the Act came into force with effect from 17.2.1976.
The respondents filed statements before the competent authority
under section 6 of the Act including the lands in question which were
in excess of the ceiling limit which each of them could retain after the
coming into force of the Act. Thereafter they filed the above writ F
r petitions out of which these appeals arise contending that the acquisi-
tion proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 should be pro-
ceeded with and the acquisition of proceedings of the surplus land
under the ceiling law should be dropped. In this connection the
respondents relied upon the provisions contained in section 24 of the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in which clause 'seventhly' stated that any G
outlay or improvements on, or disposal of the land acquired, com-
menced, made or effected without the sanction of the Collector after
'-i the date of publication of the notification under section 4, sub-section
( 1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 should not be taken into consi-
deration by the Court at the time of determining compensation pay-
able under the said Act. The argument of the respondents was that H
1006 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1988] 1 S.C.R.

clause 'seventhly' in section 24 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
A
again amounted to an embargo on construction of buildings on the
lands which attracted sub-clause (i) of clause (q) of section 2 of the Act
and, therefore, the lands were not vacant lands. Reliance was placed
by the respondents on the decision of the High Court of Delhi in Smt.
Shanti Devi v. The Competent Authority under U.L. (C. & R.) Act,
B 1976, Delhi and others, AIR 1980 Delhi 106 in which the High Court of
Delhi had taken the view that a land in respect of which a notification
under section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 had been issued
was a land on which construction of buildings was not permissible and
was thus outside the definition of the expression 'vacant land' in
section 2( q) of the Act. The reason given by the Delhi High Court for
reaching the above conclusion is set out in para 12 of the said decision.
c It reads thus:-

"U. It is pertinent to note that the land in Sant
Nagar is under threat of acquisition by issue of S. 4 notifica-
tion of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. This is not denied
D by the respondents. In this view of the matter also building
activity would not be permissible as no prudent person
would construct on land already notified under S. 4 of the
said Act because he will get no compensation for it unless
the construction is made with the permission of the Land
, Acquisition Collector. For all intents and purposes the
E effect of S. 4 notification, therefore, is that building activity
is not permissible in Sant Nagar. This would also result in
excluding the Sant Nagar plots from the total holding of the
petitioner for the purposes of computing vacant land under
the Act."

F With great respect to the High Court of Delhi it has to be stated
that the view taken by it is wholly incorrect. The High Court of Delhi ~
omitted to notice that in order to exclude a land from the definition of
'vacant land' it should be shown that it was a land on which construc-
tion of a building was not permissible under the building regulations in
force in the area in which such land was situated. The question
G .whether a piece of land is a vacant land or not does not depend upon
the fact whether a prudent man would put up a building on that land or
not after the issue of a notification under section 4(1) of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894. Nor a land will cease to be a vacant land merely
because the permission of certain authority is to be taken to put up a
building thereon. It may be further seen that what clause 'seventhly' in
1'j section 24 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 provides is that any
STATE OF GUJARAT v. PARSHOTTAMDAS [VENKATARAMIAH, J.[ 1007
... outlay or improvements on, or disposal of the land acquired, com- A
)(
menced, made or effected without the sanction of the Collector after
the date of the publication of the notification under section 4( 1) of the
Land Acquisition Act shall not be taken into consideration while
awarding compensation. It does not ban the construction of any build-
ing on the land which is so notified. The High Court of Gujarat against
B
whose judgment these appeals have been filed also committed an error
~ in accepting a similar contention which was urged before them. The
declaration made by the High Court in these cases that the land acqui-
sition proceedings did not suffer from an infirmity. which indirectly
~
suggests that the proceedings should go on is again erroneous. It is
open to the State Government to drop the land acquisition proceed-
/~ ings and to withdraw the lands from acquisition under section 48 of the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894. We are informed that the State Govern-
c
ment has in fact subsequently withdrawn these lands from acquisition.
The proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 cannot there-
fore have any bearing on the question whether the lands in question
are vacant lands or not for purposes of the ceiling law contained in the
Act. When the lands in question or bulk of them are likely to be D
acquired under the ceiling law by paying compensation as provided
therein, it would not be proper to compel the Government to acquire
them under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. As
already stated the Act has the overriding effect on all other laws .
.'-!
E
It was, however, urged before this Court by the learned counsel

-- for the appellants that because the lands in question have been re-
served under the Town Planning Scheme for purposes of building staff
quarters the lands could not be treated as vacant lands. We do not find
any substance in this submission because the construction of buildings
on the lands in question is permissible though not by the owners of F

r land. Sub-clause (i) of clause (q) of section 2 of the Act does not
provide that a land on which the owner cannot construct a building will
cease to be vacant land for purposes of the Act. As long as construe-
ti on of building can be done on a land by some person or authority, the
land does not get excluded from the definition of the expression
'vacant land' under the Act. The lands in question, therefore, are G
vacant lands.

---1 Before concluding our judgment we wish to refer to the decision
of the Full Bench of the High Court of Bombay in Prabhakar Narhar
Pawar v. State of Maharashtra and another, AIR 1984 Bombay 122 in
which the following passage appears at page 130: H
1008 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1988] l S.C.R.

"Reliance was placed on the decision of the Delhi
High Court in Shanti Devi v. Competent Authority, (AIR
1930 Delhi 106). In that decision, the learned Judges of the
Delhi High Court took the view that S. 2(q) of the Act
contemplated that the activity of building is not permissi-
ble on the date when the land is sought to be dealt with and
B not at any future time and the possibility that such activity
could come to be permitted in future or that there are
buildings constructed in the area or that there is no prohibi-
tion to construct in an unapproved colony or that there is
no permanent prohibition to construct would not be suffi-
cient to treat the land as 'vacant land' within the meaning
of the provision, So far as the decision holds that the rele-
c vant date for determination for the purpose of S. 2(q)(i) of
the Act is the date .on which the land is sought to be dealt
with, that is, the commencement date referred to in S. 3
there can be no dispute. In a part of the decision, the Divi-
sion Bench seems to have taken the view that land notified
D for acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act must be
held to be one on which construction of buildings was not
permitted. We are really not concerned with that view, so
far as the present petitions are concerned, but it is suffi-
cient to point out that the correctness of that view has not
been accepted by this Court in Dattatraya v. State of 'y
E Maharashtra, [1981] Mah LJ 764; (AIR 1981Born3'.?6) and
in an unreported decision of this Court in D.P. Dani v.
State of Maharashtra (Writ Petition No. 1650 of 1979
decided on 31st January, 1983). In Dattatraya's case the
contention was that certain plots of land which were re-
served for various public activities, such as buildings of
F primary school, high school, civil hospital, bus terminus
etc. under the Town Planning Scheme should be excluded
for the purpose of computation of vacant land, because,
according to the petitioners, in that case no building acti-
vity was permitted on those lands so far as the petitioners
were concerned. The Division Bench after referring to the
G primary object of the Act as set out in the case of Union of
India v. Valluri Basavaiah Choudhary, (AIR 1979 SC 1415)
rejected the contention that merely because the petitioners
are prohibited from constructing any building under the
building regulations contained in the Town Planning
Scheme the land should not be treated as vacant land. The
H Division Bench found that if the regulations allowed the
STATEOFGUJARATv. PARSHOITAMDAS [VENKATARAMIAH,J.] 1009

building activity not to a person who holds that land but by A
public bodies or the State Government then certainly con-
struction of building is permitted either by an individual or
even by public authority and cannot be taken out of the
definition."
B
We agree with the observations made in the above case. A Full
Bench of the Allahabad High Court has in The State of U.P. and
another v. Radha Raman Agarwal and another, AIR 1987 Allahabad 272
also taken the view that a land will cease to be a 'vacant land' for
purposes of the Act only where the construction of a building on it is
wholly impermissible. We agree with the views expressed by the High
-t
'
Courts of Bombay and Allahabad.

In the result we allow these appeals, set aside the judgment of
C

the High Court and dismiss the writ petitions filed in the High Court.
There will, however, be no order as to costs.
D
N.V.K. Appeals allowed.