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Supreme Court of India

STATE OF GUJARATversusBHOGILAL KESHAVLAL & ANR.

Citation
1979 INSC 251
Decided
27 November 1979
Disposal
Appeal(s) allowed

Holding

A fresh notification under Section 6 is valid when the earlier notification is ineffective, and acquisition for a cooperative housing scheme is a public purpose; the delay was not unreasonable.

Summary

The State of Gujarat issued a Section 4 notification in 1960 indicating that certain land in Ahmedabad might be needed for a public purpose, followed by a Section 6 notification in 1961 to acquire the land at the expense of a cooperative housing society. The first notification was challenged on the ground that acquisition for a public purpose could not be funded entirely by a private entity, leading the government to cancel the 1961 notification in 1963 and issue a fresh Section 6 notification in 1964 stating that acquisition would be at public expense. The Gujarat High Court struck down the 1964 notification, holding that the earlier notification was valid, that the Section 4 notification was exhausted, and that the delay of over four years was unreasonable. The Supreme Court held that the 1961 notification was invalid, so the Section 4 notification remained effective, allowing a fresh Section 6 notification; it also ruled that acquisition for a cooperative housing scheme is a public purpose, that the government may issue a new Section 6 notification when the earlier one is ineffective, and that the delay of one year and four months was not unreasonable. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the High Court’s order set aside, and the writ petition dismissed.

Issues considered

  • The validity of the second notification under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 after the first notification was held invalid.
  • Whether acquisition of land for a cooperative housing society constitutes a public purpose.
  • Whether the government may issue a fresh Section 6 notification after cancelling an earlier one without a new Section 4 notification.
  • Whether the delay between cancellation of the first notification and issuance of the second notification is unreasonable.
  • Whether a Section 4 notification is exhausted once a Section 6 notification is made.

Legislation cited

Subjects

Land acquisitionPublic purposeCooperative housing societySection 6 notificationDelay in notificationValidity of notificationCompensation

Judgment

        284

LA                                         STATE OF GUJARAT
                    , I

                f   ,   , .I ~   L
                                                     v.                   • f


                                     BHOGILAL KESHAVLAL & ANR.
                                            November 21, 1979
  B                                  [P. N. SmNGHAL AND A. P. SEN, JJ.]
          Ltmd Acquisition Act, 1894, SectiOM 4 & 6- Scope of. ·
          The first respondent owned certain Land forming part of a town planning
      scheme, situated within the city limits. At the request of the second reapondentF
      a Cooperative Housing Society, the State Government issued a Notification~
- c   under section 4 of the Act ori August 3, 1960 stating that the' land was likely   ·
      to be needed for a public purpose and it was foUowed by a farther notificatioll'
      of the State Goveroment under Section 6 of the Act dated August 21, 1961
      that the land was to be acquired at the expense of the Cooperative Housing.
      Society for the public purpose specified in column 4 of the Schedule to the
      notification. The entire expense of the acquisition was to be borne by the
      second respondent.
·o        The first respondent moved the High Court undor Article 226 of the Consti-
      tution cf¥U~enging the valadity of the notification under section 6 of the Act.
      During the pendency of the Writ Petition, the appellant by a notification dated
      May 27, 1963 cancelled the earlier notification under section 6 and issued a
      fresh notification. The High Court struck down the second notification dated
      September 10, 1964 issued under section 6 of the Act. In the appeal to this
      Court, on the question of the validity of the 2nd notification dated September
  E   10, 1964.
         HElD : (i) The High Court was in error in striking down the second
      notification under section 6 of the Act issued on September 10, 1964.
          (ii) This Court in Valjibhai Mulfibhal Soneji v. State of Bombay [1964] 3
      S.C.R. 686 has held that the Governme111.t ~ no power to issue a notification
. F   for acquisition of land for a public purpose, where the compensation is to be
      entirely paid by a company. [287 C-D]
          In the instant case the first notification issued by the Government for
      acquisition of land for a public pUrpOSe at the e:xpeme, of the second respon-
      dent, the cooperative societY was therelore, invalid and the Govt. was justified
      in issuing the second notification under section 6 after removing the lacuna by
. G   providing for acquisition of the land for public purpo!le, at public expense•
                           /                                                [287 D-E]'
          (iii) The acquisition of land for cooperative housing society is a public
      purpose. The Govt. is the best judge to determine whether the ptJl'll(li8e in
      question is a public purpose or not. It cannot be said that a Housing Scheme-
      for a limited tmmber of persons cannot be construed to be a public Pllrtlote·
      When a notific&ti.on·under section 6 of the Act is in~id, the Govt. may treat it
 B    as ineffective and issue a fresh notification under stction 6 af tlle Act and
      nothing in section 48 of the Act precludes the Government from ioing 110.
                                                                           [291 C-E}
 C-   .J

                              GUJARAT v. BHOGILAI. KESHAVLAL (Sen, 1.)                          285

                   Girdharilal Amratlal Shodan & Ors. v. State of Gujarat & Ors. [1966]                  A ·
               3 S.C.R. 437, Sham Bdwri & Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. [1964]
               .6 S.C.R. 636, Pandit Jhandu Lal & Ors. v. The State of Punjab & Ors. [1961]
                2 S.C.R. 459 Ratilal Shankarbhai & Ors. v. State of Gujarat &: Ors. AI.R.
                1970 S.C. 984, Ram Swarup v. The District lAnd Acquisition Officer, Aligarh
               & Ors. A.I.R. 1972 SC 2390, referred to.
                   (iv) In the instant case, tho Respondent had not taken any ground in the
               Writ Petition with regard to the delay in the issuance of the second notifica-
               ton. The High Court was therefore, not justified in observing that "the appel-
                                                                                                         •
-r----     ,
               lant had not explained the delay by 1lling any affidavit."

                                                                                .
                                                                           If there W!l6 no
               ground taken, there could be no occasion for filing of any such affidavit.
                                                                                   [292 B-C]
                   (v) There is nothing in the Act which precludes the Govt. from issuing
               a fresh notification under s. 6 of the Act if tile earlier notification is found to
               be ineffective. The delay of one year and four months between the date of
               ~ancellation and the issue of the second notification cannot be regarded to be
               unreasonable. [292 E-F]
                   Gujarat State Transport Corpn. v. Valji Mulji Soneji [1979] 3 S.C.R. 202,
               referred to
                                                                                                         D
                   CiviL APPELLATE JURISDICTION :             Civil Appeal No·. 1479               of
               1971.
 >                From th~ Judgment and Order dated 254-1969 of the Gujarntl
               High Court in SCA No.' 271/65.
                   G. A. Shah, N. S. Pande and M. N. Shroff for the Appellant.
                  P.R. Mridul, Vimal Dave and Miss Kailr;8N Mehta for Respondent
               No.1·
                   J. N. Shroff and H. S. Parihar for Respondent No. 2.
                   The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
                                                                                                         p.
                   SEN, J.-This appeal on' certificate from a judgment of the Gujarat
               High Court raises a question as to thd validity or otherwise of a fresh
               notification issued by the Government of Gujarat under s. 6 of the
               Land Acquisition Act, 1894, consequent upon an earlier notificationj
               .under s. 6 of the Act being discOIV'ered to be invalid.
                    The first respondent in this case owned certain land bearing Final
                                                                                                         c
               J>lot No. 38 forming part of Town Planning Scheme No. III (Ellis~
               bridge) situate within the city of Ahmedabad. At the request of
               the second respondent Sri Ayodhya Nagar Co-operative Hous,ing Socie-
               ty Ltd., registered under the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act, 1925,
               Mw deemed to be registered under the Gujarat Co-operative Societies                       a·
               Act, 1961, formed with the object of enabling its members! to construct
               houses, the State Government on Augusr 3, 1960 issued a notifieatioii



           ____________________                                       ..... ~...._,....~,·-··   ·• ' "
                                                                                          vI.


             286                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [1980] 2 s.c.R.

      A     under s. 4 stating that. the land was likely to be needed for a public
            purpose.    This was followed by a notification of the State Goverii·
            ment dated August 21, 1961 under s. 6 of the Act stating that the
            hmd was to lJe acquired at the expense of Sri Ayodhya Nagar Co-
            operative Housing Society Ltd. for the public purpose specified        in
            column 4 of the schedule annexed thereto. The public purpose speci-
            fied in column 4 of the schedule was 'For construction of houses for
           Sri Ayodhya Nagar Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., Ahmedabad.'                ..
            The entire expense of. the acquisition was to be borne by· the second
           respondent, i.e., the Co~operative Hoilsing Society. . The first respoo-~
            dent moved the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution challeng-    r

      ·c    ing the validity of t11e notification under s. 6 on the( .ground that the      .
           acquisition of the land for a public purpose at the expense of the
           second respondent was legally invalid.        On December 4. 1961 the
           High Court issued an ad interim injunction restraining the appellant
           from proceeding with the acquisition proceedings. While this writ peli-
           tion was pending, the State Government by its notification dated May
     'D    27, 1963 cancelled the notification under s. 6.       On Septetmber 10.
           1964 the State Government issued a fresh notification under s. 6 stat-
           ing that the land was tO! be acquired at theJ public expense, for the pub-
           lic purpose specified- in column 4 of the schedule. The public pur-
                                                                                        _..(_-
           pose specified in column 4 in the schedule was 'For housing scheme
           undertaken by Sri Ayodhyru Nagar C~operative Housing Society Ltd.'
     TE
               The High Court following its earlier decision in Dosabhai Ratansha
           Keravala v. State of Gujdl'at & Ors.(l) struck down the second notifi-
           cation unde.r. s. 6 dated september 10, 1964. 'It held inter alia that
           (1) the first notification under s. 6 issued on August 21, 1961 being.
           an acquisition for a society at its cost, was. valid and. the Government
      F could have proceeded to complete the acquisition tmder it but, 'under
           a false sense ofl apprehension as to its validity, the Government cancel-
          led it on May 27. 1963. There was no justification for cancelling the
                                                                                            .._
          first notification under s. 6 and even if the Government wanted to cancel
          it out of a feeling of apprehensi0111 as to its validity, the Government
          need not have taken one year and ten months to do so. (2) After the
     G·
          issue of the first notification under s. 6 on August 21, 1961, the- notifi- ·
          cation dated August 3, 1960 under s. 4 was exhausted and, therefore,
          could not be used to support the second notification issmxl under s. 6
        . on September 11, 1964.         (3) The cancellation of the fir~t notification
          under s. 6 by the notification dated May 27, 1963 did not have the
     11 effect of reviving the notification under s. 4 so as to make it available
          for supporting the second notification onder s. 6.       The second notifi-
                (1) (1970) 11 Guj. L.R. 361.




i-
     .. · ..J
                                        GUJARAT V. BHOGILAL KESHAVLAL (Sen, J.)              287


                       cation under s. 6 not being supported by any notification under s. 4
                        WaS consequently invalid. (4) A notification unde.r s. 6 in order to be
                        valid must follow within a reasonable time after the issue of a notifica-
         •              tion under s. 4. The notification under s. 4 was issued; on August 3,
                        i960 and the socond notification under s. 6 on September l 0, 1964
                       and there was, thus an interval of about fo\W years and one month bet-
                                                                                                     B
                       ween the two notifications. This interval of time. could not be regard-
                       ed as reasonable.     Even tested by the yardstick of reasonable tim~
                       provided by the legislature in the second proviso introduced in s. 6
                      _!:>y the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1967,.
                       namely three years, the period of about four years .and one month
                       between the two notifications under s. 4 and s. 6 would be dearly un-         c
                       reasonable.     The socond notification must, therefore, be beld to be
                       invalid on this ground also.
        We are clearly of the opinion that the High Court was in error in
    striking down the second notification under s. 6 issued on September
    10, 196 4. in Valjibhai Muljibhai Soneji v. State of Bombay( 1)
                                                                                                     D
    the Court held that the Government has no power to issue a notifica- .
    tion for acquisition of land for a public purpose, where the compensa-
    tion is to be entirely paid by a company. The first notification issued
·-; by the Government under s. ·6 for acquisition of the land for a public
    purpose, at the expense of the socond respondent, the Co-operative
    Society, was, therefore, invalid.     The State Government was, there-                           E
    fore; justified in issuing the second notification under s. 6 after remov-
  . ing the lacuna i.e., by providing for acquisition of the land for the said
: ~ public purpose, at public expense.                 ·

·                         In an endeavour to suppo.rt the ju~gment, counsel for the first res-
                      pondent advanced a three~fold contention.        It was urged, firstly, that   F
                      su~cessive notifications cannot be issued under s. 6 placing reliance on
                      State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. v. Vishnu Prasad Sharma & Ors.(2)
                      It was pointed out that the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Vali-
     "                dation) Act, 1967 had a limited scope and it validated only successive
                      notifications issued under s. 6 in respect of different parcels of land but
                      did not validate successive notifications in respect of the same land.         G
         •      1     Further, it was urged that the Act was not retrospective in oper.ation
     ~       IJ- ..   and, therefore, the validity of the second notific"<ltion dated September
                      ~0, 1964 h~d to be adjudged with reference. to the pre-amendment law,
                      Le., accordmg to the law as declared by this Court in Vishnu ·Prasad
                      Sharma's case. Secondly, it was urged, on the strengt!h of the doci-
                                                                                                     H
                           (1) [1964]  3 S.C.R. 686.
                            (2) {1966} 3 S.C.R. 557.



    ..                                         \
      288                 SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [1980] 2 s.c.R.

                                                                                             I
A    sion in Dosabhai Ratansha Karevala's case (supra) that a notification             )
     under s. 4 is. exhausted when it is followed by declaration under s. 6.
     It was urged that the first notification under s. 6 dated August 2-1,
     1961 was valid and the High Court was, therefore, justifi~l in holding
     that with its canc~llation, the notification under s. 4 lapsed.      Thirdly,
                                                                                       ...
                                                                                       •I



     it was urged that there was unreasonable delay in issuing the second
B    notification under s. 6 and, this, by itself, wasl sufficient to invalidate it.
                                                                                       ..
          In Vishnu Prasad Sharma's case the Court held that ss. 4, 5-A
      and 6 are integrally connected and present a complete scheme for acqui-~
     sition and, therefore, it was not open to the Government tOi make sue;; .·
c    cessive declarations under s. 6. Wanchoo J. (as he then was), speak-
     ing for himmself and Mudholkar J., observed :
               "It seems to us clear that once a declaration under s. 6
           is made, the notification under s. 4{1) must be exhausted,
           for it has served its purpose. There is nothing in ss. 4, 5-A
D          and 6 to suggest that s. 4(1) is a kind of reservo1r from
          which the government may from time to time draw out land
          and make declarations with respect to it successively.       If
          that was the intention behind sections 4, 5-A and 6 we would
          have found some indication of it in the language used there-
          in.     But as we read these three sectiOills together we. can
E        only find that the scheme is. that s. 4 specifies the locality,
          then there may be survey and drawing of maps of the land
          and the consideration whether the land is adapted for the
         purp6se for which it has to be acquired, followed by objec-
          tions and making up of its mind by the government what
         particular land out of that locality it needs. This is fqllowed
F        by a declaration under s. 6 specifying the particubr land
       . needed and that in our opinion completes the process and
         the notification under s. 4(1) cannot be further used there-
         after. At the stage of s. 4 the land is not particularised but
         only the locality is mentioned; at the stage of s. 6 the land
         in the-locality is particularised and thereafter it seems to us
G        that ~he notification under s. 4( 1) having served its purpose
        exhausts itself."

    Snrkar J., in a separate but concurring'judgment, observed :
            "My learned brother has said that ss. 4, SA and 6 of the
H       Act have to be read together and so read, the conclusion is
        clear that the Act contemplates only a single declaration under.
        s. 6 in respect of a notification under s. 4.''
                                 GUJARAT v. BHOGILAL KESHAVLAL (Sen, J.)                 · 289

'       '        . Aften rejecting the contention that the Government may have difficulty
                   in making the plan of its projects complete at a time, particulaly where
                                                                                                    A

                   rthe project is large, and therefore, it is necessary that it should have
                   lXJWer to make successive declarations under s. 6, he observed :
                              ''I cannot imagine a Government, which has ,vast resour~
    t                    ces, not being able to make a complete plan of its project at
                                                                                                    B
                         a time. Indeed, I think when a.plan is made, it is a camp-
                       . Iete plan.     I should suppose that before the Government
                         start-; acquisition proceedings by the issue of a notification
                        under s. 4, it has made its plan· for otherwise it cannot state
                         in the notification, as it 'has to do, that the land is likely to
                         be needed.       Even if it had not then completed its plan, it            c
                         would have enough time- before the making of a declaration
                        under s. 6 to do so. I think, therefo.re, that the difficulty of
                         the Government, even if there is one, does nt't lead to the
                         conclusion that the Acd contemplates the making: of a number
                         of declarations under s. 6."
                        In the present case, the question, however, does not arise as the           D
                  'first notification under s. 6 dated August 21. 1961 being invalid, the
                  ·Government was. not precluded fromJ making a second notification. Due
-'i I
                   to the invalidity of the notification under s. 6, the notification under
                   s. 4 still held ~e field and on its~ strength another notification unde.r s. 6
                  ·Could be issued. It is, therefore, not necessary to deal with the effect         E
                   of the validating Act.
                         The matter is squarely covered by the decision of the Court in:
                   ·Girdharilal Amratlal Shodan & Ors. v. State of Gujarat & OrY.(l)
                  ·The Court rejected the contention that' by cancelling the first notffica-
                   ·tion under s. 6, as here, the Government must be taken to have with-
                   -drawn from the acquisition and consequently could no~ issue a second            F
                    llOtification under s. 6.    There also the first notification under s. 6
                    was invalid and of no effect, as the Government had no power to issue
                    a notification for acquisition for a public purpos~ wherd the compensa-
                     tion was to be paid entirely by a company, as held by this Court in
                    .Sham Behari & Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. (2) .                     G
            •       It will be noticed that in Girdharilal Amratlal Shodan's case the
            ~ ~ ~acts were i~entic.al. On August 3, 1960 the Government of Gujarat
              · JSsped a notification under s. 4 in respect of certain land falling in
                Final Plot No. 460 of th~ Town Planning Scheme No. III of Elisbridge
                in the city of Ahmedabad, stating that the land was likely to be needed
                for a public purpose, viz., for construction ·of houses for Sri Krishna-            B
                        (]) [1966] 3 S.C.R. 437.
                        (2) fl964] 1 6 s.c.R. 636.
                                                                                                ..
                      290               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [1980] 2 S.C.R.

                A   kunja Government Servants' Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. · On
                    July 18, 1961 the State Government issued a notification under s. 6
                    stating that the land was to be acquired for the aforesaid public purpose
                    at the expense of Sri Krishnakunj Government Servants' Co-operative
                    Housing Society Ltd. On September 22, 1961, the landholder fileci
                    a writ petition in the High Court for an order quashing the notification
            B       under s. 6. During the pendency of the-proceedings, the Government                '
                    issued a notification dated April 28, 1964 c~cellii1g the aforesaid
                    notification dated July 18, 1961. On August 14, 1964 the Govern-
                    ment issued a fresh notification under s. 6 stating that the Ian~ ,
                    notification under s. 6 stating that the land was neede~ t1) be acquire~  ·-     'f
                    at the public expense for a public purpose viz., for the housing scheme
            c       undertaken by Sri Krishnakunj Government Servants' Co~openitive
                    Housing Society Ltd.
                        The contention was that by cancelling the first notification under
                    s. 6, the Government must be deemed to have withdrawn from the
                    acquisition and cancelled the notification under s. 4, and therefore,-
            D       could not issue the 5econd notification under s. 6, without issuing a
                    fresh notification: under s. 4. It was also urged that the power of the·
                    State Government to issue a notification under s. 6 waS' exhausted, and
                    the Government could not issue a fresh notification unde.r s. 6. The             _.t-:-
                    Court rejected both the contentions observing :

            E                 "Having regard to the proviso tq s. 61 of the Act, a dccla~
                         ration for acquisition of the land for a public purpose could
                         only be made if the compensatiotn tol be awarded for it was: to        /
                         be paid wholly or partly out of public revenues or some
                         fund controlled ur managed by a local authority. The Govern~
                        ment had no power to issue · a notification for' acquisition
            F            for a pubic purpose where the compensation was to be paid
                       ·entirely by a company.        The notification dated July 18,
                         1961 was, theref01re, invalid and of no effect, see· Shyam
                        Behari v. State of Madhya Pradesh. The, appellants filed the
                        writ petition challenging the aforesaid notification on this                 •
                         ground. The challenge was justified and the notification was
            G           liable to be quashed by the Court."
                            "The State Government realised that the notification was
                       invalid, and without waiting for an order of Court, cancelled
                     · the notification on April 28, 1964. The cancellation was in
                       recognition of the invalidity of the notification.       111e
            B          Government had no intention of withdrawing from the acqui-
                       tion.   Soon after the cancellation, the G·ovemment issued a
                       fresh notification under s. 6 whereas in this case the notifi-



...
       I·

      -".
                                             -;---·   -   ------- ·---------
        ·': ·




                                    · GUJARAT V. BHOGILAL KESHAVLAL (Sen, J.)
                                                                                             291
                         cation under s. 6 is incompetent and invalid, the Govern         t
                ;                    .      . fi .                                    men
                         may treat 1t as me echve and issue a fresh notification d
                                     . .     h    .   b                              un er
                         s. 6.   T h IS ISJ w at, m su stance, the Government did in this
                         case. The cancellation on April28, 1964 was no more than
                         u recognition of the invalidity of the earlier notification.''
    '.
    I      •
                    The first notification issued under s. 6 on August 21, .l961 was obvi-
                                                                                                      B
I           I
                     ously invalid and of no effect.   By the issue of this notification the
                    Go\'ernment had not eiTecti\·cly execciscd its powers under s. 6. ' In
                    the circumstances, the Government could we~ issue a fresh notification
                    under s. 6 dated September 10, 1964.
                          In State of Gujarat v. Musamiyan Imam Haidl!r Bux Raz:vi &
                     Anr. etc. (') this Court v.-hile <reversing the decision of the Gujarat          c
!· 1                 High Court in Dosabhai Ratansha Kerravala (supra) on which the High
                     Court based its decision, has laid down two important principles :
                     {I) In vie'v: of the decisions of this Court in Pandit ilumdu Lal & Ors.
                     v. The Stare of Punjab & Ors.,(2) Ratilal Shankarbhai & Drs. v. State
                     of Gujarat & Ors.C) and Ram Swarup v. The District Land Acquisi-                     II !
                     tioll Offir:er, Aligarh & Ors.(4) the acquisition of land for a co-opera-
                    tive housing society is a public purpose.      The GoYernment is the best
                    Judge to dctcnninc whether the purpose in question is <li public purpose
                    or not; and, it cannot be said that <11 housingj scheme fat a limited num-
                    ber of persons cannot be construed to be a public purpose inasmuch as
                                                                      a
                    the need of a section of the public may be public purpose.             (2)        E
(. 1                When a notification under s. 6 is invalid, the government may treat it
                                                                                                          : I
r                   as incfi~tive and issue a fresh' notillc'atio,n under s. 6, and nothing in
                    s. 48 of the -Acr precludes the government from doing so, as held by
                                                                                                          ' I
                    this Co:.:rt in Girdlz.arilal Amratutl Shodan.
                         The I ligh Court had not the benefit of these de~isions _when           it   F
                    held that acquisition of land foe a. co-operative houstng soctcty          was
                    not a public purpose and therefore. tho first notific:Ition dated August
                                                6
                    21, 1961 i-;sucu under s. of the Ac~ was valid. The sub:~tratum on

    •
        .           Which the ucci~ion of tho I Jigh Court rests has, th;;-.rd~r~, dl_sappcared .
                         c      ·           .                          t-u the dectston 10 State of
                                                                   · ·h··'
                    ih'1> ourt Jn !t-fusam1 \'llll's case utsltngUJs
                                                            .t·. ·
                                                                                                      G
                    Madhya Pradesh & O;s. v. Vishnu PrasaJ SJwrm~ & . Ors.. (supra) by
                    q.u0 t'Jng the passage ref~?.rrt'd to above. The· d~iston
                                                                           .. . . m Vzsltnu Prasad
                    Sharrnu·, case is not an authority for the proposttion that where n
                    notific-..ttion unucr s 6 is found to be invaliu it cannot be fot.lowcd by
                    ~on ~nder s.. 6. In fact, the decision of thej Ihgh Court
                         OJ {1976} Supp. S.C.R. 28.                                                   u
                         (2) [1961] 2 S.C.R. 459.
                         t3) A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 984.
                         (.H A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 2390.
              292                 SUPREME COURT REPORTS               (1980] 2 S.C.R.

       A    runs counter to what it had observed in Dosabhai Ratt~nsha Keravala's         ....
            case, after referring to the decisions of this Court in Vishnu Prasad
            Sharma's case and Girdharilal Amratlal Shodan's case :
                     "If the first s. 6 notification is invalid, that is, non est,

       B
                 s. 4 notification cannot be regarded as exhausted, for its pur-
                 pose is yet unfulfilled; its purpose could be fulfilled only by
                                                                                          ..
                 issue of a valid notification under s. 6.'·
                 There. remains the question whether the High Court was right in
            quashing the second notification under s. 6 on the ground of unreason-
            able delay in its issuance.      The respondent had nQ11 taken any such
       C    ground in the writ petition filed by him.       The High Court was, there-
            fore, not justified in observing that 'the appellant had not explained the
            delay by filing any affidavit'.    We fail to appreciate that if there was
            no ground taken, there could be no occasion for filing of any such
            affidavit.    Further, the delay, if any, was of the respondent's own
            making_      He had challenged the first notification unJer s. 6, presum-
 I     !)
·' f        ably on the ground tlmt the acquisition being for a public purpose,
            could not be made at the expense of tho second respondent.             The
-..
 I          challenge was justified and the Smte Government, therefore, withdrew
            the first notification under s. 6 without waiting for an order of the
            High Court        The cancellation was in recognition of the invalidity
            of the notification.. The Government had no intention of withdrawing
       E    from the acquisition.      Thereafter, thC! Government issued a fresh noti-
~
· I
It;         fication. under s. 6 making a declaration for acquisition of the bnd for      •
            a public purpose at public e:"C:pcnse. There is nothing in the Act which
\           precludes tbe Government from issuing a fresh notification under s. 6.
            if the earlier notification is found to be ineffective.  ThCl delay of one
       1'   year and fou.r months between the date of cancellation and the issue of
            the second notification c:nnnot be regarded to b" unreasonable, in the
            facts and circumsmnces of the case.        In somewhat similar circumstan~
            ces, this Court recently in Gujarat Stat~ Transport Corpn. v. Valji !vJulii
            Soneji(') held the delay of about fifteen years in making the seco.nd
            notification under s. 6 not to bo unreasonable.       We cunnot, therefore,
       G    uphold the High Court's decision that tho second notification must
            be struck down on the ground of delay.
                 In the result, the appeal succeeds and' is allowed with costs, tbe
            ju<lJ!mCnt of the High Court is ~et asiJc, and the writ petition filed by
            the first re~pondcnt is dismis~ed. Responuent No. 1 shall hear. the costs.
       II
            N.K.A.                                                   Appeal a{lowed.
              (I) (!979] J S.C.R. 20!.




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