STATE OF GUJARATversusTHAKOR SHRI PRAVINSINHJI BHARATSINHJI & ORS.

                                                                             A


                        STATE OF GUJARAT
                                    v.
   THAKOR SHRI PRAVINSINHJI BHARATSINHJI & ORS.
                                                                             B
                             MAY 15, 1986

              IR.S. PATHAK AND R.B. MISRA, JJ.]

      Practice and Procedure:

     Special leave petition-party impleaded as respondent not party          c
before Revenue Tribunal and High Court-Whether order impleading
him amounts to adjudication of his right-Whether can assail the High
Court order.

      The petitioner was at one time the Ruler of an erstwhile princely      D
State which ceded to the Dominion Government in 1948. A Jagirdar,
who was the owner of a half share in a Jagir of villages contained in that
princely State, became entitled to compensation for the trees standing
thereon under the provisions of the Bombay Merged Territories and
Areas (Jagirs Abolition) Act, 1953.
                                                                             E
      Upon an application filed by the Jagirdar, the Jagir Abolition
Officer awarded Rs. 18,258 as compensation for all the trees standing on
the jagir and directed that half of it was payable to the Jagirdar and
that the other half would go to the former Ruler. In appeal, the Gujarat
Revenue Tribunal determined the total value of all the trees at
Rs.68,03~, of which half was payable to the Jagirdar. In a writ petition     F
the High Court held on July 23, 1975 that the total market value of the
trees was Rs. 1,70,540 and the Jagirdar would be entitled to the half
share with interest thereon from August 1, 1954.

      The petitioner never made any application for compensation on
the abolition of the jagir and was not a party to the proceedings before     G
the Jagir Abolition Officer and the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal.

      During the pendency of the appeal by special leave by the State in
this Court the application made by the petitioner to be imp leaded as a
respondent was allowed. That appeal was disposed of in view of the
decision in State of Gujarat & Ors. v: Gujara{RevenueTribunal & Anr.         H
    100                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [1986] 3 S.C.R.

A   [ 1976) (3) SCR 565. The petitioner, thereafter, unsuccessfully persisted
    with the State authorities for payment to him of the half share in the
    compensation and ultimately filed the present Miscellaneous Petition
    claiming a sum of Rs.4,80,487. 10.

          It was contended for the State that the mere fact of being im-
B
    pleaded as a respondent in this Court did not entitle the petitioner to
    any part of the compensation awarded by the High Court, that there
    was no adjudication that the other half share belonged to the petitioner,
    and that since the jagir now stood vested in the State of Gujarat, the
    half share passed into the ownership of the State.
                                                                                  I

c         Dismissing the Miscellaneous Petition, the Court

          HELD: 1. The order impleading the petitioner as a respondent in
    the appeal did not amount to adjudication on the question whether he
    was the owner of the other half share of the compensation. His presence
    in the array of respondents could not vest any right in him to any part of
D
    the compensation, for the special leave petition was filed by the State
    against the order of the High Court in a writ petition preferred by the
    Jagirdar, to which the petitioner was not a party. There was no adjudi-
    cation by High Court on any claim of the petitioner. The entire con-
    troversy before it was between the Jagirdar and the State. I1058-D)
E
         2. When the valuation of the Jagirdar's half share was deter-
    mined by the High Court, the valuation of the other half share stood
    automatically determined, but there was nothing in that order deter-
    mining the ownership of the other half share. IIOSA-B I

F         3. The order disposing of the appeal did not confer any right on
    the petitioner in respect of the compensation payable on the abolition of
    the jagir. If that appeal had been allowed in terms of the relief sought
    by the State, it would have resulted in a reduction of the quantum of
    compensation awarded to the Jagirdar and had it been dismissed, the
    quantum of compensation determined by the High Court would have
    stood affirmed. I lOSD-E]
G
          4. The petitioner will have to establish his title to a half share of
    the compensation in some other proceedings. IlOSG I

         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Misc. Petition
H   No. 5255 of 1986
              STAIB OF GUJARAT v. P.B. THAKOR [PATHAK, J.]              101

                                      in                                       A

    Civil Appeal No. 1885of1977

         From the judgment and order dated 23.7.75 of the High Court of
    Gujarat at Ahmedabad in Special Civil Application No. 1636 of 1972.        B

         M.N. Shroff, for the Petitioner.
         Soli J. Sorabjee, P.H. Parekh and Meeta Singhvi, for the Res-
    pondents.

         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
                                                                               c
          PATIIAK, J. The petitioner, Shri Virendrasinhji Chauhan, was
    at one time the ruler of Chhota-Udepur. The State of Chhota-Udepur
    containd the Jagir of villages Gundi and Kheda, in which a half share
    belonged to a Jagirdar, Thakor Shri Pravinsinhji Bharatsinhji of Kad-
    wal (hereinafter referred to as "the Thakor"). An agrement dated           D
    March 19, 1948 was executed between the Governor General of India
    and the Raja of Chhota-Udepur. Under that agreement the Raja
    ceded to the Dominion Government full and exclusive authority,
    jurisdiction and powers for, and in relation to, the governance of the
    State and agreed to transfer the administration of the State to the
    Dominion Government on June IO, 1948. In lieu thereof the Raja was         E
    entitled to receive a privy purse and was entitled to the full ownership
    and enjoyment of all private properties (as distinct from State proper-
    ties) belonging to him on the date of the agreement. He and the
    members of his family were entitled to all personal privileges enjoyed
    by them within or outside the territories of the State immediately
    before August 15, 1947. A letter dated October 1, 1948 from Shri V.P.      F
    Menon of the Government of India in the Ministry of States elaborated
    on the terms of the agreement and also declared:
               "(5) Pensions, gratuities, annnuities, and allowances
               granted by the State to the members of its public services
               who have retired or have proceeded on leave preparatory         G
               to retirement before 1st April 1948, as also the enjoyment
I              of the ownership of Khangi Villages, lands, jagirs, grants,
               etc. existing on 1st April 1948 are hereby guaranteed. This
               guarantee is without prejudice to the right of Government
               of Bombay to issue any legislation which does not discrimi-
               nate against the State and their subjects."                     H
    102                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [1986] 3 S.C.R.

A   As has been mentioned, the Thakor was the owner of a half share of
    the Jagir of villages Gundi and Kheda. Under the provisions of the
    Bombay Merged Territories and Areas (Jagirs Abolition) Act, 1953,
    he became entitled to compensation for the trees standing on the lands
    of the Jagir. He filed an application for compensation. By an award
B   dated May 27, 1969, the Jagir Abolition Officer, Baroda held him
    entitled to compensation in respect of unreserved trees only and de-
    clared that no compensation was payable in respect of reserved trees in
    the Jagir. ·He fixed the value of unreserved trees at Rs.2,620 and
    observed that while half of the compensation was payable to the claim-
    ant the other half would go to the former ruler of Chhota-Udepur. The
    Thakor appealed to the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal, and the Tribunal,
c   by its order dated June 9, 1961, remanded the case to the Jagir Aboli-
    tion Officer for a fresh determination of the valuation of unreserved
    trees, while observing at the same time that he was not entitled to
    compensation for reserved trees. The Thakor filed a writ petition in
    the High Court, and on December 16, 1963 the High Court held that
D   he was entitled to compensation in respect of reserved trees also. By
    his order dated September 2, 1967, the Jagir Abolition Officer
    awarded Rs. 18,258 as compensation for all the trees, reserved as well
    as unreserved, standing on the Gundi and Kheda Jagir and directed
    that out of that amount a sum of Rs.9.129 was to be paid to the
    Thakor. Dissatisfied with the award, the Thakor filed an appeal. On
E   March 29, 1968, the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal remanded the ease to
    the Prant Officer with the direction that he should determine the valu-
    ation of the trees on the basis of the evidence on record. The Prant
    Officer, Chhota-Udepur made his award on August 7, 1971 and held
    that the valuation of all the trees was Rs.10, 134.96 only, of which the
    Thakor would be entitled to Rs.5,067.48. The Thakor again appealed
F   to the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal and the Tribunal found that the total
    value of all the trees was Rs.68,039 of which half was payable to the
    Thakor. The Thakor then filed a writ petition in the Bombay High
    Court, and on July 23, 1975 the High Court held that the total market
    value of the trees was Rs. l, 70,540 and the Thakor would be entitled to
    the half share of Rs.85 ,270 with interest at 3 per cent per annum on
G   that amount from August 1, 1954.

          The State of Gujarat obtained Special Leave to appeal against
    the order of the High Court. This gave rise to Civil Appeal No. 1885 of
    1977. During the pendency of the appeal an application was made by
    the petitioner, Shri Virendrasinhji Chauhan, praying for permission to
H   be impleaded as a respondent in the appeal. The application was
              STATE OF GUJARAT v. P.N. THAKOR [PATHAK, J.[             103

    allowed on August 18, 1977 and the petitioner was added in the array       A
    of respondents. In this behalf the record of the case states:

               "Upon hearing the office report and hearing counsel for
               the parties, the Court allowed the application of Maharaj a
               Virendrasinhji N. Chauhan for being impleaded as a party        B
               respondent in this matter and also directs that non-filing of
               the application in the High Court for a certificate to appeal
               to this Court is ignored and condoned. The Court granted
               Special Leave limited to the question of solatium and in-
               terest and dictated an oral order dated August 18, 1977
               disposing of the appeal with no order as to costs."

    The appeal was disposed of by an order of tnat date which reads:

               "In view of the decision of this Court in State of Gujarat &
               Ors. v. Gujarat Revenue Tribunal & Anr. the award for
               solatium is knocked down and interest will also be awarded      D
               in the light of that judgment. Parties were agreed to this
               situation in this Court. The appeal is disposed of accord-
               ingly. There will be no order as to costs."

          The petitioner applied to the State of Gujarat and the Collector
    of Baroda claiming that he was entitled to a half share in the total       E
    amount of compensation, but apparently met with no success. Accord-
    ingly, he applied to this Court for initiating proceedings for contempt
    of Court against the State and the Collector. Meanwhile, the State had
    field an application for the amendment of the order of this Court
    permitting the petitioner to be irnpleaded as a respondent in the ap-
    peal. Both applications were disposed of by an order dated April 4,        F
    1978, which reads:

•              "We do not think that this is a case where a contempt
               proceeding can be started on the allegation made in the
               petition. The petitioner may follow such right as may be 1
               available to him in law for enforcement of the award, de-  G
               cree or order if there be any in his favour.

                     Mr. S.T. Desai appearing for the State stated that he
               is withdrawing his petition which is filed for amendment to
               the order of this Court in C.M.P. Nos. 6560 to 6571 of
               1977."                                                          H
    104                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS             11986] 3 S.C.R.

A        The petitioner persisted with the State authorities for payment to
    him of a half share in the compensation, but having failed to obtain
    payment he has filed the present petition claiming that a sum of
    Rs.4,80,487.10 was payable to him on account of a half share in the
    compensation with interest thereon.
B        The application is-opposed by the State of Gujarat and the Col-
    lector of Baroda. It is disputed that the petitioner is entitled to any
    compensation under the order dated August 18, 1977 of this Court
    disposing of the appeal. It is contended that the mere fact of being
    impleaded as a respondent in this Court does not entitle the petitioner
    to any part of compensation awarded by the High Court, which was
c   concerned solely with adjudicating a dispute between the Thakor and
    the State. It is pointed out that the petitioner had never made an
    application for compensation on the abolition of the jagir, and was not
    a party to the proceedings before the Jagir Abolition Officer and the
    Gujarat Revenue Tribunal. The adjudication by those authorities de-
    termined that a half share belonged to the Thakor and there was no
D   adjudication that the other half share belong to the petitioner. On the
    contrary, it is asserted, the half share belonged to the erstwhile State
    of Chhota-Udepur and on its merger with the then State of Bombay
    that half share belonged to the State of Bombay. On the reorganisa-
    tion of the States in 1960, when the State of Gujarat came into exist-
    ence, the half share passed into the ownership of the State of Gujarat.
E    Upon the abolition of Jagirs on August 1, 1954 by the Bombay Merged
    Territories and Areas (Jagirs Abolition) Act, 1953, the Jagir of Gundi
    and Kheda was abolished and it now stood vested in the State of
    Gujarat. It is pointed out further that the inventory of the private
    properties of the ruler prepared under the Instrument of Merger made
    no reference to the J agir of Gundi and Kheda. It is also stated that the
F   application for modification of the order dated August 18, 1977 imp-
    leading the petitioner was not pressed by the State only because the
    petitioner had withdrawn the application for contempt and, therefore,
    there was no point in pursuing it.
           The question is whether the right of the petitioner to a half share
     of the compensation stands determined by the order dated May 4, 1978
G
     of this Court disposing of the appeal. The appeal was directed against
     the order dated July 23, 1975 of the High Court. That order was made
     on a writ petition filed by the Thakor against the State of Gujarat. The
     petitioner was not a party to the writ petition. The writ petition had
     arisen on proceedings taken in respect of the Thakor's half share in the
H   Jagir and the determination of the compensation. We have perused the
            STATE OF GUJARAT v. P.N. THAKOR [PATHAK, J.]                105

order of the High Court disposing of the writ petition and we do not           A
find any adjudication on any claim of the petitioner. The entire con-
trovesy before the High Court was a controversy between the Thakor
and the State. It is true that when the valuation of the Thakor's half
share was determined by the High Court in the writ petition, the
valuation of the other half share stood automatically determined. But
there is nothing in the order of the High Court determining the owner-         B
ship of that other half share. There is nothing at all to indicate that the
other half share belongs to the petitioner. As we have seen, the peti-
tioner applied for being impleaded as a respondent in the Special
Leave Petition, but the order impleading him did not amount    • to an
adjudication on the question whether he was the owner of the other
half share in the compensation. It was a Special Leave Petition filed by       c
the State of Gujarat against an order of the High Court passed on the
dispute between the State and the Thakor. The presence of the
petitioner in the array of respondents could not vest any right in the
petitioner to any part of the compensation. If the appeal was allpwed
in terms of the relief sought by the State, it would have resulted in a
reduction of the quantum of compensation awarded to the Thakor. If             D
it had been dismissed, the quantum of compensation determined by
the High Court would have stood affirmed. There was no scope any-
where in the appeal for determining whether the petitioner could claim
a part of the compensation.
      Upon that ground alone this petition must fail.                          E
       If it was permissible to go into the merits of the claim of the
petitioner, it would be necessary to consider whether any part of the
J agir of Gundi and Kheda belonged to the petitioner before the Instru-
ment of Merger and, if it did, whether under the Instrument of Merger
it was included in the list of' private properties of the ruler or was         F
retained by him under any other provision of the Instrument of Merger
or of law. We find it unnecessary to express any opinion on this point
because, as has been seen earlier, the petitioner has based his claim on
the order of this Court disposing of the appeal, and that order cannot
be said to confer any rights on the petitioner in respect of the compen-
sation payable on the abolition of the J agir. It will be for the petitioner   G
to establish his title to a half share of the compensation in some other
proceeding.
      The petition fails and is dismissed with costs.

P.S.S.                                                  Petition dismissed.    H