STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS.versusM.P. MOHLA
- Citation
- 2006 INSC 832
- Decided
- 10 November 2006
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- S B SINHA
Holding
A review petition cannot be entertained to obtain clarification or raise a fresh issue and is not maintainable where it contradicts the party's earlier stand.
Summary
M.P. Mohla, a veterinary surgeon employed by the State of Haryana, claimed entitlement to a higher promotional pay scale under the Haryana Civil Services (Revised Pay) Rules, 1998 and the Assured Career Progression (ACP) Rules, 1998. The High Court allowed his writ petition, granting the higher pay, but the State’s Special Leave Petition was dismissed by the Supreme Court. The State then filed a review petition in the High Court seeking clarification on whether the Revised Pay Rules or the ACP Rules applied, which was dismissed. The State appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that the review petition was permissible to obtain clarification and that it could resile from its earlier admission. The Supreme Court held that a review petition cannot be used to seek clarification or raise a fresh issue not raised in the original proceeding and that the State could not contradict its earlier stand, rendering the review petition non‑maintainable. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed without deciding the substantive question of which pay rule applied.
Issues considered
- The maintainability of the State's review petition seeking clarification on the applicability of the Revised Pay Rules versus the ACP Rules.
- Whether a review petition can be used to raise a fresh question or obtain clarification contrary to the party's earlier position.
- Whether the State can resile from its admission made in the writ proceedings.
Legislation cited
Subjects
Judgment
A STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS.
v.
M.P. MOHLA
NOVEMBER 10, 2006
B [S.B. SINHA AND DAL VEER BHANDARI, JJ.]
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-0rder XLV/l-Review Petition-
Maintainability of-Claim for higher promotional revised pay scale by
C employee-Denied by State-Writ Petition-Jn counter affidavit admission by
State th(Jt f1Xation of the pay-scale of employee governed by Revised Pay
Rules-Claim permitted by High Court-SLP against order of High Court,
raising question ofapplicability ofACP Rules and non-applicability of Revised
Pay Rules, dismissed by Supreme Court-Review Petitio.n for review of order
of High Court seeking clarification regarding applicability of the Rules-
D Dismissed-On appeal, held: Review Petition was not maintainable-It was
not open to the State to ask for a clarification contrOIJ' to or inconsistent ·with
its stand taken in the Writ Petition-The question as regards applicability of
one or the other Rules could not have been decided in the Review Petition-
Haryana Civil Services (Revised Pay) Rules, 1998-Haryana Civil Services
E (Assured Career Progression) Rules, 1998.
Respondent was appointed as Veterinary Surgeon in 1965. In 1980
he was promoted as Assistant Director with effect from 1.4.1992, he was
drawing Selection Grade Scale of Rs. 4100-5300. On 9.4.1996 he was
promQted to the post of Deputy Director. In 1998 Haryana Civil Services
F (Revised Pay) Rules, 1998 and Haryana Civil Services (Assured Career
Progression) Rules, 1998 (ACP Rules) came into force. In terms of the ACP
Rules the scale of Rs. 4100-5300 was revised to Rs. 12000-16500 w.e.f.
1.1.96. Respondent was also given a certificate of higher responsibility. His
pay was fixed in the scale of Rs. 13500--17250. He claimed fixation of his
pay in the higher promotional revised pay scale of Rs. 14300-18300. The
G claim was rejected. Hence he filed Writ Petition on the ground that
consequent to his promotion on the next higher post of Deputy-Director,
he was entitled to next higher revised pay scale of Rs. 14300-18300. The
Writ Petition was allowed by High Court. Special Leave Petition against
the order of High Court was dismissed by Supreme Court, wherein the
H 926
STATE OF HARYANA v. M.P. MOHLA 927
State had raised the question of anomaly in the applicability of the Revised A
Pay Rules and ACP Rules, stating that respo:ident was not entitled to be
fixed in the corresponding pay scale of Rs. 4100-5300 under Revised Pay
Rules. This statement was contrary to his statement in the counter-affidavit
in the Writ Petition admitting that the respondent was governed by the
Revised Pay Rules. Despite dismissal of the SLP, State filed Review Petition
before High Court seeking clarifications in respect of applicability of the B
Rules. Respondent contended therein that ACP Rules were not applicable
as he had already been promoted twice prior to coming into force thereof.
The Review Petition was dismissed. Hence the present appeal.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court c
HELD: 1.L A review petition filed by appellants herein was not
maintainable. There was no error apparent on the face of the record. The
effect of a judgment may have to be considered afresh in a separate
proceeding having regard to the subsequent cause of action which might
have arisen but the same by itself may not be a ground for filing an D
application for review. (936-C-D)
1.2. The application for review in effect and substance was not an
application for clarification of the judgment of the High Court. An
application for clarification cannot be taken recourse to; to achieve the E
result of a review application. What cannot be done directly, cannot be
done indirectly. [936-D-E)
Ram Chandra Singh v. Savitri Devi and Ors., (2004) 12 SCC 713,
referred to.
F
1.3. A judgment must be read in its entirety. The judgment of a c9urt
must also be implemented. But what would be the effect of a judgment
must be considered from the reliefs claimed in the writ petition as also
the implications thereof which has to be deciphered from reading the entire
judgment. A judgment may also have to be read on the touchstone of
pleadings of the parties. [934-E-F) G
State of Karnataka and Ors. v. C. Lalitha, (2006[ 2 SCC 747, relied
on.
1.4. It may not also be open to a party to the lis to ask for a H
928 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006) SUPP. 8 S.C.R.
A clarification contrary to or inconsistent with its stand taken by it in the
writ proceedings. Subsequent event may have some relevance but the same
must have a direct nexus with the judgment sought to be reviewed. In this
case the purported subsequent event is the filing of the contempt petition.
Appellants' specific stand in the contempt petition is that the order of the
B court stood complied with. If the order of the court stood complied with,
there was no subsequent event which was necessary to be taken into
consideration. Filing of an application under the provisions of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 itself cannot be a ground to deny the benefit
under a judgment. It is one thing to state that the judgment of the court
has been implemented, but it is another thing that the effect of the
C judgment is not that what was being contended by Respondent. It is in
that sense, this Court has laid down the law that such subsequent events
may give rise to a fresh cause of action. [936-G; 937-C-Fl
Board of Control for Cricket in India and Anr. v. Netaji Cricket Club
and Ors., 120051 4 SCC 741, distinguished.
D
Na.'ional Housing Coop. Society Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan and Ors.,
[2005) 12 sec 149, referred to.
2.1. The Court wiU not go into the question as to whether the
E Haryana Civil Services (Revised Pay) Rules, 1998 on Haryana Civil
Services (Assured Career Progression) Rule!., 1998 will apply in the case
of Respondent. The dispute between the parties has to be decided in
accordance with law. What, however, camiot be denied or disputed that
a dispute between the parties once adjudicated must reach its logical
conclusion. If a specific question which was not raised and which had not
F been decided by the High Court the same would not debar a party to
agitate the same at an appropriate stage, subject, of course, to the
applicability of principles of res judicata or constructive res judicata. It is
also trite that if a subsequent cau~e of action had arisen in the matter of
:mplementation of a judgmen~, a fresh writ petition may be filed, as a fresh
G cause of action has arisen. j935-B-D)
J.S. Parihar v. Ganpat Duggar and Ors., (1996) 6 SCC 291; State of
Orissa and Anr. v. Aswini Kumar Baliarsingh, [2006) 7 SCALE 610, referred )
to.
2.2. Whereas a party may not be permitted to resile from his
H
STATE OF HARYANA v. M.P. MOHLA [S.B. SINHA, J.] 929
admission at a subsequent stage of the same proceedings, it is also trite A
that an admission made contrary to law shall not be binding on the State.
(936-A-Bl
Sangramsinh P. Gaekwad and Ors. v. Shantadevi P. Gaekwad (Dead)
Thruugh LRs. and Ors., [2005] ll SCC 314, distinguished.
2.3. If the ACP Rules were applicable in the case of Respondent, it B
was the duty of appellants to bring it to the notice of the High Court and
ask for adjudication on the said question. But the effective order passed
as against it could not have been sought to be nullified by raising a question
which had not been raised in the writ petition. There might not have been
an adjudication on a question which was relevant for determination of the C
issue directly or indirectly but in a case of this nature such a contention
could not have been entertained in a review proceeding which would have
the effect of taking away the benefit granted by a court upon adjudication.
(936-E-G)
3. The question as regards applicability of one or the other Rules if D
arises in future, the same has to be determined on its own merit in
accordance with law and having regard to the fact situation obtaining in
each case. In the facts and circumstances of this case, there shall be no
order as to costs. (938-Bl
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4772 of2006. E
From the Final Judgment and Order dated 11.5.2004 of the High Court
of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in R.A. No. 34712002 in C.W.P. No.
907111999.
R. Srivastava, Ajay Siwach and T.V. George, for the Appellants. F
Prabhjit Jauhar and S.S. Jauhar for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
S.B. SINHA, J. Leave granted.
G
Respondent was appointed as veterinary surgeon in the cadre of Haryana
Veterinary Service (Grade-I) on or about 5.8.1965. He was promoted to the
post of Assistant Director-cum-Sub-Divisional Officer on 1.6.1980. In the
year, 1986, he was granted a pay scale of Rs. 2375-3600. The State, however,
implemented grant of Selection Grade Scale in the scale of Rs. 2000-3500 H
930 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 8 S.C.R.
A which was revised to Rs. 2200-4000 and Selection Grade Scale of Rs. 4100-
5300 to 20% of the posts of Veterinary Surgeons who had completed 12
-
years of service. He was placed in the said pay scale by an order dated 20th
September, 1993 with retrospective effect from 1.4.1992. In the meantime,
however, an intermediary senior scale of Rs. 3000-4500 was introduced which
B became applicable upon completion of five years of regular service. He became
entitled thereto. He was promoted to the post of Deputy Director in the pay
scale of Rs. 3000-4500. On 9 .4.1996 he was drawing Rs. 4500/- and Rs. l 00/
- for personal pay.
Haryana Civil Services (Revised Pay) Rules, 1998 (for short "the Revised
C Rules") came into force on 7.1.1998 in terms whereof the pay scales were
revised. In terms of the said Rules, the pay scales of the posts of Deputy
Director and Joint Director/ Project Director were said to have been revised
from Rs. 3000-4500 and Rs. 3000-5000 to Rs. 10000-13900 and Rs. 10000-
15200 respectively.
D Another rules known as Haryana Civil Services (Assured Career
Progression) Rules, 1998 (for short "the ACP Rules") came into force with
effect from 7.1.1998 in terms whereof the pay scales of Rs. 3000-4500 and
Rs. 4100-5300 were revised respectively to Rs. 10000-13900 and Rs. 12000-
375-16500 with effect from 1.1.1996. In terms of ACP Rules, the pay of
Respondent was fixed at Rs. 12000-16500. By a letter dated 15.4.1998,
E RespondPnt asked for grant of a certificate of performance of higher
responsibility so as to enable him to claim the benefit of promotional
increments in the pay scale of Rs. 12000-16500. Therein, he also cited the
instances of other persons who had been granted similar benefit.
F Pay of Respondent was fixed in the pay f.cale of Rs. 13500-17250 by
an order dated 12.10.1998. A certificate of higher responsibility was also
issued to him pursuant whereto he claimed promotional increment in the
revised scale of Rs. 13 500-17250. The claim of Respondent was rejected by
an order dated 16.4.1999 stating:
G "While inviting yocr attention on the subject cited above, it is informed
that you are already working in the h:gher pay scale of Rs. 4100-
5300 before your promotion. Yc.ur pay, therefore, has been correctly
fixed under Clause 2 of Note 7 of Rule 15 of A.C.P. Rules, 1998. The
Govt. Jetter dated 7.3.88 is not applicable in respect of pay fixation
with effect from 1.1.1996."
H
STATE OF HARYANA v. M.P. MOHLA [S.B. SINHA, J.] 931
A writ petition was filed by Respondent claiming inter alia the following A
reliefs:
"(i) a writ in the nature of certiorari may kindly be issued in favour
of the petitioner and against the respondents quashing the order dated
16.4.1999 (Annexure P/13) whereby claim of the petitioner for fixation
of his pay in the higher promotional revised pay scale of Rs. 14300- B
400-18300 has been rejected on a totally erroneous premise ignoring
the fact that the petitioner was already drawing the Selection Grade
of Rs. 4100-5300 with effect from 1.4.92 (Annexure P/2) and which
Selection Grade scale now has been revised to Rs. 13 500-17250 with
effect from 1.1.1996 and consequently on his promotion to the next C
higher post of Dy. Director w.e.f. 29.3.1996, the petitioner is entitled
to be placed in the next higher revised pay scale i.e. of 14300-400-
18300.
(ii) a writ in the nature of mandamus may kindly be issued in favour
of the petitioner and against the respondents directing the respondents D
to fix the pay of the petitioner in the revised pay scale of Rs. 14300-
400-18300 from the date of his promotion as Dy. Director, instead of
fixing in the pay scale of Rs. 13500-17250, i.e., the pay scale which
the petitioner would have continued to draw even while working on
the post of Assistant Director-cum-Sub-Divisional Officer and
alternatively the respondents may be further directed to fix the pay of E
the petitioner on the promotional post of Deputy Director w.e.f.
9.4.1996 on the next stage in the existing pay scale of Rs. 13500-
17250 in accordance with Rule 4.4 (c)(i) of CSR Vol. I and to grant
all other consequential benefits."
By an order dated 4.12.2000, the said writ petition was allowed directing: F
"Accordingly we accept this writ petition and quash the impugned
order. It is directed that the petitioner would be promoted in the
present corresponding scale of Rs. 4100-5300 and on promotion will
be given one increment. The arrears should be paid within four months G
from today. We deem it necessary to observe that the State should
take necessary steps and remove the said anomaly that might arise in
case of many other officers."
A Special Leave Petition filed by Appellants thereagainst was dismissed
by this Court by an order dated 10.8.200 I. In the meanwhile Respondent H
932 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006] SUPP. 8 S.C.R.
A filed a Contempt Petition claiming a higher scale of pay corresponding to Rs.
14300-18300 wherein Appellants filed their reply stating that the order of the
High Court had been complied with. It is not in dispute that the question as
regards purported anomaly in the applicability of the Revised Rules and the
ACP Rules had not been determined by the court.
B The said contention indisputably was raised by Appellants in the special
leave petition stating:
"Because the Respondent is not entitled to be fixed in the
corresponding pay scale of Rs. 4100-5300 as contained in First
Schedule, Part II, ofH.C.S. (Revised Pay Rules), 1998 by way of rule
c 2(h) and the ACP Rules are applicable as contained under Sr. No. 6
in Schedule l, part l of H.C.s (Assured Career Progression) Rules,
1998. Therefore, the order passed by High Court is in contravention
of H.C.S. (Revised Pay Rules), 1998 and also not in accordance with
H.C.s (A.C.P.) Rules 1968"
D It is not in dispute that in its counter-affidavit an admission was made
by Appellants stating:
"That this para is wrong and misleading. The Petitioner was working
on the post of Deputy Director in the pre-revised scale of Rs. 3000-
4500 and selection grade of Rs. 4100-5300 and his pay was protected
E
in the scale of Rs. 4100-5300. His pay was fixed in the pre-revised
scale of Rs. 3000-4500 and his pay was protected in the scale of Rs.
4100-5300. After granting new pay scales by the govt. the pay of the
Petitioner was re-fixed in the scale of Rs. 13500-17250, for which he
was entitled. The pay fixed by the respondent department is in
F accordance with the revised pay scale which is correct."
A review application was filed before the High Court despite dismissal
of the special leave petition by this Court seeking purported clarifications in
the matter of the applicability of the Rules. It was contended that the purported
admission made was on a wrong reading of the provisions of the Rules. It
G was further contended that Respondent is governed by the ACP Rules and
not the Revised Rules.
Respondent, on the other hand, contended that the ACP Rules has no ·
application as he had already been promoted twice prior to coming into force
H thereof.
- STATE OF HARYANA v. M.P. MOHLA [S.B. SINHA, J.]
The said review application has been dismissed by reason of the
933
A
impugned order.
- Before we embark upon the rival contentions of the parties, we may
notice that a Division Bench of the High Court passed the following order on
2.3.2004:
B
"The petitioner was in the scale of Rs. 4100-5300, which was
withdrawn vide order dated 4.12.2000, the same was ordered to be
restored, dispute arose as to what is the corresponding scale to the
said scale in the light of 5th Pay Commission.
Learned Counsel for the parties are not clear as to what C
corresponding scale was being applied prior to its withdrawal. Stand
of the Learned Counsel for the state is that corresponding scale should
be Rs. l 200~-16500/-, while according to the petitioner corresponding
scale should be Rs. 13500-17250/-.
Since Writ Petition has been disposed of and this issue was not D
adjudicated upon, strictly speaking the controversy raised cannot be
the subject matter of the Review Petition. However, this issue will be
decided on the next date of hearing."
We may at this juncture also take note of a letter issued by the Financial
Commissioner and Secretary to the Government of Haryana, Finance E
Department which is in the following terms:
"I am directed to invite your attention on the subject noted above and
to say that it has come to the notice of the Finance Department that
the various departments are not allowing replacement pay scales of
Selection Grade (Pre-revised) as prescribed under 1st Schedule Part II F
of the Haryana Civil Services (Revised Pay) Rules, 1998 issued vide
Fi.nance Department notification dated 7. l.1998.
This matter has been examined by Government in detail and have
decided that wherever Selection Grades were existing in the pre-
revised scales as a definite percentage of the posts and after stipulated G
years of service, they would carry the Selection Grade also in the
revised scales and the replacement of such Selection Grade would be
the replacement scale prescribed under 1st Schedule Part II of the
Haryana Civil Services (Revised Pay) Rules, 1998 if the same has not
been mentioned separately. This would hold good in case of all the H
A
934 SU~REME COURT REPORTS [2006) SUPP. 8 S.C.R.
concerned Government employees for whom specific ACP scales have
not been provided."
-
Contention of Mr. R. Srivastava, learned senior counsel appearing on
behalf of Appellants is that the High Court despite observing that the question
with regard to the applicability of the Rules as also the effect of the purported
B admission made on behalf of application shall be examined, failed to do so
as would appear from the impugned order.
In the functioning of the Executive Government mistake can always
take place and if a wrong rule is made to apply by reason thereof, the same
ordinarily should not only be allowed to be perpetrated as the same may have
c a huge financial repercussion. Ambiguity in the matter of applicability of
scale ofpay, it was urged, should have been determined by the High Court.
Mr. Prabhjit Jauhar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent,
on the other hand, submitted that the ACP Rules which were issued in 1998
D with retrospective effect from 1996 have no application in the instant case.
It was admitted that Respondent's pay was fixed in the pay scale of Rs.
13500 17250 at the Directorate level and in that view of the matter Appellants
cannot be permitted to resile from the said admission.
A judgment as is well-known must be read in its entirety. The judgment
E of a court must also be implemented. But what would be the effect of a
judgment must be considered from the reliefs claimed in the writ petition as
also the implications thereof which has to be deciphered from reading the
entire judgment. A judgment may also have to be read on the touchstone of
pleadings of the parties.
F In State of Karnataka and Ors. v. C. Lalitha, (2006] 2 SCC 747, this
Court observed:
"A judgment, as is well known, is not to be read as a statute. But, it
is also well known that the judgment must be construed as if it had
been rendered in accordance with law."
G
It was noticed:
"In Gajraj Singh v. State of U.P.6 this Court held: (SCC p. 768, para
8)
"A doubt arising from reading a judgment of the Court can be
H
STATE OF HARYANA v. M.P. MOHLA [S.B. SINHA, J.] 935
resolved by assuming that the judgment was delivered consistently A
with the provisions of law and therefore a course or procedure
in departure from or not in conformity with statutory provisions
cannot be said to have been intended or laid down by the Court
unless it has been so stated specifically."
We, as at present advised, do not intend to go into the question as to B
whether the Revised Pay Rules or the ACP Rules will apply in the case of
Respondent. The dispute between the parties has t.:> be decided iri accordance
with law. What, however, cannot be denied or disputed that a dispute between
the parties once adjudicated must reach its logical conclusion. If a specific
question which was not raised and which had not been decided by the High C
Court the same would not debar a party to agitate the same at an appropriate
stage, subject, of course, to the applicability of principles of res judicata or
constructive res judicata.
It is also trite that if a subsequent cause of action had arisen in the
matter of implementation of a judgment a fresh writ petition may be filed, as D
a fresh cause of .action has arisen.
In J.S. Parihar v. Ganpat Duggar and Ors., [1996] 6 SCC 291, this
Court held:
" ... The question is whether seniority list is open to review in the E
contempt proceedings to find out whether it is in conformity with the
directions issued by the earlier Benches. It is seen that once there is
an order passed by the Government on the basis of the directions
issued by the court, there arises a fresh cause of action to seek redressal
in an appropriate forum. The preparation of the seniority list may be
wrong or may be right or may or may not be in conformity with the F
directions. But that would be a fresh cause of action for the aggrieved
party to avail of the opportunity of judicial review. But that cannot
be considered to be the wilful violation of the order. After re-exercising
the judicial review in contempt proceedings, a fresh direction by the
learned Single Judge cannot be given to redraw the seniority list. In G
other words, the learned Judge was exercising the jurisdiction to
consider the matter on merits in the contempt proceedings. It would
not be permissible under Section 12 of the Act...."
[See also State of Orissa & Anr. v. Aswini Kumar Baliarsingh, (2006)
7 SCALE 610] H
936 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006) SUPP. 8 S.C.R.
A The law as regards the effect of an admission is also no longer res
integra. Whereas a party may not be permitted to resile from his admission
at a subsequent stage of the same proceedings, it is also trite that an admission
made contrary to law shall not be binding on the State.
Reliance has been placed on Sangramsinh P. Gaekwad and Ors. v.
B Shantadevi P. Gaekwad (Dead) Through LRS. and Ors., [2005] 11 SCC 314
but therein the court was considering the effect of an admission made in the
pleadings which was binding on the party proprio vigore in the subsequent
proceedings.
C A review petition filed by Appellants herein was not maintainable.
There was no error apparent on the face of the record. The effect of a
judgment may have to be considered afresh in a separate proceeding having
regard to the subsequent cause of action which might have arisen but the
same by itself may not be a ground for filing an application for review.
Mr. Srivastava submitted that an application for review in effect and
D
substance was an application for clarification of the judgment of the High
Court. We do not think so. An application for clarification cannot te taken
recourse to achieve the result of a review application. What cannot be done
directly, cannot be done indirectly. [Ram Chandra Singh v. Savitri Devi and
Ors, [2004] 12 SCC 713]
E
If the ACP Rules were applicable in the case of Respondent, it was the
duty of Appellants to bring it to the notice of the High Court and ask for
adjudication on the said question. But the effective order passed as against
it could not have been sought to be nullified by raising a question which had
not been raised in the writ petition. There might not have been an adjudication
F on a question which was relevant for determination of the issue directly or
indirectly but in a case of this nature such a contention could not have been
entertained in a review proceeding which would have the effect of taking
away the benefit granted by a court upon adjudication.
It may not also be open to a party to the lis to ask for a clarification
G contrary to or inconsistent with its stand taken by it in the writ proceedings.
Our attention has been drawn to a decision of this Court in Board of Control
for Cricket in India and Anr. v. Netaji Cricket Club and Ors., [2005] 4 SCC
741 wherein this Court opined:
H "It is also not correct to contend that the Court while exercising its
STATE OF HARYANA v. M.P. MOHLA [S.B. SINHA, J.] 937
review jurisdiction in any situation whatsoever cannot take into A
consideration a subsequent event. In a case of this nature when the
Court accepts its own mistake in understanding the nature and purport
of the undertaking given by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on
behalf of the Board and its correlation with as to what transpired in
the AGM of the Board held on 29-9-2004, the subsequent event may
be taken into consideration by the Court for the purpose of rectifying B
its own mistake."
Therein a review proceeding was entertained as the court accepted its
own mistake in understanding the nature and purport of the undertaking
given by the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the Board. It was C
in that context opined that the subsequent event may be taken into consideration
by the court for the purpose of rectifying its own mistake. Subsequent event
may have some relevance but the same must have a direct nexus with the
judgment sought to be reviewed. It has been noticed hereinbefore that before
us an endeavour has been made to urge that the review application was in
effect and substance an application for clarification. D
· In this case the purported subsequent event is the filing of the contempt
petition. Appellants' specific stand in the contempt petition is that the order
of the court stood complied with. If the order of the court stood complied
with, there was no. subsequent event which was necessary to be taken into
consideration. Filing of an application under the provisions of the Contempt E
of Courts Act, I 971 itself cannot be a ground to deny the benefit under a
judgment. It is one thing to state that the judgment of the court has been
implemented, but it is another think that the effect of the judgment is not that
what was being contended by Respondent. It is in that sense, this Court times
without number has laid down the law that such subsequent events may give F
rise to a fresh cause of action.
Reliance has also been placed on a decision of this Court in National
Housing Coop. Society Ltd v. State of Rajasthan and Ors., [2005] 12 SCC
149 wherein following Kunhayammed and Ors v. State of Kera/a and Anr.,
[2000] 6 sec 359 a Division Bench of this Court opined that when a special G
leave petition is dismissed by a non-speaking order, the High Court could be
moved for a writ for review.
Submission of Mr. Jauhar, however, is that if a review petition is
permitted to be filed and allowed,. the same would nullify the order of this
H
938 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006) SUPP. 8 S.C.R.
A Court dismissing the special leave petition filed by Appellants. This may be
so but we are of the opinion that keeping in view the facts and circumstances
of this case it is not necessary for us to make an endeavour to reopen a
binding precedent particularly when no such action arises therefor.
We, therefore, are of the opinion that this appeal has no merit and, thus,
B must be dismissed accordingly. However, the question as regards applicability
of one or the other Rules if arises in future, the same has to be determined
on its own merit in accordance with law and having regard to the fact situation
obtaining in each case. In the facts and circumstances of this case, there shall
be no order as to costs.
c K.K.T. Appeal dismissed.
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