STATE OF HARYANA& ORS.versusM/S. VINOD OIL& GENERAL MILLS &ANR.

                         [2014] 13 S.C.R. 524


A                   STATE OF HARYANA& ORS.
                                   V.

            M/S. VINOD OIL& GENERAL MILLS &ANR.
               (Civil Appeal Nos. 9098-9099 of 2014)
B
                       SEPTEMBER 23, 2014
             [T. S. THAKUR AND R. BANUMATHI, JJ.]

        Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - ss. 4 and 6 -Acquisition
c of industrial land - For the residential and commercial
  purpose - The acquired strip of land measuring 19 mar/as
  is contiguous to the factory and can be adjusted in the
  Planning Scheme and hence acquisition thereof is quashed
  -Anbther strip measuring 1 Kanai 11 mar/as is hindrance
D for the wholesome development of the scheme, hence
  acquisition thereof upheld- In view of s. 24(2) ofAcquisition
  Act of 2013, matter remitted to High Court to examine certain
  factual aspects - Right to Fair Compensation and
  Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation,
E Resettlement Act, 2013- s. 24(2).
        Public Purpose- Meaning and determination of- Held:
  A public purpose includes a purpose involving general
  interest of community as opposed to individual interest -
F State is the first judge to determine whether there exists public
  purpose.
         Disposing of the appeals, the Court

        HELD: 1. The action of the State in first approving
G setting up of a factory and then acquiring the same
  cannot be held as unreasonable. Permission for change
  of land use and developing the area as an industry, has
  no relevance while considering the validity of
  ac~uisition. The fact that the factory and building was
H
                                 524
  STATE OF HARYANA v. M/S. VINOD OIL & GENERAL           525
                     MILLS

put up in the lands with the approval of the authority A
cannot be a bar for acquisition of the land. Public interest
overrides individual's interests. The only effect of
permission for such change in land use and approval
for construction and developing the area as an industry
can be recognized as valid only to the extent as to B
confer right upon the land owners to recover the
appropriate compensation. [Paras 7, 8][530-D; F-H;
531-A-B]

      2. Public purpose includes a purpose involving c
general interest of community as opposed to the interest
of an individual directly or indirectly involved. Individual
interest must give way to public interest as far as public
purpose in respect of acquisition of land is concerned.
Prima facie, State is the first Judge to determine whether D
there exists public purpose or not. But the decision of
the State is not beyond judicial scrutiny. The requirement
of land for residential and commercial purposes and for
development of the Sector involves in it an element of
general interest of the community and hence, must be E
regarded as a 'public purpose' as opposed to the
particular interest of individuals. [Paras 9, 11 and 12]
[531-D-E; 533-E; 534-C-D]
     Dau/at Singh Surana & Ors. v. First Land             F
     Acquisition Collector&· Ors. 2006 (8) Suppl. SCR
     1076 : (2007) 1 SCC 641; Sooraram Pratap
     Reddy & Ors. v. Distt. Collector, Ranga Reddy
     Dist. & Ors. 2008 (13) SCR 126: (2008) 9 SCC
     552 - relied on.                                     G
      3. There is no bar to the subsequent acquisition of
the land nor is there a bar for issuance of successive
notification for acquisition of the land. In the present
case, earlier notification was issued for the same H
526      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2014] 13 S.C.R.

A purpose for which subsequent acquisition was made.
  The subsequent acquisition was done, when the State
  felt that the land sought to be acquired cannot be
  adjusted in the development of the Plan. [Para 15]
  [535-C-E]
B
        Roshan Lal & Ors. vs. State of Haryana & Ors.
        2003 (3) PLR 199 - referred to.

       4. Khasra No. 148/2/2, which is contiguous to the
  factory of the respondents, can be adjusted in the
C Planning Scheme of the Sector and on this ground, the
  order of quashing the acquisition thereof is affirmed.
  Insofar as another strip of 1 Kanai 11 Marla of land is
  concerned this strip of land is hindrance for the
D wholesome development of the Sector and the same
  cannot be adjusted in the development of the Sector.
  Order of quashing acquisition of this strip of land is
  upheld. [Paras 16, 17][536-B-F]

        5. In view of the plea that by virtue of Section 24 (2)
E of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in
  Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation, ResettlementAct, 2013
  the subject of acquisition shall be deemed to have
  lapsed, certain factual aspects viz., (i) whether
F possession of the land measuring 1Kanai11 Marlas has
  been taken or not; (ii) whether the compensation in
  respect of this acquired land was paid or not have to
  be examined. Since the 2013 Act has come into force
  with effect from 1.1.2014, the High Court did not have
G occasion to examine whether proceedings already
  initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 have
  lapsed on account of the alleged non-payment of
  compensation and the failure of the authorities to take
  over possession of the land acquired from them. The
 H
   STATE OF HARYANA v. M/S. VINOD OIL & GENERAL               527
                      MILLS

matter is remitted to the High Court to examine the above A
limited questions in respect of the acquisition of the land
1 Kanai 11 Marla. [Para 21][538-A-E]
     Pune Municipal Corporation & Anr. v. Harakchand
     Misirimal Solanki & Ors .2014 (1) SCR 783 :              B
     (2014) 3 sec 183 - referred to.
                     Case Law Reference:
2006 (8) Suppl. SCR 1076          relied on       Para 10

                                                Para 11
                                                              c
2008 (13) SCR 126                 relied on

2003 (3) PLR 199                  referred to   Para 13
2014 (1) SCR 783          •       referred to   Para 20
     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal D
Nos. 9098-9099 of 2014.
     From the judgment and order dated 25.05.2007 in CWP
Nos. 17458 and 17469 of 2006 passed by the High Court of
Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh.                        E

    Narender Hooda, Sr. Adv., Vineet Malik, Nupur
Choudhary, Kamal Mohan Gupta for the Appellants.
    Puneet Jindal, Sr. Adv., Rajat Sharma, Subhashish         F
Bhowmick, Dr. Kailash Chand for the Respondents.
     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
     R. BANUMATHI, J. 1. Delay condoned. Leave granted.
      2. These appeals arise out of the judgment of High Court G
of Punjab and Haryana in and by which the High Court quashed
the acquisition of the lands of the respondents, intera/ia, on
various grounds. Feeling aggrieved, State of Haryana is before
us.
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528        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2014] 13 S.C.R.


A          3. Facts in nutshell giving rise to these appeals are as
   under:- The respondents being a partnership concern had set
   up an industrial unit in the year 1981 which is running under
    the name and style of M/s. Vinod Oil and General Mills. On
    19.5.1992, Haryana Government issued a notification under
 B Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short 'Act') in
    which the land of the respondents was also included. The
    respondents submitted their objections under Section 5-A of
    the Act and after considering their objections, the State
    Government excluded the land of the respondents from the
 C acquisition proceedings before declaration under Section 6
    of the Act. Later at the time of planning of the Sector, it was felt
    that two strips of lands of the respondents are creating
     hindrance in the wholesome Development Plan of the Sector.
 D Haryana Government again initiated acquisition proceedings
     by issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Act on
     15.3.2004 to acquire the land in the area of village Hissar
     Hadbast No.146 and village Satrod Khas and Satrod Khurd
     Hadbast Nos.154 & 155, Tehsil and District Hissar including
 E the lands of the respondents for public purpose, namely, for
     development and utilization of land for residential and
     commercial Sector 9 & 11, Hissar. The respondents filed
     their objections under Section 5-A of the Act and after hearing
     the respondents, the Government decided to acquire the land
 F in dispute and the declaration under Section 6 of the Act was
     issued on 14.3.2005 and thereafter notice under Section 9 of
     the Act was also issued. Challenging the acquisition
     proceedings, the partnership concern filed two writ petitions
     one by Savitri Devi, one of the partners (CWP          No.17469/
 G 2006) and the another by Mis. Vinod Oil and General Mills, a
     registered partnership firm through Shri lnder Sain Aggarwal
      (CWP No.17458/2006) praying to quash the notifications
      dated 15.3.2004 and 14.3.2005 under Sections 4 and 6 of
      the Act and also prayed for direction to release their land from
  H acquisition proceedings.
   STATE OF HARYANA v. M/S. VINOD OIL & GENERAL                   529
              MILLS [R. BANUMATHI, J.]

      4. The High Court quashed the acquisition proceedings, A
interalia, on the grounds:- (i) having permitted the change of
land use for developing the area as an industry and after 26
years cannot turn around and acquire the land for
development of residential and commercial purposes; (ii)
lands having been released from earlier acquisition in 1992 B
cannot be included in the notification for re-acquisition; (iii)
the land of the respondents being located in one of the corners
of the sector that is proposed to be developed, the same could
be conveniently adjusted in the Plan/Scheme.
                                                                   c
      5. Mr. Narendra Hooda, learned Addi. Advocate General,
appearing for the State of Haryana, submitted that the
development and utilization of land for residential and
commercial purpose in Sector 9 & 11, Hissar will benefit many
people and the High Court erred in not appreciating that the D
interest of the individuals could not come in the way of
development plan. Learned counsel further submitted that at
the time of planning of sector, it was noticed that the land in
dispute was creating hindrance in development of the sector
and the High Court did not properly appreciate the hindrance E
that is being caused by the land, for the development of the
sector as residential and commercial sector. It was submitted
that the release of the land from acquisition in the earlier
notification in 1992 would not in any way bar fresh acquisition
of the same land.                                               F

         6. Mr. Puneet Jindal, learned Senior Counsel appearing
  for the respondents/claimants submitted that when the
  respondents' lands were earlier sought to be acquired, upon
  consideration of objections by the respondents that they have G
  set up industry and put up constructions in their lands and after
· verification of the same, the claim of the respondents was
  accepted by the Government and the land of the respondents
  was then released from acquisition and while so, the
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530         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2014] 13 S.C.R.


A     notification issued by the State of Haryana seeking to acquire
      the land again is illegal and arbitrary and the High Court has
      rightly quashed the acquisition.

          7. Acquisition of respondents' lands was held to be
 B vitiated on the ground that State having granted permission to
   the respondents for change of land use and develop the area
   as an industry cannot turn around after twenty six years to
   acquire the land saying that the same is required to be
   developed for residential purposes and the action of the
 c respondent/State was held to be arbitrary. Of course, Director
   of Town and Country Planning, Haryana earlier granted
   permission to the respondents herein for change of land use
   for construction of Oil and General Mills in their lands in 23
   Kanai 6 Marla in Khasra No.148/1, 148/2 and 149/10. The
 D fact that the factory and building was put up in the lands with
   the approval of the authority cannot be a bar for acquisition of
   the land. Public interesfo'verrides individual's interests. In
   our view, the High Court was not justified in saying that the
   acquisition is bad since permission was earlier granted for
 E change of land use and developing the area as an industry
   and that Government is estopped from initiating acquisition
    proceedings.

         8. Permission for change of land use and developing
 F the area as an industry, in our view, has no relevance while
   considering the validity of acquisition. If we are to hold that
   once permission is granted for change of land use for
   developing the area as an industry and thereafter State cannot
   acquire it, then a situation may arise that for all time to come,
 G the particular area cannot be acquired which may not be in the
   larger public interest. We are'also unable to agree with the
   view taken by the High Court that the action of the respondents/
   State in approving setting up of a factory and then acquiring
   the same is unreasonable. It is not as if the lands where
 H
  STATE OF HARYANA v. M/S. VINOD OIL & GENERAL                       531
             MILLS [R. BANUMATHI, J.]

factories are set up are immune from any acquisition. The only A
effect of permission for such change in land use and approval
for construction and developing the area as an industry can
be recognized as valid only to the extent as to confer right
upon the land owners to recover the appropriate
compensation.                                                  B

      9. The land was acquired for development and utilization
of the same for residential and commercial purposes in Sector
9 & 11, Hissar. So far as the purpose of acquisition of land
is concerned, the High Court observed that "the acquisition          c
is not for essential public services such as development of
infrastructure, railways, metro or the purpose related thereto,
irrigation, water supply,· drainage, road, communication
etc ..... ". High Court was not correct in observing that only
development of infrastructure, railways or irrigation, water D
supply, drainage, road etc. are primary public purposes.
Public purpose includes a purpose involving general interest
of community as opposed to the interest of an individual directly
or indirectly involved. Individual interest must give way to public
interest as far as public purpose in respect of acquisition of E
land is concerned.

      10. The concept of 'public purpose' was dealt with in detail
in Dau/at Singh Surana & Ors. vs. First Land Acquisition
Collector & Ors. (2007) 1 SCC 641, in which this Court has           F
held as under:-
     "49. In United Community Services v. Omaha Nat. Bank
     (77 NW 2d 576, 585, 162 Neb 786) the Court observed
     that a public purpose has for its objective the promotion G
     of the public health, safety, morals, security, prosperity,
     contentment and the general welfare of all the inhabitants.
     50. In People ex rel Adamowski vs. Chicago R.R.
     Terminal Authority (151 NE 2d 311, 314, 14111 2d 230)
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532    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2014] 13 S.C.R.


A      the Court observed that public purpose is not static
       concept, but is flexible and is capable of expansion to
       meet conditions of complex society that were not within
       contemplation of framers of the Constitution.

B      51. In Greenv. Frazier(176 NW 11, 17, 44 ND 395), the
       Court observed that a public purpose or public business
       has for its objective the promotion of the public health,
       safety, morals, general welfare, security, prosperity and
       contentment of all the inhabitants or residents within a
c      given political division, as for example, a State, the
       sovereign powers of which are exercised to promote
       such public purpose or public business.
        52. In the words of Lord Atkinson in Central Control Board
        v. Cannon Brewery Co.Ltd. {1919AC 744: 88 LJCh464:
 D
        121 LT 361 (HL)} the power to take compulsorily raises
      . by implication a right to payment.



 E     59. In Somavantiv. State of Punjab (1963) 2 SCR 774:
       AIR 1963 SC 151 the Court observed that public
       purpose must include an object in which the general
       interest of the community, as opposed to the particular
       interest of individuals, is directly and vitally concerned.
 F     Public purpose is bound to change with the times and
       the prevailing conditions in a given area and, therefore,
       it would not be a practical proposition even to attempt
       an extensive definition of it. It is because of this that the
       legislature has left it to the Government to say what is a
 G     public purpose and also to declare the need of a given
       land for a public purpose.
       60. The Constitution Bench of this Court in Somavanti
       observed that whether in a particular case the purpose
 H
  STATE OF HARYANA v. M/S. VINOD OIL & GENERAL                  533
             MILLS [R. BANUMATHI, J.]

     for which land was needed was a public purpose or not A
     was for the Government to be satisfied about and the
     declaration of the Government would be final subject to
     one exception, namely, that where there was a
     colourable exercise of the power the declarations would
     be open to challenge at the instance of the aggrieved B
     party.


     73. Public purpose cannot and should not be precisely C
     defined and its scope and ambit be limited as far as
     acquisition of land for the public purpose is concerned.
     Public purpose is not static. It also changes with the
     passage of time, needs and requirements of the
     community. Broadly speaking, public purpose means 0
     the general interest of the community as opposed to the
     interest of an individual."
       11. Prima facie, State is the first Judge to determine
whether there exists public purpose or not. But the decision of .
the State is not beyond judicial scrutiny. The Courts have the E
jurisdiction and it Is their duty to determine the matter whenever
a question is raised whether a requisition order is or is not for ·
a public purpose. In Sooraram Pratap Reddy & Ors., vs.
Dlstt. Collector, Ranga Reddy Dist. & Ors., (2008) 9 SCC F
552, it was held as under:
     "133 .......... It is primarily for the State to decide whether
     there exits public purpose or not. Undoubtedly, the
     decision of the State is not beyond judicial scrutiny. In
     appropriate cases, where such power is exercised ma/a G
     fide or for collateral purposes or the purported action is
     dehors the Act, irrational or otherwise unreasonable or
     the so-called purpose is "no public purpose" at all and
     fraud on statute is apparent, a writ-court can undoubtedly
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534        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2014] 13 S.C.R.


A         interfere. But except in such cases, the declaration of
          the Government is not subject to judicial review. In other
          words, a writ court, while exercising powers under Articles
          32, 226 or 136 of the Constitution, cannot substitute its
          own judgment for the judgment of the Government as to
B         what constitutes "public purpose"."

        12. While determining the question whether a requisition
  order is or is not for a public purpose, the facts and
  circumstances in each case are to be closely examined in order
c to determine whether a public purpose has been established.
  The requirement of land for residential and commercial
  purposes and for development of the Sector involves in it an
  element of general interest of the community and whatever
  furthers the general interest must be regarded as a 'public
D purpose' as opposed to the particular interest of individuals.
          13. High Court quashed the acquisition on yet another
   ground that the land was sought to be acquired earlier by
   issuing notification dated 19.5.1992 under Section 4 of the
 E Act and accepting the respondents' objections, their land was
   earlier released and ignoring the said fact situation, the State
   arbitrarily included the land of the respondents in the
   notification under Section 4 of the Act for reacquisition. Relying
   upon its own judgment in Roshan Lal & Ors. vs. State of
 F Haryana &Ors. 2003 (3) PLR 199, the High Court quashed
   the acquisition proceedings i~voking principle of estoppel.
         14. Mr. Narender Hooda, learned Addi. Advocate
   General, appearing for the appellants/State of Haryana,
 G submitted that the judgment rendered in Roshan Lal (supra)
   does not apply in the facts of the present case, since in the
   said case, the land was earlier released on certain conditions
   and then again acquired the land and the Government was
   bound by the earlier conditions. But in the present case, there
 H
   STATE OF HARYANA v. M/S. VINOD OIL & GENERAL                      535
              MILLS [R. BANUMATHI, J.]

was no such condition imposed on either party at the time when A
the land was released earlier. It is further submitted that the
respondents have a total area of 23 Kanai 6 Marla, out of which
only small portion in two small strips are sought to be acquired
which is very much required for the development of the Sector.
                                                                       B
       15. As regards contention of the learned counsel for the
respondents that the land once released cannot be
subsequently reacquired, in our view, there is no bar to the
subsequent acquisition of the land nor is there a bar for
issuance of successive notification for acquisition of the land. c
It would not be right to contend that because the land was
already released, it cannot be acquired by subsequent
notification. If it is to be held that land already released cannot
be reacquired, an anomalous situation may arise that the land
cannot be acquired for all time to come even if it is genuinely D
required. It is not in dispute that the earlier notification is issued
by the State for the development of the land for residential and
commercial purposes which is same purpose for subsequent
acquisition as well. When the State felt that the land sought to
be acquired cannot be adjusted in the development of the Plan, E
there is no bar for issuance of notification for acquisition of the
land.
      16. Yet another ground on which the High Court quashed
the acquisition is that the land of the respondents is located in F
                                                                 •
one corner of the area that is proposed to be developed and
the land of the respondents could conveniently be adjusted in
the planning scheme. We have perused the Plan of Sector 9
& 11. Two chunks of lands of the respondents one strip
measuring 19 Marla and another measuring 1Kanai 11 Marla G
are sought to be acquired. 19 Marla of land in Khasra No.
148/2/2 standing in the name of Savitri Devi measures
192'.6"x 27'.6" feet. In this small strip of land of 19 Marla,
office block, laboratory and Mandir (place of worship) are said
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536       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2014] 13 S.C.R.


A to have been constructed. Main sheds of the factory and the
  land underneath have not been acquired. According to the
  respondents, this small strip of land of 19 Marla is not
  contiguous with the other land of Government/HUDA and in
  the absence of office building, laboratory, the respondents will
B not be able to run their factory. We find substance in the
  contention of the respondents that Khasra No. 148/2/2, the
  small strip of land which is contiguous to their factory appears
  to be in the corner of the Development Plan and the same
   can be adjusted in the Planning Scheme of the Sector and
C on this ground, we affirm the order of the High Court quashing
   the acquisition in respect of Khasra No.148/2/2 measuring
   19 Marla.
         17. Insofar as another strip of 1 Kanai 11 Marla of land
 D which stands in the name of Mis. Vinod Oil and General MiUs,
   this strip of land in Khasra No.149 is situated in the midst of
   Sector 9 & 11. We find substance in the submission of the
   State that this strip of land is an hindrance for the wholesome
   development of the Sector and the same cannot be adjusted
 E in the development of the Sector. Order of the High Court
   quashing acquisition of this strip of land measuring 1 Kanai
    11 Marla in Khasra No.149 is set aside and the acquisition of
   1 Kanai 11 Marla in Khasra No.149 is upheld.
 F         18. Regarding acquisition of 1 Kanai 11 Marla in Khasra
   • No.149, on behalf of the respondents it wasihen argued that
     by virtue of Section 24 (2) of the Right to Fair Compensation
     and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation,
     Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act
 G 2013'), the subject of acquisition shall be deemed to have
     lapsed because the award is prior to the commencement of
     the Act 2013 and since no compensation has been paid to
     the respondents nor the amount was deposited and the
    ·possession was not taken.
 H
   STATE OF HARYANA v. M/S. VINOD OIL & GENERAL                      537
              MILLS [R. BANUMATHI, J.]

       19. Learned counsel for the appellants Mr. Hooda A
submitted that there is no default on the part of the appellants
and hence the acquisition proceedings have riot lapsed under
Section 24(2) of the Act 2013. He, however, submitted that
the matter be remitted back to the High Court for consideration
of that aspect as was ordered in Civil Appeal No. 8104/2014 B
and connected matters titled Surjit Kaur vs. State of Haryana
& Ors. decided on 5.9.2014 by this Court where similar
situation prevailed.
      20. Considering the scope of Section 24(2) of the Act          c
2013 in Pune Municipal Corporation &Anr. Vs. Harakchand
Misirimal Solanki & Ors., (2014) 3 SCC 183, in para (11)
this Court has held as under:-
     "11. Section 24(2) also begins with non obstante clause.        D
     This provision has overriding effect over Section 24(1 ).
     Section 24(2) enacts that in relation to the land acquisition
     proceedings initiated under the 1894 Act, where an
     award has been made five years or more prior to the
     commencement of the 2013 Act and either of the two              E
     contingencies is satisfied viz. (i) physical possession of
     the land has not been taken, or (ii) the compensation
     has not been paid; such acquisition proceedings ·shall
     be deemed to have lapsed. On the lapse of such
     acquisition proceedings, if the appropriate Government          F
     still chooses to acquire the land which was the subject-
     matter of acquisition under the 1894 Act then it has to
     initiate the proceedings afresh under the 2013Act. The
     proviso appended to Section 24(2) deals with a situation
     where in respect of the acquisition initiated under the         G
     1894 Act an award has been made and compensation
     in respect of a majority of landholdings has not been
     deposited in the account of the beneficiaries then all the
     beneficiaries specified in the Section 4 notification
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538        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2014] 13 S.C.R.


A         become entitled to compensation under the 2013 Act."

         21. Since the new Land Acquisition Act has come into
   force with effect from 1.1.2014, the High Court did not have
   occasion to examine whether proceedings already initiated
 B under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 have lapsed on account
   of the alleged non-payment of compensation to the
   respondents and the failure of the authorities to take over
   possession of the land acquired from them. Having regard to
   the submission of the learned counsel for the respondents,
 c certain factual aspects viz., (i) whether possession of the land
   in Khasra No. 149 has been taken or not; (ii) whether the
   compensation in respect of the acquired land in K~ 15r<1
   No. 149 was paid or not have to be examined. We are of the
   view that instead of this Court examining the above issues
 D by itself, it would be better if the matter is remitted back to the
    High Court to examine the above limited questions in respect
    of the acquisition of the land 1 Kanai 11 Marla in Khasra
    No.149.

 E       22. In the result, we uphold the order passed by the High
   Court quashing the acquisition of the land 19 Marla in Khasra
   No.148/2/2. So far as the acquisition of land measuring 1
   Kanai 11 Mirla in Khasra No.149(CWP No.17458/2006), the
   order of the High Court is set aside and it is held that the
 F acquisition proceedings have been properly concluded in
   respect of the said extent of land acquired in Khasra No.149
   and the matter is remitted to the High Court to examine the
   limited questions as aforesaid. We further direct that the status
   quo as it exists today in regard to disputed property shall be
 G maintained by the parties pending disposal of the writ petition.
   We restore the CWP. No. 17458/2006 (M/s Vinod Oil and
   General Mills Vs. State of Haryana & Ors.) on the file of the
   High Court. Since the writ petition is of the year 2006, we
   request the High Court to dispose of the same as expeditiously
 H
                                              .
   STATE OF HARYANA v. M/S. VINOD OIL & GENERAL                   539
              MILLS [R. BANUMATHI, J.]

as possible preferably within a period of four months from the A
date of receipt of copy of this judgment. The appeals stand
disposed of accordingly. In the facts and circumstances ofthe
case, no order as to costs.

                                                                  B
Kalpana K. Tripathy                        Appeals disposed of.