Holding

The Supreme Court held that the 109‑day delay was justified as sufficient cause and therefore condoned the delay, allowing the appeal.

Summary

The State of Haryana filed a Letters Patent Appeal against a judgment of the Punjab & Haryana High Court, but delayed filing the appeal by 109 days. The High Court refused to condone the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The Supreme Court examined the meaning of "sufficient cause" and held that the provision must be given a liberal, justice‑oriented construction, especially when the Government is a party. It observed that the State should not be treated as a private litigant for the purpose of strict technicalities, and that procedural delays inherent in governmental functioning can constitute sufficient cause. Applying this principle, the Court found the 109‑day delay to be justified, condoned it, and allowed the appeal, remanding the matter to the High Court for disposal on merits.

Issues considered

Whether a delay of 109 days in filing a Letters Patent Appeal by the State can be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
What constitutes "sufficient cause" for condonation of delay, particularly when the Government is the litigant.
Whether the State should be subject to the same strict standards of diligence as a private party in limitation matters.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order 21
Limitation Act, 1963s. 5

Subjects

Limitation ActSection 5Condonation of delayState as litigantLiberal constructionSubstantial justiceProcedural delayLetters Patent Appeal

Judgment

r
A STATE OF HARYANA
v
CHANDRA MANI AND ORS.

JANUARY 30, 1996

B [K. RAMASWAMY, S. SAGHIR AHMAD
AND G.B. PATTANAIK, .JJ.]

Limitation Act, 1963 :

C S.5-De/ay-Condonation of-Appeals by State-Sufficient cause-To
be considered with pragniatisnz in justice--Oriented approach rather than
technical detection-Factors peculiar and characteristic of fu11ctioning of
Govenune11t--Courts to be cognizant of-Separate sta11dards to detennine the
cause laid by State vis-a-vis p1ivate litiga11t--Ca1111ot be laid down to prove
st1ict sta11dards of sufficie11t cause-State can11ot be put on the same footing
D as an individual.

Suggestions: Govenunent at appropriate levels to constitute legal cells
to exanzine whether legal pn·nciples are involved-Officers in such legal cells
to be autho1.ised to take decision or give approp1iate pennission for. settle-
E ment-Prompt action to be pursued by the officer respo11sib/e to file the appeal
a11d should be made responsible for lapses.

Ram/a/, Motila/ & Clwte/al v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., (1962] 2 SCR 762;
New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Shanti Misra, AIR (1976) SC 237; Jnder
Singh v. Kanshi Ram, AIR (1917) PC 156; Shalamta/a Devi Jai11 v. Kuntal
F Kuman & Ors., (1969] l SCR 1006; Smt. Mi/avi Devi v. Di11a Nath, [1982]
3 SCR 366; O.P. Kathpalia v. Lakhmir Si11gh (dead) & Ors., (1984] 4 SCC
66; Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & A11r. v. M>t. Katiji & 01>·., [1987]
2 SCC 107; Smt. Prabha v. Ram Parkash Kalra, (1987] Supp. SCC 338; G.
Ramegowda, Major & Ors. v. Sp/. Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore,
G [1988] 2 SCC 142 and Mis. Shakambaii & Co. v. Union of India, (1993]
Supp. 1 SCC 487, relied on.

Concord of !11dia !11sura11ce Co. Ltd. v. Ninnala Devi & Ors., (1979] 3
SCR 694; Lala Mata Din v. A. Narayanan, [1970] 2 SCR 90; State of Kera/a
v. E.K. Kwiyipe & Ors., [1981] Supp. SCC 72; Scheduled Caste Coop. Land
H Owning Society Ltd. Bhatinda v. Union of India & Ors., [1991] 1 SCC 174;
1060
STATEv. CHANDRA MANI 1061

Binod Bihari Singh v. Union of India, [1993) 1 SCC 572; Ram Kishan & Anr. A
"1' v. U.P. State Roadways Transpon C01pn. & Anr., [1994) Supp. 2 SCC 507
and Warlu v. Gangot1ibai & Anr., (1995) Supp. 1 SCC 37, referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 4118-19
of 1996.
B
From the Judgment and Order dated 3.11.92 of the Punjab &
Haryana High Court in L.P.A. Nos. 1249-50 of 1992.

Ms. Suruchi Agarwal for Ms. Indu Malhotra, for the Appellant.

Ms. Arnita Gupta for the Respondent No. 2-6. c
Mahabir Singh for the Respondent No. 1.

The following Order of the Court was delivered :

Leave granted. D

We have heard the counsel on both sides. We decline to express any
opinion on merits. The Division Bench of the High Court refused to
condone the delay of 109 days in filing the Letters Patent Appeal. We have
perused the reasons given for the delay in filing the Letters Patent Appeal. E
Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1963 (for short, the 'Act') extends
prescribed period of limitation in filing an application or an appeal except
under the provisions of Order 21 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (for short,
the 'Code') and gives power to the Court to admit the appeal or application
after the prescribed period. The only condition is that the applicant/appel- F
!ant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the
appeal or making the application within such ,period. In Ram/a/, Motila/ &
Chhotellal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., [1962] 2 SCR 762, it was laid down that
in showing sufficient cause to condone the delay, it is not necessary that
the applicant/appellant has to explain whole of the period between the date G
of the judgment till the date of filing the appeal. It is sufficient that the
applicant/appellant would explain the delay caused by the period between
the last of the dates of limitation and the pate on which the appeal/applica-
tion is actually filed.

What constitute sufficient cause cannot be laid down by hard and H
1062 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] 1 S.C.R.

A fast rules. In New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Sltami Misra, AIR (1976)
SC 237, this Court held that discretion given by Section 5 should not be
defined or crystallised so as to convert a discretionary matter into a rigid
rule of law. The expression "sufficient cause" should received a liberal
construction. In Inder Singh v. Kanshi Ram, AIR (1917) PC 156 it was
observed that true guide for a court to exercise the discretion under Section
B 5 is whether the appellant acted with reasonable diligence in prosecuting
the appeal. In Sltakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumar & Ors., [1969] 1 SCR
1006, a Bench of three Judges had held that unless want of bona fides of
such inaction or negligence as would deprive a party of the protection of
Section 5 is proved, the application must not be thrown out or any delay
C cannot be refused to be condoned.

In Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Ninnala Devi & Ors., [1979J
3 SCR 694, which is a case of negligence of the counsel which misled a
litigant into delayed pursuit of his remedy, the default in delay was con-
D cloned. In Lala Mata Din v. A. Narayanan, [1970] 2 SCR 90, this Court had
held that there is no general'proposition that mistake of counsel by itself
is always sufficient cause for condonation of delay. It is always a question
whether the mistake was bona fide or was merely a devise to cover an
ulterior purpose. In that case it was held that the mistake committed by
the counsel was bona fide and it was not tainted by any ma/a fide motive.
E
In State of Kera/av. E.K. Kuriyipe & Ors., [1981] Supp. SCC 72, it was
held that whether or not there is sufficient cause for condonation of delay
is a question of fact dependent upon the facts and circumstances of the ,
particular case. In Smt. Mi/avi Devi v. Dina Nath, [1982] 3 SCR 366, it was
F held that the appellant had sufficient cause for not filing the appeal within .J
the period of limitation. This Court under Art. 136 can reassess the ground
and in appropriate case set aside the order made by the High Court or the
Tribunal and remit the matter for hearing on merits. It was accordingly
allowed, delay was condoned and case was remitted for decision on merits.

G
In O.P. Kathpalia v. Lakhmir Singh (Dead) & Ors., (1984] 4 SCC 66,
a Bench of three Judges had held that if the refusal to condone the delay
results in grave miscarriage of justice, it would be a ground to condone the
delay. Delay was accordingly condoned. In Collector, Land Acquisition,
H A:ta11tnag & Anr. v. Mst. Katiji & Ors., [1987] 2 SCC 107, a Bench of two
STATE v. CHANDRA MANI 1063

Judges considered the question of the limitation in an appeal ftled by the A
State and held that Section 5 was enacted in order to enable the court to
do substantial justice to the parties by disposing of matters on merits. The
expression "sufficient cause" is adequately elastic to enable the court to
apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of the
justice-that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of
B
courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiab-
ly liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does
not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy.
This Court reiterated that the expression "every day's delay must be ex-
{ plained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. The
doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. c
When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against
each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the
other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because
of a non-deliberate delay. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned
deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala
-~
D
fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he
runs a serious risk. Judiciary is not respected on account of its power to
legalise injustice on technical grounds but becanse it is capable of removing
injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from
this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the
institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the State which was seeking E
condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine
of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a
litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in
an even-handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step-motherly
treatment when the State is the applicant. The delay was accordingly F
condoned.

Experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery {no
one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought
to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology
imbued with the note-making, file-pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, G
delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to
approve. The State which represent collective cause of the community,
does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The courts, therefore, have to
be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provisions in the course
of the interpretation of the expression of sufficient cause. Merit is H
1064 SUPREME COURT REP OR TS [1996] 1 S.C.R.

A preferred to scuttle a decision on merits in turning down the case on
technicalities of delay in presenting the appeal. Delay was accordingly
condoned, the order was set aside and the matter was remitted to the High
Court for disposal on merits after affording opportunity of hearing to the
parties. In Smt. Prabha v. Ram Parkash Katra, [1987] Supp. SCC 338, this
Court had held that the court should not adopt an injustice-oriented
B
approach in rejecting the application for condonation of delay. The appeal
was allowed, the delay was condoned and the matter was remitted for
expeditious disposal in accordance with law.

In G. Ramegowda, Major & Ors. v. Sp!. Land Acquisition Officer,
C Bangalore, [1988] 2 SCC 142, it was held that no general principle saving
the party from all mistakes of it counsel could be laid. The expression
11
sufficient cause" must receive a liberal construction so as to advance
substantial justice and generally delays in preferring the appeals are re-
quired to be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence
D or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is imputable to the party seeking
condonation of delay. In litigations to which Government is a party, there
is yet another aspect which, perhaps, cannot be ignored. If appeals brought
by Government are lost for such defaults, no person is individualiy affected;
but what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers is public interest. The decisions
of Government are collective and institutional decisions and do not share
E the characteristics of decision of private individuals. The law of limitation
is, no doubt, the same for a private citizen as for Governmental authorities.
Government, like any other litigant must take responsibility for the acts or
omissions of its officers. But a somewhat different complexion is imparted
to the matter where Government makes out a case where public interest
F was shown lo have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part
of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross-pur-
poses with it. ll was, therefore, held that in assessing what constitutes
sufficient cause for purposes of Section 5, il might, perhaps, be somewhat
unrealistic to exclude from the consideration that go into the judicial
verdict, these factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the
G functioning of the Government. Government decisions are proverbially
slow encumbered, as they are, by a considerable degree of procedural red J
tape in the process of their making. A certain amount of latitude is,
therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly said that those who bear respon-
sibility of Government must have 'a little play at the joints'. Due recognition
H of these limitations on Governmental functioning-of course, within
\.

STATEv. CHANDRA MANI 1065

reasonable limits-is necessary if the judicial approach is not to be rendered A
unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put Government
and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such matters.
Implicit in the very nature of Governmental functioning is procedural delay
incidental to the decision making process. The delay of over one year was
accordingly condoned.
B
In Scheduled Caste Coop. Land Owning Society Ltd., Bhatinda v.
Union of India & Ors., (1991] 1 SCC 174, a Bench of three Judges of this
;,
Court held that the bona fides of the parties are to be tested on merits and
{
the delay of 1146 to 1079 days was not condoned on the ground that the
parties approached the court after decision on merits was allowed in other c
cases by this Court. Therefore, it was held that it did not furnish a ground
for condonation of delay under Section 5. In Binod Bihari Singh v. Union
of India, [1993] 1 SCC 572, it was held that it is not at all a fit case where
in the anxiety to render justice to a party so that a just cause is not defeated,
a pragmatic view should be taken by the court in considering sufficient D
..J.
cause for condonation of the delay under Section 5. It was held that when
,,. the party has come with a false plea to get rid of the bar of limitation, the
court should not encourage such person by condoning the delay and result

- in the bar of limitation pleaded by the opposite party. This Court, there-
fore, refused to condone the delay in favour of the party who came forward
E
with false plea. In Mis. Shakambari & Co. v. Union of India, [1993] Supp.
1 SCC 487, a Bench of three Judges held that delay caused in filing the

• appeal due to fluctuation in laying down ihe law was held to be a sufficient
cause and delay of 14 days was condoned. In Ram Kishan & Anr. v. UP.
State Roadways Transport C01pn. & Anr., (1994] Supp. 2 SCC 507, this
"' Court had held that although the story put forward by the applicant for not F
filing the application for compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act
within the period of limitation was not found convincing but keeping in
view the facts and circumstances and cause of justice, the delay was
condoned and the appeal was set aside and the matter was remitted to the
Tribunal to dispose it on merits. In Warlu v. Gangotribai & Anr., [1995] G
,. Supp. 1 SCC 37 a three-Judge Bench condoned delay of 11 years in filing
the special leave petition.

It is notorious and common knowledge that delay in more than 60
per cent of the cases filed in this Court-be it by private party or the H
!
1066 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) 1 S.C.R.

A State-are barred by limitation and this Court generally adopts liberal
approach in condonation of delay finding somewhat sufficient cause to
decide the appeal on merits. It is equally common knowledge that litigants
including the State are accorded the same treatment and the law is ad-
ministered in an even-handed manner. When the State is an applicant,
B pqying for condonation of delay, it is common knowledge that on account
of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology im-
bued with the note-making, file-pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos,
delay on the part of the State is less difficult to understand though more
difficult to approve, but the State represents collective cause of the Com-
C munity. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies prover-
bially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table
to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay-inten-
tional or otherwise-is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red tape
in the process of their making decision is a common feature. There fore,
D certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by
the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but
,.
what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression
1
'sufficient cause" should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in
justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient
cause for explaining every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to ·•
E and characteristic of the functioning of the Governmental conditions would
be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-
oriented process. The Court should decide the matters on merit unless the
case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the
cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict '
F standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should
constitute legal cells to examine the case whether any legal principles are
involved for decision by the cours or whether cases require adjustment and
should authorise the officers take a decision or give appropriate permission
for settlement. Jn the event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action
G should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he
should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State
cannot be put on the same footing as ~n individual. The individual would
always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy
by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while
H State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants.
·.'i'

STATEv. CHANDRA MANI 1067

Considered from this perspective, it must be held that the delay of 109 days A
in this case has been explained and that it is fit case for condonation of the
delay.

On the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion
that it is a fit case for condoning the delay. The delay is accordingly
condoned. The High Court is requested to dispose of the appeal as B
expeditiously as possible.

The appeal is accordingly allowed. No costs.

G.N. Appeal allowed.

, .

.,

'