STATE OF HARYANAversusEROS CITY DEVELOPERS PVT. LTD. AND OTHERS
- Citation
- 2016 INSC 62
- Decided
- 19 January 2016
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- RANJAN GOGOI
Holding
Acquisition for the expansion and systematic development of the Surajkund Tourist Complex is a valid public purpose and the doctrines of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation cannot defeat the State’s power of eminent domain where public interest outweighs private expectations.
Summary
The State of Haryana issued notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to acquire 129 kanals 14 marlas of land in Lakarpur, Faridabad for the expansion and systematic development of the Surajkund Tourist Complex, including a parking area. Earlier acquisition attempts in 1992 were dropped after the Supreme Court’s M.C. Mehta order restraining construction, and the respondent, Eros City Developers, had purchased the land in 1993 and obtained permission for a hotel project. The High Court quashed the acquisition notifications, invoking the doctrines of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation in favour of the respondent. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the proposed development constitutes a valid public purpose and that the doctrines cannot override the State’s eminent domain power where public interest is at stake. The Court also observed that the earlier drop of proceedings does not bar a fresh acquisition after the 1998 modification of the restraining order. Consequently, the appeals were allowed and the High Court’s order was set aside, upholding the acquisition.
Issues considered
- Whether acquisition of land for the expansion of the Surajkund Tourist Complex qualifies as a public purpose under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
- Whether the doctrines of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation can bar the State’s acquisition after prior permission for change of land use was granted.
- Whether the dropping of earlier acquisition proceedings in 1992 precludes a fresh acquisition later.
Legislation cited
- Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 4, s. 6
Subjects
Judgment
[2016] I S.C.R. 242
A STATE OF HARYANA
v.
EROS CITY DEVELOPERS PVT. LTD. AND OTHERS
(Civil Appeal No. 354 of 2016 etc.)
B JANUARY 19, 2016
(RANJAN GOGOi AND PRAFULLA C. PANT, JJ.)
Land Acquisition Act, 1894: ss.4 and 6 - Acquisition
Notification of land measuring 172 kanals 19 mar/as in village
c Lakarpur, District Faridabad - Out of that 129 kanals 14 marlas
owned by respondent no.I - Purpose of acquisition was expansion
and systematic development of Surajkund Tourist Complex - High
Court quashed the Notification - High Court also applied the equity
doctrines of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation in
favour of respondent no. I - On State's appeal, held: The land in
D question was under acquisition in 1992 but proceedings were
dropped after Supreme Court's order in M.C. Mehta's case - In
1993, respondent no.I purchased the said land - In 1998, the
authorities were directed to consider the plan of hotel project
submitted by respondent no. 1 - Fresh acquisition proceedings
initiated by the State - High Court has erred in quashing the
E
acquisition of land in question by applying doctrine of promissory
estoppel and legitimate expectation in the facts of the present case
- The purpose i.e. for expansion and systematic development of
Surajkund Tourist Complex is a public purpose - It included
development of parking area adjacent to the Surajkund Tourist
F Complex near annual Surajkund Fair - High Court was incorrect
in holding that the State has not acted bonafide after 1992
acquisition proceedings were dropped - Earlier proceedings were
dropped in the light of M.C. Mehta's case in 1996 restraining
construction in the area and after modification in the said order in
G 1998, the State took fresh decision to acquire the land for public
purpose and there was no illegality in the same.
Sooraram Pratap Reddy and Others v. District Collector,
Ranga Reddy District and others 2008 (13) SCR 126 :
(2008) 9 SCC 552; State of Haryana and Others vs.
Vinod Oil and General Mills and Another (2014) 15
H
242
STATE OF HARYANA v. EROS CITY DEVELOPERS P. LTD. 243
SCC 410; A.P. Pollution Control Board II v. M. V. Nayudu A
(Retd.) and Others 2000 (5) Suppl. SCR 249 : (2001)
2 SCC 62; Monnet !spat and Energy Limited v. Union
of India and Others 2012 (7) SCR 644 ; (2012) 11 SCC
1; Hira Tikkoo v. Union Territory, Chandigarh and
Others 2004 (1) Suppl. SCR 65 : (2004) 6 SCC 765 -
B
relied on.
M.C. Mehta vs. Union of India & Ors. Supreme Court's
judgment passed in W.P. (C) No. 4677 of 1985 on
10.05.1993 by - referred to.
Case Law Reference c
2008 (13} SCR 126 relied on. para9
(2014) 15 sec 410 relied on. para 11
2000 (5) Suppl. SCR 249 relied on. para 12
2012 (7) SCR 644 relied on. para 13 D
2004 (1) Suppl. SCR 65 relied on. para 14
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 354 of
2016.
From the Judgment and Order dated 21.01.2008 of the Division E
Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in CWP
No. 10611 of2004.
WITH
C. A. NO. 355 OF 2016
F
Arun Bhardwaj,AAG, Jai Wadhwa, Ronak Karanpuria, Dr. Monika
Gusain, Ugra Shankar Prasad for the Appellant.
Shyam Divan, Akhil Sibal, Malini Sud, Vidhi Goel, Priya Deep,
Sagun, Umesh Kumar Khaitan, Naresh Bakshi for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by G
PRAFULLA C. PANT, J. I. Leave granted in both the special
leave petitions.
2. These appeals are directed against judgment and order dated
21.01.2008, passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Civil
Writ Petition No. 10611 of 2004 whereby said Court has quashed the H
244 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016) 1 S.C.R.
A notifications dated 08.10.2003 and 07.05.2004 issued under Sections 4
and 6 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894, respectively, by the State ofHaryana
regarding acquisition of land measuring 129 kanals 14 marlas in village
Lakarpur, District Faridabad. The High Court has further quashed the
Award dated 05.05.2006, passed by respondent No. 4 in respect of land
owned by respondent No. 1 Eros City Developers Pvt. Ltd., which was
B
acquired through the above mentioned notifications.
3. Succinctly stated total area of 172 kanals 19 marlas situated in
village Lakharpur Tehsil Ballabgarh in District Faridabad was proposed
to be acquired by the State of Haryana through notification dated
08.10.2003 issued under Section 4 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 out of
c which 129 kanals 14 marlas (for short subject land) belonged to respondent
no. I Mis. Eros City Developers Pvt. Ltd. The details of the persons
whose land is acquired is as under:
S. Name of owner Total Area Status
No. I
I. Shri Sekher 6 kanal Compensation paid. 1
D 2 1/1 marla Possession taken over. '
Slo Shri Rosh an
Lal
i
2. Shri Sissar Slo Shri 6 kanal Compensation paid. 1
Roshan Lal 2 I> maria Possession taken over.
129.kanal - - Compensation deposited-·'I
- - ---- ·--------
E 3. Mis. Eros City
Developers Pvt. 14 maria before the Land ·
Ltd.( Respondent Acquisition Collector.
No.I herein) Acquisition quashed i
vide impugned I
judgment. ____ ~
---- -- -
F 4. Shri Vikram Bakshi 25 kanal C.W.P. No. 1510 of.
SI o Shri D N Ba ks hi 2 maria 2005 pending before the
High Court. Status quo
with regard to the I
possession of the land
ordered during the ·
pendency of the writ I
1
G petition vide order dated
22.5.2006. I
Compensation deposited
before the Land
1
Acquisition Collector.
5. Mis. Faridabad 2 kanal Compensation paid. I
H Compex 18 maria Possession taken over. I
I
STATE OF HARYANA v. EROS CITY DEVELOPERS P. LTD. 245
[PRAFULLA C. PANT, J.]
The subject land was stated to have been acquired for the purpose A
of expansion and systematic development of Surajkund Tourist Complex
which included development of parking area adjacent to the Surajkund
Tourist Complex near annual Surajkund Fair.
4. Admittedly, earlier in 1992 an attempt was made to acquire the B
same land but the acquisition proceedings were dropped after this court
passed order dated 10.05.1996 in WP (C) No. 4677 of 1985 i.e., M.C.
Mehta's case restraining the constructions in the area. Meanwhile in
1993 contesting respondent appears to have purchased the land indicated
above. It is in 1998, the order dated 10.05.1996 said to have been
modified, and Municipal Corporation Faridabad and the State Government C
were directed to consider the plan of hotel project submitted by the
respondent No. l.
5. Learned counsel for the appellant State submitted that annual
Surajkund Mela, is held every year in February in Faridabad District,
and has become a regular feature of international fame. As such, there D
was need to develop Surajkund Tourist Complex by acquiring land adjoining
to Surajkund Mela ground in Faridabad. It is also pointed out that
significance of Surajkund fair was noticed by this Court in W.P. (C) No.
4677of1985 (M.C. Mehta vs. Union of India and ors.) wherein effective
directions were issued in the year 1996 to protect and maintain the sanctity
of the area. The acquisition of subject-land is thus not only in public E
interest but also to maintain the integral development of the Surajkund
Complex in a unified and planned manner. It is contended that while
quashing the notifications mentioned above, the High Court has erred in
not considering the public interest and public purpose over private interest
of the respondent/writ petitioner, a private colonizer. The impugned order F
passed by the High Court has been assailed by the appellant, also on the
ground that the equity doctrines of promissory estoppel and legitimate
expectation were wrongly applied by the High Court in favour of
respondent No. 1. It is stated that before issuance of notification under
Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short "the Act") objections
filed on behalf of respondent No. 1 under Section 5A of the Act were G
duly considered by the authority concerned, and there was no illegality
in the acquisition.
6. On the other hand, on behalf of respondent No. 1, Shri Shyam
Divan Senior Counsel contended that Government of Haryana which
earlier attempted to acquire the same land in the year 1992, itself dropped H
246 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [20161 1 S.C.R.
A the acquisition proceedings as such it cannot be said that the land in
question is genuinely required for any public purpose. The contesting
respondent has pleaded that the land in question was purchased by it in
the year 1993 with the object to construct a hotel complex of international
standard. In the counter affidavit, it is stated that the answering respondent
got the permission for change of land use and submitted the plan for
B
sanction from the Municipal Corporation. It also obtained permission
from Public Works Department for construction of approach road to the
land. Even the Director, Tourism, Government of Haryana, had accorded
approval for the hotel project of respondent No. 1. However, the
answering respondent was prevented from raising construction due to
c the restraint order dated 10.5.1996, passed by this Court in M.C. Mehta 's
case (in W.P. (C} No. 4677 of 1985). Said order was modified on
13.05.1998. On application filed by the answering respondent, vide order
dated 12.10.1998, this Court directed the Municipal Corporation,
Faridabad, and State Government to accept option plan A with regard to
hotel project (ground plus four floors), submitted by it. It is submitted
D
that there was malice on the part of the State Government in acquiring
the land in question through the notification dated 08. l 0.2003 issued under
Section 4 of the Act. It is also pleaded that there were overwhelming
circumstances in favour of the answering respondent to invoke doctrine
of promissory estoppel, and that of legitimate expectation. In this
E connection, it is pointed out that pennission of change of land use was
also granted in favour of the answering respondent. Lastly, it is submitted
that the High Court has rightly quashed the notifications issued by the
State Government for acquisition of the land owned by the answering
respondent.
p 7. In reply to this, on behalf of the State of Haryana, it is submitted
that since the construction did not start within six months as required
under the terms of order by which permission for change of land use
was granted as such merely for the reason that permission to change of
land use granted, the acquisition cannot be questioned. It is further
submitted that the acquisition proceedings have been upheld by the High
G Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 1510 of 2005 filed by Vikram Bakshi,
who was owner of another piece of land acquired by same notification
dated 08.10.2003 issued under Section 4 of the Act read with
consequential notification issued under Section 6 of the Act.
8. We have also gone through the copy of order dated 07.07.2010
H passed by the High Court of Punjab & Haryana in Civil Writ Petition
STATE OF HARYANA v. EROS CITY DEVELOPERS P. LTD. 247
[PRAFULLA C. PANT, J.]
No. 1510 of 2005 filed by Vikram Bakshi, said writ petition was filed A
challenging the notification dated 08.10.2003 issued under Section 4 of
Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and the consequential notification issued
under Section 6 of the Act. The land for which acquisition sought to be
quashed by Vikram Bakshi relates to 32 kanal of land comprising of
rectangle no. 40 khasra Nos. 14, 17/1, 17/2, 18/1, 23/l, and 24/1 of B
Village Lakharpur Tehsil Ballabhgarh District Faridabad. In said petition
also, public purpose i.e. expansion and systematic development of
Surajkund Tourist Complex was questioned, and issue relating to
consideration of objections filed under Section 5-A was raised. The
High Court after considering the rival submissions and going through the
record opined that there was no illegality in the acquisition and dismissed C
the Writ Petition No. 1510 of2005 on 07.07.2010.
9. In Sooraram Pratap Reddy and Others vs. District Collector.
Ranga Reddy District and others (2008) 9 SCC 552, this Court has
held that the project for which land is acquired should be taken as a
whole and must be judged whether it is in the larger public interest. It D
cannot be split into different components and to consider whether each
and every component will serve public good. A holistic approach has to
be adopted in such matters. This Court further observed in said case
that development of infrastructure is legal and legitimate public purpose
for exercising power of eminent domain. In deciding whether acquisition
is for "public purpose" or not, prima facie, the Government is the best E
judge. Although the decision of the Government is not beyond judicial
scrutiny, normally, in such matters a writ court should not interfere by
substituting its judgment for the judgment of the Government. In
Sooraram Pratap Reddy (supra), this Court has further explained that
the meaning of expression "public purpose" is wider than that of "public F
necessity".
10. Clause (f) of Rule 26-D of the Punjab Scheduled Roads and
Controlled Areas Restriction of Unregulated Development Rules, 1965
(for short "1965 Rules") requires the applicant seeking change of land
use for construction to undertake to start construction on the land within G
a period of six months and complete the construction within a period of
two years from the date of order permitting the change of land use. It
appears that no construction was done in terms of Clause (f) of Rule 26-
D of 1965 Rules on the land in qu·-stion, for which acquisition is quashed
by the impugned order.
H
248 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016) 1 S.C.R.
A 11. In State of Haryana and Others vs. Vinod Oil and General
Mills and Another (2014) 15 SCC 410, this Court has held that pennission
for change of land use has no relevance while considering the validity of
acquisition. It is further observed in said case that there is no bar to the
subsequent acquisition of a land, after the land was released from earlier
acquisition.
B
12. In A.P. Pollution Control Board II vs. M.V. Nayudu (Retd.)
and Others (200 I) 2 SCC 62, this Court has observed in para 69 as
under:
"69. The learned Appellate Authority erred in thinking that because
c of the approval of plan by the Panchayat, or conversion of land
use by the Collector or grant of letter of intent by the Central
Government, a case for applying principle of "promissory estoppel"
applied to the facts of this case. There could be no estoppel against
the statute ...... "
D 13. As far as the argument advanced on behalf of the respondent
relating to the promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation is
concerned, in Monnet Ispat and Energy Limited vs. Union of India
and Others (2012) 11 SCC 1, this Court while enumerating the principles
relating to doctrine of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation
has clearly held that the protection of legitimate expectation does not
E require the fulfillment of the expectation where an overriding public
interest requires otherwise. In other words, personal benefit must give
way to public interest and the doctrine of legitimate expectation cannot
be invoked which would block public interest for private benefit.
14. In Hira Tikkoo vs. Union Territory, Chandigarh and
F Others (2004) 6 SCC 765, this Court explaining the scope of principle
of legitimate expectation has held that the doctrine cannot be pressed
into service where the public interest is likely to suffer as against the
personal interest of a party. In paragraph 22 this Court has observed as
under:
G "22. In public law in certain situations, relief to the parties aggrieved by
action or promises of public authorities can be granted on the doctrine of
"legitimate expectation" but when grant of such relief is likely to harm
larger public interest, the doctrine cannot be allowed to be pressed into
service. We may usefully call in aid the legal maxim: "Salus Populi est
suprema lex: regard for the public welfare is the higher law." This
H
STATE OF HARYANA v. EROS CITY DEVELOPERS P. LTD. 249
[PRAFULLA C. PANT, J.]
principle is based on the implied agreement of every member of society A
that his own individual welfare shall in cases of necessity yield to that of
community. His property, liberty and life shall under certain circumstances
be placed in jeopardy or even sacrificed for the public good."
15. In view of the principle of law laid down by this Court as
above, in our opinion the High Court has erred in quashing the acquisition B
of land in question, by applying doctrine of promissory estoppel and
legitimate expectation, in the facts of the present case. We have no
hesitation in holding that the purpose i.e. for expansion and systematic
development of Surajkund Tourist Complex, is a public purpose. It included
development of parking area adjacent to Surajkund Tourist Complex
near annual Surajkund Fair. We are of the view that the High Court is C
incorrect in holding that the State has not acted bonafide, after 1992
acquisition proceedings were dropped. It is apparent from the record
that earlier proceedings were dropped in the light of orders passed in
M.C. Mehta's Case in the year 1996, restraining construction in the
area, and after modification in the said order in the year 1998, the State D
took fresh decision to acquire the land for public purpose and there is no
illegality in the same.
16. Accordingly, both the appeals are allowed and impugned
judgment and order dated 21.01.2008 passed by the High Court in CWP
No.10611of2004, is set aside. No order as to costs. E
Devika Gujral Appeals allowed.
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