Supreme Court of India
STATE OF JHARKHAND & ORS. ETC.versusM/S. SHIVAM COKE INDUSTRIES, DHANBAD, ETC.
- Citation
- 2011 INSC 569
- Decided
- 10 August 2011
- Disposal
- Disposed off
- Bench
- MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA
Holding
The Joint Commissioner’s suo motu revision under Section 46(4) is valid, need not adhere to a statutory limitation period but must be exercised within a reasonable time, which was satisfied, and the order setting aside the revised assessment is set aside.
Summary
The respondents, manufacturers of coke, were assessed for tax under the Bihar Finance Act, 1981 and the Deputy Commissioner issued revised assessment orders. After a change in the Deputy Commissioner, the new officer highlighted irregularities and informed the Joint Commissioner, who then exercised suo motu revision power under s.46(4) of the Act and issued notices to the respondents, some within three years and some shortly after. The respondents challenged the notice and the Joint Commissioner’s order setting aside the revised assessment before the Jharkhand High Court, which quashed the notice and the order. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the Joint Commissioner’s suo motu power was valid, whether any limitation period applied, and whether the order dated 26.11.2007 was maintainable. The Court held that the suo motu power under s.46(4) is valid, no specific limitation period is prescribed, but the power must be exercised within a reasonable time, which was satisfied in the present case. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court’s judgment and the Joint Commissioner’s order and remitted the matter back to the Joint Commissioner for fresh consideration.
Issues considered
- Whether the suo motu power of revision under Section 46(4) of the Bihar Finance Act, 1981 vested in the Joint Commissioner was legally and properly exercised.
- Whether the exercise of such suo motu revision is barred by any limitation period, specifically the applicability of Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and whether it must be exercised within a reasonable time.
- Whether the order dated 26 November 2007 passed by the Joint Commissioner setting aside the revised assessment order of 26 December 2003 was proper and could be maintained.
Legislation cited
Subjects
suo motu revisionlimitation periodBihar Finance Acttax assessmentJoint Commissionerreasonable timestatutory interpretation
Judgment
[20'11] 9 S.C.R. 1110
A STATE OF JHARKHAND & ORS. ETC. ..
v.
MIS. SHIVAM COKE INDUSTRIES, DHANBAD, ETC.
(Civil appeal1 Nos. 6889-6891 of 2011)
B
AUGUST 10, 2011
.
[DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA AND ANIL R. DAVE, JJ.]
Bihar Finance Act, 1981:
c
s. 46 (4) - Exercise of suo motu power of revision by Joint
Commissioner of Commercial Taxes - On facts, revised
assessment order passed by the Deputy Commissioner,
Commercial Taxes Division - Subsequently, new Deputy ,_
D Commissioner brought to the notice of Joint Commissioner,
the illegalities committed by his predecessor in the revised
assessment order - Initiation of suo motu proceeding u/s.
46(4) and issuance of notice/Memo to the assessees by the
Joint Commissioner within a period of three years in some
E cases and in some cases soon after the expiry of three years
period, to determine the legality and propriety of the revised
assessment orders - Legality of - Held: Suo motu power of
revision was legally and properly exercised by the Joint
Commissioner - He exercised his own independent mind for
issuing the notice and also recorded his own reasons for
F
coming to a conclusion as to why the power u/s 46 (4) should
be exercised - Thereafter, issued notice to the assessees
after forming a decision - Though the Deputy Commissioner
pointed out the illegalities and irregularities committed in the
revised assessment orders passed by his predecessor, but
G there was no referencE1 in the notice to the letter of the Deputy
Commissioner and any other materials contained with the ' ~
said letter - Therefore, it cannot be said that while coming to
the aforesaid conclusion in the impugned notice, the
H 1110
STATE OF JHARKHAND & ORS. ETC. v. SHIVAM COKE 1111
INDUSTRIES, DHANBAD, ETC.
- ...
-- Commissioner was influenced only by the opinion of the A
Deputy Commissioner - It was not a revision initiated on the
basis of any application filed by the aggrieved party namely
the Deputy Commissioner but initiation of a revisional
.... proceeding by the Joint Commissioner by forming his own
.>
opinion and satisfaction to exercise suo motu power vested B
uls. 46 (4) - Thus, order passed by the High Court as also
the Joint Commissioner setting aside the revised assessment
order is set aside - Matter remitted back to the Joint
Commissioner for consideration afresh.
s. 46(4) - Initiation ofsuo motu revisional proceeding by
c
the Commissioner or by the Joint Commissioner - Period of
Limitation - Held: No penod of limitation is prescribed for suo
; motu revision proceeding by the Commissioner or the Joint
Commissioner - When the language of the legislature is clear
and unambiguous nothing could be read or added to the D
language which is not stated specifically - If the legislature
intended to provide for any period of limitation or intended to
apply the said provision of Article 137 into s. 46(4) the
legislature would have specifically said so in the Act itself -
On facts, the High Could read application of Article 137 of the E
Limitation Act to s. 46 (4) which was not correct - However,
such power cannot be exercised by the revisional authority
.. indefinitely- It has to be exercised within a reasonable period
of time which depends on the facts and circumstances of the
case - Joint Commissioner exercisep suo motu powers of F
revision within about three years of time in some cases and
in some cases soon after the. expiry of three year~period
which was within a reasonable period of time - Limitation Act,
1963 - Article 137.
...... 1' G
Order passed by the Joint Commissioner setting aside
the revised assessment order - Propriety and maintainability
of - Held: Said order was passed during the pendency of the
writ petition in the High Court - Assessee could not contest
the matter very effectively before the Joint Commissioner -
H
Thus, the order passed bv the Joint Commissioner is set
1112 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 9 S.C.R.
A aside and matter is remitted back to the Joint Commissioner. ---.
Respondent-assessees, engaged in processing of
coal to coke were assessed to tax for Financial Years,
determining the tax on intra-State sales transactions as
well as Central Sales Tax on inter-State sales
8
transactions. Respondent challenged the assessment
order before the Joint Commissioner of Commercial
Taxes who remanded the assessment proceedings. The
Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes passed the
revised assessment orders reversing the then inter-State
C sales under Section 3i(a) of the Central Sales Tax Act 1956
into the intra-State sales. Pursuant thereto, the
respondents filed an application for refund of excess
amount of tax. Subseiquently, the Deputy Commissioner
got changed and the new Deputy Commissioner opined
D that the revised asseissment orders did not conform to
the appellate direction and informed the Joint
Commissioner about the same. The Joint Commissioner
initiated the proceeding suo motu under Section 46(4) of
the Bihar Finance Act, 1981 and issued notice/Memo
E directing the respondent to furnish the complete sets of
books of account in order to determine the legality and
propriety of the said rnvised assessment orders. In some
cases, sou motu power of revision was exercised within
a period of three years and in some beyond the expiry
F of thn!e years period, but soon thereafter. Thereafter, the
respondents filed writ petition for quashing the notice/
Memo issued by thEt Joint Commissioner; as also the
order passed by the Joint Commissioner whereby he set
aside the revised assessment order. The High Court
G allowed the writ petitions. Therefore, the appellant-State
filed the instant appeals.
The question which arose for consideration in the
instant appeals were whether the suo motu power of
revision under Section 46(4) of the Bihar Fianance Act,
H
STATE OF JHARKHAND & ORS. ETC. v. SHIVAM COKE 1113
INDUSTRIES, DHANBAD, ETC.
- ... 1981, vested with the Joint Commissioner was legally A
~
~ and properly exercised; whether or not the action taken
by the Department was barred by limitation and whether
such action was bad for not having been initiated within
a reasonable time; and whether the order dated
• ...;
26.11.2007 passed by the Joint Commissioner setting B
1 aside the revised assessment order dated 26.12.2003 is
· proper and could be maintained.
Remitting back the matter to the Joint Commissioner,
the Court
c
HELD: 1.1 Under Section 46 of the Bihar Finance Act,
1981 it is the Commissioner who on the basis of an
application filed by an aggrieved party revise the order
.>
passed by any authority subordinate to him. He also has
~
the additional power alongwith the Joint Commissioner D
as a delegatee as provided under Section 46 (4) of the
BFT Act, 1981 to revise an order passed by an authority
subordinate to it by exercising its suo motu power. This
is delegated in terms of the notification issued by the
State of Bihar under S.O. No. 795 dated 28th June 1986. E
[Paras 13 and 14] [1127-D-F]
1.2 In all these appeals, there were letters written by
the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes to the
)
Joint Commissioner (Administration). In one of such
F
letter, it is stated by the Deputy Commissioner that the
said communication is regarding filing of suo motu
revision under Section 46(4) of the BFT Act, 1981. The
Deputy Commissioner pointed out some alleged "
mistakes in the original tax assessment order and the
revised order. He also stated in that communication that G
.., he is unable to agree with the revised tax assessment
order and reimbursement order passed by the Divisional
lncharge and therefore, according to his opinion a
revision should be filed under Section 46(4) of the BFT
Act, 1981 against the revised tax assessment order. H
1114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 9 S.C.R.
A Thereafter, the notice for revision was issued on
17. 12.2007 to the respondents by the Joint
Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Administration).
[Paras 22 and 23] [1129-E-H; 1130-A]
1.3 A bare perusal of the notice issued on 17. 12.2007,
8
would indicate that the said notice was issued by the
Joint Cc>mmissioner by exercising his individual suo
motu power as provided under Section 46(4). It is not a
case where such notice was issued on the basis of an
C application filed by th1e Deputy Commissioner. This is
obvious because in thi~ said notice, there is absolutely
no reference made of tlhe application sent by the Deputy
Commissioner. If from tlhe available records of a particular
case, the Joint Commissioner forms an independent
opinion that the same is a case where suo motu power
·-
D of Revision should be exercised, he is empowered to
exercise· such suo motu power of revising an order which
appears to be illegal and without jurisdiction to the
competent authority who is empowered to issue such
notice by recording his reasons for coming to such a
E conclusion in the notice itself. [Para 26] [1131-C-F]
1.4 In the instant case, the Joint Commissioner
exercised his own independent mind for issuing the
notice and also record1~d his own reasons for coming to
F a conclusion as to why the power under Section 46(4)
should be exercised. Having recorded the said reason,
such notice was issued to the assessee after forming a
decision. The assessee was informed by issuing the said
notice that the legality and propriety of the revised
G assessment order has not been established because of
the reasons mentioned in the notice and therefore, the
revision of the said orders is proposed as it has been
considered necessary. By the said notice, the assessee
was directed to be present before the Joint Commissioner
H and place his side as to why the revised assessment
STATE OF JHARKHAND & ORS. ETC. v. SHIVAM COKE 1115
INDUSTRIES, DHANBAD, ETC.
- / -"
order should not be set aside. [Para 27] [1131-G-H; 1132· A
A-8]
1.5 The respondent being aggrieved by the issuance
of the said order filed a writ petition before the High
Court. The High Court, however, did not grant any stay 8
·'
of the said notice and permitted the respondent to
contest the said notice in accordance with law during the
course of which the Joint Commissioner of Commercial
Taxes set aside the revised orders and sent back the
matter for fresh assessment to the assessing officer. The C
said subsequent development which took place during
the pendency of the writ petition in the High Court was
not addressed to and decided by the High Court as the
High Court disposed of the entire writ petition on two
issues namely on the issue of the ambit and scope of
Section 46(4) of the.BFT Act, 1981 and also on the ground D
of limitation. The Deputy Commissioner, Commercial
Taxes Division pointed out in communication to the Joint
Commissioner several loopholes in the revised
assessment orders passed by the assessing officer.
[Paras 28-29] [1132-C-G] E
- 1.6 The Deputy Commissioner also pointed out how
the assessee made conflicting claims and statements
and also how while upholding such contradictory claims,
there has been a revenue loss for the department. F
Alongwith his letter, some of the relevant records were
transmitted to the Joint Commissioner. It is true that the
Deputy Commissioner, Commercial Taxes Division
brought out and pointed out some of the illegalities and
irregularities committed in the revised assessment orders G
<' passed by his predecessor in the assessment orders
relating to the respondent. But the impugned notice
issued by the Joint Commissioner ex facie indicates that
he being the competent authority formed an independent
opinion and personal satisfaction that the legality and H
1116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 9 S.C.R.
A propriety of the revised assessment orders was not .. \
.
established because of the reasons specifically stated in
the said notice and therefore, he thought it fit to exercise
his power of suo motu revision consequent upon which
the said notice was is!;ued. [Paras 30-31] [1132-F-H]
B ~,
1.7 There is no reference in the said notice to the
letter and any other mc:iterials contained with the letter of
the Deputy Commissioner anywhere in the notice and
therefore, it cannot be said that while coming to the
aforesaid conclusion in the impugned notice, the
c Commissioner was inflluenced only by the opinion of the
Deputy Commissioner. On consideration of the records,
it was not a revision initiated on the basis of any
application filed by an aggrieved party namely the Deputy
Commissioner but initiation of a Revisional proceeding f
D by the Joint Commissioner by forming his own opinion
and satisfaction to exercise suo motu power vested
under Section 46(4) of the BFT Act on the basis of the
materials on record. [Para 32] [1133-C-E]
E 2.1 No period of limitation is prescribed for initiation
of suo motu revisional proceeding by the Commissioner
or the .Joint Commissioner as the case may be, whereas
a period of limitation is prescribed for filing a revision
application by an aggrieved party for initiation of the
F revisional jurisdiction of the Commissioner which period
is 90 days, as is stood at that relevant time. [Para 34]
-
[1133-H; 1134-A-B]
2.,! The High Court held that there cannot be an
unlimited period of limitation even for exercising of suo
G motu revisional power for initiation of a proceeding by the
Commissioner or the Joint Commissioner as the case >
'
may be and therefore, provision of Article 137 of the
Limitation Act was read into the Act laying down that at
least within a period of three years from the date of
H accrual of the cause of action such a power of suo motu
- ~·
STATE OF JHARKHAND & ORS. ETC. v. SHIVAM COKE
INDUSTRIES, DHANBAD, ETC.
Revision should be exercised by the Joint Commissioner.
1117
A
[Para 35] [1134-C-D]
2.3 The legislature has not stated in the provision at
all regarding the applicability of Article 137 of the
• ,.; Limitation Act to Section 46(4) of the BFT Act. If the B
legislature intended to- provide for any period of limitation
or intended to apply the said provision of Article 137 into
Section 46(4), the legislature would have specifically said
so in the Act itself. When the language of the legislature
is clear and unambiguous, nothing could be read or
added to the language, which is not stated specifically.
c
The High Court wrongly read application of Article 137 of
the Limitation Act to Section 46(4) of the BFT Act. Such
a power cannot be exercised by the revisional authority
indefinitely. Such extra ordinary power i.e. suo motu
power of initiation of revisional proceeding has to be D
exercised within a reasonable period of time and what is
a reasonable period of time would depend on the facts
and circumstances of each case. [Paras 36 and 39] [1134-
E-F; 1135-B]
E
Sakuru vs. Tanaji (1985) 3 SCC 590: 1985 (2) Suppl.
SCR 109; Sulochana Chandrakant Galande vs. Pune
• Municipal Transport and Ors. (2010) 8 SCC 467: 2010 (9)
SCR 476; Govt. of India v. Citedal Fine Pharmaceuticals,
Madras and Ors. (1989) 3 SCC 483:1989 (3) SCR 465; State F
of Punjab and Ors. v. Bhatinda District Co-operative Milk
Producers Union Ltd. (2007) 11 SCC 363: 2007 (11) SCR
14 - referred to.
2.4 On perusal of the records, it is found that such
powers have been exercised within about three years of G
.. {
time in some cases and in some cases soon after the
expiry of three years period. Such period during which
power was exercised by the Joint Commissioner cannot
be said to be unreasonable by any stretch of imagination
in the facts of the instant case. Three years period cannot H
1118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [20111 9 S.C.R.
A be said to be a very long period and therefore, in all these
cases, the power was exercised within a reasonable
period of time. [Para 44] [1136-0-E]
3.1 The order dated 26.11.2007 was passed by the
B
Joint Commissioner while the respondent was fighting .. ·-
out the litigation in the High Court and therefore, it was
not possible for the assEissee to give his entire focus and
attention and also to give full concentration to the said
proceeding pending before the Joint Commissioner. The
counsel for the appellant also could not dispute the fact
c that the respondent was somewhat handicapped in
contesting the said maUer very effectively before the Joint
Commissioner. [Para 46] [1137-A-C]
3.2 Considering the entire facts and circumstances •
D of the case, the order dated 26.11.2007 is set aside and
the matter is remitted back to the Joint Commissioner
once again to hear the parties and to pass fresh order in
respect of the legality and propriety of the revised
assessment order dated 26.12.2003. The impugned
E judgment and order passed by the High Court is set aside
to the said extent while remitting back the matter. [Para
47) [1137-C-D]
\
Cas;e Law Reference:
F 1985 (2) Suppl. SCR 109 Referred to Para 37
2010 (9) SCR 476 Referred to Para 41
1989 (3) SCR 465 Referred to Para 42
2007 (11) SCR 14 Referred to Para 43
G ....
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Givil Appeal No.
6889-6891 of 2011.
From the Judgment & Order dated 14.03.2008 of the High
H Court of Jharkhant at Ranchi in WP(T) No. 6377 of 2007 with
STATE OF JHARKHAND & ORS. ETC. v. SHIVAM COKE 1119
INDUSTRIES, DHANBAD, ETC.
~
WP(T) No. 5895 & 5892 of 2007. A
WITH
C.A. Nos. 6892 & 6893 of 2011.
Ratan Kumar Chaudhuri, Brahamajeet Mishra, Akshay
J
(Shukla, Anil Kumar Jha, Chhaya Kumari for the Appellants. B
!
Shyam Divan, Arijit Mazumdar, Rameshwar Prasad Goyal,
Pradeep Kumar Bakshi, S.L. Aneja, Achint Ranjan Singh for
the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
c
DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J. 1. Delay condoned in
SLP (C) No. 8424 of 2010 .
....
2. Leave granted. D
By this common judgment and order, we propose to dispose
of these appeals as they involve similar issues both of facts as
also of law and therefore, they were heard together.
3. Appeals arising out of SLP (Civil) Nos. 19104-19106 E
of 2008 are directed against the judgment and order dated
14.3.2008 in WP (T) No. 6377 of 2007, WP (T) No. 5895 of
2007 and WP (T) No. 5892 of 2007. The appeal arising out of
SLP (Civil) No. 21491 of 2008 is directed against the judgment
and order dated 19.3.2008 in WP (T) No. 6071 of 2007 and F
the appeal arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 8424 of 2010 is
directed against the judgment and order dated 31.7.2009 in
W.P. (T) 54 of 2009 passed by the High Court of Jharkhand at
Ranchi allowing all the Writ Petitions filed by the respondents
herein. G
~ CIVIL APPEAL ARISING OUT OF SLP (C} NO. 19104 OF
2008
4. The facts leading to the filing of the case in the appeal
arising out of SLP (C) No. 19104 of 2008 are that the H·
1120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 9 S.C.R.
A respondent-Mis Shivam Coke Industries, Dhanbad is a
manufacturer of coal and was registered under the provisions
of the Bihar Finance Act, 1981 [now repealed - for short "BFT
Act, 1981'1 and presently under the provisions of Jharkhand
Value Added Tax, 2005. Respondent-assessee being
B manufacturers of hard coke buys coal from Bharat Coking Coal
Ltd. after making the payment of local Sales Tax @ 4% which
is being used as an input for the purpose of manufacturing the
hard coke. Respondent was assessed to tax for the Financial
Years 1988-89, 1992-93 and 1996-97 determining the tax on
c i.ntra-State sales transactions as well as Central Sales Tax on
inter-State sales transactions. Respondent preferred an
Appeal before the Joint Commissioner of Commercial Taxes
(Appeals), Dhanbad Division, Dhanbad against the assessment
orders passed between :26.4.1990 to 23.12.1998 for the
Financial Years 1988-89, 1992-93 and 1996-97, who vide
D order dated 25.08.2003 remanded the aforesaid assessment
proceedings by a common order to re-examine the books of
account and to re-determine the nature of sales as to whether
they are intra-state sales or inter-state sales, on the basis of
the books of account and the audit reports as well as on the
E basis and within the meaning and scope of Section 3(a) of the
Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (for short "the CST Act").
Thereafter, Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes,
Dhanbad Circle on the basis of guidelines issued by the Joint
Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Appeals) passed the
F revised assessment orders on 26.12.2003 reversing the then
inter-State sales under Section 3(a) of the CST Act 1956 into
the intra-State sales. Respondent on 10.3.2005 filed an
application for refund of excess amount of tax after adjustment
of the amount to be paid by Respondent. Accordingly, on 1
G 21.8.2006 notice was isisued by Deputy Commissioner of
Commercial Taxes to Respondent to file its refund application
before the Joint Commissioner of Commercial Taxes since the
amount refundable to the Respondent is above Rs. 25,000/-.
Thereafter in the year 2006, as is alleged by the respondent,
H the Deputy Commissioner of the Dhanbad Circle got changed 1
STATE OF JHARKHAND &ORS. ETC. v. SHIVAM COKE 1121
INDUSTRIES, DHANBAD, ETC. [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
..,
and the new Deputy Commissioner examined the revised 'A
assessment orders of the Respondent and he opined that the
revised assessment orders do not conform to the appellate
direction and Deputy Commissioner informed the Joint
-> _.
Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Administration) about his
observations. The Joint Commissioner of Commercial Taxes B
(Administration), Dhanbad Division, Dhanbad [Appellant No. 4]
then initiated the proceeding suo motu under Section 46(4) of
the adopted Bihar Finance Act, 1981 [now repealed] and
issued notice/Memo No. 744 dated 1.8.2007 directing the
Respondent to furnish the complete sets of books of account c
in order to determine the legality and propriety of the said
revised assessment orders conforming to the appellate order.
Jo
On 28.11.2007 Respondent filed Writ Petition before the High
Court of Jharkhand which was registered as WP (T) No. 6377
of 2007 praying for a direction to quash the notice/Memo No.
D
883 dated 20.9.2007 [which was issued in pursuance to earlier
notice/Memo No. 744 dated 1.8.2007] issued by the Joint
Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Administration) for
initiating the proceeding suo motu under Section 46(4) of the
repealed BFT Act, 1981 and also for quashing the order dated
E
26.11.2007 passed by the Joint Commissioner of Commercial
Taxes by which he set aside the revised assessment order
. dated 26.12.2003. The High Court of Jharkhand vide its order
dated 14.03.2008 allowed the Writ Petitions of the respondent
herein against which the appellants have filed the present
appeals on which we heard the learned counsel appearing for F
the parties.
CIVIL APPEALS ARISING OUT OF SLP {C) NOS. 19105-
06 OF 2008
G
·-' 5. The facts leading to the filing of appeals arising out of
SLP (C) Nos. 19105-06 of 2008 are that the Respondent -M/
s. Rani Sati Coke Manufacturing Company, Baliyapur,
Dhanbad is engaged in processing of coal to coke and was
assessed to tax for the Financial Years from 1984-85 to 2000-
H
1122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 9 S.C.R
A 2001 determining the tax on "intra-State sales" transactions, as
well as Central Sales Tax on inter-State sales transactions.
Respondent filed an appeal against the assessment orders
passed between 29.12.1907 to 10.3.2003 for the Financial
Years from 1984-85 to 2000-01 and the appellate authority, i.e.,
B the Joint Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Appeal),
Dhanbad Division, Dhanbad remanded the aforesaid
assessment proceedings by a common order to re-examine the
nature of intra-State sales and inter-State sales on the basis
of the books of account and the audit reports as well as on the
c basis of the meaning and scope of Section 3(a) of the CST
Act, 1956. Thereafter, the Deputy Commissioner of
Commercial Taxes passed the revised assessment order vide
orders dated 14.12.2005 and 29.12.2005 reversing I converting
the then inter-State sales under Section 3(a) of the CST Act,
D 1956 into the intra-State sales. Pursuant thereto, Respondent
filed prescribed refund application before the Deputy
Commissioner of Commercial Taxes. Thereafter in the year
2006, it is alleged by the respondents that, the Deputy
Commissioner of the Dhanbad Circle got changed and the new
E Deputy Commissioner examined the revised assessment
orders of the Respondent and he opined that the revised
assessment orders do not conform to the appellate direction
and as such do not have any merit as they were re-assessed
on the basis of same facts for converting the then inter-State
sales into the intra-State sales, which resulted the claim of
F refund and Deputy Commissioner informed the Joint
Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Administration) about his
observations. Pursuant to this Joint Commissioner of
Commercial Taxes (Administration) initiated the proceeding suo
motu under Section 46(4) of the Bihar Finance Act, 1981 and
G issued notice No. 850 dated 06.09.2007 directing Respondent
to furnish the complete sets of books of account, in order to
determine the legality and propriety of the said revised
assessment orders conforming to the appellate order.
Thereafter, Respondent No. 2 filed two Writ Petitions before
H the High Court of Jharkhand which were registered as W.P. (T)
STATE OF JHARKHAND & ORS. ETC. v. SHIVAM COKE
INDUSTRIES, DHANBAD, ETC. [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
1123 .
_,
~ Nos. 5892 and 5895 of 2007 praying for the direction to the A
appellants for immediate refund of the entire amount arising out
of the revised assessment orders in which High Court directed
the appellants to participate in revision proceedings, after which
Respondent filed an amended petition before the High Court
... -' by bringing the fact that the revision proceedings under Section B
46(4) of the Bihar Finance Act, 1981 was opened on the basis
of an application of the Deputy Commissioner which is not
permitted as per the provisions of the repealed BFT Act, 1981
and that the same is also barred by limitation. The High Court
of Jharkhand vide its order dated 14.03.2008 allowed the Writ c
Petitions of the respondents herein against which the appellants
have filed the present appeals on which we heard the learned
counsel appearing for the parties.
,.
CIVIL APPEALS ARISING OUT OF SLP {C} NO. 21491 AND
8424 OF 2008 D
6. The appeals arising out of SLP(C) No. 21491 of 2008
are against the judgment and order of the High Court of
Jharkhand dated 19.03.2008 following the judgment in WP (n
NO. 6377 of 2007. The facts of this appeal and also of the E
appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 8424 of 2010 are similar to
the other appeals at hand. So, we need not go into the detailed
facts of the said two appeals. ...
~
~
7. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant while
taking us to the impugned judgment and also the connected F
records submitted that judgment and order passed by the High
Court is incorrect. He further submitted that the findings arrived
at by the High Court are erroneous and based on wrong
readings of the materials available on record.
G
8. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents on
the other hand while drawing support from the impugned
judgment and order submitted that the findings recorded by the
High Court are findings of fact and therefore this Court should
not interfere with the aforesaid conclusions of fact arrived at by H
1124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 9 S.C.R.
A the High Court by giving coi~ent reasons for its conclusions.
.. .,
9. Upon reading the entire records and materials placed
and also upon hearing the learned counsel appearing for the
parties, in our considered opinion three following issues appear
B
to arise for our consideration; ..
(a) Whether the suo motu power of revision under
Section 46(4) of the BFT Act, 1981, vested with the
Joint Commissioner was legally and properly
exercised in the present case;
c
(b) Whether or not the action taken by the Department
was barred by limitation and whether such action
was bad for not having been initiated within a
reasonable tim~~;
D (c) Whether the order dated 26.11.2007 passed by the
Joint Commissioner setting aside the revised
assessment order dated 26.12.2003 is proper and
could be maintained;
E 10. We propose to deal with the aforesaid three issues
one after the other and record our reasons for coming to the
decision in each of the aforesaid issues;
~
Issue 1: Whether exercise of Suo Motu power of revision
as provided under Section 46(4) of the BFT Act, 1981 '
F
could be upheld;
11. Section 46 of the BFT Act, 1981 with which we are
concerned in the present case came to the statute book with
the enactment of Bihar Finance Act, 1981. The aforesaid Act
G was a consolidated Act which was passed by the State
Legislature amending the law relating to levy of tax on sale and
purchase of goods. In the said Act, Section 45 provides for the
provision of filing an appeal whereas Section 46 of the Act lays
down the provision of revision. In the present case, we are only
H concerned with the provision of revision and in our estimation,
STATE OF JHARKHAND & ORS. ETC. v. SHIVAM COKE 1125
INDUSTRIES, DHANBAD, ETC. [DR MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.)
the entire provision of Section 46 should be extracted A
hereinafter.
46. Revision - (1) Subject to such rules as may be made
by the State Government an order passed on an app~al
> under sub-section (1) or (2) of s.ection 45 may, on
B
application, be revised by the Tribunal.
(2) Subject as aforesaid any order passed under this part
or the rules made thereunder, other than an order passed
by the Commissioner under s·ub-section (5) of section 9
or an order against which an appeal has been provided C
in section 45 may, on application be revised.
(a) by the Joint Commissioner, if the said order has
been passed by an authority not above the rank of
Deputy Commissioner; and o
(b) by the Tribunal, if the said order has been
passed by the ·Joint Commissioner or
Commissioner.
(3) Every application for revision under this section shall E
be filed within ninety days of the communication of the
order which is sought to be revised, but where the authority
~ to whom the application lies is satisfied that the applicant
, had sufficient cause for not applying within time, it may
condone the delay. F
(4) The Commissioner may, on his own motion call for an
examine the records of any proceeding in which any order
has been passed by any other authority appointed under
section 9, for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the
legality or propriety of such order and may, after examining G
the record and making or causing to be made such enquiry
as he may deem necessary, pass such order as he thinks
proper.
H
1126 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 9 S.C.R.
A (5) No order under this section shall be passed without
giving the appellant as also the authority whose order is
sought to be revised or their representative, a reasonable
opportunity of being heard.
8
(6) Any revision against an appellate order filed and .
pending before the Joint Commissioner or a revision
against any other order filed and pending before the
Deputy Commissioner since before the enforcement of
this part shall be deemed to have been filed and/or
transferred respectively to the Tribunal and Joint
c Commissioner; and any revision relating to a period prior
to the enforcement of thi.s part against an appellate order,
or against any other order passed by an authority not
above the rank of Deputy Commissioner shall, after the
enforcement of this part, be respectively filed before the
D Tribunal and the Joint Commissioner.
12. The said Act came to be amended in 1984. Section
10 of the Bihar Finance Amendment Act, 1984 amended
Section 4Ei in some respect which again is extracted
E hereinbelow:-
10. Amendment of section 46 of the Bihar Act V, 1981
(Part/). - In sub-section (3) of section 46 of the said Act
for the word "sixty" the word "ninety" shall be substituted.
•.
F (2) For sub-section (4) the following sub-section shall be
substituted namely :-
"4 (a) The Commissioner may, on his own motion call for
and examine the records of any proceeding in which any
order has been passed by any other authority appointed
G
under section 9, for the purpose of satisfying himself as
to the legality or property of such order and may, after
examining the record and making or causing to be made
such enquiry as he may deem necessary, pass such order
as he thinks proper.
H
STATE OF JHARKHAND & ORS. ETC. v. SHIVAM COKE 1127
INDUSTRIES, DHANBAD, ETC. [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
~ i
13. By inserting a provision namely Section 7 of the Bihar A
Finance (Amendment) Ordinance, 1989, clause (b) of sub-
Section (4) has been deleted with effect from May, 1989.
Therefore; the statutory provision that now stands and is
~ operative is that Section 46 provides for a revision of all
appellate and other orders passed by various authorities under B
the BFT Act, 1981. According to the statutory provision as
applicable, power of revision is vested with the Tribunal and the
Joint Commissioner, which power is to be exercised on
., application by any person aggrieved, but subject to time limit
prescribed in sub-Section (3) i.e. 90 days of the communication
of the order with a further power to condone the delay, if
c
sufficient cause is shown. There is an additional power vested
on the Commissioner which empowers the Commissioner to
initiate suo motu revision proceedings at any time and for
exercising such power no limitation has been prescribed. in the
statute. The power of the Commissioner to initiate such suo D
motu revisional proceeding has been delegated to the Joint
Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Administration) against
the orders of the officers lower than his rank which is so
delegated in terms of the notification issued by the State of
Bihar under S.O. No. 795 dated 28th June 1986. E
14. It is thus established that under Section 46 of the BFT
Act, 1981, it is the Commissioner who on the basis of an
application filed by an aggrieved party revise the order passed
by any authority subordinate to him. He also has the additional F
power alongwith the Joint Commissioner as a delegatee as
provided under Section 46(4) of the BFT Act, 1981 to revise
an order passed by an authority subordinate to it by exercising
its suo motu power.
G
15. In all these appeals, the Joint Commissioner of
Commercial Taxes has exercised the power vested on him
under Section 46(4) of the BFT 'Act, 1981 which power in most
cases concerning the present appeals was exercised by him
within a period of three years but in some other cases beyond
H
1128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 9 S.C.R.
A the expiry of three years period, but soon thereafter.
16. In that view of the matter, counsel appearing for the
respondent submitted in the High Court that exercise of such
power by the Joint Commissioner after expiry of more than two
years time is illegal, without jurisdiction and bad in law. The
8 Division Bench of the Jharkhand High Court found force in the
aforesaid submissions of the counsel appearing for the
respondent and held that such suo motu power vested on an
authority must be exercised within three years period which is
a period prescribed under Article 137 of the Limitation Act,
C 1963. According to the Hi!~h Court where no time limit is
prescribed for filing a revision, Article 137 of the Limitation Act
would apply to such cases. It was further held that since under
Section 46(4), no time limit is prescribed the limitation as
prescribed under Article 137 of the Limitation Act would apply
D to the facts and circumstanc:es of the present case.
17. Counsel appearing for the appellant, however,
submitted before us that the aforesaid contentions on the face
of it cannot be accepted as a correct position in law for by
E enacting sub-Section (4) in Section 46, the legislature thought
it fit not to impose any restric:tion or time limit so far as limitation
is concern1ed and therefore to hold that Article 137 of the
Limitation Act would apply to such provisions is nothing but
misreading of the provisions for if that was the intention of the
F legislature it would have so stated specifically by making the
said provision applicable to a case like this.
18. The counsel therefore, submitted that such power of
initiation of suo motu revision proceedings by the
Commissioner or Joint Commissioner as the case may be
G should be held to be without any time or such restriction or at
least it should be held that such exercise of power of revision
could be exercised suo motu within a reasonable time
depending on the facts and circumstances of each case.
H 19. Another submission which is advanced by the counsel
STATE OF JHARKHAND & ORS. ETC. v. SHIVAM COKE 1129
INDUSTRIES, DHANBAD, ETC. [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.)
' ~
appearing for the respondent was that the Joint Commissioner A
has exercised the power of suo motu revision in the instant case
on the basis of an application filed by the Deputy
Commissioner which was sent to the Joint Commissioner by
·, him and that application was drawn up and submitted under
Section 46(4) itself and therefore, the entire exercise of power B
by the Joint Commissioner is fallacious, untenable and should
be held to be illegal.
20. The counsel appearing for the appellant, however,
refuted the said allegations and submitted that although Deputy
Commissioner had written a letter to the Joint Commissioner
c
bringing to his notice some mistakes and errors apparent on
the face of records and illegalities by his predecessor in his
order, but, it was a power which was exercised by the Joint
Commissioner independently on his own accord and therefore,
it cannot be said that the aforesaid power was exercised D
illegally or without jurisdiction.
21. We may therefore, refer to the materials on record so
as to record our findings on the aforesaid issue.
E
22. In all these appeals, there are letters which were written
by the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes to the Joint
Commissioner (Administration). One of such letter is dated
28.8.2007. In the said letter it is stated by the Deputy
Commissioner that the said communication is regarding filing
F
of suo motu revision under Section 46(4) of the BFT Act, 1981.
The aforesaid letter by the Deputy Commissioner, Commercial
Taxes was written to the Joint Commissioner (Administration).
In the said letter, the Deputy Commissioner has pointed out
some alleged mistakes in the original tax assessment order
and the revised order. He also stated in that communication G
... )
that he is unable to agree with the revised tax assessment order
and reimbursement order passed by the Divisional lncharge
and therefore, according to his opinion a revision should be
filed under Section 46(4) of the BFT Act, 1981 against the
revised tax assessment order dated 29.12.2005 H
1130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 9 S.C.R.
_.,,
A 23. Our attention was also drawn to the notice for revision
issued by the Joint Commissioner of Commercial Taxes
(Administration). One of the notices is dated 17.12.2007 issued
to Mis. Shivam Coke Industries namely the respondent herein
for the assessment years 1988-1989 to 1992-1993 and 1996-
B 1997. The said notice reads as follows:-
"Whereas all the points and facts have not been
considered while passing the revised assessment orders
pertaining to the above cases which were to be considered
as per directions of the appellate court, hence the related
c revised assessment orders are not in conformity neither
the directions of the appellate court and the provisions of
law.
In the light of the above facts the legality & propriety of the
D revised assessment orde!rs has not been established and
hence the revision of the said orders have been
considered necessary.
You are hereby directed to be present before the
undersigned on 15.5.2007 and place your side as to why
E
the above stated revised orders should not be set aside?
Joint Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Adm.)
Dhanbad Division, Dhanbad"
F
24. Such orders are al~;o existing against similar notices
in the connected matters.
25. Relying on the aforesaid two documents, the counsel
for the respondent submitted before us that it is apparent on
G the face of the record that the Joint Commissioner of 4 ...
Commercial Taxes initiated the suo motu action on the basis
of the letter of the Deputy Commissioner, Commercial Taxes
who had stated that the revision should be filed under Section
46(4) of the BFT Act, 1981. It was submitted in such a situation
H and that since it is an application filed by the Deputy
•
STATE OF JHARKHAND & ORS. ETC. v. SHIVAM COKE 1131
INDUSTRIES, DHANBAD, ETC. [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
Commissioner, the same was a power to be exercised under A
Section 46 (2) of the BFT Act, 1981 which is an ordinary power
of revision to be exercised by the competent authority on an
application filed by the aggrieved party and here the Deputy
Commissioner. According to the counsel, since the Deputy
Commissioner is an aggrieved party, he could file such an B
application seeking for revision within a period prescribed i.e.
90 days and in that view of the matter even if the Joint
Commissioner exercises suo motu power, such power could
and should have been exercised within a period of 90 days as
prescribed.
c
26. We are, however, unable to accept the aforesaid
contentions for the simple reason that a bare perusal of the
notice issued on 17.12.2007, the contents of which have been
extracted hereinbefore would indicate that the aforesaid notice
was issued by the Joint Commissioner by exercising his D
individual suo motu power as provided under Section 46(4). It
is not a case where such notice was issued on the basis of an
application filed by the Deputy Commissioner. This is obvious
because in the said notice, there is absolutely no ,reference
made of the application sent by the Deputy Commissioner. If E
from the available records of a particular case, the Joint
Commissioner forms an independent opinion that the same is
a case where suo motu power of Revision should be exercised,
he is empowered to so exercise such suo motu power of
revising an order which appears to be illegal and without F
jurisdiction to the competent authority who is empowered to
issue such notice by recording his reasons for coming to such
a conclusion in the notice itself.
27. In the present case, the Joint Commissioner has
• ! exercised his own independent mind for issuing the notice and G
also recorded his own reasons for coming to a conclusion as
to why the power under Section 46(4) should be exercised.
Having recorded the aforesaid reason, such notice was issued
to the assessee after forming a decision. The assessee was
H
1132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 9 S.C.R.
A informed by issuing the said notice that the legality and propriety
• of the revised assessment order has not been established
because of the.reasons mentioned in the notice and therefore,
the revision of the said orders is proposed is it has been
considered necessary. By the said notice, the assessee was
8 directed to be present before the Joint Commissioner and
place his side as to why the above revised assessment order
should not be set aside.
28. The respondent being aggrieved by the issuance of
the aforesaid order filed a writ petition before the High Court.
C The High Court, however, did not grant any stay of the aforesaid
notice and permitted the respondent to contest the said notice
in accordance with law during the course of which the Joint
Commissioner of Commercial Taxes has set aside the revised
orders and sent back the matter for fresh assessment to the
D assessing officer.
29. The aforesaid subsequt::nt development which had
taken place during the pendency of the writ petition in the High
Court has not been addressed to and decided by the High Court
E as the High Court has disposed of the entire writ petition on
two issues namely on the issue of the ambit and scope of
Section 46(4) of the BFT Act, 1981 and also on the ground of
limitation.
30. The Deputy Commissioner, Commercial Taxes
F Division has pointed out in his communication to the Joint
Commissioner several loopholes in the revised assessment
orders passed by the assessing officer. The Deputy
Commissioner has also pointed out how the assessee has
made conflicting claims and statements and also how while
G upholding such contradictory claims, there has been a revenue
loss for the department. Alongwith his letter, some of the relevant
records were transmitted to the Joint Commissioner. It is true /
that the Deputy Commissioner, Commercial Taxes Division has
brought out and pointed out some of the illegalities anc.
H irregularities committed in the revised assessment orders
STATE OF JHARKHAND & ORS. ETC. v. SHIVAM COKE 1133
INDUSTRIES, DHANBAD, ETC. [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
·4
passed by his predecessor in the assessment orders relating A
to the respondent.
31. But the impugned notice issued by the Joint
Commissioner ex facie indicates that he being the competent
authority has formed an independent opinion and personal B
satisfaction that the legality and propriety of the revised
assessment orders has not been established because of the
reasons specifically stated in the said notice and ·therefore he
has thought it fit to exercise his power of suo motu revision
consequent upon which the aforesaid notice was issued.
c
32. There is no reference in the said notice to the letter
and any other materials contained with the letter of the Deputy
Commissioner anywhere in the notice and therefore, it cannot
be said that while coming to the aforesaid conclusion in the
impugned notice, the Commissioner was influenced only by the D
opinion of the Deputy Commissioner. On consideration of the
·.records we are satisfied that it was not a· revision initiated on
the basis of any application filed by an aggrieved party namely
the Deputy Commissioner but initiation of a Revisional
proceeding by the Joint Commissioner by forming his own E
opinion and satisfaction to exercise suo motu power vested
under Section 46(4) of the BFT Act on the basis of the
materials on record. The aforesaid contention· is therefore,
rejected.
F
Issue 2 • Whether or not the action taken by the
Department was barred by limitation
33. The next issue which now arises for our consideration
is whether the aforesaid exercise of power of drawing up a
revisional proceeding by exercising suo motu power was not G
exercised within the period of limitation or within a reasonable
period of time.
34. We have also extracted the provision which clearly
indicates that no period of limitation is prescribed for initiation H
1134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 9 S.C.R.
A of suo motu revisional proceeding by the Commissioner or the
Joint Commissioner as the case, may be, whereas a period of
limitation is prescribed for filing a revision application by an
aggrieved party for initiation of the revisional jurisdiction of the
Commissioner which period is 90 days, as is stood at that
B relevant time.
35. The High Court has held that there cannot be an
unlimited period of limitation even for exercising of suo motu
revisional power for initiation of a proceeding by the
Commissioner or the Joint Commissioner as the case may be
C and therefore provision of Article 137 of the Limitation Act was
read into the Act laying down that at least within a period of
three years from the date of accrual of the cause of action such
a power of suo motu Revision should be exercised by the Joint
Commissioner.
D
36. We are again unable to accept the aforesaid
contention as the legislature has not stated in the provision at
all regarding the applicability of Article 137 of the Limitation Act
to Section 46(4) of the BFT Act. If the legislature intended to
E provide for any period of limitation or intended to apply the said
provision of Article 137 into Section 46(4), the legislature would
have specifically said so in the Act itself. When the language
of the legislature is clear and unambiguous, nothing could be
read or added to the language, which is not stated specifically.
F Therefore, the High Court wrongly read application of Section
137 of the Limitation Act to Section 46(4) of the BFT Act.
37. It is a settled position of law that while interpreting a
statute, nothing could be added or subtracted when the
meaning of the section is clear and unambiguous. In this
G connection we may also refer to the decision of this Court in
Sakuru vs. Tanaji reported in (1985) 3 SCC 590 wherein it was
stated by this Court that the Limitation Act applies to courts and
not to quasi judicial authority.
H 38. The aforesaid principle and settled position of law was
STATE OF JHARKHAND & ORS. ETC. v. SHIVAM COKE 1135
INDUSTRIES, DHANBAD, ETC. [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA J.)
.., ; totally ignored by the High Court while laying down that Article A
137 of the Limitation Act would be applicable to the facts and
circumstances of the present case.
39. We would, however, agree with the position that such
a power cannot be exercised by the revisional authority
8
indefinitely. In our considered opinion, such extra ordinary power
i.e. suo motu power of initiation of revisional proceeding has
to be exercised within a reasonable period of time and what
is a reasonable period of time would depend on the facts and
circumstances of each case.
c
40. For this proposition, a number of decisions of this
Court can be referred to on which reliance was placed even
by the counsel appearing for the respondent.
41. In Sulochana Chandrakant Galande Vs. Pune 0
Municipal Transport and Others reported in (2010) 8 SCC
467, this Court dealing with the issue of "reasonable time" held
as follows:-
29. In view of the above, we reach the inescapable
conclusion that the revisional powers cannot be used E
arbitrarily at a belated stage for the reason that the order
passed in revision under Section 34 of the 1976 Act, is a
judicial order. What should be reasonable time, would
~ depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case.
F
42. In Govt. of India v. Citedal Fine Pharmaceuticals,
1
Madras and Others reported in (1989) 3 SCC 483:
6....... While it is true that Rule 12 does not prescribe any
period within which recovery of any duty as contemplated
by the rule is to be made, but that by itself does not render G
the rule unreasonable or violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution. In the absence of any period of limitation it
is settled that every authority is to exercise the power
within a reasonable period. What would be reasonable
H
1136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 9 S.C.R.
('
A period, would depend upon the facts of each case .....
43. In State of Punjab cg. Ors. v. Bhatinda District
Cooperative Milk Producers Union Ltd. reported in (2007) 11
sec 363
B 18. It is trite that if no period of limitation has been
prescribed, statutory authority must exercise its jurisdiction
within a reasonable period. What, however, shall be the
reasonable period would depend upon the nature of the
statute, rights and liabilities thereunder and other relevant
c factors.
44. Now, the question that arises for our consideration is
whether the power to exercise Suo motu revisional jurisdiction
by the Joint Commissioner in tile present cases was exercised
o within a reasonable period. On perusal of the records, we find
that such powers have been exercised within about three years
of time in some cases and in some cases soon after the expiry
of three years period. Such period during which power was
exercised by the Joint Commissioner cannot be said to be
E unreasonable by any stretch of imagination in the facts of the
present case. Three years period cannot be said to be a very
long period and therefore, in all these cases, we hold that the
power was exercised within a reasonable period of time.
Issue 3: Whether the order dated 26.11.2007 passed by
F the Joint Commissioner is proper and could be
maintained;
45. Having decided the aforesaid two issues in the
aforesaid manner, the next and the last issue that arises for our
G consideration is whether the order dated 26.11.2007 passed
by the Joint Commissioner setting aside the revised
assessment order dated 27 .12.2003 is proper and could be
maintained, as the said order was passed during the pendency
of the writ petition in the High Court.
H
STATE OF JHARKHAND & ORS. ETC. v. SHIVAM COKE 1137
INDUSTRIES, DHANBAD, ETC. [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
46. On this issue also, we have heard the learned counsel A
appearing for the parties. The aforesaid order dated
26.11.2003 was passed while the respondent was fighting out
the litigation in the High Court and therefore, it was not possible
for the assessee to give his entire focus and attention and also
to give full concentration to the aforesaid proceeding pending B
before the Joint Commissioner. The learned counsel appearing
for the appellant also could not dispute the fact that the
respondent was somewhat handicapped in contesting the
aforesaid matter very effectively before the Joint Commissioner.
47. Considering the entire facts and circumstances of the
c
case, we also set aside the order dated 26.11.2007 and remit
back the matter to the Joint Commissioner once again to hear
the parties and to pass fresh order in respect of the legality and
propriety of the revised assessment order dated 26.12.2003.
Consequently, the matter is now remitted to the Joint D
Commissioner of Commercial Taxes to pass order .in
accordance with law giving reasons for its decisions as
expeditiously as possible. The impugned judgment and order
passed by the High Court is set aside to the aforesaid extent
while remitting back the matter as aforesaid, leaving the parties E
to bear their own costs.
N.J. Matters disposed of.
> •
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