Holding

An Additional District Magistrate appointed as an Executive Magistrate under Section 20(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code has jurisdiction to issue orders under Section 144, and the order restraining the respondent was valid.

Summary

The Additional District Magistrate (ADM) of Dakshina Kannada issued an order under Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code restraining Dr. P.B. Thogadia from entering the district for 15 days, fearing his inflammatory speeches would reignite communal tensions. Dr. Thogadia challenged the order, arguing the ADM lacked jurisdiction and that the order was based on mere speculation. The Karnataka High Court quashed the order, holding the ADM had no power to issue it. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the statutory framework, noting that under Section 20(2) of the Cr.P.C. an Executive Magistrate can be appointed as an ADM and thereby exercise the powers of a District Magistrate, including issuing orders under Section 144. The Court also emphasized that past conduct and the potential for communal unrest justify preventive measures and that courts should not interfere unless the order is patently illegal. Consequently, the Supreme Court held the ADM had jurisdiction, upheld the validity of the order, and set aside the High Court's judgment.

Issues considered

The jurisdiction of an Additional District Magistrate to issue an order under Section 144 Cr.P.C.
Whether the order restraining the respondent was valid despite being based on anticipated communal disturbance.
Whether the High Court erred in quashing the ADM's order.
Whether the statutory notifications appointing the ADM as an Executive Magistrate satisfied the requirements of Section 20(2) Cr.P.C.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 144, s. 20, s. 482

Subjects

Section 144Additional District Magistratejurisdictioncommunal harmonypreventive orderpublic orderfreedom of speechexecutive magistrate

Judgment

)

A STATE OF KARNATAKA
\I.

DR. PRAVEEN BHAI THOGADIA

MARCH 31, 2004

B [DORAISWAMY RAJU AND ARIJIT PASAYAT, JJ.)

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973-Section 144-0rder of Additional
District Magistrate restraining a person from entering the district on
C apprehension of vitiating communal harmony through his inflammatory
speeches-High Court quashed the order holding that the Magistrale has no
jurisdiction-Correctness of-Held, Courts. in appeal. should not interfere
with such orders unless they are patently illegal or passed without jurisdiction-
Courts cannot substitute its own view for that of the competent authority-On
facts, Magistrate has necessary jurisdiction and the order was passed based
D on past conduct and antecedents of the person.

Additional District Magistrate (ADM), by an order passed under Section
144 Cr.P.C., restrained respondent from entering the district for a period of
15 days. The ADM felt that the respondent, who incited communal feelings
through his inflammatory speeches in other places, would make similar
E speeches in the district stoking communal feelings and vitiating communal
harmony. The respondent challenged the order before High Court contending
that the ADM has no jurisdiction to pass order under Section 144 Cr.P.C.;
and that his speeches had nothing to do with communal disharmony. The High
Court allowed the appeal of the respondent.

F In appeal, the appellant-State contended that the ADM rightly
considered the prior conduct of the respondent in gi\'ing inflammatory
speeches at several places resulting in communal clashes before passing the
'order under Section 144 Cr.P.C.; and that the ADM had sufficient power to
pass an order under the Section.

G Tile respondent contended that the ADM had no .iurisdiction to pass
an order under Section 144 Cr.P.C.; and that the order of the ADM was
passed on mere hypothetical assumptions that he may deliver speeches which
might destroy communal harmony.

Disposing of the appeal, the Court
H 652
STATE OF KARNATAKA r. DR. P.El. THOGADIA 653
.~ ......
HELD: I.I. Courts should not normally interfere with matters relating A
to law and order which is primarily the domain of the concerned
administrative authorities. They are, by and large, the best to assess and to
handle the situation depending upon the peculiar needs and necessities, within
their special knowledge. Past conduct and antecedents of a person or group
or an organisation may certainly provide sufficient material or basis for the
action contempl::ted on a reasonable expectation of possible turn of events,
B
which may need to be avoided in public interest and maintenance of law and
..,.. order. Whenever the concerned authorities in charge of law and order find
that a person's speeches or actions are likely to trigger communal antagonism
and hatred resulting in fissiparous tendencies gaining foothold undermining
and affecting communal harmony, prohibitory orders need necessarily to be c
passed, to effectively avert such untoward happenings.
1657-D-E, G-H, 658-AI

1.2. Communal harmony should not be made to suffer and be made
dependent upon will of an individual or a group of individuals, whatever be
their religion be it of minority or that of the majority. While permitting D
holding of a meeting organised by groups or an individual, which is likely to
disturb public peace, tranquillity and orderliness, irrespective of the name,
cover and methodology it may assume and adopt, the administration has a
duty to find out who are the speakers and participants and also take into
account previous instances and the antecedents involving or concerning those
E
persons. If they feel that the presence or participation of any person in the
meeting or congregation would be objectionable, for some patent or latent
reasons as well as past track record of such happenings in other places
involving such participants, necessary prohibitory orders can be passed. Quick
decisions and swift as well as effective action necessitated in such cases may
' ... not justify or permit the authorities to give prior opportunity or consideration
at length of the pros and cons. The imminent need to intervene instantly having
F
regard to the sensitivity and perniciously perilous consequences it may result
in, if not prevented forthwith cannot be lost sight of. The valuable and
cherished right of freedom of expression ao1d speech may at times have to be
sub.jectcd to reasonable subordination of social interests, needs and necessities
to preserve the very chore of democratic life - preservation of public order
G
and rule of law. At some such grave situation, the decision as to the need and

~ "'
necessity to take prohibitory actions must be left to the discretion of those
entrusted with the duty of maintaining law and order, and interposition of
Courts unless a concrete case of abuse or exercise of such sweeping powers
for extraneous considerations by the authority concerned or that such H
654 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] 3 S.C.R.
.i-....
A authority was shown to act at the behest of those in power, and interference
as a matter of course and as though adjudicating an appeal, will defeat the
very purpose of legislation and legislative intent. 1658-A-FI

Madhu limaye v. Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Monghyr and Ors., 1197013
sec 746, relied on.
B
1.3. The High Court should not have glossed over by saying that the
people of the locality where the meeting was to be organised were sensible
and not fickle minded to be swayed by the presence of any person in their 1'
amidst or by his speeches. Such presumptive and wishful approaches at times
may do greater damage than any real benefit to individual rights as also the
c need to protect and preserve law and order. The Court was not acting as an
appellate authority over the decision of the official concerned. Unless the order
passed is patently illegal and without jurisdiction or with ulterior motives and
on extraneous considerations of political victimisation by those in power,
normally interference should be the exception and not the rule. The Court
D cannot in such matters substitute its view for that of the competent authority.

S.R.. Bommai v. Union of India etc., [l994J 3 SCC I referred to.
[659-F-GI

l.4. The legislative intr!ltion to preserve public peace and tranquillity
....
•
E without lapse of time acting emergently, if warranted, giving thereby
paramount importance to societal needs by even overriding temporarily
private rights keeping in view public interest, is patently inbuilt in Section
144 Cr.PC. 1661-C-DJ

F
l.5. On consideration of the State Government notitkations, the
Additional District Magistrate has jurisdiction to pass order under Section
144 Cr.PC. [663-DI
.. ,
Hari Chand Aggarwal v. The Batala Engineering Co. Ltd. and Ors., AIR
(1969) SC 483, referred to.

G l.6. Since different fact situations warrant different approaches, no hard
and fast guidelines, which can have universal application, can be laid down
or envisaged. The situation peculiar to a particular place or locality vis-a-vis
particular individual or group behaving or expecting to behave in a particular
manner at a particular point of time may not be the same in all such or other
H eventualities. in another part of the country or locality or place even in t~e
STJ\lE OF K/\RN/\T/\KA " DR. l'.B. TllOG/\DI/\ l/\RLllT l'/\S/\ YA T. J. !655

same State. The scheme underlying the very provisions carry sufficient inbuilt A
safeguard~ and the avenue of remedies available under Cr.P.C. itself as well
as by way or judicial review are sufficient safeguards to control and check
any unwarranted exercise or abuse in any given case and Cou.rts should
ordinarily give utmost importance and primacy to the view or the competent
authority, expressed objectively also, in this case without approaching the B
issue, as though considering the same on an a weal, as of routine, keeping in
view the fact that orders of the nature arc more preventive in nature and not
punitive in their effect and consequences. 1663-E-HI

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 401
of 2004. C
From the Judgmen: and Order dated 13.2.2003 of the Karnataka High
Court in CrLP. No. 636 of 2003.

Sanjay R. Hegde for the Appellants.
D
Yinay Pratap Singh and CD. Singh for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

ARIJIT PASA YAT, J. Leave granted.
E
Though by passage of time, the basic issues seem to have become
infructuous, in view of the importance and recurring nature of the legal issues
involved, with consent of the learned counsel for the parties, they are taken
up. For deciding the issues involwd in the appeal the background facts,
which arc practically m.disputed. run as follows:
'>- F
The respondent by an order of Additional District Magistrate (in short
. th~ ·ADM'), Dakshina Kannada was restrained froi:1 entering the said district
:ind from participating in any function ·in the district for a period uf 15 days
i.~. fro111 10.2.2003 to 25.2.2003. The order was dated 7.2.2003. A function
was organised at Mm1g~lorc on 13.2.2003 where several religious leaders G
were shown as the likdy participants. On 7.2.2003, a permission for holding
the meding was obtained by the organisers fron1 the District Magistrate,
Mangalore. Permission was also granted by the pnlirc authorities and the
Corporation. The ADM at this stage passed an order dmcd 7.2.2003 in MAG(2)
CR 352/2002-03,Dand restrained the respondent as aforesaid on the gro11nd
that 1i1c district hJd bc.:onh' comnnmally sensitive and th~r~ \\Cre several H
656 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2004 J 3 S.C.R.

A communal clashes starting from 1988 resulting in several deaths and damage
to public and private properties. It was indicated in the detailed order passed
which was under challenge before the High Court of Kamataka that the
responde1Hduring his visit to another place on 18.12.2002, had delivered an
inflammatory speech which incited communal feelings and the communal
B hannony was greatly affected. The ADM felt that a similar speech by the
respondent would result in stoking communal feelings vitiating ham1onious
social and communal atmosphere. The respondent challenged the order in a
petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short
the 'Code') before the High Court taking the stand that the ADM had no
jurisdiction, because he was not an Executive Magistrate or had not been
C conferred with powers of an Executive Magistrate. The respondent also took
the stand that his speeches had nothing to do with any communal dis-hannony.
They were made with reference to political issues which have been the subject
matter of debate for several years. Only for political reasons a case was
registered against him. The petition was resisted on several grounds; firstly
it was pointed out that an alternate remedy was inbuilt under Section 144 of
D the Code and without exhausting that statutory remedy, the present respondent
should not have rushed to the High Court for exercise of power under Section
482 of the Code. The stand of the present respondent that the time available
was very short and result of the so-called alternate remedy would not have
yielded any fruitful results is incorrect. Secondly, reference was made to
E several instances where on account of the action of the respondent, and his
speeches and acts of organisers of the function there were communal clashes
and the District Administration had to intervene to avoid disturbances of
social tranquillity and communal hannony.

The High Court by the impugned judgment held that the ADM did not
F have jurisdiction to issue the order in purported exercise of power under
Section 144 of the Code. It further held that serene communal atmosphere of
the State was an example of communal harmony and hope was expressed that
the sensible and knowledgeable people of the State would not get swayed by
any speeches touching communal issues. Accordingly, the order passed by
G the ADM was quashed.

In support of the appeal, Mr. Sanjay R. Hegde submitted that the High
Court should not have interfered with an order which was aimed at' maintaining
law and order in the area and preventing untoward incidents. The prior conduct
of the respondent in giving speeches at several places and his other activities
H which inflamed a violent reaction and resulted in communal clashes and
STATE OF KARNATAKA v. DR. P.B. THOGADIA IARl.IIT PASAYAT . .l. ]657
,......
hatred had been properly taken into account in passing the order under Section A
144(3) of the Code and should not have been lost sight of. In any event, the
concbsions of the High Court that the ADM had no power to pass the order
under Section 144 of the Code is also without any legal foundation. In fact
the Notifications referred to by the High Court clearly show that the ADM
was possessed of such powers.
B
Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the High
Court has taken the totality of the circumstances into consideration before
passing order under challenge in this appeal and that on mere hypothetical
assumptions that the respondent would o; may deliver speeches which might
destroy communal harmony, the order should not have been passed. In any C
event, when the ADM did not have the power to pass the order, the other
grounds were really of academic interest.

Courts ;hould not normally interfere with matters relating to law and
order which is primarily the domain of the concerned administrative authorities.
They are by and large the best to assess and to handle the situation depending D
upon the peculiar needs and necessities, within their special knowledge. Their
decision may involve to some extent an element of subjectivity on the basis
of materials before them. Past conduct and antecedents of a person or group
or an organisation may certainly provide sufficient material or basis for the
action contemplated on a reasonable expectation of possible turn of events,
which may need to be avoided in public interest and maintenance of law and E
order. No person, hqwever, big he may assume or claim to be, should be
allowed irrespective of the position he may assume or claim to hold in public
life to either act in a manner or make speeches which would destroy secularism
recognised by the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short the 'Constitution').
' >- Secularism is not to be confused with communal or religious concepts of an p
individual or a group of persons. It means that. State should have no religion
of its own and no one could proclaim to make the State have one such or
endeavour to create a theocratic State. Persons belonging to different religions
live throughout the length and breadth '."If the country. Each person whatever
be his religion must get an assurance from the State that he has the protection
of law freely to profess, practise and propagate his religion and freedom of G
conscience. Otherwise, the rule of law will become replaced by individual
perceptions of ones own presumptuous good social order. Therefore, whenever
the concerned authorities in charge of law and order find that a person's
speeches or actions are likely to trigger communal antagonism and hatred
resulting in fissiparous tendencies gaining foot hold undermining and affecting H
658 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] 3 S.C.R.

A communal harmony, prohibitory orders need necessarily to be passed, to
effectively ave11 such untoward happenings.

Communal harmony should not be made to suffer and be made
dependent upon will of an individual or a group of individuals, whatev•er be
their religion be it of minority or that of the majority. Persons belonging to
B different religions must feel assured that they can live in peace with persons
belonging to other religions. While permitting holding of a meeting organised
by groups or an individual, which is likely to disturb public peace, tranquillity
and orderliness, irrespective of the name, cover and methodology it may -1'•'
assume and adopt, the administration has a duty to find out who are the
C speakers and participants and also take into account previous instances and
the antecedents involving or concerning those persons. If they feel that the
presence or participation of any person in the meeting or congregation would
be objectionable, for some patent or latent reasons as well as past track
record of such happenings in other places involving such participants necessary
prohibitory orders can be passed. Quick decisions and swift as well as effective
D action necessitated in such cases may not justify or permit the authorities to
give prior opportunity or consideration at length of the pros and cons. The
imminent need to intervene instantly having regard to the sensitivity and
perniciously perilous consequences it may result in, if not prevented forthwith
cannot be lost sight of . The valuable and cherished right of freedom of
E expression and speech may at times have to be subjected to reasonable
subordination of social interests, needs and necessities to preserve the very
chore of democratic life - preservation of public order and rule of law. At
some such grave situation at least the decision as to the need and necessity
to take prohibitory actions must be left to the discretion of those entrusted
with the duty of maintaining law and order, and interposition of Courts -
F unless a concrete case of abuse or exercise of such sweeping powers for -< •
extraneous considerations by the authority concerned or that such authority
was shown to act at the behest of those in power, and interference as a matter
of course and as though adjudicating an appeal, will defeat the very purpose
of legislation and legislative intent. It is useful to notice at this stage the
G following observations of this Court in the decision reported in Madhu Limaye
v. Sub Divisional Magistrate, Monghyr and Ors., [1970] 3 SCC 746:

"The gist of action under Section 144 is the urgency of the
situation, its efficacy in the likelihood of being able to prevent some
harmful occurrences. As it is possible to act absolutely and even ex
H parte it is obvious that the emergency must be sudden and the
STATE OF KARNATAKA v. DR. P.B. THOGADIA IARIJIT PASAY AT. J.] 659

consequences sufficiently grave. Without it the exercise of power A
would have no justification. It is not an ordinary power flowing from
administration but a power used in a judicial manner and which can
stand further judicial scrutiny in the need for the exercise of the
power, in its efficacy and in the extent of its application. There is no
general proposition that an order under Section 144, Criminal B
Procedure Code cannot be passed without taking evidence: see Mst.
Jagrupa Kumari v. Chobey Narain Singh, (37 Ct.LJ.95) which in
our opinion is correct in laying .down this proposition. These
fundamental facts emerge from the way the occasions for the exercise
of the power are mentioned. Disturbances of public tranquillity, riots
and affray lead to subversion of public order unless they are prevented C
in time. Nuisances dangerous to human life, health or safety have no
doubt to be abated and prevented. We are, however, not concerned
with this part of the section and the validity of this part need not be
decided here. In so far as the other parts of the section are concerned
the key-note of the power is to free society from menace of serious D
disturbances of a grave character. The section is directed against
those who attempt to prevent the exercise of legal rights by others or
imperil the public safety and health. If that be so the matter must fall
within the restriction which the Constitution itself visualizes as
permissible in the interest of public order, or in the interest of the
general public. We may say, however, that annoyance must assume E
sufficiently grave proportions to bring the matter within interests of
public orcler."

The High Court in our view should not have glossed over these basic
requirements, by saying that the people of the locality where the meeting was
to be organised were sensible and not fickle minded to be swayed by the F
presence of any person in their amidst or by his speeches. Such presumptive
and wishful approaches at times may do greater damage than any real benefit
to individual rights as also the need to protect and preserve law and order.
The Court was not acting as an appellate authority over the decision of the
official concerned. Ur.less the order passed is patently illegal and without G
jurisdiction or with ulterior motives and on extraneous considerations of
political victimisation by those in power, normally interference should be the
exception and noi the rule. The Court cannot in such matters substitute its
view for that of the competent authority.

H
660 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 12004) 3 S.C.R.

A Our country is the world's most heterogeneous society, with rich heritage
and our Constitution is committed to high ideas of socialism, secularism and
the integrity of the nation. As is well known, several races have converged
in this sub-continent and they carried with them their own cultures, languages,
religions and customs affording positive recognition to the noble and ideal
B way of life -'Unity in Diversity'. Though these diversities created problems,
in early days, they were mostly solved on the basis of human approaches and
hannonious reconciliation of differences, usefully and peacefully. That is
how secularism has come to be treated as a part of fundamental law, and an -r--·
unalignable segment of the basic structure of the country's political system.
As noted in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India etc., [1994] 3 SCC I freedom of
C religion is granted to all persons of India. Therefore, from the point of view
of the State, religion, faith or belief of a particular person has no place and
given no scope for imposition on individual citizen. Unfortunately, of late
vested interests fanning religious fundamentalism of all kinds vying with
each other are attempting to subject the constitutional machinaries of the
D State to great stress and strain with certain quaint !deas of religious priorities,
to promote their own selfish ends, undettered and unmindful of the disharmony
it may ultimately bring about and even undennine national integration achieved
with much difficulties and laudable determination of those strong spirited
savants of yester years. Religion cannot be mixed with secular activities of
the State and fundamentalism of any kind cannot be pennitted to masquerade
E as political philosophies to the detriment of the larger interest of society and
basic requirement of a welfare State. Religion sans spiritual values may even
be perilous and bring about chaos and anarchy all around. It is, therefore,
imperative that if any individual or group of persons, by their action or
caustic and inflammatory speech are bent upon sowing seed of mutual hatred,
F and their proposed activities are likely to create disharmony and disturb
equilibrium, sacrificing public peace and tranquillity, strong action, and more
so preventive actions are essentially and vitally needed to be taken. An]
speech or action which would result in ostracization of communal harmony
would destroy all those high values which the Constitution aims at. Welfare
of the people is the ultimate goal of all laws, and State action and above all
G the Constitution. They have one common object, that is to promote well
being and larger interest of the society as a whole and not of any individual
or particular groups carrying any brand names. It is inconceivable that there
can be social well being without communal harmony, love for each other and
hatred for ncne. The chore of religion based upon spiritual values, which the
H Vedas, Upanishads and Puranas were said to reveal to mankind seem to be-
STATE OF KARNATAKA v. DR. P.B. THOGADIA [ARlJIT PASAYAT. .l.] 661

> .... "Love others, serve others, help ever, hurt never" and "Sarvae Jana Sukhino A
Bhavantoo". Oneupship in the name of religion, whichever it be or at
whomsoever' s instance it be, would render constitutional designs
countermanded and chaos, claiming its heavy toll on society and humanity as
a whole, may be the inevitable evil consequences, whereof.

Coming to the other issues relating to the jurisdiction of the ADM to B
pass the order, reference may be made to Section 144 of the Code. Section
144 appears in Chapter X dealing with "Maintenance of Public Order and
·~ Tranquillity" and is a part of Sub-Chapter 'C'. The Sub-Chapter is titled
"Urgent Cases of Nuisance or Apprehended Danger" and the Section deals
with the power to issue orders in urgent cases of nuisance or apprehended C
danger. The order can be passed in terms of sub-section ( 1) by a District
Magistrate or a Sub-Divisional Magistrate or any other Executive Magistrate
specially empowered by the State Government in this behalf. The order can
be passed when immediate prevention or speedy remedy is desirable. The
legislative intention to preserve public peace and tranquillity without lapse of
time acting emergently, if warranted, giving thereby paramount importance
~
D
to societal needs by even overriding temporarily private rights keeping in
view public interest, is patently inbuilt in Section 144 of the Code.

The stand of the respondent before the High Court was that the ADM
who passed the order was not covered by the categories of officials empowered
to pass the order. Section 20 of the Code deals with "Executive Magistrates". E
Sections 20, 21 and 144 of the Code, altogether deal with five classes of
Executive Magistrates i.e. (i) District Magistrate (ii) Additional District
Magistrate (iii) Sub-Divisional Magistrate (iv) Executive Magistrate and (v)
Special Executive Magistrate. Sub-section (I) of Section 20 provides that in
every district and in every metropolitan area, the State Government may F
appoint as many persons as it thinks fit to be Executive Magistrates and shall
appoint one of them to be the District Magistrate. Sub-section (2) of Section
20 is relevant to solve the present controversy, in this regard. It not only
enables the State Government to appoint any Executive Magistrate to be an
Additional District Magistrate but also provides that such Magistrate shall
have such of the powers of a District Magistrate under the Code or under any G
other law for the time being in force, as may be directed by the State
Government.

As observed by this Court in Hori Chand Aggarwal v. The Batala
Engineering Co. Ltd and Ors., AIR ( 1969) SC 483, unless a person has been H
662 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] 3 S.C.R.

A appointed under Section 20( I) of the Code he cannot be called a District
Magistrate, and Additional District Magistrate is below the rank of District
Magistrate. The scheme of Section 20 leaves no manner of doubt that the
District Magistrate and the ADM are two different and distinct authorities. In
the above noted decisions this Court was dealing with a notification delegating
B power under Section 40 of the Defence of India Act, I 962 issued by the
Central Government empowering only District Magistrates to exercise by
virtue of the said delegative powers under Section 29 of the said special
enactment, when it rejected the claim for its exercise projected vis-a-vis
Additional District Magistrate. But under Section 20(2) of the Code the latter
may exercise all or any of the powers of a District Magistrate though the two
C authorities cannot be equated and the Additional District Magistrate cannot
be called the District Magistrate. The distinction is also clear from the fact
that the object of appointing ADM is to relieve the District Magistrate of
some of his duties. The crucial question therefore is whether the ADM was
an Executive Magistrate in terms of Section 20.

D Under sub-section (I) of Section 20 the State Government has the
power to appoint as many persons as it thinks fit to be the Executive
Magistrates. Under sub-section (2) any Executive Magistrate can be appointed
as an Additional District Magistrate. Therefore, first thing to be seen is whether
there was any appointment of an Executive Magistrate as Additional District
E Magistrate.

It appears from the materials placed on record that on 27.3 .1974 the
Government of Karnataka had appointed w.e.f. 1st April, 1974, the Special
Deputy Commissioner of a District and the Headquarters Assistant to the
Deputy Commissioner of a District who are appointed as Executive Magistrates
F in Government Notification dated 27.3,1974 to be Additional Di~;trict ... '
Magistrate in such districts. The Notification is numbered HD IO PCR 74
dated 27.3.1974. The Notification dated 27.3.1974 (Notification No.Ill) was
issued vide S.0. No. 539 in exercise of powers conferred under sub-section
(2) of Section 20 and was in supersession of Government Notification No.
HD PCR 65 dated 4.5.1968 and Notification No. HD 33 PCR 73 dated
G 6.12.1973. The High Court was of the view that in the Notification dated 9th
July, 1974 there was no reference to the Notification dated 27.3.1974 by
which the Executive Magistrates were vested with power under Section 144
who are appointed under the Notification dated 27.5.1974 and which is
altogether a different notification and not relatable to a Notification dated
H 27.3.1974. The ADM who passed the order in this case was appointed under
•
.,..,_
I

STATE OF KARNA TAKA r. DR. l'.B. THOGADIA [ARLllT l'ASA YAT. J.] 663

the Notification dated 27.3.1974. A
The High Court felt that since the Notification dated 27.5.1974 was
not before it, the inevitable conclusion was that the ADM who passed the
order had no authority to pass the same. It was for the respondent who was
questioning before the High Court the authority of the .\DM to place the
materials to substantiate his claim, though nothing precluded the authority B
also to have placed the relevant proceedings, if there had been any such.
Since the respondent whose duty it was did not produce the notification, if
at all adverse inference should have been drawn against him. From the mere
non-production alone, the conclusion should not have been arrived at that the
ADM had no power to pass the order. The confusion arose because of certain C
inaccuracies in the dates. The correct notification is dated 27.3.1974 and not
27.5 .1974. On verification, it is categorically stated that there is no notification
bearing the date 27.5.1974 and it only refers to the notification dated 27.3.1974.
Similarly there is no relevant notification dated 9.7.1974. In reality, it is
dated 6.7.1974. The copies of correct notifications have been placed on record D
by learned counsel for the appellant-State. On consideration thereof, the
inevitable conclusion which follows is that the Additional District Magistrate
had jurisdiction by virtue of his being appointed as ADM. This position is
crystal clear from reading the notifications dated 27.3.1974 and 6.7.1974.
The conclusions to the contrary arrived at by the learned Single Judge in the
High Court cannot be sustained. E
During the course of liearing, learned counsel for the parties submitted
that the prohibitory orders should not be allowed to be passed at the ipse dixit
of the concerned executive officials. There must be transparent guidelines
applicable. Since different fact situations warrant different approaches, no F
•/ hard and fast guidelines which can have universal application can be laid
down or envisaged. The situation peculiar to a particular place or locality vis-
a-vis particular individual or group behaving or expecting to behave in a
particular manner at a particular point of time may not the same in all such
or other eventualities in another part of the country or locality or place even
in the same State. The scheme underlying the very provisions carry sufficient G
inbuilt safeguards and the avenue of remedies available under the Code itself
as well as by way of judicial review are sufficient safeguards to control and
check any unwarranted exercise or abuse in any given case and Courts should
·ordinarily give utmost importance and primacy to the view of the competent
authority, expressed objectively also, in this case without app}oaching the H
issue, as though considering the same on an appeal, as of routine, keeping in
664 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] 3 S.C.R.

A view the fact that orders of the nature are more preventive in nature and not
punitive in their effect and consequences.

For all the reasons stated above, we are unable to approve of the orders
passed by the High Court in this case and they are set aside. The appeal is
disposed of accordingly.
B
B.S. Appeal disposed of.