Holding

Teachers continuing after superannuation under Rule 62 are not entitled to the benefit of pay revision; Rule 60(c) excludes only increment and promotion and does not cover pay revision.

Summary

The Supreme Court considered whether teachers who, after attaining the age of superannuation, continued in service under Rule 62 of the Kerala Education Rules, 1959 were entitled to the benefit of a pay revision that took effect during the extended service period. The State of Kerala argued that Rule 60(c) of the Kerala Service Rules, which excludes increment and promotion during the post‑superannuation period, should be read to also exclude pay revision as a case of casus omissus. The Court held that the language of Rule 60(c) is clear and unambiguous, referring only to "increment" and "promotion", which are conceptually distinct from a pay‑scale revision. Consequently, teachers continuing after superannuation are not eligible for the pay‑revision benefits. The Court reiterated the principle that courts cannot read into a statute words that are not there unless the provision is meaningless, and a casus omissus may be supplied only in cases of clear necessity. The appeals were dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether teachers continuing in service beyond superannuation under Rule 62 are entitled to pay revision benefits.
Whether Rule 60(c) of the Kerala Service Rules can be interpreted to include pay revision despite its reference only to increment and promotion.
Whether a casus omissus can be supplied by the court in the context of statutory interpretation.

Legislation cited

Kerala Education Rules, 1959s. Rule 62
Kerala Service Ruless. Rule 60(c)

Subjects

service lawpay revisionincrementstatutory interpretationcasus omissusKerala Education Rulesretirementteacherssuperannuation

Judgment

A STATE OF KERALA AND ANR.
v.
P.V. NEELAKANDAN NAIR AND ORS.

JULY II, 2005

B [ARIJIT PASAYAT AND S.H. KAPADIA, JJ.]

Service Law:

Kera/a Education Rules, 1959-Chapter XIV(A) Rule 62-Kerala
-C Service Rules-Rule 60(c)-Pay Revision-Benefit of-Entitlement of-To
teachers continuing in service after superannuation by virtue of Rule 62-
Held: Such teachers are entitled to the benefit of revision-Rule 60(c) denies
benefit of incre1J1ent and promotion which is conceptually different from
revision-Revision cannot be read into the provision uls. 60(c)-Court cannot
D read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous-
A casus omissus cannot be supplied by the Court except in the case of clear
necessity and when reason for it is found in the statute itself-Interpretation
of Statutes.

Interpretation ofStatutes-Object of-Held: ls to ascertain the intention
E of the legislature enacting it.

Maxim:

"Ad ca quae fi·equentius accidund Jura adaplantur"-Meaning of

p Words and Phrases:

'increment' and 'revision '-Meaning of in the context of Service Law.

The questions for consideration in this case was whether teachers
superannuating during a particular academic year but continuing in service
G by virtue of Rule 62 of Chapter XIV(A) ofKerala Education Rules, 1959 are
entitled to the benefit of pay revision coming into effect during such extended
period.

Dismissing the appeals, the Court

H 426
STATEOFKERALAv. P.V.NEELAKANDANNAIR 427

HELD: 1. A civil servant retires under the applicable rules in the A
afterno-0n of the last day of the month in which he attains the age of 55 years.
Similarly a teacher is normally to retire on completing the age of 55 years.
But in the specifically prescribed cases the date of retirement is postponed
"till the last day of month in which the academic year ends" so that the
education of the students is not disturbed during the academic year. The
legislature has denied the benefit of increment and promotion during the B
extended period. There is no scope for reading into the provision the benefits
of pay revision. "Increment" has a definite concept in service laws. It is
conceptually different from revision of pay scale. "Increment" is an increase
or addition on a fixed scale; it is a regular increase in salary on such a scale.
Under the Labour and Industrial Laws, an "increment" is in the same scale. C
A promotion involves going to a higher grade. The pay of an employee is
generally fixed with reference to a pay scale. On the other hand, in the case
of revision, the pay scale is revised which may incidentally result into
increment. Rule 60(c) does not refer to pay revisions which is conceptually
different from annual increments within the prescribed pay scale. Therefore,
entitlement of the concerned teachers for the benefits of pay revision cannot D
be doµbted. (435-G, H; 436-A-B-C)

State Bank of India v. The Presiding Officer, Central Government Labour
Court, Dhanbad and Anr., (1972] 3 SCC 595, relied on.

2.1. The expression "increment" cannot be read as "the enhanced,
E
amount received or receivable due to pay revision". The Court cannot read
anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. A statute
is an edict of the Legislature. The language employed in a statute is the
determinative factor of legislative intent Words and phrases are symbols that
stimulate mental references to referents. The object of interpreting a statute F
is to ascertain the intention of the Legislature enacting it. The intention of
the Legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used, which
means that attention should be paid to what has been said as also to what has
not been said. As a consequence, a construction which requires for its support,
addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words as G
meaningless has to be avoided. Courts, cannot aid the Legislatures' defective
phrasing of an Act. It is contrary to all rules of construction to read words
into an Act unless it is absolutely necessary to do so. Rules of interpretation
do not permit Courts to do so, unless the provision as it stands is meaningless
or of doubtful meaning. Courts are not entitled to read words into an Act of
Parliament unless clear reason for it is to be found within the four corners H
428 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. l S.C.R.

A of the Act itself. (432-E, F, G; 433-A-C]
Institute of Chartered Accountants ofIndia v. Mis Price Waterhouse and
Anr., AIR (1998) SC 74, referred to.

Crawford v. Spooner, (1846) 6 Moore PC 1; Stock v. Frank Jones
B (Tiptan) Ltd., [1978) 1 All ER 948 HL; Lord Loreburn L.C. in Vickers Sons
and Maxim Ltd. v. Evans, (1910) AC 445 (HL) and Lenigh Valley Coal Co. v.
Yensavage, 218 FR 547, referred to.

The State of Gujarat and Ors. v. Dilipbhai Nathjibhai Patel and Anr.,
C (1998) JT 2 SC 253; Jamma Masjid, Mercara v. Kodimaniandra Deviah and
Ors., AIR (1962) SC 847; Union ofIndia and Ors. v. Filip Tiago De Gama of
Vedem Vasco De Gama, A~R (1990) SC 981 and D.R. Venkatchalam and Ors.
etc. v. Dy. Transport Commissioner and Ors. etc., AIR (1977) SC 842, referred
to.

D 2.2. While interpreting a provision the Court only interprets the law
and cannot legislate it. If a provision oflaw is misused and subjected to the
abuse of process of law, it is for the legislature to amend, modify or repeal it,
if deemed necessa_ry. (433-G)

Commissioner ofSales Tax, MP. v. Popular Trading Company, Ujjain,
E 1200015 sec 511, referred to.

2.3. A casus omissus cannot be supplied by the Court except in the case
of clear necessity and when reason for it is found in the four corners of the
statute itself but at the same time a casus omissus should not be readily inferred
and for that purpose all the parts of a statute or section must be construed
F together and every clause of a section should be construed with reference to
the context and other clauses thereof so that the construction to be put on a
particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole statute. This
would be more so if literal construction of a particular clause leads to
manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not have been intended
G by the Legislature. [433-H; 434-A-B-C]

Artemiou v. Procopiou, (1966) 1QB878; Lukev. !RC, (1963) AC 557,
referred to.

2.4. A casus omissus ought not to be created by interpretation, save in
H
ST ATE OF KERALA v. P. V. NEELAKANDAN NAIR [PASAYA T, J.] 429

some case of strong necessity. Where, however, a casus omissus does really A
occur, either through the inadvertence of the legislature, or on the principle
quad semel aut bis existit proetereunt legislators, the rule is that the particular
case, thus left unprovided for, must be disposed of according to the law as it
existed before such statute. [434-E-F)

Fenton v. Hampton, (I858) XI Moore, P.C. 347; Jones v. Smart, 1 T.R. B
52, referred to.

2.5. The golden rule for construing wills, statutes, and, in fact, all written
instruments has been thus stated: "The grammatical and ordinary sense of
the words is to be adhered to unless that would lead to some absurdity or some C
repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case
the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified, so as to
avoid that absurdity and inconsistency, but no further." [434-G-H; 435-A]

Grey v. Pearson, (I857) (6) H.L. Cas. 61 and Abley v. Dale, I I, C.B. 378,
referred to. D
Maulavi Hussein Haji Abraham Umarji v. State of Gujarat and Anr.,
[2004) 6 SCC 672 and Prakash Nath Khanna and Anr. v. Commissioner of
Income Tax and Anr., [2004) 9 SCC 686, referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 3603-3605 of E
2005.

From the Judgment and Order dated 24. 7 .2003 of the Kerala High Court
in W.A. Nos. 3951, 3952/2001and34 of2002.

WITH F

C.A. Nos. 3606 and 3607 of2005.

Ramesh Babu M.R. for the Appellants.

P.P. Rao, E.M.S. Anam, Sewa Ram and P.K. Manohar with him for the G
Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

ARIJIT PASAY AT, J. Leave granted.
H
430 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005) SUPP. I S.C.R.

A Point of controversy in all these appeals is whether teachers
superannuating during a particular academic year but continuing in service
by virtue of Rule 62 of Chapter XIV (A) of the Kerala Educatio,p Rules, 1959
(in short the 'KER' ) are entitled to the benefit of pay i;evision coming into
effect during such extended period.

B Detailed reference to the factual aspect is unnecessary as the basic
feature in each of the appeals is that the concerned teachers were to retire
on the date of attaining the age of superannuation. The said date in each case
fell within academic year. Jn view of the provisions contained in Rule 62 of
Chapter XIV (A) of the KER they continued till the last date of the month in
C whjGh' the academic year ends. Undisputedly the academic year in each case
came to end on 31st March of the concerned year. The age of retirement in
each case is 55 years, but benefit of continuance in servrce is granted till the
end of the academic year. In each case, the concerned teachers were to
superannuate on attaining the age of 55 on various dates between July, 1996
and March, 1997. i.e. during the course of academic year 1996-97. Irrespective
D of their due date of superannuation, they were allowed to continue in service
by virtue of Rule 62 of the Chapter XIV(A) of KER. They retired from service
on 31.3.1997. The Government ofKerala (Finance Department) by G.O. No.
3000/98/Fin dated 25.11.1998 had issued orders on acceptance of the
recommendations of the Pay Revision Committee 1997 that the existing scales
E of Pay wiil be revised and the revised scales will come into force with effect
from 1.3.1997. Writ petitions were filed by the concerned teachers claiming
benefit of the pay revision and for fixation ofpensionary benefits on the basis
of the revised pay. The Writ Petitions were allowed by several judgments
passed by learned Single Judges. The State preferred _Writ Appeals before the
Division Bench. When the matter was placed before a Division Bench, it was
F noted that there appeared to be conflicting views expressed by different
Division Benches. The matter was, therefore, referred to a Full Bench, which
by its common judgment affirmed the v~ew that the revised pay scale was to
be given. Subject matter of challenge in the appeals arising out of SLP(C) Nos.
17525-17527 of2003 is the said common judgment. Jn the connected appeals
the said judgment of the Full Bench was followed and the State's appeals
G were dismissed.

In support of the appeals, learned counsel for the appellant-State and
its functionaries submitted that the High Court has failed to notice that
though continuance is permitted, it was clearly stipulated in the Rule 60(C)
H (Part I) of the Kerala Service Rules. (in short the 'Service Rules') that the
STATEOFKERALAv. P.V.NEELAKANDANNAIR[PASAYAT,J.) 431

benefit of increment or promotion was not to be granted during the period A
of service beyond the date of superannuation. It was submitted that though
Rule 60(c) of the Service Rules does not specifically refer to pay revision, it
has to be read into the said rule as it is clearly a case of casus omissus.

In response, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the
language of the provision is clear and, therefore, the view taken by the High B
Court cannot be faulted. '

In order to appreciate the rival submissions the relevant rules needs to
be quoted.

Rule 62 of Chapter XIV(A) of the Kera/a Education Rules:-
c
"62. Retirement. A teacher who completes the age of retirement during
the course of an academic year but not within one month from the
date of reopening, shall continue in service till the close of the school
for the mid-summer vacation. But ifhe is on leave on such date with D
no prospect of returning to duty or on leave from the commencement
of the academic year to the date of superannuation he may be retired
. on the due date. If the teacher applies ,for any leave other than casual
. leave during the period of the continuance under thus rule beyond the
age of retirement he shall be retired forthwith. .
E
[Provided that in cases where the academic year is extended beyond
the 3 lst day of March in any year, a teacher to whom this rule is
applicable shall retire on the last day of March itself].

Rule 60(c) of Kera/a Service Rules (Part /):-
F
60(c) The teaching staff of all educational institutions (including
Principals of Colleges) who complete the agecof 55 years during the
course of an academic year shall continue in service till the last day
of the month in which the academic year ends. They shall be entitled
to the benefits of increments and promotion, which fall due, before the G
last day of the month in which they attain the age of 55 years. But
they shall not be eligible for increment or promotion during the period
of their service beyond such date. If they are on leave on the day they
attain the age of 55 years and if there is no prospect of their returning
to duty before the closing day of the academic year, they shall be
retired from service on the day of superannuation or on the date of H
432 SUPREME COURT REPOIFS [2005) SUPP. I S.C.R.

A suspension whichever is later.

If, however, the day on which 'the teaching staff (including
Principals of Colleges) attains, the age o(55 years falls with~n the
period of one month beginning with the day of re-opening ~f the
institutions they shall cease to be on duty with effect from the date
B of such re-opening and they shall be granted additional leave from the
date of re-opening to the last day of the month in which they attain
the age of 55 years. They shall be entitled to the benefit of increment
if it fails due before the actual date on w~ich they attain the age of
55 years.
c If they are eligible to continue in service till the close of the
academic year under the 1st paragraph of this sub-rule they shall be
granted addition leave from the date of closing for vacation till the last ..
day of the month when the date of closing is earlier than the last day
of the month.
D The additional leave granted under this sub-rule will not be counted
against the eligible leave and will count for pension. During the period
of leave they will draw leave allowance at the same rate as the pay
and allowances they would ·have drawn· if they were on duty.''

E On a bare reading of Rule 60(c) ofthe'Service Rules the position is clear
that the ineligibility indicate'd relates to increment or promotion. Learned
counsel for the appellant submitted that the '~xpression "increment" is
conceptually capable of reading as ''the enhanced amount received or
receivable due to pay revision". His other submission is that even though
same has not been specifically stated, it can be read into the provision being
F a case of casus omissus.

It is well settled principle in law that the Court cannot read anything
into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is an
edict of the Legislature. The language employed in a statute is the determinative
G factor of legislative intent.

Words and phrases are symbols that stimulate mental references to
referents. The object of interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention of
the Legislature enacting it. (See Institute of Chartered Accountants of India
v. Mis Price Waterhouse and Anr., AIR (1998) SC 74). The intention of the
H Legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used, which means
STATEOFKERALAv. P.V.NEELAKANDANNAIR[PASAYAT,J.] 433

that attention should be paid to what has been said as also to what has not A
been said. As a consequence, a construction which requires for its support,
addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words as
meaningless has to be avoided. As observed in Crawford v. Spooner, ( 1846)
6 Moore PC l, Courts, cannot aid the Legislatures' defective phrasing of an
Act, we cannot add or mend, and by construction make up deficiencies which
are left there. (See The State of Gujarat and Ors. v. Dilipbhai Nathjibhai B
Patel and Anr., JT (1998) 2 SC 253). It is contrary to all rules of construction
to read words into an Act unless it is absolutely necessary to do so. (See
Stock v. Frank Jones (Tiptan) Ltd., (1978) 1 All ER 948 HL). Rules of
interpretation do not permit Courts to do so, unless the provision as it stands
is meaningless or of doubtful meaning. Courts are not entitled to read words C
into an Act or Parliament unless clear reason for it is to be found within the
four comers of the Act itself. Per Lord Loreburn L.C. in Vickers Sons and
Maxim Ltd. v. Evans, (1910) AC 445 (HL), quoted in Jamma Masjid, Mercara
v. Kodimaniandra Deviah and Ors., AIR (1962) SC 847.

The question is not what may be supposed and has been intended but D
what has been said, "Statutes should be construed not as theorems of
Euclid". Judge Learned Hand said, "but words must be construed with some
imagination of the purposes which lie behind them''. (See Lenigh Valley Coal
Co. v. Yensavage, 218 FR 547). The view was re-iterated in Union ofJndi9 and
Ors. v. Filip Tiago De Gama ofVedem Vasco De Gama, AIR (1990) SC 981. E
In D.R. Venkatachalam and Ors. etc. v. Dy. Transport Commissioner
and Ors. etc., AIR (1977) SC 842, it was observed that Courts must avoid the
danger of a priori determination of the meaning of a provision based on their
own pre-conceived notions of ideological structure or scheme into which the
provision to be interpreted is somewhat fitted. They are not entitled to usurp F
legislative function under the disguise of interpretation.

(.
While interpreting a provision the Court only interprets the law and
cannot legislate it. If a provision of Jaw is misused and subjected to the abuse
of process, of law, it is for the legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if
deemed necessary. (See Commissioner ofSales Tax, MP. v. Popular Trading G
Company, Ujjain, (2000] 5 SCC 511). The legislative casus omissus cannot be
supplied by judicial interpretative process.

Two principles of construction - one relating to casus omissus and the
other in regard to reading the statute as a whole- appear to be well settled. H
434 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) SUPP. I S.C.R.

A Under the first principle a casus omissus cannofbe suppHed·by the Court
except in the case of clear necessity al1d whenteasori for it is found in the
four comers of the statute itself but at the same time a casus omissus should
not be readily inferred and for that purpose ail the parts of a statute or section
must be construed together and every clause of a section should be construed
with reference to the context and other clauses thereof so that the construction
B to be put on a particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole
statute. This would be more so if literal construction of a particular clause
leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not have been
intended by the Legislature. "An intention to produce an unreasonable result",
said Danackwerts, L.J. in Artemiou v. Procopiou, (1966) I QB 878, " is not
C to be imputed to a statute if there is some other construction available".
Where to apply words literally would " defeat the obvious intention of the
legislature and produce a wholly unreasonable result" we must " do some
violence to the words" and so achieve that obvious intention and produce
a rational construction. Per Lord Reid in Luke v. !RC, (1963) AC 557 where
at p. 577 he also observed: ''this is not a new problem, though our standard
D of drafting is such that it rarely emerges''.

It is then true that, '' when the words of a law extend not to an
inconvenience rarely happening, but due to those which often happen, it is
good reason not to strain the words further than they reach, by saying it is
E casus omissus, and that the law intended quaefrequentius accidunt." "But,"
on the other hand, '' it is no reason, when the words of a law do enough
extend to an inconvenience seldom happening, that they should not extend
to it as well as if it happened more frequently, because it happens but seldom"
(See Fenton v. Hampton, (I 858) XI Moore, P.C. 347). A casus omissus ought
not to be created by interpretation, save in some case of strong necessity.
F Where, however, a casus omissus does really occur, either through the
inadverterice of the legislature, or on the principle quod ·semel aut bis existit
proetereunt legislators, the rule is that the particular case, thus left unprovided
for, must be disposed of according to the law as it e~isted before such statute-
Casus omissus et oblivioni datus dispositioni communis Juris relinquitur; "a
G casus omissus," observed Buller, J. in Jones v. Smart, 1 T.R. 52, "can in no
case be supplied by a court of law, for that would be to make laws."

The golden rule for construing wills, statutes, and, in fact, all written
instruments has been thus stated: "The grammatical and ordinary sense of
the words is to be adhered to unless that would lead to some absurdity or
H some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which
STATEOFKERALA v. P.V.NEELAKANDANNAIR[PASAYAT,J.] 435
case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified, so A
... as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency, but no further" (See Grey v.
Pearson, _(1857) 6 H.L. Cas. 61). The latter part of this "golden rule" must,
however, be applied with much caution. "if," remarked Jervis, CJ., "the
I
precise words used are plain and unambiguous in our judgment, we are bound
•
_j to construe them in their ordinary sense, even though it lead, in our view of B
the case, to an absurdity or manifest injustice. Words may be modified or
varied where their import is doubtful or obscure. But we assume the functions
of legislators when we depart from t!le ordinary meaning of the precise words
used, merely because we see, or fancy we see, an absurdity or manifest
injustice from an adherence to their literal meaning" (See Abley v. Dale, 11,
C.B. 378). c
At this juncture, it would be necessary to take note of a maxim ''Ad ea
quae frequentius accidunt jura adaptantur" (The laws are adapted to those
cases which more frequently occur). (See Maulavi Hussein Haji Abraham
Umarji v. State of Gujarat and Anr., [2004] 6 SCC 672 and Prakash Nath
Khanna and Anr. v. Commissioner ofIncome Tax and Anr., [2004] 9 SCC 686). D

There is no dispute that the Service Rules are statutory. Chapter VIII
deals with retirement from service and Rule 60 deals, with age of
superannuation. Clause (c) deals with Teachers. Apart from Clause (c) of Rule
60 Clause (a) is also relevant. It reads as follows:
E
"60(a) Except as otherwise provided in these rules the date of
compulsory retirement of an officer shall take effect from the afternoon
of the last day of the month in which he attains the age of 55 years.
He may be retained after this date only with the sanction of Government
on public grounds, which must be recorded in writing. But he must p
not be retained after the age of 60 years except in every special
circumstances.''

A civil servant retires under the applicable rules in the afternoon of the
last day of the month in which he attains the age of 55 years. Similarly a
teacher is normally to retire on completing the age of 55 years. But in the G
specifically prescribed cases the date of retirement is postponed ''till the last
day of month in which the academic year ends" so that the education of the
students is not disturbed during the academic year. The legislature has denied
the benefit of increment and promotion during the extended period. There is
no scope for reading into the provision the benefits of pay revision. H
436 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. l S.C.R.

A "Increment" has a definite concept in service laws. It is conceptually different
from revision of pay scale. "Increment" is an increase or addition on a fixed
scale; it is a regular increase in salary on such a scale. As noted by this Court
in State Bank of India v. The Presiding Officer, Central Government Labour
Court, Dhanbad and Anr., [1972] 3 SCC 595, under the Labour and Industrial
Laws,. an "increment" is in the same scale. A promotion involves going to
B a higher grade. The pay of an employee is generally fixed with reference to
a pay scale. On the other hand, in the case of revision, the pay seal_~ fs revised
which may incidentally result into increment. Rule 60(c) does not'refer to pay
revisions which is conceptually different from annual increments within the
prescribed pay scale. Therefore, entitlement of the concerned teachers for the
C benefits of pay revision cannot be doubted. The view taken by the High
Court does not suffer from any Infirmity to warrant interference.

The appeals are dismissed with no. orders as to costs.

K.K.T. Appeals dismissed.

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